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Abstract
The developments in trade and political relations between Poland and the European 
Union during the period of association is used to conduct an analysis of policy-making 
in transition and an investigation into the relationship between economic reform and 
social/ political factors, on both national and international levels. Internal and external 
impediments to policy reform are discussed, with emphasis on issues of credibility and 
reciprocity in inter- state cooperation, as well as domestic path- dependencies, legacies, 
political cultures and social pre-dispositions.
The focus is on the role of international leverage in affecting domestic change and 
stabilising reform. Drawing on the complexity of multiple disciplines, the author 
challenges the main neoliberal institutionalist assumptions about ‘anchoring’ policies in 
international regimes to increase their credibility.
By assessing the effectiveness of the Europe Agreement as an ‘anchor’ for Polish trade 
policy and a supportive instrument for the transition, the author argues that, in contrast 
to neoliberal expectations, an international regime, can, if it does not fulfill certain 
conditions, impede reform, reducing its viability and long-term sustainability. Because 
the EU has failed to carry through its declared promises of assistance for the transition 
or consistently pursue the liberal policies advocated to Poland as a condition for 
association, it has, collectively, fallen short of fulfilling these conditions.
In addition, the technocratic, elitist style of decision-making necessary for the fulfilment 
of the EU’s compulsory targets, combined with rigid conditionality and an institutional 
framework for association not adapted to national particularities, have, in the Polish 
case, multiplied domestic policy dilemmas, undermining the credibility of the liberal 
reforms initially pursued, and ultimately weakening the capacity of the ‘state’ to provide 
the public goods necessary for the consolidation and institutionalisation of the systemic 
changes.
Finally, the author asserts that the fundamental legitimisation dimension has been 
neglected in the policy debate over the Polish transformation. Accordingly, the thesis 
investigates the evolution of the state/societal relationship in Poland, as it emerges in 
response to external and internal developments, and analyses the Polish specificities that 
have made the consolidation of a market-democracy problematic.
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Introduction
How to intentionally guide ‘the market economy’ and design domestic institutions to 
best serve the needs of the Market has been a fundamental question underlying 
economic policy making throughout the industrialised world. In transition economies1, 
this debate has revolved around another crucial dimension, that of the role of 
international organisations in steering such domestic policy objectives by serving as 
guiding ‘anchors’ for regime change and exerting leverage on policy reform, outcomes 
and performance.
The deliberate construction of a market democracy in CEE has relied heavily on a two- 
level strategy; simultaneously liberalising domestic activity and integrating the 
emerging systems into the world economy through the imitation and transplantation of 
economic, political and institutional patterns prevalent in advanced capitalist countries. 
To successfully consolidate the systemic changes, the states in transition would have to 
meet two concurring conditions: growing legitimisation in domestic politics 
complemented by favourable conditions of internationalisation.
Thus, to improve their creditworthiness and guarantee the irreversibility of the transition 
process, in the early 1990’s, the first post-socialist governments in the region locked in 
their reform efforts by linking domestic institutions to the international anchor of 
European integration. As the primary instrument of internationalisation and basis for 
association with the European Union, the Europe Agreements signed by all ten future 
EU candidates , were designed to increase the viability of the reform measures 
undertaken, stabilise the domestic political process, serve as institutional guidelines and 
secure crucial external support for the transformation, in the form of direct aid, market 
access and increased investment.
Painful economic reforms such as the systemic changes required of transformation are 
sustainable if within a foreseeable amount of time they can bring benefits to the 
majority of the population. If people’s material conditions improve or they can see a 
light at the end of the tunnel, they will accept the temporary hardships in exchange for a 
better future. However, at the crucial point where public support for the reforms begins
1 In this thesis, the author uses ‘transition’ and ‘transformation’ concurrently to signify the process of 
regime change from state-led socialism to market-led democracy. The division between the concepts 
remains vague and the exact moment where transition becomes transformation is unclear, although most 
experts agree that the transition was more or less over when most of the market infrastructure was in 
place, giving way to a more encompassing phase of systemic transformation.
See Staniszkis, J. (1995).‘In search of a paradigm of transformation’, in W Wnuk-Lipinski, E. (1995). 
After Communism: a multidisciplinary approach to radical social change. Warszawa: Instytutu Studiow 
Politycznych PAN.
2 Czech Rep., Slovakia, Hungary, Poland, Latvia, Lithuania, Estonia, Slovenia, Rumania and Bulgaria
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to weaken along with rising transaction costs, the role of external support is pivotal in 
buttressing the reformers and providing opportunities to increase national growth and 
welfare, as well as encourage competitiveness. If, on the other hand, external conditions 
are not favourable to stimulate domestic growth, the transition, at its most vulnerable 
point, can easily be derailed off course and the reform efforts threatened. To be effective 
in encouraging and supporting regime change, international organisations and 
institutions, such as the European Union, thus have to be aware of the dangers posed by 
self- interested, protectionist policies vis a vis the ‘state’ in reform.
On the eve of Eastern Enlargement of the EU, this book aims to assess the extent to 
which the Association Strategy pursued by the Union, based on the Europe Agreements 
signed with all ten aspirants, has provided the CEE nations with the conditions that 
would support their process of economic modernisation and integration, enabling them 
successfully complete the transformation.
While the thesis focuses exclusively on the Polish case, it is the author’s belief that the 
nine other CEE candidates for EU membership have at various points and intervals 
faced very similar problems, followed comparable patterns and dealt with the same 
kinds of issues throughout the ‘leap to market’. During the initial stages of reform, all 
the CEE reformers faced comparable dilemmas, related to the inherited backward 
economic structures, dependent on the CMEA, socialist legacies and egalitarian 
expectations of the populations, weak civil societies and party systems, budget deficits, 
and various other external constraints, such as a recession in the West. All underwent 
maketisation, democratisation, internationalisation and European integration.
Throughout the mid- 90’s, their reform strategies based on economic stabilisation, price 
liberalisation, privatisation and restructuring proceeded at various paces, with different 
emphasis and with somewhat divergent strategies, but by 2000, the leading regional 
European Union aspirants had put the first stages of transition behind them, switching 
their attention to less dramatic, albeit not less important microeconomic and institutional 
reforms. However, according to the EBRD, “the first phase of transition has left the 
countries of the region with serious imbalances across different dimensions of market- 
oriented reforms”.3 Consequently, as the CEE began to move into the second phase, 
they faced the same challenges: institution building, combating crime and corruption, 
labour market and fiscal reform, social security and welfare targeting reform, 
administrative reform, further structural changes and other associated microeconomic,
3 EBRD (1998). Transition report 1998. London: European Bank for Reconstruction and Development,
p.2.
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regulatory and social policy issues. In fact, the author argues that while the speed and 
scope of the reforms has varied throughout the region, with certain countries like Poland 
and the Czech Republic initially choosing more radical blueprints for the transition and 
others like Hungary or Meciar’s Slovak Republic, Rumania or Bulgaria attempting a 
more gradual approach, by 2003 the ‘front-runners’ and their prospective progress 
rankings had changed too many times to make serious attempts at drawing conclusions 
from these reports very complicated.
While some, like the Czech Republic or Latvia, have faced tumultuous currency and 
banking sector crises, and others, like Bulgaria, extreme macroeconomic crises, all have 
witnessed assorted stumbling blocs on the paths to economic recovery after the initially, 
deep transition depressions. Following these primary GDP and output falls, all, with the 
exception of the Czech Republic, experienced sky-rocketing unemployment, and by 
2000, all except Slovakia, held trade deficits with the European Union. Moreover, all 
the states have been exposed to large- scale policy reversals and reform backtracking, in 
one dimension or another, and all their political systems have witnesses, at various 
intervals, the return of the former Communists to power, as their societies weary of the 
enormous costs of the transitions have rejected the liberalisers.
Overall, the Viseghrad group has performed best in the region with shortest recessions, 
lowest inflations, deeper progress in privatisation, liberalisation and institutional reform 
and fastest economic growth. By the 2000 Commission Progress Reports, Poland, 
Hungary and Estonia were considered the best performers, followed by the Czech 
Republic and Slovenia. By 2003, however, Slovenia, a late developer, seems to have 
come closest to gaining the “gold”, leading the future EU members in per capita 
income, standard of living and generally national competitiveness. Slovenia’s top 
position was by no means achieved without painstaking costs, as the Slovene nation, 
just as the three Baltic states and the other Balkans, was faced with not only having to 
reconstruct the entire socio-economic system after the collapse of communism, but also 
to rebuild a sense of nationhood, as they struggled to regain their independence after the 
fall of the USSR and Yugoslavia.
Furthermore, the Baltics along with Slovakia, representing the EU’s Helsinki group4, 
have more or less managed to make up lost time and delayed reforms by 2003,
4 The first group of EU candidates invited to negotiate membership in 1998 during the Luxembourg EU 
Council summit was later referred to as the Luxembourg group, made up of Poland, Czech Republic, 
Hungary, Slovenia and Cyprus. At the Helsinki European Council, in 2000, the Union decided to open 
negotiations with the Helsinki group; namely Latvia, Lithuania, Estonia, Slovakia, Bulgaria, Rumania and 
Malta.
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narrowing the distance in terms of transition progress between themselves and the front- 
running Luxembourg Group.
A former leader according the 1998 transition indicator scores5, Hungary now struggles 
with the same fiscal imbalances, monetary policy, institutional and employment 
problems as the other leading CEE. Having effectively dealt with the currency crisis in 
1997, the Czech Republic is again gaining ground, quickly followed by the Slovaks who 
in the radical change of policy after the fall of Meciar have gained lost time and are 
radicalising their delayed reform measures by introducing such schemes as a linear tax 
rate to consolidate public finances and improve fiscal policy management. Both the 
Czech Republic and Hungary continue to receive the highest levels of per capita 
Foreign Direct Investment, and their per capita income is only lower than that of 
Slovenia. The Baltics have made considerable progress in strengthening macroeconomic 
stability and implementing structural reforms, catching up with the top contenders for 
EU membership, following the preliminary delays in reforms and difficulties associated 
with disentangling links from the Russian economy. According to the Commission’s 
Regular Report in 2000, the Baltics along with the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, 
Slovakia and Slovenia can be regarded as functioning market economies able to cope 
with competitive pressure and market forces within the Union in the medium term.6 
Bulgaria, itself having survived a currency crisis and dramatic falls in output in 1997 is 
beginning to witness returns on its new reform efforts, as growth increases and EU 
membership draws closer. Rumania, after a legacy of reform failures under the previous 
Iliescu regime, is showing strong signs of recovery, following the implementation of 
macroeconomic austerity package in 1997, aiming along with Bulgaria for the 2007 EU 
accession date.
Poland, in turn, while arguably the most radical reformer, the first country in the region 
to recover output falls in 1996 from the recession brought about by the systemic 
collapse of socialism, and considered in 1996-7 the leading CEE ‘Tiger’, by 1999, was 
again struggling with macroeconomic difficulties, including slower growth, higher 
current account and trade deficits, increasing unemployment rates and decreasing levels 
of investments and savings, accompanied by numerous economic policy reversals. It has 
even been claimed that to attribute Poland’s initially rapid progress in transition and 
quick economic recovery to Shock Therapy after 1989 is an oversimplification. In fact,
5 EBRD Transition Report 1998. ibid.
See also White, S., Batt, J. and Lewis, P.G. (Ed.) (1993). Developments in East European Politics.
Basingstoke: Macmillan.
- (Ed.) (1998). Developments in Central and East European Politics 2. Basingstoke: Macmillan.
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Former Finance Minister G. Kolodko has argued that Poland’s impressive high growth 
rates between 1994-1997, exceeding 6% of GDP annually, could not have taken place 
without the economic reforms initiated in Poland throughout the 1980’s under the
n
previous system. In addition, while Poland can be considered a solid transformation 
success story in many ways, its reforms have by no means proceeded linearly or in a 
smooth fashion. Because, the political economy of the reform process was largely over­
simplified in the early 1990’s, and the conditions that would support or hinder the 
transformation, such as domestic legacies of the past or negative externalities, were 
under-discussed, the transformation process has proven to take longer than anyone 
primarily expected.
Accordingly, this book will argue that the experiences of the Eastern Enlargement 
process in the 1990’s suggest that policy makers need to be wary of many of the policy 
strategies pursued by the leading CEE. The ‘anchoring’ thesis around which the Polish 
liberalisers centred their economic programme, for example, was based on the 
assumption that the EU would not renegade on the principle of free trade and true 
reciprocity, in supporting the transition through trade. The overly- optimistic belief that 
the external anchor would provide sufficient conditions to sustain the difficult reform 
measures led to many assumptions about the future policy making environment which 
have not held. This, in turn, increased the political and economic tensions 
accompanying the transition process.
Because the scale of the dilemmas faced by the Polish state has been larger than in the 
other states in the region, owing to Poland’s size and population, the Polish example can 
be effective in illustrating the magnitude and seriousness of some of the problems to be 
faced in process of marketisation and democratisation. The discussion of the political 
economy of policy reform in the Polish transformation hinges upon an analysis of the 
intricate relationship between the economic and political factors, indispensable for 
successful reform, on both international and domestic levels. Examining the experience 
of one country in detail provides an opportunity to weigh the relative contribution of 
these political and economic considerations in the international and domestic realms to 
the changes in the stance of policy reform in general, as well as a chance to assess the 
adequacy of specific strategies and institutional arrangements, in enhancing the 
credibility of economic change. A case study can also assist in the identification of the 
conditions necessary for the benefits of a reforming nation in making commitments to
6 EU Commission, Conclusions o f  the Regular Reports, 2000.
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particular rules and organisations, to outweigh the costs. The Polish experiences allow 
us to consider transformation politics in general and generate policy prescriptions for 
the next wave of reformers, especially the Balkans who are now pursuing parallel paths 
in their bid for EU membership. Other states in the region including Ukraine, Belarus, 
and the former CIS as well as even nations like Iraq or Afghanistan facing multiple 
layered regime change can also benefit from the Polish lessons.
While the author would encourage the kinds of radical reform instigated by the initial 
Polish liberalisers to other countries undergoing macroeconomic crisis, an analysis of 
the political legacies of the early reforms in Poland suggest that some aspects of the 
transformation could have been done better and with more caution. The Poles paid a 
heavy price for learning that international trade bargaining comes down to tit for tat 
negotiations and zero-sum game calculations.
The current paralysis of the Polish transformation in both the political and economic 
realms cannot only be attributed to domestic factors. The international environment and 
especially association with the European Union has had a powerful impact on internal 
developments. This book will argue that a more cautions approach should be taken by 
future applicants to ‘anchoring’ their reforms on European integration. Future 
candidates to the Union as well as other aspiring reformers should be more wary of 
basing their domestic economic strategies on calculations of the expected benefits to be 
gained from regional integration. Overestimating the advantages to be acquired through 
anchoring strategies, and underestimating the repercussions of the failure of the 
international environment to live up to its declared rhetoric, threatens to damage the 
credibility of the reforms and of the reformers themselves; ultimately undermining the 
entire attempt at a liberal transformation.
In sum, while shock therapy in Poland was a necessary condition to overcome the 
economic crisis prevalent in 1989, it was in itself insufficient to guarantee long-term 
and sustainable growth while consistently increasing national competitiveness. In fact, 
this author maintains that while the speed and breadth of the Polish reforms might have 
been initially more dramatic than in the other CEE states, the benefits of this early 
reform phase have been offset to a large extent by later policy backtracking and evident 
slow down in both macro and microeconomic reform. The declining pace of progress 
and rising tendency towards policy reversals has been particularly evident in enterprise 
restructuring, privatization, institutional reform, as well as the coordination of fiscal and
7 Kolodko, G. and Nuti M. (1997). Polska Alternatywa: stare mity, twarde fakty, nowe strategie. 
Warszawa: Poltext.
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monetary policies. With low growth rates (1.0-1.3% GDP 2001-02), a soaring budget 
deficit around 5% GDP, accompanied by other fiscal policy imbalances, unemployment 
figures reaching 19%, a continuing long-term trend of falling investment and savings 
levels, a highly inelastic labour market and delays in structural reform, Poland’s status 
as the ‘Tiger’ of transformation reform has been acutely undermined. Thus the hard- 
won gains of the first phase of the transition have been placed increasingly at risk at a 
time when further reforms are crucial to prepare Poland for EU accession. These 
developments are the result of factors on both domestic and international levels, and the 
focus of this book is to determine the relative impact of each on policy outcomes and 
performance in Poland.
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1. International Regimes and Credibility Problems: theoretical 
background
I. Introduction
The US Presidential Commission on Industrial Competitiveness has defined
competitiveness, as
the degree to which (a nation) can under free and fair market conditions produce goods 
and services that meet the test o f international standards while simultaneously 
maintaining and expanding the real income o f its citizens. Competitiveness is the basis 
for a nation’s standard o f living. It is also fundamental to the expansion o f  employment 
opportunities and the nation’s ability to meet its international obligations.8
Domestic economic policies are considered the most important factors stimulating 
competitive development of the nation, creating the conditions for the markets to 
function, and ultimately sustaining national growth. Competitiveness however is 
substantially encouraged by conditions of open and fair international trade. This is 
particularly true with respect to the countries undergoing systemic transitions, whose 
vulnerability to external shocks is exacerbated due to the necessity to radically reorient 
their economies to decrease the development gap, and proceed with the liberalisation 
reforms at a much faster pace and on a more encompassing scale than the experiences of 
industrial countries.
In light of this, regional integration through the creation of Preferential Trade 
Agreements and Free Trade Areas can be considered an important element of a nation’s 
economic policy. Integration, as a strategy designed to speed up the opening up the 
economy, can do so by playing a dual role; quickening the process of economic change 
and adjustment through increased competition and simultaneously easing the transition 
tensions by providing market access and buttressing investment.
Never the less, while on the theoretical level free trade does increase prosperity, on the 
level of trade negotiations, the opening up of economies to external competition 
intensifies both national and international conflict. The fundamental cause for this 
conflict is to be found in the increasing salience of internationalisation of the world 
economy for domestic politics and the strain placed on domestic actors in adjusting to
8 1985 Report o f  the US Presidential Commission on Industrial Competitiveness, vol II, p. 7.
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the growing interdependence. In transition again, the pressures emanating from 
internationalisation are further strained by massive cuts in public expenditure required 
by macroeconomic strategies and fiscal austerity measures as crucial components of 
stabilisation programmes. Because of the economic dislocation associated with 
restructuring and privatisation, regional integration, while providing opportunities for 
growth, can simultaneously increase tensions and intensify internal conflicts as 
domestic actors are faced with profound shocks of adjustment.
Thus for FTA’s and regional integration to be successful in stabilising the domestic 
transitions in post- socialist states and bring about the expected benefits, true reciprocity 
and free trade are essential international environment conditions. Because of the 
asymmetric dependence of CEE on the EU for both markets and capital, it is thus 
crucial that the Union put the interests of the candidates before its own interests to 
buttress the transition process at its most vulnerable stage.
In Poland, for the initial post- socialist liberalisers, the creation of a Free Trade Area 
between Poland and the European Union was considered a critical component of the 
Shock Therapy package, encouraging the restructuring and reorientation of the Polish 
economy and securing external support for the transition. Open European markets, 
technical assistance and investment were regarded as an integral part of the transition, 
spurring economic growth and complementing the liberalisation, deregulation and 
privatisation market domains of the plan. In sum, the Polish liberals took a conscious 
risk in the early reform years, presuming that the European Union would be willing to 
grant them generous concessions and uphold the declared rhetoric that association with 
the EU was considered a reward for the radical domestic reforms undertaken. However, 
during the first negotiation sessions of border- protection reductions between the EU 
side and Poland already, it became clear that the opening up of the European economy 
would not be easily or readily achieved. Following a year and half of difficult 
negotiations, in December 1991, the EU finally granted Poland the status of association, 
within the framework of what would be later referred to as the Europe Agreement, and 
trade became the comer stone of both the transition and the integration processes.
By examining the developments in Polish- EU relations during the period of association 
and the actual implementation of the EA, this thesis will show that an international 
regime, can paradoxically, if it does not fulfil certain conditions, impede rather than 
stabilise the fragile decision-making apparatus in countries attempting transition, 
leading to policy backtracking and derailing the reforms themselves. The EU’s open, 
liberal policies prescribed to the Polish partner as a condition for integration have not
16
been consistently implemented by the Union itself,, and have, as a result, negatively 
influenced the credibility of the economic measureis pursued by the reformist Polish 
elites, undermining their political authority. The dcomestic backlash against 
internationalisation and radicalism, in turn, contributed to a rise in populism, and free 
trade began to be portrayed as a luxury of economiic fundamentalists; a luxury that 
politicians could not afford. The term ‘liberal’ itsellf became synonymous with negative 
political connotations and in particular with radicall technocratism and semi­
authoritarian policy- making, ‘dictated by forces hostile to the Polish nation’.9 
Because the transition has taken longer than anyone could have predicted, and as a 
result of the negative impact of association on both the Polish economy and the political 
process, this book will argue that the Union has contributed to shaping Polish domestic 
policy responses in favour of protectionism. Its incoherent approach to association and 
lack of credibility as to the policies prescribed have damaged the viability of the liberal 
reforms and contributed to policy backsliding.
Moreover, the emerging state-societal relationship iin Poland suggests that the main 
danger of economic strategies based on ‘locking in’ domestic policies stems from their 
far-reaching implications for the development of internal social dialogue, crucial for the 
consolidation of democracy, and ultimately the sustainability of economic reform 
measures through participatory means. The author’s analysis indicates that the most 
difficult problem facing successive Polish elites has been how to pursue effective 
reforms required for international credibility, and integration with the EU, while at the 
same time maintaining public confidence and remaining democratically accountable. 
Thus, it could be argued that the ‘anchoring’ strategy, initially and consciously chosen 
by the first post-socialist governments in Poland and prescribed by the EU, has actually 
complicated the policy making process. The conflicting demands placed upon the ‘state’ 
to simultaneously respond to the binding obligations of the EA, while building domestic 
legitimacy necessary for internal democratisation, have often undermined each other, 
inhibiting the development of effective institutions and weakening the ability of the 
authorities to govern or provide the public goods indispensable for the consolidation of 
a market democracy.
A. Background
In the immediate years following the collapse of the Soviet bloc in 1989, the first 
successor government in Poland, was faced with the immense task of reforming the
9 Gazeta Wyborcza, ‘Interview with J. Olszewski’, Former Solidarity PM, later founder of ROP 
(Movement for the Restoration of Poland), nationalistic party. 02/03/00.
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entire social, political and economic system, in line with the current prevalent rationale 
of neoliberal economics underlying the conditionality of institutions such as the IMF, 
the World Bank or the OECD.10 The liberalism of the initial reforms stemmed not only 
from the market-oriented and liberal internationalist sentiment of the new Polish elites, 
and their rejection of anything resembling command economics, but also from the 
requirements of international credibility, necessary to secure external aid.
Due to a severe economic and political crisis following the first partially-free elections 
in 1989, more pronounced than in the other leading CEE countries1 the introduction of 
marketisation in Poland was marked by an unusual social consensus on dismantling the 
former system and getting rid of the centralised bureaucracy. Economic theory was used 
to rationalise the necessary changes and persuade society to accept the viability of 
neoliberal assumptions. Using this window of opportunity, in January 1990, the new 
government led by Prime Minister T. Mazowiecki, together with a team of economic 
technocrats under Finance Minister L. Balcerowicz, was able to successfully push 
through a radical reform package of stabilisation and liberalisation, under the so-called 
Shock Therapy programme.
While the West did encourage Balcerowicz to follow through on his plan of radical 
reform12, and there was clear foreign influence in the programme, the package itself was 
not imposed by foreign institutions, but rather deliberately chosen by the Polish 
liberalisers. This unusual coalition of domestic and international elitist-technocrats 
based their economic projections on the assumption that international free trade was to 
buttress the domestic transformation, decreasing the scope and strength of the primary 
output shocks. The rationale behind the dramatic economic opening stemmed from the 
radical nature of the changes required of Poland. Shock Therapy and speedy adjustment
The author’s own research.
10 In this context, the author refers to the neoliberal rhetoric of the early 1990’s so called ‘Washington 
Consensus’, which was based on a radical laissez faire, minimalist state and anti-regulation policy 
position. Today the consensus is much less evident, with figures such as J Williamson himself (the person 
most frequently associated with the Washington Consensus), J Stiglitz or J Sachs (amongst others) 
criticizing the initial neo-liberalism of the shock therapy pursued in Poland, and institutions such as the 
EBRD shifting focus from strategies based on radical macroeconomic packages, to a policy- mix 
approach that incorporates institution building, regulation and social considerations within the reform 
measures.
" Poland had the lowest standard of living of the three Viseghrad countries (Czechoslovakia, Poland, 
Hungary), East Germany, and Yugoslavia prior to 1989. Consequently, when Shock Therapy was 
introduced and macroeconomic austerity measures combined with already low productivity, the situation 
deteriorated rapidly, leading to an economic crisis more pronounced that in the other leading reforming 
countries.
12 See Sachs, J. (1993). Poland’s Jump to the Market Economy. Cambridge, MA.: MIT Press.
Sachs, J. (1994). ‘Life in the Economic Emergency Room’, in Williamson (Ed.) (1994). The Political 
Economy o f Policy Reform. Washington DC: Institute for International Economics.
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to the rules of the international economic order were to quicken the pace of transition 
and buffer some of the adjustment costs. Basing their conclusions on the failure of 
gradual reform to reinvigorate the Polish economy in the 1980’s, the Balcerowicz team 
had a sound, powerful and well thought-out programme, and strong reasons to abandon 
a more cautions approach.13
The fundamental core of the Polish Big Bang revolved around the duality of the ‘state’s’ 
political and economic aspirations, as exemplified by Moravcsik’s two- level game.14 
The external transformation of Poland’s geopolitical position was dependent on its 
internal metamorphosis, and the internal metamorphosis, in turn, conditional upon its re­
integration into the international system. Each political bargain struck in the 
international arena would shape and constrain domestic policy choices, while the 
success of the transition itself would directly correspond to Poland’s credibility on the 
international scene and to its position as a global and regional player.
To strengthen this international credibility as well as assure the irreversibility of the 
transition process, Polish elites ‘locked’ in their reform efforts by linking domestic 
policies to the binding rules of various international regimes; the Europe Agreement 
being the most important one. This strategy of ‘anchoring’ was to increase the viability 
of the measures undertaken, stabilise the domestic political process and secure external 
support for the internal changes.
In ruling circles, it was assumed that the window of opportunity for radical economic 
change would be too small to risk gradual reform, and that in order to avoid future 
temptation to give into interest group pressure, the government would unilaterally limit 
its policy making discretion, by tying its hands with binding international obligations 
and credibility considerations. Thus as domestic actors returned to the political arena 
and the initial social consensus over the reforms faded with rising transaction costs of 
adjustment, the authorities would be able to resist growing public dissatisfaction with 
liberal policies and increasing pressure to reverse or slow down the reforms. In addition, 
the benefits of opening up the economy through international agreements were to 
provide other incentives and visible rewards for the continuation of difficult changes. 
The economic radicalism of the early 90’s chanced a highly technocratic and top- down 
approach to policy formulation, and the Balcerowicz team was aware of the political
13 See Balcerowicz, L. ‘Poland’, in Williamson (Ed.) (1994). The Political Economy o f Policy Reform. 
ibid.
Balcerowicz, L. (1995). Socialism, Capitalism, Transformation. Budapest: Central European University 
Press.
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risks. However, a more gradual approach would have meant that either the economy 
was not going to recover from the dramatic macroeconomic crisis evident at the time or 
that the political power would be given back to the Communists. Wanting to avoid 
either of these traps, and knowing that the window of opportunity provided by extra­
ordinary politics was very small, they took a gamble.15 Moreover, aware that there was 
no realistic alternative other than elitism as a strategy for modernisation, they were 
prepared to risk the dangers of this social experiment in order to deliver in the shortest 
amount of time and while social consensus still existed, visible benefits of the transition 
to ensure its irreversibility. These benefits were clearly conditional on a favourable 
international environment and on domestic economic performance that would have to 
impress in just a few years time.
B. The Europe Agreement
Trade with the world economy was one of the central features distinguishing former 
command systems from market models. A crucial issue in the transformation of Poland 
from a planned to a market economy has thus been foreign trade re-orientation, and the 
goal of trade policy reform was to bring the domestic economic regime in line with 
market mechanisms of the international structure; to increase openness, strengthen 
national competitiveness and ultimately contribute to growing internal prosperity.
As such, trade policy became a reflection of the dramatic changes going on both within 
the country and in the international context. In 1990, the newly democratised Polish 
government unilaterally liberalised its trade relations with the outside world through a 
series of measures, including radical cuts in tariff levels16, currency convertibility, and 
other forms of liberalisation aimed at freeing economic activity from state control. To 
enhance the credibility of their commitment to openness, the new elites entered into a 
series of regional and global international trade agreements, signalling their resolution 
to liberalise economic transactions and reorient the pattern of trade from East to West. 
The most significant of these agreements, the EA, was designed to create a Free Trade
14 Moravscik, A. (1993). ‘Introduction’, in Evans, P., Jacobson, H. and Putnam, R. (Ed.) (1993). Double- 
edged Diplomacy: international bargaining and domestic politics. Berkeley: University of California 
Press.
15 Interviews with L Balcerowicz,
R Anczak,
J Saryusz-Wolski 
J K Bielecki 
J Frasyniuk 
P Nowina- Konopka
16 Poland reduced its average unweighed rate of custom duties to 5% at the end of 1990 through a 
suspension of tariffs on 60% of duty items.
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Area and subsequently a Customs Union between the Polish ‘state’ and the European 
Communities.
Official political rhetoric, from both the EC and the Polish side, made it clear that the 
EA was perceived as a reward for the changes taking place in the former socialist state 
and as a tool of support for the internal process of political and economic 
transformation. As a foundation for the creation of a FTA, the EA was seen as a 
prerequisite to the pursuit of sound macroeconomic policies in the reforming associate, 
facilitating exports to the Union and intensifying domestic competition, thus stimulating 
economic growth through both static and dynamic benefits of trade creation. The trade 
liberalisation schedule within the framework of the EA was to be mutually beneficial, 
providing a growing new market to the current member states of the Union as well as 
crucial transition assistance, in the form of market access and direct financial aid, to the 
candidate. In combination, the standstill clause and the principle of asymmetric 
opening17 were to pave the way for smooth integration of the Polish economy with the 
Community’s markets. In addition, the EA was to enhance Poland’s credit-worthiness in 
the eyes of foreign financial institutions and multinational corporations, contributing to 
higher rates of inward foreign investment, invigorating development and hence 
accelerating recovery form transition recession. As a result of increased economic 
growth and visible gains of liberalisation, the EA was to serve as a foundation for the 
development of pluralism and liberalism in Poland, contributing to the emergence of a 
group of beneficiaries of the reforms able to provide a solid base of support to the 
reforming elites. Economic growth was thus to open up the political game to new 
players and ensure that the balance of interests lacking under command structures would 
emerge, contributing to healthy political competition. Accordingly, the EA was not only 
to serve as an ‘anchor’ for domestic reform; guiding the emerging Polish economic 
regime in the direction of openness by using conditionality as external leverage and 
providing incentives for difficult domestic decisions, but also to support the process of 
internal democratisation.
The final goal of the EA was to create, on the cornerstones of economic integration, the 
conditions necessary for political convergence. In fact, heralded within official
1 0  #
declarations , the long term objective of the entire association process was to the
17 This ‘anchoring’ stemmed from the application of the standstill clause provided for in the EA, which 
makes the re-introduction of protectionist measures after the Agreement has gone into force illegal. The 
principle of asymmetric liberalisation of trade is based on the notion that the EU, as a stronger partner, 
opens up more quickly than the associated state in transition. See chapter two.
18 See Kohl, Chirac etc... Enlargement speeches 
http://europe.eu.int/comm/dgla/enlarge/docs/speeches/index.htm
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reunify Europe through the successful transformation of the CEE states into functioning 
market democracies; their integration with the Union, in turn, increasing Europe’s 
economic dynamism, political weight and internal and external stability.
The role of the European Community was critical. In the interest of the candidate as 
well as in its own long- term interest, the EC was to let Poland reap the benefits of 
association and reward the Polish elites for the risky radical reforms and dramatic 
liberalisation. To make the necessary evil of elitism worth the costs for the Polish 
political system, it was essential that the EU fulfil its side of the bargain.
The aim of this thesis is to assess the effectiveness of the Union in fulfilling these 
objectives and to examine the consistency/ coherence of the EU’s policy prescriptions to 
the Polish partner. Has the economic conditionality used by the Union collectively, 
based on strict targets and rigorous criteria, combined with the concurrent democratic 
requirement of social inclusion in the decision making process worked in achieving the 
goal of buttressing the internal transformation, or have the two goals been in conflict 
with each other?19
How have the Polish elites themselves reacted to their self-imposed anchoring 
restrictions in attempted to deal with often irreconcilable dilemmas, and how much 
flexibility has the EU side, in turn, shown in supporting them in their ongoing struggle 
for balance between the needs of the market, on the one hand, and the postulates of 
social legitimacy, on the other.
As such, this book aims to challenge the main assumptions behind neoliberal
0C\institutionalist arguments for policy ‘anchoring’, and demonstrate that, while in theory 
correct to propagate the economic case for free trade, neoliberal institutionalism in and 
of itself is insufficient both to prescribe how to guide policy reform and to predict how 
in fact policies will be formulated. Upholding the normative economic case made for 
free trade, and not necessarily complete laissez faire,21 the author never the less believes
19 Paradoxically the social acquis requires dialogue and consultations between the social partners and the 
state and is not only a fundamental pillar of the EU, but also a requirement for accession. See Tsoukalis 
(1997).
20 Neoliberal institutionalism is an International Relations/ International Political Economy theoretical 
term is not to be confused with and distinct from the ideology of ‘neoliberalism ’ in economics. (Which 
espouses to a position based on radical laissez faire, a minimalist state and anti- regulation.) Neoliberal 
institutionalism as used in this book can also be labeled institutional liberalism or new institutionalism. 
See below.
21 While the author considers herself a liberal, she does not necessarily espouse to the radical economic 
liberalism referred to popularly as neoliberal economics, favouring instead a more active engagement of 
the state in guiding capitalism, particularly in transition, and a more conscious and careful, strategic 
approach to liberalisation based on a strong policy-mix. These views are more in line with the 
evolutionary- institutionalist literature of Gerard Roland, which places emphasis on the role of the state in 
institution building and microeconomic reform, as necessary components to complement macroeconomic 
stabilisation.
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that in order for openness to be accepted and bring about the expected benefits, market 
forces and market- led guidelines must be embedded in society, and the crucial 
legitimacy dimension must be included in all economic strategies.
C. Trust
The author hopes to disqualify the neo-liberal economic notion, which underpinned 
Poland’s radical restructuring, that economic reform must proceed political change in 
order for national authorities to avoid the potential trap of having to reconcile social 
conflict and political feasibility with economic efficiency considerations. Conflict is a 
natural by-product of democratic policy making: it is argued here that economic reform, 
to be sustainable in the long run, should be based on conflict resolution, rather than 
avoidance. Public consensus-seeking and mobilisation, grounded in the sociological 
concepts of legitimacy and trust, are to serve as the cornerstones of reform 
consolidation.
On the domestic level, the mechanism of building political ‘trust’ in this thesis will be 
understood as the institutionalisation of conflict and the representation of interest within 
domestic political structures. This requires that the ruling authorities seek a solid social 
base for their reform efforts and remain accountable to various public interests, both the 
supporters and the opponents of the measures. Moreover, to be legitimate and endowed 
with trust, the political institutions of the state themselves must be built on a minimum 
level of consensus present in a given political culture of a nation, implemented in a 
predictable, transparent and non- discrimination way. Transplanted international 
procedures will not past the legitimacy test unless they are socially internalised and 
embedded in particular local interests and ideas, and unless they are accompanied by an 
effective regulatory/ legal framework. The concept of domestic legitimation, crucial for 
the consolidation of a market- based democracy, is consequently built upon ppopular 
confidence in and trust given to the authorities, and a policy- making environment 
governed by consistent, transparent and credible rules.
In Poland of the early 90’s, however, the initial Mazowiecki/ Balcerowicz libealisers 
neglected the social and institutional dimensions of the transition reforms.
Consequently, the Polish version of political elitism and technocratic paternalism that 
emerged, this book will argue, endangered the development of social trust, precisely at a 
time when the Polish population was expecting an elastic and representative form of 
politics. By undermining public confidence, the early liberalisers, followed by each 
successive government, damaged their own authority and depleted their capacity to 
consistently implement the transition reforms.
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On the international level, the consolidation of economic reform also has its foundations 
in ‘trust’; bestowed by national elites on an international institution in seeking guidance 
and support for domestic change. In this thesis, the international legitimating dimension 
will be accordingly built on the notion of credibility of the international institution; as 
demonstrated by its own actions, fulfilment of declared objectives, and, finally, 
coherency of policy prescriptions. It will be argued that externally prescribed, 
technocratic economic strategies cannot be domestically consolidated, if they are not in 
and of themselves pursued consistently by the international organisation. The failure to 
bridge the gap between the policy rhetoric of the international institution and the reality 
of its behaviour can breed mistrust in the associated partner, discrediting not only the 
international institution, but also the pursued reforms and the reformers themselves. 
Throughout the period of association and during the actual implementation of the EA, 
the European Union’s protectionist trade policies and failure to make good on the 
promises of asymmetrical market opening not only had a negative impact on the 
transition process itself, but also placed the Polish liberals in an uncomfortable position 
of arguing that Polish economic policy should be more ‘free’ than the Union’s. This left 
them wide open to criticism both from the social democrats and from various populist 
parties. In sum, the Union’s protectionism undermined the credibility of the liberal 
economic reforms in Poland and reinforced the image of the liberalisers as gullible 
Utopians.
While it is not the purpose of this paper to argue that external regimes cannot fulfil their 
goal of strengthening the viability of domestic change, or to question the benefits of 
economic openness or free trade, the aim is rather to point out what lessons can be 
learned from the Polish- EU case and the implications for future policy reform in 
countries undergoing similar transformations; such as the Balkans, Ukraine, Belarus, 
Russia and the former CIS.
It will be argued that certain conditions have to be fulfilled in order for an external 
anchor to work in consolidating the economic goals pursued. As A Moravcsik has 
observed, “to enhance credibility, arrangements {like the EA} tend to be insulated from 
direct democratic control and are strictly limited by government oversight, resulting in 
the ‘democratic deficit’.”22 However, because market-led policies should primarily stem 
from domestic interests, institutions and ideas, the development of this democratic 
deficit can in fact increase public resistance to the reforms, contributing to the
24
resurgence of pressures for economic protection and unilateral breaches of international 
agreements. The author none the less upholds the view that an international ‘anchor’ can 
be used as a valuable supportive tool in the pursuit of reform, assuming that the
23‘politics’ of the reform process are gotten right.
‘Anchoring’ strategies, implemented through technocratic means and steered by 
externally imposed targets, not adapted to national conditions, not balanced between 
macroeconomic targets and microeconomic institutional reform, and not accompanied 
by generous financial and technical support can be threatening to reform sustainability. 
Outside actors attempting to exert positive leverage on domestic change should pay 
active attention to domestic responses and adapt anchoring strategies to national 
specificities. To be sustainable, international regimes should be defined by clear rules of 
the game, combining conditionality parameters with guidelines for the construction of 
culturally appropriate institutions and complementary policy- mixes to respond to the 
social costs of the reforms.
In this thesis, the author will demonstrate that the European Union has not fulfilled 
these conditions necessary for an external anchor to work, and that the ‘anchoring 
strategy’ supported by the Union was not based on adequate calculations as to its 
implications for the transition process or implemented in a flexible enough way to 
account for evolving complications. In sum, the Union has depleted its own credibility 
as an open liberal trader, and contributed to a deepening legitimacy crisis of the Polish 
‘state’.
The socially painful radicalism of shock therapy in Poland, combined with the 
surprisingly disappointing behaviour of the EU has led, in practice, to a growing tension 
between the Polish reformers who continue to argue the neoliberal case for 
marketisation24, and whose political position has been undermined because of the length 
of the transition (longer than would have been the case under more fair conditions of 
international trade), and the many constituencies who oppose this ‘no alternative’, 
radical approach. This has bred political paralysis and crippled the current government’s
22 Moravcsik, A. (1998). ‘Theorising European Integration’, in Moravcsik (Ed.) (1998). The Choice for  
Europe: Social purpose and State Power From Messina to Maastricht. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University 
Press, p 78.
23 As opposed to substitutes. The author here refers to JMC Rollo’s comments on thesis.
24 For example, currently, Balcerowicz, as President of the Polish National Bank, is determined to 
discipline the Social Democratic government’s fiscal policy through tight monetary control and high 
interest rates.
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attempts to pursue consistent economic policy reform, at a time when serious effort is
• 9 Sstill needed to prepare Poland for accession into the European Union.
In fact, the author will show that by multiplying the policy dilemmas, the ‘anchoring’ 
strategy, as it evolved during association, contributed to depleting ‘state’ capacity in 
Poland, delaying the institutionalisation of the reforms and undermining the 
consolidation of a participatory democracy.
D. The emerging trade regime
The emerging structure of the Polish trade regime reveals that it has evolved in 
unexpected ways. Despite initial intentions of policy irreversibility, the overall level of 
protection has been on the rise during the 12 years of systemic transformation, and the
9 fstemptation of Polish authorities to micromanage the economy has been little reduced.
In addition, protection has become an economic tool advocated not only by populist
♦ 97parties, but also by mainstream policy makers and experts.
A closer analysis of the crystallising trade regime reflects ‘the state’s’ feeble attempts to 
concurrently respond to the external requirements of liberalisation and to the demands 
emanating from the domestic political situation. Endeavours to reconcile these 
incompatible pressures, in turn, have weakened its ability to make credible policy 
decisions and contributed to its declining legitimacy in the eyes of both domestic and 
international actors. As a result, trade policy has evolved as a set of incoherent, 
inconsistent and even mutually blocking elements, with progressive liberalisation based 
on incremental tariff level reductions, on the one hand, combined with significant policy 
backsliding, through the introduction of various Non Tariff Barriers, on the other. 
Initially, the systemic crises of the command system in Poland enabled the government 
to reject single-handedly the principles of central planning and radically and unilaterally 
liberalise trade, without public opposition. However, as the adjustment costs began to be 
felt under conditions of an evolving parliamentary democracy, public dissatisfaction 
with the reforms began to be expressed through protests. ‘Extraordinary politics’ gave
9 fiway to normal politics of parties and interests groups , and the pressures of external 
opening up coupled with internal recession placed the ‘state’ in a critical dilemma. With 
social consensus for radical neo-liberal reforms rapidly diminishing, policy makers had 
to chose either to respond to the growing public unrest and give into protectionist
25 Such as fiscal (tax) and public finance reform, welfare and social security policies, labour market 
policies, privatisation and restructuring, improvements in physical infrastructure.
26 Including subsidies to agriculture, Non Tariff Barriers of various kinds, monetary policy etc... Poland’s 
protectionist policy stance in the new Doha WTO Round is particularly regrettable...
7 See Gazeta Wyborcza, Rzeczpospolita (various issues and years). Chapter seven.
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pressures, thereby demonstrating democratic accountability, or to remain credible in the 
international arena, fulfilling their obligations with whatever political means available. 
Simultaneously, due to an incomplete and unbalanced initial reform programme, the 
instiutionalisation of the trade regime failed to evolve in a transparent way, opening the 
door for the capture of the ‘state’ by various powerful interest groups (particularly the 
winners of those early reforms) and paving the way for corruption.
To sustain themselves in power, the authorities began to function on the basis of ad hoc 
reactions to political crises and rent- seeking activities, giving into the loudest voices of 
domestic protests and most powerful interests. The more successive governments gave 
into social pressures, the more critical the EU side became of the Polish partner. On the 
other hand, continuing liberalisation in face of domestic resistance, as was subsequently 
required by the EU, was contributing to the alienation of society and strengthening the 
symptom of distrust already characteristic of Polish political culture. As society adapted 
to voicing its discontent as a result of democratisation, the ‘state’, due to its 
international requirements, simultaneously learned not to respond to this voice or 
alternatively to respond to it inadequately. These developments undermined the 
credibility of the initial liberal reform efforts, strengthening populism and radicalising 
policy preferences.
The crisis-management, reactionary behaviour and unpredictable decision-making of 
the public administration have provided a fertile ground for the growth of corruption, as 
vested interests learned that the only way to get their demands heard was through 
protest, combined with not necessarily legal lobbying activities. As a result, political 
cronyism has grown, and the rule of law has been weakened. Ultimately, due to the 
opposing pressures placed upon it, the weakened ‘state’ and its institutions was not only 
unable to stabilise the economic regime, but, on the contrary, actually increased the 
ineffectiveness of the reforms, while at the same time contributing to the degeneration 
of the democratic impulse.
II. The Evolution of Polish Trade Policy
The underlining thesis throughout this paper will be that the EA has failed to increase 
the credibility of Polish trade policy reform. Moreover, the Agreement has not provided 
a coherent framework adapted to local conditions and to the needs of the applicant, to 
build and consolidate a socially-responsive, market democracy. In implementing the 
EA, the European Union has not paid enough attention to Polish domestic responses, to
28 Balcerowicz, L. (1994). ‘Poland’, in Williamson, J. (Ed.) (1994). The Political Economy o f Policy 
Reform. Washington DC: Institute for International Economics, p 177.
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institution building during regime change or to the social dimension of the reforms. The 
EA has paradoxically complicated the transition process, trapping ‘the state’ in 
irreconcilable policy dilemmas, decreasing its capacity to govern, and strengthening the 
tendency towards haphazerdous policy-making. The incoherent trade regime that has 
actually evolved in Poland depicts the weakness of the ‘state’ in transition, the 
ineffectiveness of its institutions and the deficiency of its authority. By examining a 
range of literature, I argue that the reasons for this weakness are several-fold.
To begin with, the increase in protection has primarily been an economic response to 
the dramatic growth of imports and subsequent deterioration in the balance of trade. It 
will be shown that the objectives of asymmetrical trade liberalisation and generous 
market access and financial aid, declared by the EU when granting Poland the EA, were 
overridden by short-term internal bickering within the Union and conflicting goals of 
the member states’ multiple interests. In addition, the growing trade deficit with the EU, 
and the scarcely changing commodity structure of the Polish trade regime have 
signalled a lack of serious commitment from the EU to support the process of internal 
transition, increase Poland’s national competitiveness, or buttress the credibility of the 
open, liberal economic reforms.
The author’s analysis suggests that protectionism in Poland has reappeared largely as 
political backlash to the perceived failure of the Union itself to collectively act 
consistently in pursuit of open economic policies. The EU has furnished Polish 
authorities with an example of modem methods of managed trade through its own rising 
tendencies in protecting domestic markets. This behaviour has depleted the 
creditworthiness of the Union as a liberal trading partner, while simultaneously 
undermining liberal reform and the authority of the Polish reforming elites. Polish- EU 
relations under the EA have evolved around a number of highly contentious issues and 
various trade disputes that have damaged mutual tmst and hurt political cooperation. In 
the end, the multiple breakdowns in constructive dialogue coupled with the mixed 
signals sent to the Polish side by the member states, have undermined the coherence of 
the EU’s strategy and the consistency of its policy prescriptions, contributing to 
increasingly mercantilist behaviour of the associated partner.
Finally, the author will argue that Polish trade policy reversals can be attributed to 
political economy explanations and questions of domestic interests, institutions and 
ideas. It will be examined how the interplay between integration, marketisation and 
democratisation has affected the creation of Polish interests, and how, in turn, the 
struggle between these domestic groups, as constrained by national institutions and
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dominant political culture, has determined the balance between protectionism and 
liberalisation in the trade regime.
This thesis will accordingly analyse the process of Polish trade policy making, taking 
into consideration the impact of both external and internal factors as they have affected 
economic policy preferences and outcomes, and suggesting that neither dimension can 
be treated in isolation from the other in explaining the political economy of policy 
reform.
A. Multi-disciplinary approach
H Milner has claimed “that the stylised whole we call a country’s trade policy is really a
90collection of often conflicting policies, each designed to address different problems.” 
According to this definition, the outcome of a particular trade policy mix is a result of 
complex political compromises involving various goals, pressures and expectations. 
Moreover, the eventual balance between free trade, on the one hand, and protectionism, 
on the other, depends on internal politics, the external environment and the way in 
which the interaction between them shapes the ongoing domestic struggle.
In light of this, a survey of existing literature in the field must cover variety of subjects 
ranging from various schools of economic theory, to international relations and 
international political economy literature, regime change studies, sociology and finally 
transition/ transformation itself.
Transformation is complex a social, political and economic phenomenon that involves 
many tangibles and intangibles, as well as multiple layers of competing factors that 
determine the outcomes of the process. As such, it cannot be reduced to any single 
paradigm and must be conceptualised through a multi- disciplinary perspective that 
incorporates standard theories of structure and agency stemming from political science, 
with processual models of behaviour provided by sociology, notions of legitimisation 
coming from political theory, mixed with variants of economic analysis, and in 
particular policy-making literature. Systemic change such as the ‘leap to market’ has to 
be built on both domestic and international level explanations, using tools that explain 
macro incentives for states as units as well as micro motives of individuals that make up 
those states.
This paper thus begin with a general survey of factors that might determine policy 
outcomes in transformation, paying particular attention to the political economy of 
policy reform and the interplay between outside support and internal change.
29 Milner, H. (1988). Resisting Protectionism: global industries and the politics o f international trade. 
Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, p 17.
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A. Neoliberal institutionalism
Before one begins to assess the role of international anchors, such as the Europe 
Agreement, in enhancing policy reform credibility, one must examine the arguments 
that provide the rationale as to why nations willingly seek international cooperation as a 
form of external leverage on domestic change. The body of work that corresponds most 
closely to this line of thinking stems from both political science and economics and 
centres around the notion of international regimes or institutions. In international 
relations, these theories are referred to as either institutional liberalism or neoliberal 
institutionalism and are closely related to the work of economists from the new 
institutionalist school discussed below. While the latter examines how national political 
institutions might affect policy outcomes, its IR counterpart analyses the role of 
international institutions as they influence domestic change within a particular nation as 
well as cooperation between nations states themselves.
According to Biersteker, “an institution or a regime is a form of governance, 
institutionalising elements of economic policy and constituting what is a state-driven 
change, often in the face of strong domestic opposition or in expectation that opposition
i n
will arise as a result of reform.” Neoliberal institutionalists argue that states modify 
their behaviour in the presence of institutions, and that legal frameworks such as treaties 
or agencies facilitate cooperation. Thus in providing explanations as to why 
governments employ the ‘anchoring’ strategy in their economic reform programmes, 
liberal institutionalists correctly assume that politics matter in the process of policy 
formulation. However, the main premise of this body of work, whether in its domestic 
or international variant, is that in order to improve economic efficiency, the role of 
politics should be limited.
This literature explains policy co-ordination, by focusing on the two-level strategy
designed by national elites. By binding domestic politics to international regimes, the
government restructures future domestic incentives and raises the costs of non-decision
or non-compliance. This assures, on the one hand, that the other government will accept
the agreed legislation, and, on the other, locks in future decisions against domestic
opposition. Accordingly, Moravcsik upholds that “states pool sovereignty and delegate
powers to outside institutions in order to precommit themselves to a stream of future
11
decisions by removing the possibility for unilateral decision making.” ‘Anchoring’
30 Biersteker, ‘chapter four,’ in Rosenau, J.N. and Czempiel, E. (1992). Governance Without Government: 
Order and Change in World Politics. Cambridge Studies in International Relations, Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, p 110.
31 Moravcsik (1998). Theorising, ibid., p 69.
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thus precludes more explicit control over internal policies and helps to defuse potential
39resistance from disadvantaged groups.
Liberal institutionalists suggest that to ensure the credibility of economic reforms, clear 
and enforceable rules, administered impartially, are needed. A government can signal its 
commitment to reform by joining an international organisation such as the WTO or the 
OECD, and as such reduce the scope of its own ability to alter policy.33 Hence, regional 
integration, such as that with the EU, serves as a tool to signal a government’s 
determination to fulfil its own goals as well as the commitments arising from 
internationalisation. These external obligations, in turn, by reducing the possibility of 
arbitrary alteration of policies and changing the incentive structure for the ruling elites, 
lead institutionalists to conclude that binding national policies to various external 
regulations forces countries to follow sound policies. In sum, international anchors 
diminish the influence of domestic interests groups on the process of policy making and, 
as a result, increase the credibility of the reforms.34
In addition, external institutionalisation of reform can provide a viable model for 
creating, through duplication, domestic institutions. This strategy is based on the 
adoption by the reforming state certain tried and tested rules as well as internationally 
acceptable norms and standards. Accordingly, in prescribing trade reform strategies to 
developing countries or countries in transition, the World Bank recommends that their 
governments “adopt a new institutional design of trade policy making that would 
contain protectionist pressure and induce contestability, reducing all discrimination by
• • • * 9  35the adoption and imitation of tried and tested institutions of highly developed nations.” 
The main assumption of this ‘anchoring thesis’ is rooted in the notion of conditionality. 
It is assumed that conditionality is to provide a catalyst for change in economic policy, 
and that the rule-based framework of international treaties has the ability to influence 
domestic preferences, through pressures and practices already established at 
international levels.
32 Moravcisk (1998). ibid.
33 Piazolo, D. (1998). ‘Poland and the European Union: Quantifying the Growth Effects of Enhanced 
Institutions’, in Zielinska- Glebocka, A. and Stepniak, A. (Ed.) (1998). EU Adjustment to Eastern 
Enlargement: Polish and European Perspective. Gdansk: University of Gdansk, pi 47.
34 See Kaminski, B., Wang, Z. and Winters, L.A. (1996). ‘Foreign Trade in the Transition: the 
international environment and domestic policy’, World Bank Studies o f  Economies in Transformation, No 
20, Washington DC: World Bank
35 World Bank (1997). Poland: Country Economic Memorandum: Reform and growth on the road to the 
EU. Washington DC: World Bank, 15 July.
36 Milner, H. (1988). Resisting Protectionism: global industries and the politics o f international trade. 
Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, p 13.
Moravcsik (1998). ibid.
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Neoliberal institutionalists argue that once an institution is formed, the rules of the game 
take off and develop on their own. This conclusion is premised on the notion that 
international negotiations aim to secure commercial advantages for domestic producer 
groups that benefit from increased openness. As such, in the words of P Bofinger, “the 
hands tying dynamic effects of the EA (in Poland should) strengthen the relative power 
of lobbies whose interests are often neglected in political decisions on trade issues 
(namely exporters and consumers), changing the balance of power between different 
national interest groups and leading to decreased demand for protection. Thus from a 
political economy perspective, the main advantage of EU membership is the provision 
of an open economic constitution which guarantees an efficient allocation of resources 
as it greatly reduces the power of national producer lobbies and the potential for state 
intervention into the market mechanism.”
It is this author’s opinion that there are two problems with these theories. Primarily, by 
focusing on why states cooperate and why institutions increase the credibility of 
commitments, the international dimension is over-emphasised in policy reform and the 
role of individuals as they react to or comply with particular directives of international 
treaties is underestimated. Secondly, even if the distributive consequences of 
international bargaining are recognised by institutionalists, the assumption is that the 
winners of globalisation are numerous enough to overpower the losers, and thus have 
more political clout in influencing policy decisions, and that somehow reform can be 
sustained without the active inclusion and participation of these very losers.
These arguments imply that commitment to economic reform can only be guaranteed by 
limiting democratic accountability. Institutionalists maintain that for reform to be 
successfully consolidated, it must be carried out by technocratic national elites deprived 
of real policy autonomy and thus isolated from the risk of giving into domestic interest 
group pressure and social demands. Technocratic solutions empower experts and 
minimise legal or political oversight required for policy making, as the information 
available to make highly technical decisions is usually quite limited to the public or 
even to the parliament. Institutionalists contend that marketisation should accordingly 
precede democratisation, and be carried out as quickly as possible to achieve the desired 
goals of economic efficiency.
Employing this technique to achieve policy goals thus seems to be premised on the 
notion that economic reform can indeed proceed before social support has been
37 Bofinger, P. (1995). ‘The Political Economy of the Eastern Enlargement of the EU’, CEPR Discussion 
paper, No 1234, London: CEPR, p 10.
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generated. This author in turn argues that the assumption of an ‘institutionally 
frictionless environment’ does not hold under conditions of a transition to a 
parliamentary democracy.
Moreover, the pursuit of economic reform at the short-term expense of democracy is not 
sustainable in the long run. To understand why this is so, it is necessary to delve into 
the intricacies of notions such as legitimacy and trust that form the basis of the 
relationship between capitalism and democracy and avoid over-simplified solutions and 
reductionist models in the search for economically desirable policy options.
To summarise, even if one accepts that external anchoring can enhance the credibility of 
policy reform in the short-run, the question never the less remains what happen to the 
sustainability and consolidation of the reforms. While the external creditworthiness of 
the government is indeed strengthened through international commitments, this does not 
solve the lingering problem of domestic credibility of either the government or of the 
international institution and the authority created by them. In addition, although it might 
be possible, to jump start an economic process during a period of economic crisis and 
political chaos without seeking public consensus, once the grace period granted to the 
government is over, social legitimacy is a necessary ingredient in sustaining the 
measures, and the key to successful policy reform lies in securing a broad enough base 
of support to enable the reformers to carry on with their program.
Ultimately, then while international institutions might strengthen the credibility of 
reforms by defining the boundaries of policy making and committing the government 
officials to respect international obligations39, in doing so, they can undermine the 
democratic impulse and threaten the sustainability of the policies themselves.
By over-estimating the unitary character of the ‘state’ and neglecting to examine how 
individual citizens respond to both national and international institutions and how, in 
turn, this reaction drives policy outcomes, neoliberal institutionalists place too much 
hope on the primacy of the external leverage in domestic reform consolidation.
This author, in turn, argues that the leverage of international ‘anchors’ should not be 
over-stated and policy-makers, attempting to lock in reform efforts, should seek to 
prioritise domestic factors.
C. Economics
In reviewing the literature on economic policy reform, the first set of theories that seeks 
to explain policy outcomes comes from economics. Normative economics is based on
38 In addition the author assumes that weakening democratic mechanisms is itself not desirable.
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the assumption that the objective of economic policy is the promotion of the general 
good, the maximisation of the social welfare function. Mainstream economists take it 
for granted that government policy is made with this long-term horizon in mind, and 
that the ‘state’ should consequently act as an umpire rather than a favour granting 
mechanism. Pluralist theories (Viner) give priority to the neoclassical questions of 
efficiency and wealth and explain the exchanges in international trade as nothing more 
than a simple outcome of market forces. From the point of view of economists then, a 
nation, as a unitary whole, is primarily concerned with securing the most efficient 
allocation of resources. Raising protective barriers and closing markets is hence 
irrational behaviour that leads to substantial economic losses. As such, normative 
economists find no rationale as to why states should pursue mercantilist trade policies. 
They acknowledge the existence of rent-seeking behaviour of vested interests, which is 
the root cause of protectionism, but do not seek to address this issue, focusing their 
attention instead on quantifying the losses incurred.
By emphasising national macroeconomic goals and long-term objectives attributed to
free trade and paying too little attention to short-term distributional questions and
associated social and political tensions, normative economic analysis cannot explain the
qualitative factors that determine the process and outcomes of policy making. While
tables and figures can demonstrate the diversion of trade flows and variations in
commodity patterns, they cannot account for the political influences that trigger these
economic responses and thus cannot predict what developments will take place in the
economy as a result of applying theoretical trade models.
S Strange has pointed out that
customs union theory and other liberal theories o f international trade make the false 
assumptions that firms in planning and states in deciding commercial policies can 
afford to disregard the questions o f security and survival, in order to give priority to 
economic consequences. They treat trade in isolation from other power structures, and 
pay too much attention to the economic relationship between demand and supply, to 
trade creation and diversion, disregarding the role o f politics and political bargains40
C.2 International relations- mercantilism
In international relations, mercantilism, built on theories of realism, corresponds to the 
normative economic variant in explaining policy outcomes. This is the literature based 
on competing states, whereby each nation is focused on securing the best possible terms 
for itself in cooperating with the others. Security and economic calculations provide the
39 Thomas, V. and Nash, J.D. (1991). Best practices in Trade Policy Reform. Oxford: Published for the 
World Bank by Oxford University Press.
34
arguments for protection, and national perceptions of fairness in trade relations justify 
retaliation as a political response to tit for tat international bargaining and zero-sum 
game negotiations.
Although theories of economic nationalism, as mercantilism is sometimes called, 
acknowledge the role of domestic politics as an intervening factor in influencing policy 
decisions, they insist that it is the structure of the global economy and international 
repercussions that in fact determine the outcomes.41 Under conditions of 
interdependence, credibility constraints, such as reliance on external foreign capital or 
trade, will restrict state responses in seeking to maximise its welfare function.
The weakness of these theories is exactly this sort of reductionism that relies heavily on 
an overly deterministic view of international relations, whereby structure completely 
limits the behaviour of the agents. Economic realists over-emphasise the diminishing 
role of the state and place undo importance on the international structure of the market, 
which, according to them, much more than national governments or other factors 
determines the eventual outcome of policy.
Consequently, this literature, by treating nations as unitary wholes, does not address the 
distributional questions that are so fundamental to understanding trade and trade policy 
reform. The impact of domestic politics on policy making and the influence of interests, 
institutions and ideas within individual nation states on outcomes and performance is 
undervalued. H Milner has pointed out that, “international agreements emerge from an 
inherently political process in which national actors are seeking to protect perceived 
national competitive interest, regardless of whether these may be reconciled with the 
state of goods of inciting efficiency and ensuring stability in the larger market.”42 The 
role of politics ultimately intervenes in the policy making process and the economic 
questions of efficiency, as Strange, in turn, has noted “move towards managing the 
issues of conflict that arise as a result of economic transactions.”43
C.3 Classical liberalism and political thought
Criticising neoliberal economics, R Sally has pointed out “that from Adam Smith to 
John Stuart Mill and beyond, classical economists grasped the essential insight that the 
politics of international commerce has more to do with conflicts between interests in
40 Strange, S. (1988). States and Markets. London: Pinter, p 165.
41 See Gilpin, R. and Gilpin, J.M. (1987). The Political Economy o f International Relations. Princeton, 
NJ: Princeton University Press.
42 Milner,H. (1994). ‘Regional Integration and Multinational Production’, in Cable, V., Henderson, D. 
(Ed.) (1994). Trade blocs?: the future o f regional integration. London: Royal Institute of International 
Affairs/International Economics Programme, p 158.
43 Strange, S. (1988). ibid., p 14.
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one country than with conflicts between countries.”44 As such, classical liberals rejects 
the notion that the ‘rules of the game’ approach pursued by neoliberal institutionalists is 
the key to sustainable economic reform, focusing rather on the social contract within a 
single state. In sharp contrast to policy co-ordination through international 
organisations, classical liberalism places emphasis on national policies and national 
institutions, supported by domestic interests and ideas, in determining the success or 
failure of policy sustainability. At the core of this argument lies the notion that 
reciprocity and international binding rules on liberalisation do not compensate for a lack 
of domestic political support for free trade.
Classical liberals reject the argument that by relinquishing policy autonomy to external 
rules, policymakers can protect themselves from interest group capture and even gain an 
element of policy autonomy within the domestic sphere 45 R Sally, for example, has 
disapproved of the neoliberal institutionalist suggestion that the locking-in or 
‘anchoring’ effect of reciprocity is to support free trade which otherwise would not be 
achievable. “By conveying the impression that governments ‘concede’ import access to 
their own markets in exchange for access to others”, neoliberal institutionalism creates a 
political atmosphere in which trade negotiators extract as many concessions from other 
governments as feasible, while at the same time striving to give away as little as 
possible on access to their own market. Sally aptly concludes “that this reliance on 
reciprocity encourages countries to think in terms of power games rather than economic 
efficiency and is therefore ultimately mercantilist.”46
Thus while classical liberals recognise that the main obstacles to economic reform have 
domestic origins, and cannot be ‘fixed’ by international institutions, they fail to advance 
the analysis one step further to discuss the underlying reasons for domestic resistance to 
policy change or how this resistance can in fact be channelled towards support. In 
addition, while classical liberal theorists identify social, ideological and cultural factors 
as the main barriers to regime change, they stop short of examining the fundamental 
notions of political conflict, legitimacy and trust that underlie these social phenomena. 
Instead, classical liberalism, like its neoliberal economic counterpart, seeks to advance 
economic efficiency and welfare maximisation effects, analysing the dangers of 
bureaucratically, imposed from above and binding international rules of the game for 
the efficient allocation of resources. It does not address the implications of this sort of
44 Sally, R. (1998). Classical Liberalism and International Economic Order, Studies in theory and 
intellectual history. London: Routladge, p 7.
45 Sally (1998). ibid., p 20.
46 Sally (1998). ibid., p 21.
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‘anchoring’ for the development of a democratic culture or the emergence of an civil 
society, such as has not existed in transition economies^
C.4 New Trade Theories
Newer versions of trade theory, by making a clear distinction between normative and 
positive economics, fare much better in explaining and even providing justification for 
the selective pursuit of mercantilism. By adding both the political as well as the 
international dimension to the questions of the pareto- optimality of the market, New 
Trade Theory rationalises the introduction of tariffs and Non Tariff Barriers from the 
point of view of economic efficiency. The economists from this school claim to 
combine positive economic analysis and value judgements about the objectives of the 
policy, with theories of the operation of the political processes.47 Aware of the major 
assumptions underlying their analysis, they take into account the role of transaction 
costs in determining policy outcomes. As such, they consider the influence of trade 
policies on the distribution of welfare, on the generation of conflict and on social 
stability.
This shift in concentration away from questions of pure economic desirability and 
towards political feasibility makes New Trade Theory much more balanced than 
normative economics and allows economists to incorporate the role of interests, 
ideology and institutions in their analysis of policy reform.
The theoreticians concede that it is usually the initial impact of reform rather than its 
long-term benefits that is crucial for sustainability. Consequently, they recognise the 
role of temporary protection in softening the negative short-term consequences of trade 
liberalisation. Moreover, strategic trade policy versions of new trade theory provide 
justification for selective protection of specific industries basing their arguments on 
both political and economic considerations of policy outcomes.49 By admitting that free 
trade is not always optimal, strategic trade policy economists rationalise state 
intervention and management of the trade regime under certain conditions, such as the 
existence of infant industries, the necessities of in-depth restructuring or a staggering 
trade deficit.
47 Dillon, P., Lehman, J. and Willett, T. (1990). ‘Assessing the Usefulness of International Trade Theory 
for Policy Analysis’, in Odell, J.S. and Willett, T.D. (Ed.) (1990). International trade policies: gains from  
exchange between economics and political science. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.
See also Krugman, P. (1987). ‘Is free trade passe?’, Economic perspectives, Vol 1, No 2, November, p 
131-144.
48 Dixit, A.K. (1996). The Making o f Economic Policy: a transaction-cost politics perspective.
Cambridge, Mass, London: MIT Press.
49 See W Orlowski, P Krugman
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Finally, the notions of ‘reciprocity’ and ‘retaliation’ are also identified by New Trade 
Theory as factors that influence policy decisions, significantly widening the scope of the 
analysis from models based on economic efficiency and domestic political questions to 
those that incorporate the international political dimension.
Although these newer variants of international trade theory significantly improve the 
ability of economists to apply their static models to real world politics and to predict 
policy outcomes and performance, never the less, the continued primacy of economics 
and economic considerations leaves them open to serious criticism as far as policy 
implementation and consolidation is concerned.
D. Political economy
J Spero claims that “trade policy is the stuff of domestic politics. Because trade policy 
often determines prosperity or adversity for various economic groups, it is also the 
subject of frequent and often highly charged domestic conflict.” Furthermore, “most of 
the time, tariffs are not the result of any specific economic arguments, but are a 
response to pressures exerted by particular vested interest groups in an importing 
country which have succeeded in winning over the government of the day.”50 
The school of political economy thus seeks to detect the political and economic 
mechanisms that allow certain interests and ideas to dominate the policy making process 
within the established boundaries of national institutions. Political economist examine 
the instances where actors change or modify their perception of a situation and 
ultimately their policy preferences during the process of interaction, emphasising the 
role of agency capture as it determines policy outcomes.51
These theories are divided into three sets of domestic-level explanations and a fourth 
version that seeks to combine domestic factors with international determinants of 
policy-making.
D.2 Interest-based explanations
The first set of political economy theories attempts to examine the outcome of economic 
reform by emphasising the role of interest group bargaining in the formulation of policy. 
These interest-based explanations reject the arguments that the structure of the 
international system can explain why certain kinds of policies prevail over others, 
instead concentrating on the process of domestic balancing of interests. National interest 
is thus understood as the real material interest of society that reflects the particular 
combination and diversity of its individual and group interests. In explaining policy-
50 Spero, J.E. (1990). The Politics o f International Economic Relations 4th ed. London: Routladge, p 67.
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making, E J Ray, for example, argues that “contemporary trade policy actually results 
from the interaction of self-promoting economic interest groups with national economic 
and political policies. These latter ‘national’ policies represent shared or consensus 
values which are slow to change and thus quite durable.”
Since policy reform will benefit some groups while disadvantaging others, the main 
assumption is that if a pattern of policy is to be sustained, it must advance the interests 
of the broadest or politically most powerful segment of society, usually producers and 
their group coalitions.
P Hall has characterised this public choice school of thought “as sets of models built on 
neoclassical economic theory that effectively endogenise vote-seeking politicians.” 
Interest- prone theoreticians assume that the motive of the politician is limited to 
seeking re-election, and that the voter is voting only on what he perceives as his 
economic interest. By overemphasising political power as an overriding determinant in 
policy making, public choice theory ignores the role played by ideas, and the fact that 
sometimes other factors, such as cultural legacies or the concern for equity and 
adjustment costs, account for policy preferences. In addition to ideas, the part to be 
played by institutions in constraining policy options is undervalued.
Moreover, while these explanations recognise that changes in the international realm 
might influence domestic politics, their primary focus remains internal interests and 
their impact on policy making. As such, by ignoring the international foreign policy 
dimension, the special interest model paints an overly simplistic picture of how 
economic policy is made.
Finally, while these theories can be seen as attempts to explain policy making in 
industrialised countries, they are inapplicable to emerging markets, where the entire 
structure of domestic interests and their power balancing is not only different than 
public choice would expect but is constantly fluid and rapidly changing. While 
dynamic, export-oriented industries will have considerable political influence on, for 
example US trade policy54, these interests have either yet to emerge or are under­
developed and disorganised in emerging markets. Consequently, they cannot provide
51 For an overview see Bhagwati, J.N. (1988). Protectionism: The Ohlin lectures. Cambridge, Mass., 
London: MIT Press.
52 Ray, EJ. (1995). ‘Changing Patterns of Protection’, in Frieden, J. and Lake, D. (1995). International 
Political Economy: perspectives on global power and wealth. London: Routledge, p 355.
53 Hall, P. (1997). ‘The role of interests institutions and ideas in the comparative political economy of the 
industrialised nations’, in Irving, M., Lichbach, S. and Zuckerman, A. (Ed.) Comparative Politics: 
Rationality, Culture and Structure Cambridge. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, p 179.
54 Baldwin, R. (1985). The Political Economy o f US Import Policy. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press.
(1988) Trade Policy in a Changing World Economy. London: Harvester- Wheatsheaf, p 221.
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their governments with the economic power and support that makes international 
openness a desirable national policy objective, as public choice theorists would predict. 
It is not a certain fact that in developing countries, export oriented firms will gain in 
political power as the older industries witness drops in employment and thus political 
influence. On the contrary, this paper will show that in Polish trade policy making, it 
has continued to be import-competing interests that have dominated the decision­
making apparatus.
D.3 Institutional explanations
Another set of analyses rejects the interest group explanations, arguing that national 
institutional frameworks have considerable resilience in the face of socio-economic 
pressures.55 The focus shifts to the organisational structures of the national political 
economy such as trade unions, employers’ associations, consumers, producers and other 
arrangements of social, political and economic life. According to this school of thought, 
the specific set of institutions within a nation will influence the behaviour of 
individuals, thus taking primacy over socio-economic interests as a factor in 
determining policy decisions. In addition, because institutions will differ across nations, 
policy outcomes will also be different.
The applied version of this PE variant is ultimately concerned with designing the ‘right’
institutions to guarantee policy performance. For example, the EBRD transition report
has observed that that
the rapid pace o f liberalisation and privatisation {in CEE) has not been matched by 
concomitant progress in the development o f institutions necessary to support a well 
functioning market economy. These imbalances have caused serious market distortions 
in the transition economies, which can generate substantial gains to particular interest 
groups (often with close ties to government) while imposing great costs on the rest o f
society.56
Much like the school of international liberal institutionalism discussed above, domestic 
institutionalists dismiss the role of legitimacy in affecting the performance and 
effectiveness of institutions, determining their eventual long-term sustainability. These 
theories also undervalue the part played by social actors and political coalitions in 
shaping and constraining the development of institutions and, as Hall has observed, “the
0 en
degree that the core institutions of the political economy are subject to change.”
55 Garrett, G and Lange, P. ‘Internationalization, Institutions, and Political Change’, in Keohane, R. and 
Milner, H. (Ed.) (1996). Internationalisation and Domestic Politics. Cambridge: Cambridge University 
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56 EBRD (1998). Transition Report. London: European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, p 2.
57 Hall (1997). ibid., p 183.
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D.4 Ideas- based explanations
The third strand of Political Economy seeks to explain policy by looking at the 
importance of ideas. This type of approach emphasises the role of individuals and 
cognitive beliefs over and above interest group bargaining or the constraints of 
institutions. Ideas-based explanations highlight cultural variables in economic policy 
making, such as the legacies of the past, the intellectual climate within the nation, 
personal or psychological characteristics of individual statesmen, social perceptions of 
justice or epistemic communities. While these theories capture the dimension of the 
human interaction lost in other political science and social science perspectives, they, as 
Hall has argued, “do not provide an effective mechanism for establishing causal links
co
between ideas and other factors explaining policy outcomes.”
Never the less, there is no doubt that the power of ideology has played an important part 
in shaping economic policy making in transition economies. The whole notion of a 
‘Return to Europe’ has been after all founded on idealised concepts of historical 
continuity, and a sense of belonging to a community. Moreover, the embrace of Shock 
Therapy could not have taken place without a very specific intellectual climate 
dominant in Poland at the particular time. Finally, it has been ideas such as sovereignty 
or fears such as land sales to foreigners that have in significant ways contributed to a 
rise in Polish protectionism and economic policy backsliding. This paper thus concludes 
that while on their own ideas- based explanations are insufficient in accounting for 
reform outcomes, ideology has played a very substantial part in influencing policy 
choices and performance in transition economies.
E. Integrated theories
In summary, while international- level explanations look at a state’s position in the 
international system and domestic-level explanations examine the interests, ideas and 
institutions of individual nation- states to predict policy outcomes, the fourth set of 
political economy theories is concerned with all four.59 This literature attempts to 
address in depth the relationship between international, structural constraints of the 
interdependent economy and factors in domestic politics. As such, it proposes that the 
interaction between these two levels of analysis can be used to detect political conflict 
that results from the process of internationalisation. Underlying this conflict are 
distributional questions that determine the construction of interests and their
58 Hall (1997). ibid., p 185.
59 Moravcsik, A. (1993). ‘Introduction’, in Evans, Jacobson &Putnam (Ed.) (1993). ibid., p 4.
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preferences, which then, in turn, shape policy decisions, as constrained by existing 
institutions on both the national and the international levels.
E.2 Liberal interdependence school
The liberal interdependence school argues that the differentiated impact of international 
trade agreements on the distribution of costs and benefits on specific domestic interests 
groups is the link between domestic politics on the one hand and international relations 
on the other.
To explain why internationalisation has clear social effects that translate into national 
policy responses, Evans, for example, has pointed out that, “in most cases distributional 
issues (resulting from free trade arrangements) divide domestic interests. Not everyone 
participates in the joint gains, and the losers have an interest in blocking perspective 
agreements.”60 Because trade agreements, by their very nature lead to changes in the 
distribution of resources between different socio-economic groups, they affect the 
opportunities and constraints facing social actors, and therefore their policy preferences. 
Thus the liberal interdependence literature strives to incorporate not only domestic 
interests, institutions and ideas with international systemic constraints, but also to 
disentangle the intricate relationship between all these levels of analysis, and examine 
how this interaction shapes policy outcomes.
For international political economists the main division of interests that follows the 
opening up of the economy takes place between internationally competitive, and thus 
politically and economically more powerful, industries and those uncompetitive sectors 
whose costs of adjustment to globalisation are exceedingly high. They predict that as 
internationalisation proceeds, the ‘state’ is more likely to align itself with the 
competitive winners, seeking their political support to improve the country’s overall 
comparative advantage.61
Accordingly, in responding to the oversimplification that rising levels of trade and 
investment are eroding de facto sovereignty, Milner contends that “on the contrary, the 
effect demonstrated (in her work) was that interdependence actually reshapes societal 
actors’ preferences and they influence states’ policies.”
E.3 Interests versus institutions
Internal divisions between variants of IPE literature focus around the so-called 
comparative/ international divide. One set of theories tends to pay attention to
60 Evans, P. (1993). ‘Building an integrative approach’, in Evans, Jacobson, Putnam (Ed.) (1993). ibid., p 
397.
61 See Keohane, R. and Milner, H. (Ed.) (1996). ibid.
62 Milner (1988). ibid.
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international environment and impact on interests, with less emphasis on domestic 
institutions, while the other prioritises institutions, assigning less importance to the 
international environment and ultimately socio-economic groups in determining policy 
outcomes.
Interest-based theories combine analysis stemming from public choice theory and 
comparative politics with economic models of globalisation and its consequences for 
various national and international actors. Hall observes that, “these studies suggest that 
intensified international integration shifts the comparative advantage of various kinds of 
producers or intensifies cleavages between those in the traded and non-traded sectors in 
such a way as to erode old political coalitions and make new ones feasible.”63 
On the other hand, institutionalists like Frieden and Rogowski accentuate the role of 
institutions, and argue that “because gains from free trade exceed the sum costs, reliable 
mechanisms and political institutions that further sustain it become everywhere more 
important for domestic stability as exposure to international trade expands.”64 As such, 
they expect that as the competitiveness of a country improves, pressure for openness 
will increase and as the terms of trade decline closure will become more attractive. 
Garrett and Lane continue this line of thinking, claiming that “the course of policy 
change will differ markedly from that anticipated by economic pluralism, because 
existing institutions will generate pressure for the government to persist with policies 
that are favoured by those groups that brought them to power, even if their own power 
has declined in the process.”65 Institutions matter more than interests as they outlive the 
constellations of interests that created them.66
The work of these institutionalists in the comparative politics realm is particularly 
relevant for transition economies, as it brings in a dimension neglected by other 
international political economists. Applying modem democratic theory to their analysis 
of policy-making, Garrett and Lane are able to explaining the continuing importance of 
labour in spite of the shifts in the global economy. The authors conclude that the view 
that changes in the balance of power between sectors is reflected in policy changes is 
overly simplistic because “even if the private sectors gains economic power, existing 
ideas and institutions in the form of socio-economic arrangements that represent the
63 Hall (1997). ibid., p i87.
64 Frieden, J. and Rogowski, R. (1996). ‘The Impact of the International Economy on National Policies: 
An Analytic Overview’, in Keohane and Milner (Ed.) (1996). ibid., p 45.
See also Rogowski, R. (1990). Commerce and Coalitions: How trade affects domestic political 
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public sector bloc changes and continue to exert more influence on policy than their
cn
politically more powerful counterparts.” Moreover, they demonstrate that “democratic 
elections, based on the one- person, one- vote principle, will tend to bias policy 
outcomes in favour of less productive and nontradable sectors”, in contrast to what 
economic pluralism would expect.68
To retort, Keohane and Milner, for example, concede that labour unions and losers from 
internationalisation will continue to hold considerable political leverage, but, they 
argue, the reason for this is that these actors intentionally create the kind of institutions 
that reflect their preferences.69
It is this author’s opinion that the irresolvable chicken-egg dilemma of whether 
institutions or interests come first and which is more important for policy making 
becomes a secondary factor in assessing the usefulness of these theories. What is more 
important from the point of view of analysing policy reform in transition is the attempt 
to incorporate not only standard factors of public choice analysis, but also to pay 
attention to the impact of unquantifiable elements such as information or ideas on the 
policy making process.
E.4 Explaining international cooperation
While the above explanations lay the groundwork for clarifying national policy 
decisions, they still fall short of explaining why international leverage might be useful 
in exerting positive pressure on domestic change. In the realm of international economic 
relations, the most interesting and defendable of the IPE theories concentrate on this 
dimension of inter-state cooperation and its interaction with domestic politics.
While liberal trade theories, such as those of Kant’s Perpetual Peace, expect that free 
trade will result in economic gains that encourage cooperation, international political 
economists argue that, “on the contrary, under the distributive pressures of the 
international economy, reaching an economic agreement between states becomes more
70difficult.” In criticising liberal institutionalists, thus, the interdependence school 
argues that static economic theory does not pay enough attention to the distributive 
effects of the easing of trade, and how in turn, these influence future trade negotiations.
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IPE scholars correctly observe that because realist and institutionalist theories of 
international trade explain economic outcomes for societies as a whole, they dismiss the 
implications for individual groups, their policy preferences and future political 
behaviour. According to Milner, the failure to examine domestic politics while treating 
states as black-box units “leads both realist and liberal institutionalists to an overly 
optimistic view of countries’ ability to make agreements.”71
Central to Milner’s argument is thus that cooperation among nations “is affected less by 
fears of other countries relative gains or cheating than it is by the domestic distributional 
consequences of cooperative endeavours.” Because cooperative agreements create 
winners and losers domestically and thus generate supporters and opponents, the 
internal struggle between these groups shape the possibility and nature of future 
international cooperation. Moreover, not only do international negotiations “often fail 
because of domestic politics, they are also often initiated because of domestic politics.” 
Thus, Milner concludes that “in polyarchic systems, the struggle for internal power and 
compromise can produce behaviour that appears less than rational from an international 
systemic standpoint. This behaviour is nonetheless rational but only when the 
perspective of the domestic political system is added.”72
Because the sustainability of international regimes themselves is in question, IPE 
theorists reject both the realist and the neoliberal institutionalist predictions that these 
external institutions will increase domestic policy credibility and guarantee their 
viability.
In summary, the main contribution of international political economy theory from the 
perspective of assessing the impact of international regimes on domestic policy reform 
is the recognition that liberal institutionalists overestimate the unity of the ‘state’ and 
the efficacy of international institutions, while concurrently failing to examine the 
underpinning coalitions of socio-economic interests which shape and re-shape the 
emerging regime, according to their evolving preferences. International political 
economists also conclude that liberal economic strategies must have a positive effect on 
the domestic economy in the short run in order to be sustainable.
E.5 Applicability to transition
This author argues that a simplified version of either the interest group or institutional 
model of IPE theories even combined with the international dimension is insufficient in 
accounting for policy preferences and outcomes on transition economies. While the
71 Milner (1997). ibid., p 83.
72 Milner (1997). ibid., p 258.
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recognition that domestic institutions and the organisation of social, political and 
economic life are different in each individual nation is clearly present in the liberal 
interdependence school, the literature falls short of analysing the repercussions of past 
cultural patterns as well as various legacies for policy reform. Keohane and Milner, for 
example, rightly assume that different interests, institutions and ideas of nations will 
leave some degree of latitude to political leaders as they react to common global trends 
and often lead to different responses to internationalisation, but they put too much hope 
in the notion that ideas and preferences will change according to the impact of the 
international economy on the domestic sphere. As such, they over-estimate the speed 
and depth of the process of internationalisation and its penetration into national systems 
and political cultures.
In contrast, the comparative-political institutional model, such as that espoused to by 
Rogowski, places more weight on the role of national history and past legacies on 
policy outcomes and is a better model for explaining policy decisions in developing 
countries. Rogowski argues “that all else being equal, we would expect easier 
liberalisation in countries where the rule of law is entrenched and respected.”74 This 
attempt to delve into the complex interaction between culture, ideology and economic 
reform is a significant contribution of comparative politics to predicting the evolution of 
reforms in transition economies.
Moreover, the IPE model of interest-based analysis is built on the premise that the 
interests and their preferences in emerging markets will be the same as those in 
developed industrialised countries. Milner and Keohane, for example emphasise the role 
that the Market plays in creating special interest groups, and how, in turn, these interests 
shape policy. They argue that the logic of the Market is not necessarily inconsistent with 
the interests of domestic groups, and, on the contrary, that the Market can actually 
create the forces within domestic politics that have a stake in furthering its spread. 
According to these theories, increasing openness creates beneficiaries who see 
liberalisation as desirable and then pressure their leaders to alter national institutions in 
ways that favour liberal policies.
While the above conclusions might be based on substantial evidence, they are also 
based on several ceteris paribus assumptions; for one, the existence of a Market. By 
applying the models of market reform to neodemocracies , one presumes that the
73 Milner and Keohane (1996). ‘A conclusion’, ibid.
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Market will act according to rational expectations, and that the actors within it will 
likewise behave rationally. Moreover, these theories are premised on the presence of 
established institutions, subject to minor evolutionary changes, and capable of 
representing interests and mediating between their conflicts. They also assume a strong 
and democratically accountable government, able to withstand crisis and credible in 
both the domestic and international arena. None of these conditions are present in 
transition. In order for the Market to change the preferences of interests and for market 
mechanisms to work, there must first be a Market, something clearly missing in a 
command economy or in the early stages of transition.
In addition, these IPE theories and models assume the emergence of a large group of 
winners from the process of internationalisation. In transition economies, for example, it 
is expected that the impact of the international environment on national policy will be 
most acute in its initiation of realignments within the domestic political sphere, and that 
trade liberalisation will break the power monopoly of the entrenched interests of the 
former socialist system, enabling the newly emerging interest groups to gain significant 
influence over national policy. Thus, by creating a new socio-economic group with pro­
liberal policy preferences, the liberal interdependence school predicts that the process of 
internationalisation will become a significant element in allowing the government to 
carry through the majority its reforms and to persist on the track of liberalisation.
While Milner takes it for granted that once economic openness is initiated, interests will 
develop that will support it, B Slay, in contrast, points out that “it is difficult to predict 
how new trade patterns of interest articulation will develop during the process of 
transition from state to market and how, it turn, these forces will affect the balance 
between liberalisation and protectionism.”76 In the Polish case, the staunch advocates of 
free trade and organised pro-liberal interests, with a stake in the reform process, are yet 
to emerge, and the winners and losers are quite different than those under a market 
system. The miners, shipbuilders and steelworkers who enjoyed high status and pay 
under socialism and ironically were in the forefront of those pushing for the liberal 
reforms are those for whom the Market now has least need.
Finally, another dimension demonstrating the insufficiency of IPE models to predict 
policy outcomes in transition economies is that of democratic legitimacy itself. Milner,
Schmitter, P. (1995). ‘Zagrozenia, dylematy, i perspektywy konsolidacji transformacji’, w Hausner, J. 
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for instance, bases her conclusion that inter-state cooperation is less likely once 
domestic politics is factored into the international bargaining process on the notion that 
domestic politics is pivotal in determining foreign policy options. According to Milner, 
the type of international agreement that can be implemented by national authorities 
under the neoliberal institutionalist assumptions of a unitary state is different from the 
type that exists under conditions of parliamentary democracy, where “domestic 
legislative ratification is necessary.”77 International cooperative agreements must win 
ratification at home, which then allows the agreement to take legitimate hold over its 
democratic signatories. Hence, Milner correctly assumes that in a democracy, domestic 
politics legitimises international agreements.
For Milner, international cooperation is determined by the changing preferences of 
domestic interests and reflects their balance of power in domestic politics. For the 
purposes of understanding the implications of international regimes for domestic policy 
reform, it is interesting to ask what happens, in fact, if the process of domestic 
legislative ramification does not fully function according to the democratic principle. 
What happens to this model if the negotiated international agreement is not entirely 
mandated by society in its initiation, or if its subsequent implementation is executed 
without active public involvement, social dialogue or national consensus seeking? Is it 
in fact sustainable in face of domestic resistance under conditions of a parliamentary 
democracy?
This thesis will argue that because the above conditions were not clearly present in the 
negotiations of the EA between the Polish government and the European Union, the 
Agreement’s implementation in Poland has had to rely on the abandonment of the 
democratic principle in order to allow the ‘state’ to fulfil its external commitments. 
While the window of opportunity made the signing of the Agreement possible in the 
first place, because public consensus or dialogue between the social partners and the 
state was not pursued, the development of democratic politics has complicated its 
implementation. To uphold its external obligations and meet the targets of the EA, the 
Polish government has had to resort to semi- authoritarian measures; a political strategy 
which is less than desirable.
In sum, the policy-making process and its outcomes in the former command economies 
cannot be explained without taking into account the breadth and complexity of the 
transition from state to market, including emphasis on cultural legacies. IPE theories
77 Milner (1992). ibid., p 493.
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pay too little attention to this dimension, suggesting a need to reach towards other 
disciplines to successfully meet the challenge.
F. New political economy
Having covered the mainstream theories of economics and political economy as they 
relate to policy reform, this thesis now turns to a body of work that attempts to bridge 
all of the above theories. This school labelled, organisation theory, new institutionalism
751 ♦ i •or neoinstitutional analysis , stems from work done by economists on economic policy 
reform. Organisation theories overlap with the regulation school of economists; they 
have also sometimes been referred to as new institutionalism in organisation theory or
7Q * • • • •new economics o f organisation. As opposed to classical institutionalism, 
organisational literature expands the usual institutional model of policy making beyond 
the traditional socio-economic arrangements, such as labour unions and employers 
organisations, to include other institutions, like the central bank or regulatory agencies. 
The strength of these theories is that they recognise varieties of capitalism. As a result 
they are more applicable to transition economies than their IPE counterparts. P Hall 
observes that “organisational theories move towards a more political approach to policy 
making, which sees politics as a relatively open-ended process and emphasises the ways 
in which non-economic factors, associated with politics or culture, influence the course 
of events that others might attempt to explain in entirely economic or rationalist
OA
terms.” Going beyond Olson’s models of interest group balancing as the explanation
o i
for policy outcomes , the organisation school, for example, attempts to predict how the 
behaviour of an economic regime may be affected by the institutional structures that 
underpins the political economy of a given nation, and how that structure is determined 
by cultural and political legacy variables.
Hall applauds new institutionalists’ rejection of the assumption that interests are 
somehow given, arguing that, “on the contrary, those interest have to be derived via a 
process of interpretation. Politics is fundamental to this process of interpretation and is 
not only a contest for power, but also a struggle for the interpretation of interests.”82 
The scholars of new institutionalism thus recognise that most people have multiple 
interests, and that the interests of a group or an individual are not clearly defined simply 
by their socio-economic position. As such, they acknowledge that the search for
78 Associated for ex. with Williamson, J, (1994). ibid.
79 Hall (1997). ibid.
80 Hall (1997). ibid., p 190.
81 Olson, M. (1971). The Logic o f Collective Action: public goals and the theory o f groups. Cambridge, 
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82 Hall (1997). ibid., p 197.
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legitimacy or culturally appropriate behaviour is sometimes more important in 
determining policy reform than questions of pure efficiency and hence, in their policy 
making prescriptions, they attempt to combine postulates of economic desirability with 
political feasibility considerations. Their aim is to establish the conditions necessary for 
the initiation and sustainability of sound economic policy. However, because, most of 
these reformed economists continue to believe that “interest groups are the enemy of a 
responsible political economy”83, their ultimate goal is to find a way as to minimise the 
harmful impact of rent-seeking behaviour on policy decisions.
While each variant of organisational theories differs according to the emphasis placed 
on the factors responsible for policy outcomes, most overestimate the role of institutions 
and concurrently underestimate the impact of interests. As such, these theories are the 
domestic counterparts of neoliberal institutionalism, maintaining that responsible 
politicians respond to the dilemma of seeking re-election by creating institutions that 
possess the power to commit them to collectively rational strategies. These public 
institutions or ‘agencies of restraint’ tie the hands of politicians and ensure the 
continuation of reform.
As such they uphold the neoliberal institutionalist argument that international regimes 
can serve as powerful tools to positively influence domestic policy reform and help 
maintain an open, liberal economy. While these arguments for ‘anchoring’ domestic 
policies in external regimes are not in and of themselves original, the added value of 
new institutionalism is that of differentiating between the conditions for policy reform 
in developed and developing countries. Moreover, these analyses draw a distinction 
between policy initiation and consolidation, recognising as Nelson does that “the most 
difficult challenges come not initially, but somewhere later in a program, when the 
public is faced with the difficult costs of adjustment and begins to question the 
rationality of the reforms.”85
In addition, new institutionalists argue that not only is the conditionality of the 
international institution to strengthen the credibility of the reform programme, but 
financial assistance is crucial to give the reform-minded policy makers within the 
reforming government extra leverage in winning internal policy disagreements and in
83 Balcerowicz, L (1999). Panstwo w Przebudowie. Krakow: Znak.
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securing social support.86 People will usually accept short-term hardships if after some 
quantifiable amount of time they are convinced that the strategies employed to achieve 
economic breakthroughs will improve their everyday lives. Consequently, the main 
assumption is that external factors can strengthen state capacity and authority by 
providing an added impetus to the reformers through rewards and incentive for change. 
International assistance in the form of market access and financial aid allows the 
government in question to sustain the reform measures long enough to stimulate the 
process of economic recovery and the appearance of visible benefits for those bearing 
the costs of adjustment to enjoy. As a result, this kind of external aid can help to avoid 
the possibility of social chaos and large-scale resistance that can threaten the reform 
efforts themselves.
As the economist J Sachs has argued,
the ability to reform has two critical components- the capacity o f  the country to reform 
itself and the role o f the outside in helping the country overcome the crisis. Internal 
reformers need generous external assistance and support, and even though foreign aid 
is not the main factor in policy initiation, it is crucial to reform consolidation and to 
ensuring that the reforms themselves have enough o f  a life-time to take hold. 87
In addition, the strength of organisational economists, in contrast to their neoliberal 
institutionalist counterparts, is their attempt to define the conditions necessary for
OQ
anchoring strategies to work. By focusing in on the effectiveness of the institution in 
compelling a government to do something it might otherwise not do, organisational 
institutionalists add the international credibility dimension, discussed above, to their 
analysis.
According to K Zukrowska, for example, the mechanism by which international 
leverage works on domestic change is based on two assumptions: trust and 
knowledge.89 On the first level, what is needed is “trust of the elites towards the 
international organisation, based on the assumption that equipped in new powers they 
(the international partners) will not misuse them.” On the second, is the “trust of the 
voters towards their government in the sense of credit given to the ruling political elites 
in power.”
While adding the credibility dimension to institutional analysis is an achievement of 
organisational theories, the problem remains of an overly optimistic portrayal of the
86 Williamson (1994). ‘In search’, ibid., p 25.
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effectiveness of international institutions in performing their intended functions. In 
doing so, the organisational scholars fail to propose what options are available to policy 
makers if the international institutions to which the state is bound falls short in fulfilling 
its obligations.
This literature is also premised on the notion that effective, rational, and responsible 
policies will benefit the nation as a whole and create enough winners as to support the 
reformers. Again, like neoliberal institutionalists, organisational economists suggest that 
market reforms should be initiated first and then that civil society and pluralist 
democracy will somehow spontaneously emerge. Consequently, they fail to account for 
a situation in which this does not happen. What is the technocrat to do if his reforms do 
not produce the intended benefits visible to the public and accessible to society at large? 
The implications of pursuing democratically not-accountable strategies to continue to 
implement the reforms are not desirable from either the political or the economic 
perspective.
Furthermore, not only do new institutionalists, like their traditional political science 
counterparts, over-estimate the durability and effectiveness of institutions, while 
undervaluing the influence of underpinning socio-economic interests, they also overlook 
the implications of transplanting institutions into national systems (as is the case in 
transition economies) for institutional performance.
Finally, both sets of institutional theories treat ‘the state’ as a rational actor, that even if 
divided will act externally as a unified whole for the purpose of preserving national 
interest, namely efficiency. As such, both the domestic and the international variants of 
institutional explanations for policy outcomes convey the impression that society is 
somehow immature and irresponsible, and create a special role for the elites as the 
enlightened guardians of public good.
This shift in focus, in turn, to the role of elites and their intentionally designed 
institutions leads the scholars to underestimate the importance of domestic legitimacy 
and political conflict in policy consolidation.
The assumption is that once society has bestowed trust upon the elites, by electing them, 
to implement wide-ranging reforms, the confirmation of this trust in later stages of 
reform is not necessary. Thus, the mechanisms of building trust and subsequently taking 
it away are not discussed in this literature. Trust seems to be a contract once signed by 
society, not to be broken or withdrawn.
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G. Regime change
The multidisciplinary approach to the study of economic and political development 
labelled regime change theories branches out from a diverse body of work including, 
among others, sociology, economics, political science, international relations, history, 
geography, and political theory. Much like economics, regime change analysis begins 
on the premise that national development and modernisation are conditioned on the 
existence of certain factors conducive to the pursuit of reform. As such, its focus is in on 
the relationship between economic policy and performance, on the one hand, and the 
stability of the political system, on the other; in another words the relationship between 
economic and politics.
The basis for this literature is that all democratic regimes rest on some explicit or 
implicit bargain between political leaders and key support groups, and that ultimately it 
is domestic politics embedded in specific socio-economic structures that determine the 
outcomes of policy.
In spite of the emphasis placed on domestic-level analysis, the study of regime change, 
as a reworked version of modernisation theory reaching back to the 1970’ s90, is 
concerned with both domestic and international constraints on policy making, 
incorporating the interaction between diverse institutions, interests and ideas that 
underpin the process. The literature has its roots in social theories of transformation and 
development, in studies of social processes and in conceptualisations of the interplay 
between structures, norms and institutions that follow choices elites make at moments 
of radical change.91
Primarily, these modernisation and elite theories attempt to identify the relevant factors 
necessary for a sustainable political economy of policy reform. In analysing the 
effectiveness of external leverage on domestic reform, Rosenau, for example, 
acknowledges that the “state’s geopolitical situation, history, culture, as well as the 
nature of the democratic transition will determine the penetration of the international 
system.” More specifically, by examining domestic democratic consolidation in light 
of the international context, he recognises that international socio- economic
90 See Sztompka, P. (1993). ‘Lessons of Post-Communist Transition for Sociological Theories of 
Change’, in Coenen-Huther, J. and Synak, B. (Ed.) (1993). Post Communist Poland. Commack, NY:
Nova Publishers
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modernisation pressure, as based on the notions like “conditionality, incorporation and 
contagion” of seeking membership in the international community, has a crucial role to 
play in the internal process of reform.
Consequently, Rosenau significantly broadens the work of neoliberal institutionalists 
from that of a simple examination of the economic efficiency and policy credibility 
consequences of international regimes, to include social and political implications of 
‘anchoring’.
In addition, regime change theories distinguish between the conditions necessary for 
policy initiation and those for consolidation. They argue that successful politics of 
adjustment are grounded in legitimate socio-economic structures that underpin each 
individual nation and are determined by strategic choices of the supporters and 
opponents of the incumbent governments.
Hence, A Krueger observes that, “the leap from policy initiation to consolidation 
depends on numerous and multiple intertwined factors such as a sensible policy 
program, the credibility of the government, the occurrence of external shocks, and the
Q -1
credibility of external assistance and of the regime.” The analysis of policy-making 
and performance cannot be reduced to reductionist models that emphasise one factor 
over others. Similarly, B Crawford suggests that, “policy outcomes will be determined 
by the specific conditions present at a given time, including the strength of social 
legacies, the capacity, role and structure of the state, the constraints and incentives of 
the international environment and alternative policy choices.” (gradualism vs. 
radicalism).94
Moreover, for scholars of regime change, both political and economic consequences of 
policy reform are equally important for its sustainability. Krueger, for example, 
polemicises with liberal institutionalists noticing that, “the belief that further 
liberalisation will follow and new groups that generate support will emerge if the 
reforms are successful leads to the opposite conclusion, that if an external shock takes 
place following the implementation of the policy, policy reversal are quite likely to 
follow”. Thus, according to Kreuger, the primary condition for consolidating adjustment 
is economic success that can create a political basis of support for the reforming
93 Krueger, A.O. (1993). The Political Economy o f Policy Reform in Developing Countries, Cambridge, 
Mass.: MIT Press, p 75.
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government. On the other hand, she argues, “economic failure can erode not only that 
basis for that support, but also threaten the power of the state itself.”95 
For regime change theorists, the importance of economic performance of a given 
institution or policy is only the first factor in determining outcomes. The second factor 
revolves around the actual implementation of the measures themselves. The literature 
builds upon the sociological concepts of trust and legitimacy96, acknowledging that the 
failure to legitimise economic policies can have serious, even regime-threatening 
political effects. Hence, sustainable economic policies must not only yield material 
results in the form of a higher standard of living, but also must be implemented in such 
a way as to build trust and increase the credibility of the reformers.
The recognition that the distributive effects of initiating and consolidating economic 
reform make it necessary to generate support of not only the winners of the process but 
also of the losers thus emerges as the central theme in regime change theories. Pivotal to 
the entire process of modernisation and central to successful policy outcomes is the role 
of the ‘state’ and its capacity to respond to changing circumstances. The strength or the 
weakness of the ‘state’ and of its institutions comes, in turn, from their legitimacy. 
According to Haggard and Kaufman, a weak ‘state’ can be captured by strong interest 
groups and cannot implement the reforms or provide other public goods, such as 
enforcement of the rule of law or protection of the citizens. On the other hand, a strong 
and efficient ‘state’, capable of responding to various modernisation dilemmas and 
paradoxes, and grounded in stable and transparent institutions, can serve as a reliable 
mechanism for a successful political economy of policy reform.97 
To regime study analysts, the kind of market failures that occur in developing and 
emerging economies, coupled with unstable domestic interests, institutions and ideas, 
create a special role for the ‘state’ and for its intervention into economic life. 
Consequently, the main goal of both the external and the internal supporters of the 
reform efforts should be to strengthen the ‘state’ and to rely on it to steer the economy
QO
and society through the transformation.
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From economists to sociologists, political scientists and historians, the proponents of 
these theories of social processes recognise that it is “the lack of institutionally 
legitimated authority which renders the governing elites defenceless in simultaneously 
responding to the various dilemmas and paradoxes of development.”99As such, the role 
of social inclusion in policy reform should not be underestimated. This conclusion is 
rooted in the belief that institutionalising agency or building mechanisms of social 
acceptance of the rules of the game is key to policy consolidation. According to C Offe, 
et al., the sustainability of reform and the institutionalisation of democracy depends on 
the construction of a broad base of support and on the building of ‘trust’ in the new 
economic sector and new institutions.100 Trust, in turn, comes from routinising and 
managing distributive conflict, a central and indispensable element of democracy.
P Schmitter, on the other hand, emphasises the need to create mechanisms for 
consultation between social partners, as well as between the state and society, such as an 
effective system of interest representation and mediation.101 J Hausner, likewise, 
accentuates the necessity of civic participation for consolidating adjustment, and the 
need for negotiation between social partners within internalised institutions that 
incorporate both the winners and losers of the changes.102
Another strength of regime change literature is the focus on the compatibility between 
capitalism and democracy. Criticising the school of new institutionalism in organisation 
theory discussed above, D Stark argues that while economic crisis conditions in CEE 
have allowed the leaders to exploit the weakness of the opposition and initiate sweeping 
reform, the type of capitalism that is emerging, carried out through large- scale social
i mexperiments, and enforce from above, has little chance of being consolidated. A 
Przeworski is also critical of these neo-liberal efforts at economic stabilisation and 
structural adjustment, as they are premised on the imposition of the measures using 
semi-authoritarian means. These policy-making methods pose problems for the future
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development of democracy. In attempting to sweep through as many radical reforms as 
is possible in the shortest amount of time, the governing elites abandon public 
consensus seeking “in their bid to centralise power and execute rapid decision­
making.”104
In addition, Linz and Stepan assert that this style of technocratic politics can lead to an 
increase in political cynicism and apathy, a decline in effective political participation, 
and a rise in crime, riots and civil violence. All of these phenomenon undermine the 
ability of the ‘state’ to perform its functions and are not only perilous to democracy but 
also to stable economic policy.105
As argued above, technocratic imposition of economic reforms is premised on the 
notion that once the market is freed from state intervention and its mechanism activated, 
democracy will follow. Hence, the main goal for the technocrat is liberalisation of 
economic activity and recovery of growth. These theories suggest as B Crawford has 
noticed, “that liberal democracies will only consolidate political support after successful 
market reforms have spawned a middle class, civic culture and pluralistic societies.”106 
Regime change scholars, on the other hand, argue that while economic performance is 
indeed necessary for the sustainability of reforms, it is in and of itself insufficient. What 
is needed to consolidate democratic rule and guarantee the viability of the reforms is the 
development of legitimate political institutions that can effectively mediate political 
conflict. This requires active state engagement at all levels of development and not the 
kind of laissez-faire strategies propagated by neoliberals.
Finally, regime change literature seeks to analyse the role of the international in 
bolstering domestic change. Recognising that under conditions of fiscal austerity 
measures required for macroeconomic stabilisation packages combined with weak
1 ryy
governments and undeveloped institutions , reforming elites in developing countries
need external assistance for their domestic efforts. B Crawford points out that
in short, it will be difficult for these countries to enact meaningful reforms and safeguard 
economic achievements purchased at high social costs i f  the international economic 
climate is unstable and i f  foreign economic relationships are highly asymmetrical and 
competitive. To the extent that these countries are further marginalised by the 
international environment, past legacies will produce technocratic, nationalist, or
populist pressures.108
104 Przeworski, A. (1991). Democracy and the Market: political and economic reforms in Eastern Europe 
and Latin America. Studies in rationality and social change. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press pp 
182-184.
105 Linz, J. and Stepan, A. (1996). Problems o f  Democratic Transition and Consolidation: Southern 
Europe, South America, and Post-communist Europe. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press.
106 Crawford, B. (1995). ‘Post Communist Political Economy’, ibid., p 4.
107 Przeworski, A. (1995). Sustainable Democracy, ibid.
108 Crawford, B. (1995). ‘Post Communist Political Economy’, ibid., p 24.
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Such conditions obviously undermine political support for the liberalisers.
By attempting to address the issue of policy implementation and presentation, regime 
theories go one step further than other bodies of work in examining the effectiveness of 
external leverage on domestic change. While the strategy of economists might be in and 
of itself correct in prescribing external ‘anchoring’ to lock in domestic institutions and 
increase the credibility of the reforms, its weakness comes from overemphasising the 
role of the external.
In contrast, regime change scholars maintain that the primary focus of economic reform 
should be legitimate domestic institutions, grounded in cultural and historical legacies, 
and based on the mediation of conflicting interests. External leverage should be seen as 
an additional supportive tool in influencing policy outcomes.
In sum, in order for international institutions to play a positive role in domestic reform, 
regime change scholars assert that they should provide incentives for change, rewarding 
the reforming elites for continuing their efforts rather than punishing through sanctions
109to exert pressure.
Conclusion
Drawing on the complexity of the theories described above and, in particular regime 
change analysis, this thesis will show that the main danger of international ‘anchoring’ 
strategies, chosen by the Polish liberal reformers and encouraged by the European 
Union, has been their implications for the development of state capacity and authority, 
as well as in their consequences for democracy building. This thesis thus argues that 
both the initial Polish technocratic governments and the EU can partially be held 
responsible for the backsliding in Polish policy reform.
The fundamental flaw in the ‘anchoring’ strategies comes from unclear assumptions 
about the relationship between democracy and the market, as well as from an 
overestimation of the unity as well as rationality of the ‘state’ in transition. By 
implementing a neoliberal economic strategy required for international credibility, the 
first, post-socialist Polish governments initiated a decision-making process based on 
technocratic policy options. The EU, in turn, by requiring ‘anchoring’ as a condition for 
Polish association110, contributed to strengthening these technocratic tendencies.
In addition, while the ‘anchoring’ effect was desired by the liberal Polish elites, the 
strategy was based on certain expectations as to the responses from the EU. However, 
the EU’s policies towards the Polish associate have evolved inconsistently, plagued by
109 See Lewis, P.G. and Pridham, G. (Ed.) (1996). Stabilising Fragile Democracies, ibid.
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contradictions between the announced goal of rendering support for internal transition, 
on the one hand, and contrasting signals sent from the member states in their actual 
policy responses, on the other. By relying on sanctions rather than rewards for exerting 
pressure on the Polish governments to liberalise, while simultaneously failing to provide 
the kind of generous external support necessary to aid in the transformation process, the 
EU has not succeeded in implementing its intent to buttress democratic-market reform 
in Poland, and ultimately has not created the conditions necessary for an external anchor 
to work in stabilising domestic policy. Moreover, by falling short of fulfilling its 
declared objectives for association, the EU collectively has damaged political relations 
between itself and the Polish ‘state’, and undermined not only its own credibility as an 
open trading partner, but also the authority of the Polish, reformist, governing 
coalitions. Liberal, domestic economic policies have not become fully institutionalised 
in Poland, because they have not materialised into tangible benefits for most of Polish 
society to enjoy. The highly competitive and asymmetrical both in political and 
economic terms climate, which has emerged between Poland and the European Union 
during the course of association, has, instead of lessening, increased the social costs of 
the reforms, weakening the political support for liberalisation.
Thus, the underestimated costs of the transition, combined with incoherent signals from 
the EU and increasing alienation of society have weakened the credibility of the 
reformist governments in Poland and of the liberal economic policies pursued by them. 
This enabled successive coalitions and opposition parties to be highly critical of the 
initial reforms. Ultimately the developments have increased the vacillations and 
instability within the Polish economic regime and contributed to the re-emergence of 
protectionist behaviour.
Finally, by over-emphasising the economic and technical dimensions of association, 
while formally expecting democratic legitimation and social inclusion in the policy­
making process111, the EU collectively has failed to realise that the main obstacles to 
successful policy reform in the Polish candidate, and eventually accession, have in fact 
been social rather than economic. Ultimately, the integration of a country into the EU 
with a long tradition of very different political and social assumptions has made this 
human capital dimension crucial to the process of policy consolidation, harmonisation 
and convergence.
110 Systemic stability being a prerequisite for association with the European Union.
111 However, this author observes that the formal political and social acquis has not always been entirely 
compatible with the economic conditionality required for association or accession.
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This thesis will show that the unique infrastructure of the Polish nation, understood in a 
much broader sense than just the economic environment, has been one fraught with 
powerful legacies of the past, weak and illegitimate institutions, incapable governments, 
underdeveloped interests and very specific mixtures of national traits, fears and 
aspirations, all of which have complicated the dilemmas of both transition and 
association. Economic policy reform has had to proceed under these conditions, and, the 
already weak and irrational ‘state’ has been forced to resolve additional policy 
dilemmas, in its confrontation of the tension between international restraints on policy­
making and domestic requirements of accountability.
60
2. External Openness and Internal Transformation
Because one o f  the strongest arguments against Polish accession is the 
underdevelopment o f the region and the consequential costs o f its membership for the 
EU, the stronger the Polish economy and the more adapted it is to western practices, 
the more convincing its application. The ability to cope with competitive pressure 
continues to be a fundamental condition for Poland's participation in the internal 
market and thus a basis for its full membership in the EU. Polish pre-accession strategy 
is thus aimed both at adjusting to EU requirements and simultaneously continuing the 
internal transformation based on sustainable growth and long term- development. 1
Trade with the outside world had been one of the central features distinguishing 
formerly planned economies from market models. In transition, trade is not just an 
economic policy. It is rather a strategic issue, determining a country's exposure to the 
outside world, as well as its global economic position. As Brabant has pointed out, 
“because the goals of establishing a functioning market system revolve around complete 
submersion into the global economy, the critical question following the transition is 
how open these economies will be and what kind of a trade regime that will crystallise 
in the process.”2
For subsequent Polish governments, seeking membership in the EU has thus been much 
more than a state of political negotiations and externally enforced adjustment, but has 
fundamentally revolved around domestic structural and systemic changes to prepare 
Poland for accession. Internal reforms and economic restructuring have been the sine 
qua non conditions of membership, as specifically set out in the Copenhagen Criteria in 
June 1993.The existence of a functioning market economy as well as the capacity to 
cope with competitive pressures and market forces within the Union were laid out as 
explicit conditions for accession.
As such, both the transformation and the pre-accession strategy have relied heavily on 
the scope of openness of the Polish economy, and the goal of trade policy, set out in the 
early days of the transition, has been to bring domestic economic policy in line with 
market mechanisms of the international structure; to increase openness and 
competitiveness of the nation in order to stimulate growth and consequently lead to 
prosperity. The implementation of the EA was to constitute the most significant element
1 Buzek, J. Polish Prime Minister, Speech, ‘Towards Membership of the European Union’, 11/10/00.
2 Brabant, J. (1993). ‘How the East can eventually merge into the world economy’, in Salvatore, D. (Ed.) 
(1993). Protectionism and World Welfare. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, p 421.
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of this strategy serving as supportive instrument as well as anchor for policy reform and 
sustainability.
This chapter thus takes a look at modem economic theory and what it has to say on the 
role openness in transformation. It also examines the objectives of the EA, the 
neoliberal institutionalist rationale for ‘binding liberalisation’ to international regimes 
and finally the provisions of the Agreement itself.
I. Openness
According to classical economic theory3, the most fundamental link between a nation’s 
and the world economy is commercial openness. By initiating internationalisation, an 
open market is the best way to foster economic efficiency and accordingly increase 
national wealth and prosperity. Openness serves as the means to an end. It leads to 
higher growth, increasing per capita income and per capita exports. Moreover, openness 
as a concept has a particular significance for the former- socialist states, implying much 
more than commercial liberalisation and encompassing basic political tenants, which 
contest the fundamental nature of the closed, totalitarian system. Beginning with 
Gorbachev’s Glasnost, one is tempted to say that the opening up of CEE economies, 
politics and societies to the outside world stimulated an unstoppable process of the 
collapse of socialism and reintegration of the members of the Warsaw Pact with western 
structures.
A. Definitions and measurements
One of the problems with analysing the relationship between openness and growth is 
that openness is neither directly observable nor has one accepted definition which is 
derived from theory.4 A vast economic literature exists on the topic, making the search 
for an exact definition arduous if not impossible. However, to understand the benefits 
that can be derived from commercial liberalisation, one must first be able to point to a 
series of variables that determine the boundaries and measurements of openness.
At the core of openness, stemming from classical liberalism, is the notion of individual 
liberty. Adam Smith’s concept of Laissez Faire symbolises economic freedom as 
pursued by the individual and guided by the market. The natural liberty of homo 
oeconomicus is safeguarded as one of the fundamental rights of man. It is precisely this
3 The author will present the rationale for openness, espoused to by liberal economists. It is assumed that 
these arguments are purely theoretical and should be interpreted as such.
4 Proudman, J., Redding, S. and Bianchi, M. (1997). ‘Is International Openness Associated with Faster 
Economic Growth?’, Bank O f England Papers, London: Bank Of England.
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freedom that was lacking in socialist economies, where the state, rather than the 
individual or the market, guided economic decisions and constrained initiative.5 The 
focus of the entire process of transformation, for both Polish and Western liberals, has 
been to free this individual initiative and introduce the basic building blocs of capitalism 
into the former command structures.
In classical economic theory, the opening up of the economy was confined to the 
macroeconomic process of trade liberalisation. However, globalisation and increasing 
interdependence of various elements of economic transactions have led to redefining 
openness in a wider sense. The linkages between trade, on the one hand, and investment 
and capital mobility, on the other, have resulted in a conceptualisation of liberalisation 
that encompasses more than the dismantling of the classical tools of protectionism, 
mainly tariffs and duties, to include diverse non-tariff barriers, exchange rate 
manipulations, as well as reforms in the areas of competition and industrial policy. The 
new interpretation of openness is synchronised with a more far-reaching understanding 
of economic integration between states and markets. According to K. Zukrowska, “the 
opening up of the economy suggests departing from protection of the internal market, 
which leads to the liberalisation of external relations. This notion incorporates numerous 
activities from reductions in tariffs, coverage of new fields by integration, to 
harmonisation of technical standards and legal regulations.”6
The simplest understanding of openness can thus be conceived of as integration of the 
national economic and institutional system within global networks. Integration is 
achieved by the liberalisation of trade and investment flows and an outward- looking 
orientation of domestic economic activity. The process of internationalising the 
economy can also be broadly defined as freeing a nation’s international trade and capital 
transfers from domestic control and arbitrary government intervention.
To understand more precisely the notion of commercial openness, economists have 
generated a series of openness indicators, which attempt to measure the extent to which 
an economy is open.7 Indicators, such as the World Bank Development indicators or the 
EBRD transition indicators, define openness through ratios, based on trade in goods on
5 Sally, R. (1998). Classical Liberalism and International Economic Order, Studies in theory and 
intellectual history. London: Routladge.
6 Zukrowska, K. (1998). ‘The Scope of Opening of the Economy in the Pre-accession Period: exemplified 
by the Polish experience’, in Zielinska- Glebocka and Stepniak (Ed) (1998). EU Adjustment to Eastern 
Enlargement Polish and European Perspective, p. 299.
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the one hand and private capital flows on the other.8 Measuring the contribution of 
foreign investment and trade to an economy’s gross domestic product, by deriving a 
simple ratio of exports plus imports/ GDP can paint a picture of a country’s relative 
participation in and dependence on international trade and capital.
The World Trade Organisation, on the other hand, applies Trade Orientation Indexes 
which measure how trade is distorted away from its free trade level by real exchange 
rate and tariff distortions.9 Sachs and Warner, similarly, provide a simple but 
comprehensive model for measuring openness, which includes variables such as average 
tariff rates and NTB’s. Their cross- country indicator measures a nation’s orientation to 
the world economy. A country is classified as closed if any of the following criteria are 
satisfied: 1- average tariff level rate above 40%, 2- NTB’s on more than 40% of 
imports, 3- socialist economic system10, 4- state monopoly on major exports, and 5- 
black market premium on the exchange rate exceeding 20%. An economy is deemed 
open if none of the 5 conditions apply. According to this model, all ten CEE states were 
considered closed until 1989, and following the initiation of reforms, they graduated to 
the “open” classification.11
B. Openness and growth
Once openness is broadly defined and understood, it is important to consider its 
implications for growth and income convergence between nations at different levels of 
development. The relationship between openness to the international economy and a 
country’s rate of economic growth is key to understanding the role that liberalisation 
can play in transformation economies. According to the WTO, the association between 
trade openness and growth demonstrates that more open economies tend to grow faster, 
are found to converge to higher levels of income, have higher investment ratios, better 
macroeconomic balances and a larger role of the private sector as the engine of 
growth.12
7 Hufbauer, G. and Kotschwar, B. (1998). ‘The Future Course of Trade Liberalisation’, Paper fo r  The 
World Bank, Institute for International Economics, Washington DC: World Bank, October.
8 Both trade as % of gdp and private capital flows as % gdp ( ppp gdp & goods gdp); Higher openness 
ratios suggests more trade with the world.
World Bank (2001). World Development Indicators, and EBRD (2000). Transition Report.
9 Ben- David, D., Winters, L.A. and Nordstrom, H. (2000). ‘Trade, Income Disparity and Poverty’, World 
Trade Organisation Special Studies, No 5, Geneva: WTO.
10 According to Komai (1992) definition.
11 Sachs, J. and Warner, A. (1995). ‘Economic Reform and the Process of Global Integration’, Harvard 
Institute o f Economic Research Discussion Paper, No 1733, Cambridge, MA: Harvard Institute..
12 WTO, (1998). Annual Report, Special Topic: Globalisation and Trade. Geneva: WTO.
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Moreover, Sachs and Warner claim that, “the only variable on which one needs to 
condition to observe convergence in income is the economy’s trade regime.”13 Although 
trade liberalisation is only one aspect of a government’s reform programme designed to 
integrate a country into the world economy, it is the sine qua non of internationalisation. 
Trade reform has a major effect on all the factors of production and serves as a conduit 
for other spillovers. Moreover, liberalisation is believed to be the quickest way to 
achieve competition in a heavily cartelised domestic market, such as the former planned 
economies, thus reducing their monopolistic structure.
Liberal economic theory maintains that economic openness, based on trade and foreign 
investment, together with competitive domestic markets and observance of sound 
macroeconomic fundamentals explain to a large extent the variation in growth rates 
between countries.14 Moreover, traditional trade theory asserts that increased trade 
results in static as well as dynamic gains. On the static side, integration into the global 
trading system brings about the benefits of increased competition, specialisation and 
economies of scale, improving national competitiveness and changing a country’s 
commodity structure to further stimulate pro- growth economic integration.15 An open 
nation tends to witness gains in total factor productivity as the country is exposed to 
various trade induced spillovers, such as new management techniques, the spread of 
knowledge and ideas and modem technologies, and the import of capital and resources 
for domestic production, supply and consumption. Cheaper imports replace more costly 
domestic products and divert labour and capital to more productive uses resulting in 
efficiency gains due to comparative advantage. Additionally, by forcing importers and 
exporters to leam to better utilise their resources, external competition also increases 
national productivity. Trade is an important determinant of job creation, as exports 
support jobs and export- oriented firms tend to be more stable than those limited to the 
domestic market. Indirectly then, trade can bring about higher wages and more flexible 
labour-market policies. Openness can also contribute to the improvements in the 
efficiency of public systems of social protection and as well as environmental quality.16
For more see also World Bank (1998). The Future Course o f Trade Liberalisation. Washington DC: 
World Bank, Institute for International Economics, October.
13 Sachs and Warner, ibid, p 2.
14 OECD (1998). ‘Open Markets Matter: The Benefits of Trade and Investment Liberalisation’, OECD, 
No 6, Paris: OECD.
15 Levine, R. and Renelt, D. (1992). ‘A sensitivity analysis of cross-country growth regressions’, 
American Economic Review, Vol 82, pp 924-63.
16 OECD (1998). ibid.
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Furthermore, liberals contend that opening up the economy reduces risk and 
vulnerability to economic cycles as world markets tend to be more stable than domestic
17ones.
Finally, various studies have attempted to demonstrate that there is a strong positive 
correlation between trade and investment, and that the indirect dynamic benefits of open 
trade are as impressive as the direct efficiency gains. Not only is additional investment 
generated as exports increase growth, but also low trade barriers can enhance the 
productiveness of foreign investments18, which, in turn, bring about additional market 
spillovers. Inward investment is the key to the creation of competitive market 
economies and the most effective way of transferring technology, know-how and 
managerial skills. Foreign investors provide a stable source of employment and long­
term capital, stimulating domestic investment, and thus helping to cover deficits in 
savings and in the balance of payments. Investments can influence the development of 
financial, regulatory and other institutions and help establish financial discipline. 
Upstream and downstream linkages and demonstration effects lead to productivity gains 
that include quickening the pace of restructuring and privatisation, and increasing R &
D intensity and ultimately stimulating innovation and competitiveness. By integrating 
domestic production capacities into global networks of production, marketing and 
distribution, FDI leads directly to increases in intra-industry trade, which, thanks to 
greater product specialisation and differentiation, further invigorates the realisation of 
economies of scale. Foreign investment thus stimulates export growth and improves the 
performance of the trade regime by influencing the structure of trade and the type of 
goods and services that are exported. Finally, like trade, FDI acts as a powerful spur to 
competition, encouraging domestic firms to reduce costs and enhance their productivity.
C. Transition/ transformation
The rationale behind radical trade opening, at the onset of transition, followed by the 
‘anchoring’ of the process of liberalisation in external regimes to ensure its continuity 
stemmed from these liberal arguments as to the benefits of openness. Both the Polish 
economic team19, led by Finance Minister L Balcerowicz, as well as their western 
advisers, had powerful and well- thought out reasons for expecting that a decisive
17 Winters, LA. (2000). ‘Trade, Liberalisation and Poverty’, Poverty Research Unit Discussion Paper, No 
7, Sussex: SEI.
18 OECD (1998). ibid.
19 Interview with Rafal Anczak, member of the Balcerowicz team. February 10, 2003.
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opening of the Polish economy to world markets would be the most expedient and 
efficient way of initiating internal reforms. The heightened competition on domestic 
markets was to result in the demonopolisation of the economy and go along with price 
deregulation, privatisation and liberalisation to ensure that no new distortions such as 
monopolistic pricing arose. Competition was also to force changes in productivity and 
efficiency, especially in the traditionally closed sectors, resulting in improvements in the 
quality of goods and services provided and bringing benefits to consumers as prices fell 
and diversity increased.
Viewed as a primary instrument of reform, trade liberalisation was also to help promote 
government responsibility in other areas.20 Increasing competition was believed to be a 
prerequisite for the market to function properly, transferring power from public to 
private and undercutting the ability of the entrenched bureaucracy to influence political 
decisions. Thus, for the economic liberals, competition was to shake vested interest 
groups out of their monopolistic positions and tilt the political balance back towards a 
more pluralistic equilibrium.21 As such, economic liberalisation was indirectly to lead to 
the emergence of a middle class, with a stake in the reforms that, in turn, would provide 
a base of support for the government in continuing its liberalisation agenda.
Finally, it was argued that trade and integration with the global economy would actually 
create a basis for political trust, and that foreign economic policy would serve as a tool 
to achieve difficult domestic goals. According to the liberals, and as postulated by 
neoliberal institutionalism, binding domestic policies to external obligations would limit 
the discretion of governments and make protectionistic policies too costly and 
complicated to re- introduce. Economic aid attached to conditionality, by entailing 
sanctions for governments that do not comply with the policy prescriptions of donors,22 
would influence the pace and performance of domestic change. Thus, ‘anchoring’ 
domestic politics within multiple international regimes would add credibility to the 
reforms, and the preferential market access granted in return would provide an 
additional incentive, a “carrot” to further justify difficult domestic decisions.
20 Sachs and Warner (1995). ibid.
Balcerowicz, L. (1995). Socialism, Capitalism, Transformation. Budapest: Central European University 
Press.
21 See chapters 3 & 4
22 Pridham, G. (1991). ‘International influences and democratic transition: problems of theory and linkage 
in politics’, in Pridham, G. (Ed.) (1991). Encouraging Democracy: The International Context o f  Regime 
Transition in Southern Europe. London: Leister University Press, Pinter Publishers.
See also Lewis, P.G. and Pridham, G. (1996). Stabilising Fragile Democracies, ibid.
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These expectations were all none the less conditional upon a favourable international 
environment and a commitment from the west to the free trade and true reciprocity 
principles.
D. Reforming external economic relations
Faced with tremendous external and internal debt, hyper-inflation, and growing 
difficulties in exporting to traditional markets, in 1990, the Polish government, with the 
encouragement of various western consultants, launched a radical stabilisation package. 
This included complete price liberalisation, tough monetary and wage policy, reduction 
of domestic demand, internal convertibility, and import liberalisation. These short run 
measures were designed to stabilise the economy and initiate the process of reform.
The main goal of the Balcerowicz Plan was to stimulate national economic growth 
through a radical re- integration of the Polish economy into the global system. The 
Polish economists rightly believed that the prerequisite for the implementation of the 
internal market reforms was the linking of the domestic sphere to the international, and 
the Polish 'Big Bang' sought to accomplish this through a sudden and unilateral 
liberalisation of external economic relations. Commenting on the initial structure of the 
trade regime, J Kulig noted that, “in Poland, trade policy reform must be considered in 
conjunction with export performance- which was accomplished under a strict 
stabilisation programme. It was a policy of exporting our way out of a recession.”23
D.2 Dismantling command structures
Trade in the classical planned economy operated through foreign trade organisations 
and the state retained monopoly power over trade activity.24 Domestic producers were 
isolated from competition and prices in world markets through various price distortions 
and centralised control of foreign exchange transactions.25 Following the collapse of the 
Soviet union and the CMEA in 1991, the leading CEE states re-oriented their 
geographical trade patterns from East to West and underwent profound trade and
23 Kulig, J. (1993). ‘discussion’, in Foti, G. (Ed.) (1993). ‘The Future of Eastern and Central Europe in 
the World Economy: Proceedings of the Jubilee Conference’, Papers for Hungarian Institute fo r  World 
Economics, Budapest, Institute for World Economics.
24 Kaminski, B., Wang, Z. and Winters, L.A. (1996). ‘Foreign Trade in the Transition: the international 
environment and domestic policy’, World Bank Studies o f  Economies in Transformation, No 20, 
Washington DC: World Bank.
25 On the import side- centralised allocation of the foreign exchange rate served as a NTB, on the export 
side- multiple exchange rates, distorted prices and foreign exchange surrender requirements undermined 
incentives of firms to engage in foreign trade.
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investment policy changes, the Polish reforms representing the most radical of the 
liberalisation packages.
For the Mazowiecki government normalisation of relations with the West meant being 
granted market access through Most Favoured Nation status as well as the Generalised 
System of Preferences. Consequently, the primarily unilateral liberalisation programme 
was soon complemented by various bi-lateral, regional and multilateral trade 
agreements including the Europe Agreements and EFT A with the EC, CEFTA within 
the region itself, and the WTO globally.
The reorientation of the trade regime from east to west was a political and economic 
priority. Politically, the move signified a dramatic break with the past and an embrace of 
the values of liberal democracies. Moreover, the diversion of trade flows from the 
former members of the CMEA to Western Europe was necessary to sustain export 
growth in the face of the collapse of traditional Eastern markets and dramatic falls in 
output. The Polish economic team under the auspices of western advisers26 argued that 
the downward spiral could only be stopped through access to new markets and increased 
economic and political integration with Poland’s most important partner- the EC. 
Accordingly, in 1992, trade became the most important driving force in the Polish 
economic recovery, when export growth to new markets provided one of the few bright 
spots in the transformation process.27
The initial reforms of the majority of the trade regimes throughout the CEE region were 
built upon standard economic theory and concerned mainly with getting rid of the 
remnants of the administratively controlled CMEA system and moving towards market- 
oriented and open external economic relations. The export subsidy schemes were 
abolished, quantitative restrictions removed and tariff schedules introduced, based on 
low and uniform tariffs. Most reformers adopted a unified exchange rate, made their 
currencies convertible in the current account and gave firms autonomy to operate in 
international markets. Most also underwent devaluation of their domestic currency in 
order to boost their export growth.28
25 Especially Sachs and Lipton
27 For more on this see EBRD (1994). Transition Report.
Kaminski,#. (1999). ‘The Role of Foreign Direct Investment and Trade Policies in Poland’s Accession to 
the European Union’, World Bank Technical Paper, No 442, Washington DC: World Bank.
28 International convertibility lends credibility to macroeconomic policies, links firms to world prices and 
is an intricate part of the package of reforms geared towards marketisation. Economic internationalisation 
was accompanied by domestic stabilisation, restructuring and privatisation.
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In Poland, trade liberalisation became effective in January 1990, when the zloty became 
internally convertible and almost all domestic prices were released from administrative 
control. Trade reform included the unification of exchange rates, liberalisation of access 
to foreign trade activity on both the import and export side and application of uniform 
tariffs on all imports. Subsidies, especially to agricultural production, and other forms of 
non-tariff measures were eliminated in the new customs code introduced in January, 
compatible with international norms.
At the beginning of 1990, the average tariff was 8.9% ad valorem. In order to reduce 
import charges in the second half of the year, customs duties were suspended on two 
thirds of tariff items, lowering the trade weighted protection from 8.9% to 4% and 
making Poland one of the most open economies world wide. Moreover, in August, 
another modification to the new customs code came into force adopting the Polish 
nomenclature system to the measurements of Combined Nomenclature applied by the 
European Community.
None the less, by 1991 already foreign trade management was becoming increasingly 
politicised. Liberalisation of tariffs was diminished by government reliance on the 
foreign exchange system and on macroeconomic policy instruments as a way of 
providing extra protection to domestic producers. In October, the zloty fixed exchange 
regime was replaced by a crawling peg with a 1.8% monthly rate of devaluation. In 
order to increase government fiscal revenues and increase the degree of protection, 
devaluation was then combined with increased tariff protection, when the average 
weighted tariff was raised to 16.83%. Furthermore, in December 1992, a 6% across- the- 
border import tax was imposed, additionally moderating the scope of liberalisation.29
II. Towards The European Union
The World Bank has observed that, “in its quest to improve allocative efficiency and 
boost growth performance, a typical developing country usually has two options: 
unilateral liberalisation of its investment and trade regimes or multilateral liberalisation 
based on reciprocity of concessions.”30 However, the Polish government had a third 
option to achieve its domestic goals; that of a preferential trade arrangement with the
Flemming, J., and Rollo, J.M.C. (Ed.) (1992). Trade, Payments and Adjustments in Central and Eastern 
Europe. London: Royal Institute of International Affairs.
Ehrenhaft, P., Hindley, B., Michalopoulos, C. and Winters, LA. (1997). ‘Policies on Imports from 
Economies in Transition’, World Bank Discussion Paper, No 22, Washington DC: World Bank.
29 Michalek, J. (2000). ‘The Europe Agreement and the Evolution of Polish Trade Policy’, in Yearbook o f  
European Studies, No 4, Warsaw: CEUW.
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European Community. This path was potentially to be superior to either unilateral or 
multilateral liberalisation31 and became a crucial component of the Polish growth- 
oriented openness strategy.
According to K Zukrowska, “an invitation to join (an organisation such as the European 
Community) and negotiate the conditions of membership can be considered as an 
external leverage to change” and a commitment to accept the burden of changing. 
“Invitation is seen as a reward for the effort to change and plays a mobilising role.”32 
The importance of this positive mobilisation through international cooperation is 
evident through the wide-ranging influence of the international community and 
institutions on domestic reform.
In addition, policy acts such as the signing of international treaties have long term and 
long-lasting effects and shape the future domestic environment by creating interests that 
either gain or lose from the policy. In an essay on linkage politics, international relations 
scholar J Rosenau has argued that, “constraints from the international environment may 
act as consistent pressure for continuity in the face of domestic change or upheaval, 
inducing various patterns of socialisation, creating new networks, and increasing 
interaction.”33 Similarly, G Almond concluded that, “external agents or developments 
are likely to exert a powerful influence on regime transition by preparing the way for it, 
as well as through direct impact during the process itself.”34
Taking all this into consideration, the Polish liberal government in 1990 consciously 
chose a development path focused on linking domestic reform to the international 
sphere, trading off political and economic benefits against the price of reduced 
sovereignty and limited policy autonomy.
30 World Bank (1998). The Future Course o f Trade Liberalisation, ibid., p 26.
31 Assuming that trade liberalisation with the EU represents a form of bi-lateral state cooperation, due to a 
common external negotiations position of the member states through the CCP.
For more see Milner, Keohanene, Czempiel and Rosenau, Strange, Krasner, Ruggie.
32 Zukrowska, K. (1998). ‘The Scope of Opening of the Economy in the Pre-accession Period: 
exemplified by the Polish experience’, in Zielinska- Glebocka and Stepniak (Ed) (1998). EU Adjustment 
to Eastern Enlargement Polish and European Perspective, p 300.
33 Rosenau, J.N. (1969). Linkage Politics: essays on the convergence o f national and international 
systems. NY: Free Press and Princeton Center of International Studies, p 14.
34 Almond, G. (1989). ‘The international- national connection’, British Journal o f Political Science,
April, pp 237-59.
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A. Association
The Commission has called trade “the economic and political cornerstone of the 
transition process”35, and, because facilitating market access for exports from CEE was 
argued to be the most effective assistance that the EU could render to the emerging 
regimes, in December1989, the Community signed its first Trade Cooperation 
Agreement with Poland. Although the agreement was meant to last for five years, it was 
quickly overtaken by the events in Central Europe and replaced by more comprehensive 
relations in the form of the Association Agreement, signed between Poland and the 
Communities on 13th December 1991.36 The interim parts of this ‘Europe’ Agreement, 
establishing trade relations between Poland and the EC, came into force in March of 
1992, the rest awaiting national ratification and taking effect February of 1994.
The signing of the EA marked a new phase in Polish- EC cooperation and represented a 
political move to transform economic relations. In a speech assessing the progress of 
Central European integration with the Union, former Trade Commissioner Leon 
Brittan's noted that, “in the pre-accession period, we have intensified our relations 
across all sectors. Bilateral trade is probably the area where we have already the most 
intense and longest experience of co-operation, built up gradually since the Agreements, 
which form the basis for our trade relations, have come into force.”37 
Initially, from the EC’s perspective, the EA was intended to serve as an instrument of 
association between Poland and the Communities, and not as a pre-accession tool, and 
Polish aspirations to become a member of the Union were only formally recognised two 
years after its signing.38 It has been argued that many within the EU saw the Treaty as 
providing an alternative to membership.39
Meanwhile, the EC took up the central role of coordinating international aid, and with 
the blessing of the OECD, the PHARE program began providing the main support for 
the process of transition in CEE. Along with the aid from the EBRD, the World Bank, 
and the IMF, the Community granted Poland ecu2 billion worth of loans, as well as
35 European Commission (1994). ‘Trade liberalisation with Central and Eastern Europe’, European 
Economy Supplement A, No 7, Brussels: EC and Directorate- General for Economic and Financial 
Affairs, pp. 1-2.
36 Formal negotiations between Poland and the Communities began in December 1990, lasting nine 
rounds with the final agreement signed a year later. See chapter six.
37 Speech by Leon Brittan in October 1998, Trade Enlargement and the International System'.
38 Maresceau, M. (1997). ‘Association, Partnership, Pre-accession and Accession’, in Maresceau, M.
(Ed.) (1997). Enlarging the European Union: relations between the EU and Central and Eastern Europe. 
London: Longman, p 9.
39 Mayhew, A. (1998). Recreating Europe: the European Union's policy towards Central and Eastern 
Europe: Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
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additional help from the individual member governments. Then, the Edinburgh 
European Council of 11th-12th December 1992 announced that, “any country with a 
European identity, democratic status, respect for human rights, able to adopt and 
implement the acquis, was eligible for membership.”40
While the Commission recognised that, trade would be the essence of what would later 
become the pre-accession strategy, and that, “trade was vital to the economic reform 
process and to the integration of the associated countries into the Community”41, it was 
only at the Copenhagen European Council on 21-22 June 1993 that the re-orientation of 
the Agreement took place. Here, on the initiative of the European Council, the 
Community finally acknowledged that the accession of the countries of CEE was a 
common objective, paving the way for Poland to formally submit its membership 
application, in April 1994, and transforming the EA into the basis for the Essen pre­
accession strategy launched in December of that year. Subsequently, the White Paper 
was published on preparing the associated countries for their entry into the internal 
market, and on 13th Dec 1997, the decision was taken by the European Union to begin 
accession negotiations with the five CEE states plus Cyprus. The negotiations formally 
began on the 31st March 1998, primarily consisting of the so-called screening sessions, 
in which the acquis communautaire was explained to the candidate countries, followed 
by the opening of the more substantive negotiations on the 31 chapters in September. In 
the meantime, Agenda 2000 was published, which at the Berlin Summit in 1999, set out 
not only the budgetary framework for the European Union until 2006, but also a whole 
set of financial instruments for pre-accession, including the Accession Partnerships. 
Finally, in July 2001, at the Gothenburg Summit, the EU agreed that negotiations should 
be finished with the most prepared candidates by the end of 2002, enabling them to take 
part in the 2004 European parliamentary elections as full -fledged members. The 
agreement on the Treaty of Nice in December 2001 opened the way for enlargement, 
allowing the eight CEE plus Cyprus and Malta to finish the negotiations in Copenhagen, 
December 2002.
40 Edinburgh European Council Dec 11-12 1992
41 Mayhew, A. (1995). ‘discussion’, in Franzmeyer, F. and Weise, C. (editors). Polen unddie 
Osterweiterung der Europaischen Union: Beitrage und Discussionsberichte zu eier Tagung des 
Deutschen Institut fur Witschaftsforshung unde der Warsaw School o f  Economics, Berlin: Duncker & 
Humbolt, 8-10 June.
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B. Expectations and goals
More than ten years have passed since the signing of the Europe Agreement establishing
relations between the Community and Poland, making it now possible to draw some
conclusions as to the actual outcomes of the various objectives sought and the
realisation of the preliminary goals of association.
In 1990, J Pinder claimed that
stable democracies and market economies in Central Europe could make a significant 
contribution to the security o f the Community and to the dynamism o f the European 
Economy. A primary aim o f the Europe Agreement must therefore be to help the Central 
Europeans to succeed with their economic and political reforms. It will be the better 
part o f the decade before the economies will be internationally competitive without 
special measures o f protection, and some time before we can be sure that democracy 
has really taken root. Until both conditions have been securely established, the 
consolidation o f reforms should take precedence over short-term commercial advantage
for the existing member statesA?
As such, the EA was initially considered a reward for the political and economic 
changes in East Central Europe and a symbolic gesture of external support. The 
officially declared fundamental objective of the Treaty was to help the associated states 
succeed in their internal economic reforms as well as encourage the consolidation of the 
nascent democracies, through the granting of far-reaching trade concessions, financial 
and technical aid as well as models for institution building.43 This intent to support the 
emerging regimes was clearly spelled out in the preamble to the Agreements.
The Preamble of the Agreements states that:
TAKING ACCOUNT o f the Community's willingness to provide decisive support for the 
implementation o f reform and to help Poland cope with the economic and social 
consequences o f structural readjustment;
TAKING ACCOUNTfurthermore o f the Community's willingness to set up instruments 
o f cooperation and economic, technical and financial assistance on a global and 
multiannual basis;
CONSIDERING the commitment o f the Community and Poland to free trade, and in 
particular to compliance with the rights and obligations arising out o f the General 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT);
BEARING IN MIND the economic and social disparities between the Community and 
Poland and thus recognising that the objectives o f this association should be reached 
through appropriate provisions o f this Agreement...
1. An association is hereby established between the Community and its Member States 
on the one part and Poland on the other part. (And the aim o f this Agreement is) to
42 Pinder, J. (1991). The European Community and Eastern Europe. Chatham House papers. London: 
Pinter Publishers, p.60.
43 Brabant, J. van (1996). ‘Integrating Europe: the transition economies at stake’, International Studies in 
Economics and Econometrics, Vol 37, Boston: Kluwer Academic Publishers, p 220.
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provide an appropriate framework for the political dialogue, allowing the 
development o f close political relations between the parties; to promote the 
expansion o f trade and the harmonious economic relations between the parties and 
so to foster the dynamic economic development and prosperity in Poland, to provide 
a basis for the Community's financial and technical assistance to Poland, and to 
provide an appropriate framework for Poland's gradual integration into the 
Community ,44
The signing of the EA was to anchor the Polish reforms in an outside institution, 
increasing their credibility and enhancing domestic stability, rewarding change through 
the provision of visible benefits tied to trade openness. The EA went beyond simple 
border measures to consider other factors affecting trade such as standards and 
competition policy. Moreover, the inclusion of some financial transfers was intended to 
compensate the weaker partner for opening up its markets, as well as directly aid in the 
process of transformation.
However, to understand better the objectives of the Europe Agreements, it is important 
to consider the motives of each partner individually.
For the European Union (EC at the time), after the fall of the Berlin Wall, the EAs were 
officially declared to be the tools for spreading market democracy in CEE and 
ultimately securing peace eastwards across the entire European continent. “Europe” 
represented an anchor of stability in the face of the unpredictable future of the former 
Soviet Union, and it was considered dangerous to leave the CEE countries in a grey area 
between politically stable West and the still volatile situation in the East.45 The coup 
d ’etat instigated by Yeltsin in the newly emerging Russian Federation served as a 
reminder that it was in the strategic interest of the Community to create a stable and 
secure area around its eastern borders, a region traditionally marked by volatility and 
conflict. Consequently, then, the signing of the EA was considered “an instrument of 
determination of Europe’s borders by a combination of strategic, economic and political 
consideration rather than by criteria of European identity.”46
For the EU the economic gains of regional integration were secondary to political and 
security considerations, as the size of the CEE markets was a miniscule share of total
44 Europe Agreement, EU Commission:
http://www.europa.eu.int/comm/enlargement/pas/europe_agr.htm.
45 Kawecka- Wyrzykowska, E. (1996). ‘On the Benefits of the Accession for Western and Eastern 
Europe, Coming to terms with accession’, Forum Report on Economic Policy Initiative, No 2, p 88.
46 Stavridis, S., Mossialos, E., Morgan, R. and Machin, H. (Ed.) (1997). New Challenges to the European 
Union: policies and policy-making. Aldershot: Dartmouth.
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EU exports and imports, and the income of the region as a whole was too low to
produce any significant profits from trade liberalisation. As A Winters pointed out,
the markets in Central and Eastern Europe were not large enough to offer EU  
producers large increases in earnings; main exception being agricultural and sensitive 
products (clothing and steel)- the very areas where integration was least complete. The 
very sectors which could generate economic gains, albeit at the cost o f  temporary 
adjustment stresses in the EU, were excluded or attenuated in the integration.47
Association was to ensure that the uncertainty of the transition process in CEE would 
not spillover into violence and migration and consequently disrupt the EU’s economic 
and political life. Since one of the main objectives was to discourage migration from the 
east to west, trade theory provided the appropriate arguments. It was maintained that by 
giving market access to the associated states and allowing their exports to flourish, the 
pressures for migration would be lessened as the returns earned on exports would 
contribute to their growth, spilling over onto political stabilisation, and aid in the 
consolidation of democracy.
Moreover, because at the time of signing of the Agreements there was no formal 
commitment to eventual accession, the EAs were seen as a sort of compensation 
mechanism, a half- way house between membership and complete exclusion of the 
former socialist states from the European structures.
The official rhetoric declared by the EC was that the substantial benefits to be gained 
from greater stability in the East outweighed any possible objections to an asymmetric 
opening of trade in favour of the candidates. This justification was based on the 
experience of the previous Mediterranean enlargement, where the three southern states 
sought entry into the EC as a sort of safe haven for their newly established democracies. 
Thus, the re-unification of the European continent was to be achieved at the price of 
marginal economic losses in the West, and in espousing to this line of thinking, in June 
1994, at the IGC Corfu Summit, the Member States declared that, “the purpose of 
enhanced trade was located not in the welfare gains (for the EU) of trade, but in the 
political benefits of consolidated democracy and the market economy as well as support 
for the political and military security of the European region.”48
Ultimately, it was hoped that association would contribute to narrowing the gap between 
the Eastern and Western halves of Europe, by returning the levels of interstate trade
47 Winters LA, (2000). ‘EU’s Preferential Trade Agreements: objectives and outcomes’, in Djck, P. van 
and Faber, G (Ed.) (2000). The External Dimension of the European Union. The Hague: Kluwar Law 
International, p 202.
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transactions back to their natural patterns, and, by decreasing regional disparities, 
encourage Europe’s overall dynamism and increase prosperity.49 Moreover, in the face 
of the growing hegemonic power of the United States, Eastern enlargement was to 
enhance the EU’s own role in international relations, by buttressing not only its political 
weight, but also its economic dynamism and competitiveness.
Coupled with these strategic- political- economic interests was a certain sense of moral 
obligation felt by the Community towards the CEE nations for their role in bringing 
down Communism, as well as a for the ‘Yalta betrayal’.50 Association with the EC and 
eventual membership in the Union would symbolise the definite end to the division of 
Europe and the re-inclusion of the East European states into the European ‘family’. 
Integration was to close the gap between the poor and the wealthy neighbours, thus 
providing some sort of reparation for being ‘abandoned’ on the other side of the iron 
curtain and excluded from the Marshall Plan following WWII.51 
As such, it was argued that the granting of EAs to CEE would ultimately be in the 
Community’s own interest, as trade along with investment, the two main pillars in the 
creation of an FTA, were seen as prerequisites to consolidating transition and as the 
rewards for CEE progress towards the market and democracy.
C. Polish objectives
If political goals dominated the Community’s drive toward granting Poland association 
and creating a Free Trade Area, it could be argued that the objectives of the initial and 
subsequent Polish governments’ were more evenly balanced between seeking economic 
benefits of integration and the political gains of greater policy stabilisation. Already in 
1990, at the very beginning of the negotiations of the Europe Agreement, the Polish side 
made its intentions clear to seek membership in the European Union, perceiving 
association as a first step towards full membership and an immediate tool to support the 
internal transition.52
48 Conclusion of the Corfu Summit, 1994.
49 Patterns prior to the Cold War divisions following WWII
See for ex, Kirshner, E. and Sterling, J. (1997). Recasting the European Order, Security architectures 
and economic cooperation. Manchester: Manchester University Press.
50 This was not only a feeling amongst the Community, but an elaborated belief of the CEE candidates. 
The perception o f ‘betrayal’ was particularly strong among the Polish public.
51 See, Lewis, P.G. and Pridham, G. (1996). Stabilising Fragile Democracies, ibid.
52 Interview with Jacek Saruysz-Wolski, Member of Polish negotiating team of the EA, First Government 
Plenipotentiary for European Integration, 1991-1996, later Secretary of State for European Integration; 
when the author worked as his adviser, and spoke with him on numerous occasions.
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In spite of numerous changes of the ruling coalitions, the integration of Poland into the 
European Communities and subsequently the EU has remained the strategic aim of 
every Polish government since the first partially free elections in June 1989. Successive 
governments, from the liberal Freedom Union (UW) to the conservative Solidarity 
Election Action (AWS), the Peasants (PSL) or the re-emerging Social Democratic 
Alliance (SLD)53, have continued to emphasise that quick entry into the Union would 
not only stabilise the newly regained democracy, but also assure that Poland would not 
face the danger of derailment from the economic course it had adopted a decade ago.
Table 2.1 Polish Presidents and Prime Ministers 1989- 2002
P resident o f  T he Polish  Peoples R epublic (PZ PR )
Years in office Name
0 7 /1 9 8 9 -  12/1990 W ojciech Jaruzelski
Presidents o f  the R epublic o f  P oland (R P)
Years in Office Name *
12/ 1 9 9 0 -  12/ 1995 Lech W alesa
12/ 1995 - Aleksander K wasniewski
P rim e M in isters o f  the P R
Years in Office Name and Party
08/ 1 9 8 9 -  12/ 1990 Tadeusz M azow iecki (U D **)
01/ 1991 -  12/ 1991 Jan K rzysztof B ielecki (U D )
12/ 1991 - 0 6 /  1992 Jan O lszewski (Solidarity***)
06/ 1 9 9 2 - 0 7 /  1992 Waldemar Pawlak (PSL)
07/ 1 9 9 2 -  10/ 1993 Hanna Suchocka (U D )
10/ 1 9 9 3 - 0 3 /  1994 Waldemar Pawlak (PSL)
03/ 1 9 9 4 - 0 2 /  1996 Jozef O leksy (SLD )
02/ 1 9 9 6 -  10/ 1997 W lodzim ierz C im oszew icz (SL D )
10/1997- 09 / 2001 Jerzy Buzek (A W S)
09/ 2001- Leszek M iller (SLD )
* Presidents in Poland are elected on a non-partisan basis
** Democratic Union- later Freedom Union (party originally connected to Solidarity movement)
*** Coalition of groups connected to the Solidarity movement
Consequently, it is difficult to distinguish between primary Polish goals in seeking 
regional integration, on the one hand, and pursuing membership in the Union, on the 
other.
Generally, the trade parts of the EA were driven by domestic motives, both political and 
economic, while the Treaty as a whole was intended to lay down the foundation for 
eventual accession. Moreover, association was to increase Poland’s political power and
53 Former United Workers Party PZPR
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strengthen its international position, as it was recognised that the Polish state was too 
small on its own to defend its interests in the global arena. Eventual EU membership 
was to expand Poland’s influence on international relations, particularly important for 
the Polish side in the early 90’s, when Russia was still perceived as a threat to its 
internal security and stability.
C.2 Static economic benefits
Most of the economic incentives to join the EU stemmed from the so-called “domino 
effect” as Baldwin has called it.54 According to this theory, when a group like the EU 
enlarges, the costs of staying out of the club increase for non-members, and “the 
countries at the margin are eventually pulled in to join.” 55 
As a trade policy instrument, the Agreement was seen as a prerequisite to sound 
macroeconomic policy, enabling the sustainability of exports that was to lead to 
recovery and growth. The goal was to create a structure for political dialogue and 
cooperation between the associated partners within a framework of an extended Free 
Trade Area. Ultimate realisation of the free movement of goods, quoted explicitly in the 
Treaty, was to pave the way for various obligations regarding the free movement of 
workers, services and capital, as necessary components of an eventual FTA. 
Consequently, the EA encompassed extensive rules on trade protection measures, some 
aspects of intellectual property rights, industrial and competition policy and special 
provisions on the movement of persons and establishment.
The Treaty was built around a comprehensive schedule for economic integration 
between the associated partners, and the clear commitment to trade liberalisation was to 
benefit both. For the Polish side, it was to help reorient trade flows from the former 
CMEA markets, following their collapse, to Western Europe and, as such, make new 
outlets available for their exports.56 Market access was to mitigate the social and 
economic costs of the painful and wholesale restructuring process of the Polish 
economic system which was beginning to take place and aid in the process of economic
54 Baldwin, R. (1992) ‘Discussion’, in Bhagwati, J.N. (1992). ‘Regionalism and multilateralism : an 
overview’, Columbia University Discussion Paper Series, No 603, New York: Columbia University, Dept 
of Economics, p 51.
55 Bhagwati, J. (1992). ‘Regionalism and Multilateralism, an overview’ , in Bhagwati, J.N. (1992). (Ed.) 
ibid., p 40.
See also Bhagwati, J. N. and Panagariya, A. (Ed.) (1996). The Economics o f  Preferential Trade 
Agreements. Washington DC: AEI Press.
Bhagwati, J.N. and Balasubramanyam, V.N. (1998). Writings on International Economics. Delhi: Oxford 
University Press.
56 Peel, Q. (1995). ‘EU Aspirants Need Markets not Subsidies’, Financial Times, No 337, 13/11.
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recovery following the initially deep transition recession. New markets were to prop up 
demand for Polish products abroad mitigating the domestic falls in demand, and as a 
result export-led growth was to soften the falls in output and employment, facilitating 
adjustment to the new environment for both individual enterprises as well as for the 
economy as a whole. While it was maintained that access to markets was the most 
lasting form of aid that the West could give to CEE to facilitate its reintegration into the 
world economy57, withdrawal of concessions offered or undo restrictions, were expected 
to exacerbate the costs of the internal reforms by slowing down growth and inevitably 
lead to a loss of popular support for the liberal economic programme. European 
integration was conceived of as a crucial component of the internal growth-oriented 
strategy and trade was to provide relief for transition, generate growth and boost 
competitiveness and efficiency.58
The EA was also to curtail the Union’s use of contingent protection, especially anti­
dumping duties59, against Polish producers and, as such, serve as a reliable insurance 
policy against sudden changes in the trading behaviour of the stronger partner.60 
Moreover, it was argued that the Agreement would indirectly contribute to increased 
inflows of investment into the region. The political gesture of signing the binding EA 
symbolised not only the possibility of future accession to the EU, but also greater policy 
credibility, and was thus a confidence booster to investors. Since the Agreement 
included chapters guaranteeing EU investors in the partner countries certain freedoms 
and rights61, it was hoped that this increased business predictability would stimulate 
interest in the Polish market. In turn, the increased flows of capital were to encourage 
further economic integration between the Union and the associated state and provide the 
other benefits of openness discussed above.
Finally, the EA was to provide a compensatory mechanism to the weaker partner for the 
adjustment costs to be incurred as a result of liberalisation. Financial transfers along 
with technical assistance for the reforms were to be used as compensation for the
57 Nello, S. S. (1991). The New Europe: Changing Economic Relations Between East and West. London: 
Harvester Wheatsheaf Press, p 184.
58 Kaminski, B. (1999). ‘The Role of Foreign Direct Investment and Trade Policies in Poland’s Accession 
to the European Union’, World Bank Technical Paper, No 442, Washington DC: World Bank.
59 Countries classified as ‘state-trading’ are treated more rigorously by the EU in its application of AD 
investigations and duties, and being recognised as a market economy, at least in theory, should reduce the 
application of this form of CP.
60 For more see Jovanovic, M.N. (1992). International Economic Integration: Limits and prospects. 
London, New York: Routledge.
61 Including freedom of establishment, freedom of capital flows and investment, repatriation of earnings, 
free movement for skilled personnel.
80
opening up of the Polish economy, as well as for the internal transition. Due to a severe 
shortage of domestic capital and the backwardness of every aspect of the Polish 
economic, political and social infrastructure, domestic modernisation required 
substantial net resource transfers. Considerable amounts of both official and private 
investment as well as grants and other types of financial aid were needed for economic 
development, recovery from the recession and progress in transition. Comparisons were 
made by many West European and American commentators to the post- WWII Marshall 
Plan.
C.3 Dynamic political benefits
In addition to the static effects of creating a FT A, as a political instrument, the EA was 
to “add guidance and credibility to Poland’s quest to establish a better economic 
regime”, furnish the Polish ‘state’ with a model for institution building and provide 
support for democratic consolidation.62
In the economic realm, thus, one of the primary goals of the Agreement was to try to 
maintain as liberal a trading environment in Poland as possible at a time when changes 
in the system were forcing many economic interests to begin searching for active 
government protection. Because at the very onset of the transition, these pressure groups 
resisting reforms were either non-existent or virtually ineffective63, a situation quite 
unique in CEE, the main problem of policy change was not initial liberalisation, but 
subsequent sustainability of the measures. Locking Poland into an ever-deepening 
network of political, economic and social interdependence with a stronger partner was 
accordingly to strengthen the process of transformation and consolidate the changes 
taking place.64
The policy framework imposed by the EA would accordingly compel successive Polish 
governments to fulfil their obligations vis a vis the Union by committing them to a legal 
contract65, and, at the price of reduced policy autonomy and restricted decision-making 
options, enhance the credibility of the reforms.66
The first period of transition in Poland, following the implementation of Shock Therapy, 
was characterised by economic recession, and, according to K Zukrowska, “under such
62 Kaminski (1999) ibid., p 26.
63 Balcerowicz, L. (1999). Panstwo w Przebudowie. Krakow: Znak.
64 Smith, A. (1994). ‘Principles and Practice of Regional Economic Integration’, in Cable, V., Henderson,
D. (Ed.) (1994). Trade blocs?: the future o f  regional integration. London: Royal Institute of International 
Affairs/International Economics Programme, p 29.
65This was to take place as a result of the standstill clause forbidding the re-introduction of tariffs, para- 
tariffs, and other quantitative restrictions once the agreement came into force.
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conditions, when it was becoming increasingly difficult to maintain economic 
liberalisation, international leverage was considered as a supportive tool in the systemic 
change.”67 The main argument behind the Polish side’s rationale for seeking external 
assistance and expecting generous rewards for its reform efforts was that, unlike the 
other states in the region pursuing more gradual courses of reform, it had pushed 
through such radical changes so quickly.
As an international agreement, grounded in international law, the EA was binding, and 
its subsequent provisos were to be “performed in good faith.”68 As a legal rule, 
negotiated between sovereign states, the EA was devised to steer to conduct the 
addresses along a certain path and provide a guarantee for the reasonableness of their 
behaviour.69 Accordingly the Treaty was to serve as external leverage, pressuring the 
Polish policymakers to resisting protectionist demands and continue the difficult 
domestic reforms. Perspective economic policy decisions were to be screened according 
to their legality by the Association Council, the body responsible for the implementation 
of the Agreement, and then scrutinised by the Commission.
Thus, “while it was clear that the Association Agreements were not decisive in 
liberalising trade, indeed they led to tariff hikes on the associated country side”, as 
Mayhew has pointed out, “never-the-less they have had an impact in dampening the rise 
of protectionism since 1991, by making the introduction of new measures more 
difficult.”70
Moreover, in addition to affecting economic integration, the policy framework (of the 
EA) was to influence the transition by having a significant impact on policy formulation 
and institutional development.71 One of the objectives of the EA was to provide a viable 
model for duplicating domestic institutions, based on the adoption of certain tried and 
tested rules as well as grounded in internationally acceptable norms and standards. 
Consequently, by creating Polish institutions in the image of those in the European
66 An assumption clearly made by both the Poles and their Western advisers.
67 Zukrowska (1998) ibid., p 303.
68 Article 26 of the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties between States and International 
Organisations.
69 Muller-Graff, PC. ( 1997). ‘Legal Framework for EU- CEEC Relations’, in Maresceau (Ed) (1997). 
ibid, p 29.
70 Mayhew, A. Recreating Europe, ibid., p 103.
71 Kaminski, B., Wang, Z. and Winters, L.A. (1996). ‘Foreign Trade in the Transition: the international 
environment and domestic policy’, World Bank Studies o f Economies in Transformation, No 20, 
Washington DC: World Bank.
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Union, the Polish elites were aspiring to secure a domestic environment in which the 
continuation of ‘sound’ economic policies was possible.
Finally, it was hoped that increasing economic integration and the opening of the Polish 
economy would result in the creation of domestic interest groups, with pro- trade liberal 
preferences72, capable of supporting the government in its quest for liberalisation. 
According to Brabant, “larger and freer international markets were to lessen the power 
of the domestic monopolistic elements, thereby strengthening reform of domestic 
markets, by undercutting the power of the entrenched bureaucracy” and shifting the 
institutional policy-making framework in favour of openness.73 P Bofinger similarly 
argued that, “the hand- tying dynamic effects of the EA was to strengthen the relative 
power of lobbies whose interests are often neglected in political decisions on trade 
issues {namely exporters and consumers}, changing the balance of power between 
different national interest groups and leading to decreased demand for protection.”74 As 
such, association was to contribute to the emergence of healthy political competition in 
Poland, thereby strengthening the consolidation of democracy.
D. Neoliberal institutionalism
Recognising that by delegating powers to an outside institution the government could 
bolster its credibility well as send a signal to the domestic interests of its commitment to 
liberalisation, the Polish technocratic elites decided to use the ‘anchoring strategy’ 
prescribed by neoliberal institutionalists, as discussed in chapter one. The regime 
provided by the EA was to constrain and shape domestic rules and behaviour, and, thus, 
as an intervening variable, “influence domestic preferences, pressures and practices 
already established at international levels.”75
In the ‘credible commitment’ variant of neoliberal theories, policy co-ordination 
between states is explained by focusing on the two level strategy designed by national 
elites. By binding domestic politics in international regimes, the government 
restructures future domestic incentives and raises the costs of non-decision or non- 
compliance. This assures, on the one hand, that the other government will accept the
72 For more on this see Keohane and Milner (1996). Internationalisation and Domestic Politics, ibid.
73 Brabant, J. van. (1990). ‘Remaking Eastern Europe: on the political economy of transition’, 
International Studies in Economics and Econometrics, Vol 23, Dordrecht, Boston: Kluwer Academic 
Publishers, p 164.
74 Bofinger, P. (1995). ‘The Political Economy of the Eastern Enlargement of the EU’, CEPR Discussion 
paper, No 1234, London: CEPR, plO.
75 Milner, H. (1988). Resisting Protectionism: global industries and the politics o f  international trade. 
Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, p 13.
For more on international regimes see S Krasner, J Ruggie
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agreed legislation, and, on the other, locks in future decisions against domestic 
opposition. Anchoring thus precludes more explicit control over internal policies and 
helps to defuse potential resistance from disadvantaged groups.76 
The main assumption of this ‘anchoring’ strategy is rooted in the notion of 
conditionality. It is expected that conditionality is to provide a catalyst for change in 
economic policy, while, as Moravcsik has pointed out, “international cooperation is to 
provide ‘two-level’ political legitimisation and institutional support for the government 
seeking to liberalise.” As such, national preferences (openness and market reform) lead 
to interstate bargaining (negotiations with the EU), reduced sovereignty, a more credible 
commitment to reforms and more centralised technocratic management.77 
Neoliberal strategies for policy reform are premised on the notion that international 
negotiations aim to secure commercial advantages for domestic producer groups, and 
that trade liberalisation is driven according to the benefits of openness, restrained by its 
distributive effects.78 Indirectly, therefore, the EA was to strengthen the relationship 
between economic reform and popular support. From the political economy perspective, 
the main value of association was to be the provision of an open constitution tied to 
visible economic and political advantages which were not only to reduce the power of 
national producer lobbies and decrease the potential for state intervention into the 
market mechanism79, but also contribute to the creation of a class of domestic 
beneficiaries committed to the principles of openness.
In sum, the EA was conceived by the Polish technocratic elites as a decisive instrument 
in solidifying the transition, constituting a concise way of defining the boundaries of 
policymaking, raising the costs of non-compliance with international obligations80, 
strengthening political competition and ultimately guaranteeing that the systemic 
changes and reform measures would not be subverted by populist forces or interest 
group pressure. J Saryusz-Wolski, former Secretary of State for European Integration as 
well as member of the Polish team during the negotiation of the EA, pointed out that, 
“for newly democratised countries, time is crucial. The sooner we can find a firm
76 Moravcsik, A. (1998). ‘Theorising European Integration’, in Moravcsik (Ed.) (1998). The Choice for  
Europe: Social purpose and State Power From Messina to Maastricht. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University 
Press.
77 Moravcsik, A. (1998). ibid., p 38.
78 Sapir (1995).
79 Bofinger, P. (1995). ‘The Political Economy of the Eastern Enlargement of the EU’, CEPR Discussion 
paper, No 1234, London: CEPR.
80 Thomas, V. and Nash, J.D. (1991). Best practices in Trade Policy Reform. Oxford: Published for the 
World Bank by Oxford University Press.
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anchor, the less volatile the political, and consequently economic situation in our
countries will be.”81 Quick entry into the European Union, which Minister Saryusz-
Wolski believed was possible even in the early days of the association negotiations,
would not only stabilise the democracy but would assure that the Candidate countries 
were not going to get blown o ff the market economy oriented course they have adopted. 
It would also ascertain the effective reform o f the administration and the whole public 
sector, which would be forced to adapt to the demands o f  competition. A precious 
mobilising effect- rewarding the bold and punishing the detractors$2
III. Main Provisions of the Europe Agreement
Based on Article 238 EC Treaty, the character of association is mixed, that is to say that 
it is signed between the Community and the member states on the one hand, and the 
associated country on the other. Those parts of the Agreement which are in the 
competence of the Community, namely the trade areas, did not need member state 
ratification before being implemented and were therefore put into force on March 1, 
1992 as the so- called Interim Agreement.
Each of the EAs signed between the Community and the associated countries aims at 
creating, within a period of ten years and on an asymmetric basis, a free trade are for 
industrial goods, providing for the abolition of custom duties on imports and charges 
having equivalent effect as well as the abolition of quantitative restrictions.83 The 
Agreements also strive at relaxing some of the protection on agricultural products. 
Association was to establish a framework for political dialogue, provisions for the free 
movement of goods, provisions on the other freedoms of movements, approximation of 
legislation, dimensions of cooperation as well as institutions set up to deal specifically 
with CEE.
The bodies responsible for the implementation of the Agreement are the Association 
Council, the Association Committee and the Association Parliamentary Committee. The 
dispute resolution procedure allows the Association Council to take decisions as to the 
implementation of the Agreement, setting up a mechanism for resolving issues if the 
Council cannot reach a decision by the agreement of both sides. In this case, each party
81 Saryusz-Wolski, J. (1997). ‘On the Threshold of Eastern Enlargement’, European Foreign Affairs 
Review, Vol 2, Issue 2.
82 Saryusz-Wolski, J. (2001). ‘The Enlargement of the European Union- The Current State of affairs: The 
view from Poland’, speech given at ESC A Forum, Brussels, December.
83 Norberg, S. (1997). ‘The Movement of Goods in EU- CEEC’s Relations’, in Maresceau (Ed.) ibid., p 
81.
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nominates one arbitrator and the Association Council nominates a third. The 
significance of this arbitration procedure is obvious as the decisions reached have 
precedence over national law of both contracting parties.
Table 2.2 The Europe Agreement
The Preamble
O bjectives o f  the Agreement
Title 1: general principles o f  the Agreement
Title 2: political dialogue
Title 3: free m ovem ent o f  goods
Chapter 1: industrial products 
Chapter 2: agriculture 
Chapter 3: fisheries
Chapter 4: com m on provisions (trade protection instruments)
Title 4: m ovem ent o f  workers, establishment, supply o f  services 
Chapter 1: m ovem ent o f  workers 
Chapter 2: establishment 
Chapter 3: supply o f  services 
Chapter 4: general provisions 
Title 5: payments, capital, com petition and other econom ic provisions, approximation o f  laws 
Chapter 1: current payments and m ovem ent o f  capital 
Chapter 2:com petition and other econom ic provisions 
Chapter 3: approximation o f  laws 
Title 6: econom ic cooperation
Title 7: cooperation in the prevention o f  illegal activities
Title8: cultural cooperation
Title 9: financial cooperation
Title 10: institutional, general and final provisions
There fo llow  12 or 13 Annexes relating m ainly to the trade chapters and listing individual 
products and rates o f  duty.
These are fo llow ed by important protocols, which are fully part o f  the agreements and w hich  
cover specific areas such as trade in textiles, ECSC products, processed agricultural groups, 
rules o f  origin, specific transitional arrangements for trade with Spain and Portugal, mutual 
assistance in custom s matters. Finally there are the jo int declarations which are made during 
the negotiations and which help to interpret the articles o f  the agreement.
Source: A. Mayhew, Recreating Europe, p 45.
A. Timetable for the elimination of trade barriers
Upon entry into force of the Interim Agreement, on March 1 1992, both parties 
abolished almost all quantitative restrictions. The basic customs rates, subject to 
liberalisation, were the rates binding on 29 February 1992, the day preceding the date of
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implementation. Regarding trade in industrial goods, both parties committed themselves 
to observing the standstill principle, i.e. not introducing any new restrictions or 
increasing already existing tariffs or equivalent charges.
With the implementation of the Interim Agreement, EC customs duties applicable to 
about 47% of Polish industrial exports were abolished. The remaining industrial goods 
were subject to gradual tariff liberalisation specified in three annexes and several 
Protocols, according to different timetables on the abolition of custom duties. The 
Communities were to do away with all tariff and non- tariff barriers by 1 January 1996 
at the latest, with the exception of textiles and cars. The liberalisation of textiles was 
subject to the Multi- Fibre Agreement within the WTO negotiations and motor vehicle 
liberalisation was to be completed by 2002.
Sensitive products fell under special regulations. Exports up to certain limits were 
subject to duty- free quotas and ceilings, and those preferential limits were further 
divided into three groups. The first group, covered by Annex III, provided for tariff 
quotas or tariff ceilings at a zero duty rate. Quotas and ceilings were to rise annually by 
20%, while duties levied on the quantities exceeding those amounts were to be annually 
reduced by 15 %. All exports above the preferential, tariff-free limits were to face tariff 
rates on the EC market as specified in the timetables of liberalisation.
The second group included textiles and clothing, regulated by Protocol 1 to the Europe 
Agreement. Because this sector has been highly protected in the EC, the liberalisation 
period was longer when compared with other industrial products. The EA contained a 
separate Textile Protocol with respect to QRs, and the removal of quotas was negotiated 
independently under the renewal of MFAs as a part of the Uruguay Round. Duties on 
imports into the EC of outward processed goods were abolished on entry into force of 
the agreement, and all other tariffs on textiles were to be abolished by January 1998.
The third group of sensitive goods included steel and coal products covered by the treaty 
establishing the European Coal and Steel Community84, regulated by Protocol 2 of the 
EA. Upon entry into force of the IA, QRs on steel products from Poland were lifted. The 
customs duties on these were to be abolished by the EC over five years (reduced to four 
at Copenhagen 1993); trade was to be tariff free by 1 January 1996. Customs duties and 
QRs on Polish coal exports, in turn, were suspended at the beginning of 1993, with the 
exception of Germany and Spain, countries which were importing about 50% of Polish
84 Treaty of Paris
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coal exports to the EC and where free market access was to be introduced at the 
beginning of 1996.
Table 2.3 Timetable of liberalisation of trade barriers in the EC (EU) for Polish 
industrial products as introduced in the EA (in % of basic customs duties, applied 
at the beginning of each calendar year 1992-1998).
Group of Commodities 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998
Textile prods. (Prot. 1) 71 71 57 43 29 14 0
Steel products (Prot. 2) 80 80 40 20 10 0 0
Minerals and chem.(attchmt Iia) 50 0 0 0 0 0 0
Non-ferrous metals 80 60 40 0 0 0 0
Other so called sensitive goods attchmt III 85 70 55 20 0 0 0
Remaining industrial goods 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Source: Journal of Laws, no. 11/1994, position 38, Attachment.
Table 2.4 Timetable of liberalisation in Poland for industrial imports from the EU,
as introduced in the EA
Commodity Group Share in polish industrial 
products in 1992(%)
Duration of liberalisation
Appendix IVa- 1365 products, 
mostly investment equipment and 
raw materials
25 Liberalised completely in 1992
Appendix IVb- cars and vehicles 5.3 1992-2002 Since 1992 duty- 
free quota for passenger cars, 
increased annually by 5%, and 
for trucks and cars equipped 
with catalytic converters, 
increased annually by 10%. In 
2002, ban on cars older than 10 
years and cars powered by two 
stroke engines will be lifted
Appendix VI- some oils and gasses, 
coal and coke as well as petroleum 
oils
2.0 Import licenses were lifted at 
the end of 1996
ECSC steel products- 8 eight-digit 
CN items- other products
2.1 Tariffs lifted 1992, 1995-1999
ECSC coal products- 7 eight- digit 
CN items- other products
11.6 Tariffs lifted 1992, 1995-1999
Textile and clothes- 43 eight-digit 
CN items- other textiles and clothes 
products
10.9 Tariffs lifted 1992, 1995-1999
Other industrial products 43.1 Tariffs lifted 1992, 1995-1999
Source: Poland’s Foreign trade Policy 1993-1994, Foreign Trade Research Institute, Warsaw 1994.
The scheme of Poland’s concessions was much simpler. With the entry into force of the 
Interim Agreement, the Polish side abolished tariffs on about 28% of the value of 
industrial imports from the EC, mainly raw materials and capital goods not produced
domestically (especially technologically advanced equipment to stimulate the 
restructuring of the Polish economy). Liberalisation of access to the Polish market for 
the remaining EC industrial goods was to start on 1/1/95, with the exception of motor 
vehicles and energy sources, imports of which were to be liberalised in ten years time. 
Liberalisation was to continue in five equal instalment’s (20 % of the basic rate each 
year), the last reduction taking place at the beginning of 1999.
Table 2.5 Reduction of customs duties on Polish industrial goods, as introduced in 
the EA. (in % of basic customs duties, applied at the beginning of the year)
Group of Commodities 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997
Textiles (Pro. 1) 100 80 60 20 20 0
Steel Prods (Prot. 2) 100 80 60 20 20 0
Raw materials and investment equipment Attchmt Iva 0 0 0 0 0 0
Remaining industrial articles 100 80 40 20 20 0
Source: Journal of Laws, no. 11/1994, pos. 38, Attachment.
In contrast to industrial goods, agricultural products were subject to selective and 
limited liberalisation. In agriculture, Mayhew pointed out that, “the EAs did not 
improve the situation of the associated countries much beyond that of any third 
country”, with only a reduction and not total abolition of trade barriers.85 In spite of the 
agreement to reduce certain duties and increase quotas and to introduce a provisional 
standstill on duties and QRs, each side was allowed to take decisions, which deviated 
from the Agreement, as part of pursuing their respective individual agricultural policies. 
Concessions consisted of levy reductions on very limited quantities of various products, 
some reductions in duties and other minor concessions which did not add up to make 
any significant impact on trade liberalisation. The respective regulations covered six 
groups of products, classified according to the timetable and scope of import barrier 
reduction in the EC. The main commodity groups covered by liberalisation were 
vegetables and fruit, live animals, meat and meat products and poultry.
The EC agricultural concessions, in the form of reduced tariffs and/or levies, were 
granted within a system of preferential quotas. This rising quota, which shared by some 
associated countries, called for gradual reductions of import levies and tariffs on the 
specified products and was calculated on the basis of average agricultural exports from 
CEE to the Communities. The controversial period between 1988 and 1990 was taken as 
a reference point for determining the average, despite the fact that this timeframe was
85 Mayhew (1998). Recreating Europe, ibid, p 65.
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characterised by unusually low volumes of exports from CEE due to transition 
depression and falls in output.
Tariffs and/or levies were to be reduced within one to three years, and preferential 
quotas were to increase 20% annually, from March 1 1992 for 5 years. The total 
increase of quotas amounted to roughly 50% of the basic volume of Polish exports to 
the EC before the IA came into force.86
Table 2.6 Liberalisation approved in the EA for imports from Poland to the EU of
agricultural articles
Group of commodities Guidelines of liberalisation
I group- attchmt Vila -  concerning: Ducks, pork meat, 
sausages, potato starch
Reduction of compensatory payments by 
50%, within limits increased by 10%, in 
yearly terms during 10 years
II group attchmt VHb- live horses, pork, poultry, wild 
meat, honey, flowers, soft fruits, some vegetables, 
apple juice
Reduction of customs duties from 30 to 
100% in one step, abolition of quantitative 
limits and introduction of minimal prices 
for fruit
III group, attchmt Xa- young slaughter meat Reduction of compensatory payments to 
25% of basic custom duties, within the 
limits for 5 years
IV group- attchmt X- beef, pork, sheep and goats, 
powdered milk, dairy buckwheat
Reduction of compensatory payments and 
custom duties by 20% in first year, 40% in 
second and 60% in consecutive years, with 
quantitative limits increased by 10% in 
yearly terms
V group attchmt Xc- potatoes and part vegetables, 
fruits (exception group II), dried fruits, jams, 
mushrooms
Reduction of custom duties by 20% in first 
three years for contingents increasing by 
10% annually
VI group- protocol 3- agricultural products processed Consecutive reduction of custom duties for 
part of the goods, also decreasing the 
burden of changing component (MOB) in 
three consecutive years in stages by 20%, 
within the tariff contingents
Source: Dziennik Ustaw- Journal of Laws, no. 1 /1994, position 38, Attachment.
For its part, Poland introduced a one-off tariff reduction of 10% (usually from 35% to 
25%) covering about 250 agricultural products, on the day the IA came into force. 
Poland also undertook the obligation to lift, at the beginning of 1997, the ban on imports 
and licensing requirements on some alcoholic beverages.87
86 Kawecka- Wyrzykowska, E. (1997). Stosunki Polski ze Wspolnotami Europejskimi od 1989 Roku. 
Warszawa: SGH.
87 Following the implementation of the Uruguay Round on Agriculture, Poland converted the ban and 
licenses on imported alcoholic beverages into tariffs, effective of July 1 1995. In the EU, NTBs, primarily 
levies, were substituted by their tariff equivalents.
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Table 2.7 Liberalisation approved in the EA for imports from the EU to Poland of
agricultural products
Attchmt IX- majority of alcohol beverages, beer Abolishment of quantitative limits no 
later than in 5 years of introduction of the 
Agreement
Attchmt XII- live animals, milk products, some cheeses, 
plants, potatoes, maize, nuts, Mediterranean fruits, rice, 
seeds of vegetables and grains, coffee, oil, oils, wine, 
herbs
Reduction of custom duties by 10% at the 
moment of entrance of the Agreement 
into life
Protocol 3- agricultural products and processed 
agricultural products
Decision about the agricultural 
component until 1/07/94, between 1995 
and 1/1/99 abolishment of nonagricultural 
burden
Source: Dziennik Ustaw- Journal of Laws, no. 11/1994, position 38, Attachment.
B. Safeguard rules
The EA also contained safeguard clauses, which under specific conditions allow a
contracting party temporarily to withdraw market access concessions. These are based
on existing GATT/WTO rules envisaging the possibility of introducing trade- limiting
measures in justified cases.
Clauses that can be applied by both parties:
• The general clause (article 30 of the Agreement)- a general ‘escape clause’ that can 
be invoked to suspend or delay concessions due to ‘serious injury’ to domestic 
producers
• A clause (article 21) on protection against disruptions of the domestic agricultural 
market
• A protective measures clause that provides for the possibility to retaliate when the 
other contracting party is behaving unfairly or when it is in breach of the rules laid 
down in the agreement, including Anti- Dumping (art. 29)
• A clause permitting the re-introduction of export restrictions in case of ‘serious 
shortage’ of an essential product on the domestic market by excessive exports (art. 
31)
• A balance of payments clause (art. 64) concerning import restrictions in order to 
counter balance of payments difficulties and disturbances
Kawecka-Wyrzykowska, E. (1997). ‘Effects of the Europe Agreement on Polish Economy and Pre­
accession Challenges’, in Yearbook o f Polish European Studies, Vol 1, Warsaw: Warsaw University 
Centre for Europe, p 131.
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• A clause allowing bans and restrictions under WTO rules (art. 35) designed to 
protect national interest; including various threats to public security, health, life of 
humans, animals or plants, intellectual property etc., and permitting the parties to 
resort to extraordinary measures for fundamental security interests (art. 112)
Plus two, which may be used only by Poland as the weaker partner:
• Infant industry and restructuring clauses providing the associated country with the 
tools to protect its industries undergoing restructuring or in their early stages of 
development (art. 112)
• A clause on exchange restrictions (art. 62)88
C. Other provisions
At a more specific level, the Agreement incorporated a protocol on the rules of origin89, 
which initially caused widespread controversy as it did not permit the cumulation of 
local content between the Viseghrad countries and others and thus had the potential to 
discourage intra- CEE trade (lower tariffs existed on imports from the EC than from 
other CEEs).90
While the Agreement was relatively liberal in terms of eliminating duties and QR’s, it 
included more stringent provisions on competition policy and state subsidies, in order to 
prevent non tariff barriers from distorting the levels of trade.91 The rules were included 
as a part of Title V on payments, capital, competition and other economic provisions. In 
addition, the approximation of laws specifically dealing with rules on ‘restriction or 
distortion of competition’ and ‘abuse of dominant position or public aid which distorts 
competition’92 were to restrain the parties from engaging in anti-competitive or 
monopolistic behaviour. The disputes and controversies surrounding competition 
policies were to be judged by the Association Council, on the basis of practice in the 
Community. As such, the Polish side was to adopt the EC’s competition policy within 
three years of entrance into force of the Interim Agreement. However, during the first
88 Kawecka- Wyrzykowska (1997). Stosunki Polski, ibid.
89 Rules of origin define the minimum content of a product to be qualified as “originating” and thus 
enjoying preferences and trade benefits restricted to the two partners involved and not to third countries.
90 EBRD (1994). Ibid.
Baldwin, R. (1994). Towards an Integrated Europe. London: CEPR.
91 Van den Bossche, AM. (1997). ‘The Competition Provisions in the Europe Agreements. A 
Comparative and Critical Analysis’, in Maresceau (Ed.) (1997). ibid., p 85.
92 Poland, Art 63 of the Europe Agreement.
92
five years of the going into effect of the EA, the Polish government was allowed to 
continue to grant public aid for restructuring purposes.
In the realm of legal harmonisation, the Polish side committed itself to ‘use its best 
endeavours to ensure that future legislation was compatible with Community legislation 
as far as possible’93, agreeing that intellectual property right laws would be adopted 
within 5 years, while all the other trade related issues harmonised with the acquis 
communautaire before accession.
In addition, the EA set out some rather imprecise provisions on the free movement of 
persons, establishment and services. In fact, the Treaty was criticised as not providing 
any improvement in the possibilities for the movement of labour over the situation 
existing before the agreement, only aiming to achieve proximity to national treatment 
clauses for workers already legally employed in the other contracting country.94 As far 
as establishment was concerned, while the articles of the EA established immediate 
national treatment for companies and nationals of the associated country, the realisation 
of this goal was constrained by bureaucratic restrictions and other confinements on the 
free movement of workers.
The supply of services was treated even more vaguely within the policy framework of 
the EA, only rendering a general intention to ‘progressively allow for the liberalisation 
of trade in services’, and paying just a bit more heed to liberalisation in construction and 
transport.
Finally, the EA did not specify what trade policies Poland should conduct with third 
countries as long as these did not directly affect trade between the EU and Poland or the 
EU’s status as laid out in the Agreement. However, as a part of the pre-accession 
strategy95, the Polish side agreed to harmonise all foreign trade related agreements 
existing with third countries from the point of view of EU trade policy and existing EU 
agreements, as well as to introduce the whole system of NTBs applied by the EU 
(subsidies, tariff quotas, phyto-sanitary requirements, technical standards etc.). 
Conclusion
Since January 1998, Polish exports have been enjoying tariff free access to the EU 
market, and most tariff barriers to the Polish market were also eliminated, with the last
93 Poland, Art. 68. of the Europe Agreement.
94 Mayew (1998). Recreating Europe, ibid., p 122.
95 Made up of four main elements, including the EA, Single Market White Paper, PHARE & structured 
dialogue, and formally launched in Essen, Dec 1994.
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ones on automobiles disappearing in 2002.96 Simultaneously, progress in the gradual 
liberalisation of agricultural products has taken place within various trade rounds, 
cumulating in the signature of the Double- Zero Agreement between the Polish side and 
the EU in 2001.97
In Poland, the EA was to play a multifunctional role, defining the depth and speed of the 
opening of the Polish economy, playing the role of external leverage in policy making, 
providing a major incentive for difficult domestic decisions, and, finally, accelerating 
the systemic transformation by speeding up restructuring, increasing competition and 
ultimately strengthening Poland’s international competitiveness. The declared 
objectives of the Europe Agreement were to lead the Polish economic regime in the 
direction of openness, by using conditionality as an anchor for policy reform, as well as 
providing rewards for change in the form of trade concessions and grants to offset the 
adjustment costs. Association was likewise to strengthen the democratic transition by 
contributing to the development of pluralism. On the basis of the creation of a Free 
Trade Area and subsequently a Customs Union, economic integration was to be used as 
the foundation for cooperation and ultimately political integration between the 
associated parties. Thus, the long term objective of the entire association and pre­
accession strategy has been to support the transformation of the Polish ‘state’ into a 
functioning market democracy able to effectively compete on the Internal Market and, 
ultimately, accede to the European Union, increasing Europe’s overall economic 
dynamism, political effectiveness and internal as well as external stability.
Because the intrinsic uncertainty of the domestic transition in Poland has made the 
entire process particularly vulnerable to the impact of the international environment, the 
success of the transformation has depended only in part on the domestic reforms 
underway, but has also been a function of international openness to Polish exports as 
well as of levels of financial and technical assistance. The benefits of association with 
the EU, expected by the Polish liberals, were consequently conditional upon the opening 
up of European markets to Polish products, and the granting of asymmetric trade 
concessions to allow the reforming country to develop its trade potential and re-orient 
its trade patterns.
96 For more detailed analysis see Zukrowska, K. (2000). ‘Opening of the Polish Economy in Context of 
Integration with the EU’. ibid.
Michalek, J. (2000). ‘The Europe Agreement and the Evolution of Polish Trade Policy’, in Y 
earbook o f European Studies, No 4, Warsaw: CEUW.
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However, even though the European Commission claimed that, the “Europe Agreements 
constitute a very substantial trade liberalisation package, the scale and pace of which is 
without precedent in the EC”98, the fundamental question posed by this thesis will be 
whether, during the course of the implementation of the EA, the dynamic gains 
envisaged by the trade arrangements actually followed. The failure of the potential 
benefits to be secured could mean one of three things. Either the rules of the EA were 
not designed properly, or they were circumvented, or both.
In the following chapters, the author will examine the actual impact of the EA on the 
Polish economy and whether the EU’s declarations of willingness to provide support for 
the transition materialised in the form of concrete market access and financial aid. Then, 
the author will analyse the developments in political relations during the course of 
association and how, in turn, these have affected economic policy-making in Poland. 
Finally, the thesis will attempt to discuss the implications o f ‘anchoring’ strategies for 
policy reform and performance, keeping in mind, as A Moravcsik has pointed out that, 
“to enhance credibility, arrangements (like the EA) tend to be insulated from direct 
democratic control and are strictly limited by government oversight, resulting in the 
‘democratic deficit’.”99
Before proceeding, it is important to underline that any given economic strategy is much 
more than a programme for achieving specific policy goals. Its implementation has 
political consequences that reach beyond the static assumptions of economic theory.
This thesis will argue that the mistake of the original drafters of the Europe Agreement 
was to underestimate the tremendous transaction costs resulting from its 
implementation, the resistance of domestic interest groups on both associated sides to 
liberalisation and finally the link between reform sustainability and social legitimacy. 
Moreover, the initial liberals in Poland left to their successive governments an 
incomplete and unbalanced reform. Failing to prioritise the crucial institutional, 
regulatory and social dimensions of the transition, alongside the macroeconomic 
package, would have serious implications for the policy-making environment in the 
future.
This thesis will show that it has been domestic interest groups, of both the present and 
future member states of the Union, as well as social obstacles that have proven to be the
97 The agreement calls for the elimination of both tariffs and subsidies in trade in unprocessed agricultural 
products between Poland and the EU.
98 European Commission (1994). ibid., p 1-2.
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most significant barriers to integration between Poland and the EU. To understand better 
the political economy of policy making in transition, the author will now turn to the 
conditions prevalent in Poland at the onset of the reforms.
99 Moravcsik (1998). Theorising, ibid., p 78.
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3. Capitalism by Design
The accelerated development o f  capitalism in the post- communist countries started 
from an ideological blueprint. It was not an economic process in which major social 
forces conscious o f their interests and capable o f defending them on a nationwide scale 
were involved here and now. The entities whose real economic interest would be linked 
with the reform were supposed to appear only after these changes were advanced.1
Normative economic analysis, as is the basis of the previous chapter, is based on the 
assumption that the objective of economic policy should be the promotion of the general 
good, the maximisation of the social welfare function. The goal of advocating national 
interest at the expense of short-term particular interest lies at the heart of neo-liberal 
policy prescription. Economists argue that the ‘state’ should be a “middleman rather 
than a favour-granting mechanism”, and that policy options should be designed with 
long-term horizon in mind. Decisions to embrace what mainstream economists assume 
should be the objective of government policies never-the-less have social and political 
consequences. The role of the ‘state’ thus becomes a crucial variable in policy reform, 
and the choices that elites make in initiating systemic changes determine to a large 
extent their outcomes.2
In the short run, economic reforms such as the opening up of the economy are bound to 
not only harm particular interests, but even to disrupt the entire socio-political fabric as 
far ranging macroeconomic measures are rapidly introduced. Commenting on the course 
of the Chilean reforms Pinera noted that, “the theoretical merit and internal consistency 
in a reform program are not enough to generate political support- the program also 
needs an upwelling of popular enthusiasm if it is to overcome resistance.” Efforts need 
to be made to mobilise public support for the reform package, through dialogue and an 
information policy and to create a solid and transparent institutional framework that will 
regulate, in a non-discriminating fashion, the implementation of the measures. The 
performance of the economic regime in turn needs to ensure that enough benefits are 
visible in the short-run to enable the reformers to continue their course of stabilisation 
and liberalisation. Whether the ‘state’ can in fact meet these challenges depends on the
1 Szacki, J. and Kisiel, C.A. (1995) Liberalism after Communism. Budapest: Central European University 
Press, p 160.
2 Zukorwska, K. ‘Poland: Changes for the Better’, in Goralczyk, B., Kostecki, W. and Zukrowska, K. 
(Ed.) (1995). In Pursuit o f  Europe: transformations o f post-communist states, 1989-1994. Warsaw: 
Institute of Political Studies, Polish Academy of Sciences, IPRA Research Team on Changes in Eastern 
Europe.
For more on public choice theory, see for example, M Olson (1982).
3 As quoted in Williamson, J. (1994). ‘In Search for a Manual for Technopols’ in Williamson (Ed.)
(1994). ibid., p 23.
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ability of both domestic and international elites to exert leadership and develop the 
conditions to consolidate the transition. Successful policy reform and economic 
development are consequently premised on the existence of certain factors conducive to 
the pursuit of objective economic goals.
This chapter begins by looking at the theoretical foundations for regime change and 
modernisation. In examining the political economy of policy reform in Poland, it places 
stress on the crucial interplay between national elites and external factors as they 
influence policy outcomes and performance.
I. Transitology and elite theory
The study of regime change and policy reform in post-communist states hinges on the
i analysis of economic development and modernisation within the so-called field of
transitology.4 This body of literature relies heavily on the belief that modernisation will
take place in a nation once the right institutions, policies and mechanisms are in place.
This task, in turn, is to be accomplished by national elites.
The bureaucratic economy will replaced with a thriving market, and the emergence o f  
liberal democratic practices will lead to the creation o f new social groups capable o f  
cementing the reforms as well as the general re-emergence o f civil society.5
Drawing heavily the reworked modernisation theories of the 1960’s, transitology 
continues to focus on the role of national elites as the drivers of economic development, 
combined with a new emphasis on the importance of external factors in influencing 
policy outcomes.6 Moreover, the literature stresses the centrality of the “purposeful 
transplantation of western institutional patterns, policies of conscious emulation, 
reference societies and pace setters in the west, as they determine economic reform.” 
The previous chapter has presented the reader with the rationale as to why the role of 
external pressure is crucial to the entire project of policy consolidation and
• o # #
sustainability. The conditionality of the international anchors, combined with financial
4 Defined as attempt to apply modernisation theories to transition economies.
Pickles, J. and Smith, A. (1998). Theorising Transition: The Political Economy o f Post-Communist 
Transformations. NY: Routladge, p 3.
5 Pickles and Smith (1998). ibid., p 4.
6 For older versions of modernisation theory see T Parsons, N Smelseerm, B Hoselitz, S Eisenstadt.
7 Sztompka, P. (1993). ‘Lessons of Post-Communist Transition for Sociological Theories of Change’, in 
Coenen-Huther, J. and Synak, B. (Ed.) (1993). Post Communist Poland. Commack, NY: Nova Publishers, 
p 15.
See for ex. Pridham, G. (1991). ‘International influences and democratic transition: the problems of 
theory and linkage politics’, Pridham, G. (Ed.) (1991). Encouraging Democracy: The International 
Context o f  Regime Transition in Southern Europe. London: Leister University Press, Pinter Publishers. 
Haggard, S., Kaufman, R. (Ed.) (1992). The Politics o f Economic Adjustment: international constraints, 
distributive conflicts, and the state. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
Sachs, J. (1994). ‘Life in the Economic Emergency Room’, in Bates (Ed.) (1994). ibid.
Crawford, B. (Ed.) (1995). Markets, States and Democracy: The Political Economy o f  Post-Communist 
Transformation. Boulder: Westview Press.
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assistance is to give domestic reformers the extra leverage necessary to secure support 
and win internal debates as to which policy options to follow; in another words to 
strengthen state capacity and authority and provide an additional impetus to resist the 
pressure for backsliding.
Going one step further and basing their theories on the belief that domestic elites are 
central to the initiation of reform, modem versions of neoliberal institutionalism 
maintain that it is indeed the role of the elites to anchor domestic institutions in 
international regimes, thereby ensuring their continuity and creating the conditions for 
policy consolidation. In addition, the quicker the process of transformation, the more 
relevant the role of the authorities. Their central position and ideology shapes the 
underlying structures of the emerging market economy, and the interplay between these 
elites, on the one hand, and external institutions, on the other, is the decisive factor in 
determining policy performance.
A. The Polish liberals
Contemporary elite theory, or the “analysis of choices that elites make at the historical 
junction of transition, the interaction of structures, norms and institutions which flow 
from these choices, and how these three constrain possibilities for regime change”9, is, 
consequently, pivotal to the understanding of transition. Elite theory focuses in on the 
purpose of institutions in policy reform and treats elites as the architects as well as 
future users of these institutions. Sociologist, J Wasilewski, in his analysis of Polish 
political actors, has labelled elites “institutional nomads”, creating institutions to their 
own use and benefit.10 Moreover, as I Pankow has claimed, “decision makers act in 
accordance with their perceptions of reality, not in response to reality itself’, thus, in 
effect, shaping present and future reality according to their own beliefs.11 
Modernists and elite theorists have continued to uphold that in all successful late-comer 
countries, it was the ‘state’ that had to create the externalities necessary for the invisible 
hand to function; such as guaranteeing a friendly business environment, establishing a 
legal framework for the market or acting as an agent for the accumulation of capital.
Waller, M., Coppieters, B. and Deschouwer, K. (1993). Social democracy in a Post-Communist Europe. 
London, Portland, Ore: Frank Cass.
9 Skapska, G. (1995). ‘Prisoners of Paradox: The Polish economic transformation’, in Perdue, W.D. (Ed.)
(1995). Modernization Crisis: the transformation o f Poland. Westport, CT: Praeger.
See also Offe, C. (1991). ‘Capitalism by Democratic Design? Democratic Theory Facing the Triple 
Transition in East Central Europe’, Social Research, Vol 58, No 4, winter.
10 Wasilewski, J. (1997). ‘Orientacje wartosciujace elity’, w Wasilewski, J. (Red.) (1997). Zbiorowi 
Aktorzy polskiej Polityki. Warszawa: PAN, Instytut Studiow Politycznych, p 197.
11 Pankow, I. (1997). ‘Narodziny posierpniowego pluralizmu: spory elity/ pluralisci’, w Wasilewski 
(Red.) (1997). ibid., p 249.
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Consequently, successful capitalism should be carefully designed and monitored by the 
ruling elites within the structures of the state.
While the notion that a strong state is crucial to the creation of a market society is
1 9nothing new, stemming as far back as Karl Polanyi’s The Great Transformation , the 
paradox in the case of the Polish transition is that these attempts at building capitalism
were instigated by economic liberals. For the Polish liberals, just as is advocated by the
* •  1  ^ •classical version of liberalism , the fundamental aim of'political economy’ should be
to create a market society, by sweeping away barriers to the free play of market forces. 
The role of ‘the state’ should be limited to providing public goods that the market might 
fail to supply, and its politics are to be determined and controlled by a free and 
independent civil society. Gill has called these attempts in Poland at the creation of a 
self- regulating, market society “political utopianism”, or experimental reforms that 
have strong parallels with 19th century British attempts at creating a market utopia from 
above.14 Thus, according to the main assumptions of this reworked version of 
liberalism, shock therapy, by freeing market transactions, should enable the pursuit of 
self -interest, while rational economic agents should adjust accordingly to the rules of 
the new game.
In 1992 at a Oxford University lecture, J Flemming, chief economist at the newly 
established EBRD, argued that that, “all countries are the same for the purpose of policy 
and that the problem of economic reform was premised on two historical ‘facts’, namely 
‘the uniformity of human nature’ and the ‘universality of technology’.”
Flemming went on to insist that reform in turn was “premised on the creation of a 
strong government with ‘credible’ economic policies. (However, the governments in 
CEE were) insufficiently strong, fragmented and thus ‘subversive to credibility’.” 15 
Recognising these credibility obstacles to policy reform, the Polish intellectuals were 
forced to reconcile their beliefs in the spontaneous rise of a market society with the 
necessity of having a strong government present in the process of transition. While the 
alleged theories of a minimalist state glorified the invisible hand of the market, the 
Polish reformers realised to their dismay that liberalism in transition required an active
12 Polanyi, K. and Maclver, R.M. (1957). The Great Transformation. Boston: Gower Beacon Press. A 
detailed description of the attempt in nineteenth century Britain to create a market society from above and 
to sweep away the social protection and regulated structure of mercantilism. Crucial was a strong state 
that could institute the measures necessary to construct commodities. It took at least 70 years to transform 
GB to something theoretically resembling a laissez-faire capitalist market society!
13 For an overview see Sally, R. (1998). Classical Liberalism and International Economic Order, ibid.
14 Gill,S. (1994). ibid., p 82.
15 Flemming, J, ‘Economic Reform in Eastern and Central Europe’, lecture given at Oxford University, 
Brasenose College, 26/10/92.
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government, needed to guard property rights and enforce the rules of a capitalist society. 
As a result, in the early days of the reforms, it became fashionable to argue that the new 
ruling elite should take the major and active role in the transformation, turning, what 
began as the classical liberal doctrine, into a revised version of the elitist model of 
modernisation.
In transition, this kind of elitism, espoused to by liberal constructivists is arguably 
unavoidable as realistically there is no alternative. Moreover, the elitism was a 
necessary evil to introduce internationalisation and ensure that the economic 
performance of the regime would spillover into the political arena, creating pluralism by 
contributing to the emergence of the beneficiaries of the reforms, and ultimately 
producing enough growth for healthy political competition to develop.
Thus, as sociologist G Skapska concluded “of all the paradoxes of transformation, the 
most glaring one was that the so called spontaneous market order could only come 
about through introduction from above .”16
B. Capitalism by design
Although the intentions of the early Polish liberals were positive and the elitist project 
was carried out in good faith, the Shock Therapy package was never the less 
unbalanced. J Goldfarb labeled the situation in Poland in the early 90’s as “the new 
totalitarian temptation of the laissez faire kind”, characterised by an atmosphere of 
impatience in liberal circles.17 The political and economic system was being rapidly 
constructed by means of legislative decisions implementing western strategies, without 
taking local conditions into account. In addition, this designing of institutions was 
shallow as it was not accompanied by the creation of a predictable and enforceable 
regulatory system. While a complex regulatory environment would not have been 
simple to introduce in a situation where a market did not yet exist, it would have been 
wise to pay more attention to this issue of microeconomic institution- building and 
prioritise it at the onset, along with macroeconomic reform. This element could have 
lessened the future rise of corruption. In addition, the Polish liberals conducted the 
entire policy formulation process without an information campaign to explain to the 
public the nuances of the reforms, thereby alienating a large segment of the population 
which potentially could have provided them with crucial support.
16 Skapska, G. (1995). ‘Prisoners of Paradox’, ibid., p 38.
17 Goldfarb, J. Goldfarb, J.C. (1992). After the Fall: the pursuit o f democracy in Central Europe. New 
York: Basic Books, p 48.
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Offe claimed that, “new institutions were being put into place by the lawyers as the
1 8legal skeleton for democracy” , and virtually no attention was paid to the possibility of 
negative reverberations of this copying of institutions for the development of 
governance. What’s more, a certain tendency appeared to question whether in certain 
conditions it would not be desirable to limit democracy in order to avoid its detrimental 
effects on the ‘objective’ needs of society, and whether reform was possible to be 
carried out with the use of fully democratic procedures. Characteristically, the liberal 
circles tended to regard the established trade union movement in Poland as an inherent 
threat to capitalism19, and in the words of one Polish writer and philosopher S 
Kisielewski “they displayed a temptation to grab people by the throat and impose 
liberalism.”20
II. Initiating the reforms
In 1990, the first free Prime Minister Tadeusz Mazowiecki called together a group of 
Polish economists led by finance minister, Leszek Balcerowicz21, to initiate a program 
of radical policy reform grounded in the neo-classical economic model. It seemed at the 
time to the Polish elites that the precondition of good economic policy was that it had to 
be made by independent economic experts, technocrats as is the fashionable term. The 
main assumption of this project was that elites, governing through a technocracy, would 
in fact be ruling in the interests of the public. Convinced that society was immature and 
underdeveloped22, these “enlightened rulers” as J Wasliewski has called them argued 
that, there was no time for social dialogue or negotiations, and that the window of 
opportunity offered to the new government was small enough to justify their 
determination to push radical through reforms as quickly as possible. The were 
convinced of the correctness of their project, arguing that somehow the other non­
economic freedoms, as espoused to by classical liberalism, would follow in the wake of 
economic freedom, and, consequently, for the time being it was not worth making the 
effort to secure them. Poignantly, Waslilewski concluded that most likely, “the Polish 
elites underestimated society and overestimated themselves.”24
18 Offe, C. (1993). Designing Institutions for East European Transitions. Krakow: Academy of 
Economics, (mimeo), p 34.
19 Balcerowicz (1999). Panstwo w Przebudowie. ibid.
20 Interview with Kisielewski, Nowy Dziennik, 1.12.92.
21 Balcerowicz team- Ministry of Finance plus group of western advisers. Interview with R Antczak, ibid.
22 Interview with Piotr Nowina-Konopka (MP in first post-socialist government, member of EA 
negotiating team, Secretary of UKIE, currently Dean of Natolin, College of Europe). Warsaw, 24/03/00.
23 For more see, Beyme, K. von (1996). Transition to Democracy in Eastern Europe. London: Macmillan 
Press.
Przeworski, A. (1991). Democracy and the Market: political and economic reforms in Eastern Europe 
and Latin America. Studies in rationality and social change. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
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Believing that the timing was right to instil life into the stagnating command economy 
structures by exposing them to external forces, namely world prices and competition,
7 <the Balcerowicz team was given a mandate by the Mazowiecki government to 
experiment with the application of theoretical market models to a closed, protectionist 
command economy. Their political stock, defined as “the aggregation of support and 
credibility that a government might have at a given moment in time”26 was unusually 
high, characterising what Balcerowicz has called a moment of “extra-ordinary politics”, 
when “the. new political structure, including political parties and interest groups are 
fluid, and in a sense, there are usually no professional politicians during this period. The 
older political elite is discredited and the politicians representing the new order have not 
yet merged.” Soon after, extra-ordinary politics give way to “ ‘politics of the ordinary’: 
politics of political parties and of interest groups, a sharply reduced willingness to think 
and act for the common good and stronger institutional constraints with respect to the
7 7individual political actors.”
In his memoirs, Balcerowicz recalls that there two basic options:
trying to change the system first and subsequently stabilise the economy, or rapidly 
launching the stabilisation and transformation programs at about the same time, 
knowing that, because o f the inherent differences on the speed with which parts o f  the 
plan could be put n place, stabilisation and liberalisation would have to be 
accomplished before the fundamental institutional structures o f the economy could be
transformed.28
Because it was doubtful whether meaningful institutional change was possible amidst 
the macroeconomic chaos, the first option was never seriously considered, and in 
November 1989, the technocrats’ ideas were approved by a special all- party 
parliamentary committee which speeded up the legislative process, enabling the entire 
package of measures to be signed by President Jaruzelski and become law by the end of 
the year. Balcerowicz defended his radical Shock Therapy, by arguing that that it was 
easier for the supporters of a liberal economic system and macroeconomic stability to
Kolodko, G. and Nuti M. (1997). Polska Alternatywa: stare mity, twarde fakty, nowe strategie. 
Warszawa: Poltext.
Winiecki, J. (1996). ‘Five Years After June: the Polish transformation, 1989-1994’, New Series, Centre 
fo r  Research into Communist Economies, No. 13, London: Centre for Research into Post -Communist 
Economies.
24 Wasilewski, J. (1995). ‘Crystallisation of Post-Communist Political Elite’, Wnuk-Lipinski, E. (1995). 
After Communism: a multidisciplinary approach to radical social change. Warszawa: Instytutu Studidw 
Politycznych PAN, p 119.
25 A technocrat and by extension a technopol, is defined as a policymaker who is motivated to pursue the 
objectives postulated by traditional normative economic analysis. A technopol is a breed of the economic 
technocrat who assumes a position of political responsibility; such as L Balcerowicz
Williamson, (1994).‘In search of a manual’ ibid., p 12.
26 Ardito-Barletta, N. (1994). ‘Panel Discussion’, in Williamson (Ed.).(1994). ibid., p 460.
27 Balcerowicz (1994). ‘Poland’, ibid., p 177.
28 Balcerowicz (1994). ibid., p 162.
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defend them as a fa it accompli than it would have been to build reform gradually in the 
face of strong populist opposition in Parliament after the elections of October 1991.
The extraordinary nature of the whole undertaking meant that there was an initial social 
calm between January and Aril of 1990. However, in April, Solidarity Trade Union 
delegates criticised the programme, while the farmers went on strike demanding higher 
milk prices. The difficult political situation in Poland was further complicated by an 
economic recession, and the situation deteriorated rapidly in 1991 following the 
collapse of trade with the former CMEA in the East. In 1991, the political climate 
reached top temperatures as trade unions staged massive attacks on the liberal 
government and the short-lived honeymoon period granted to the ruling elites to pursue 
the reforms came to an abrupt end. Although Balcerowicz was trying to keep the 
economic programme outside of political conflicts, this was becoming more and more 
difficult, as governments and prime ministers changed, and the relationship of political
• inleadership to economic reform remained unclear.
In this moment of economic crisis, policy reform in Poland was initiated behind closed 
doors and shut off from the public. The new liberal government was sheltered under the 
parasol of the Solidarity worker movement, which had vigorously fought for the 
democratic revolution along the side of the intelligentsia. Uniquely to Poland, as J Sachs 
and D Lipton observed, “in those first months, not only did the government command 
popular trust and support, but it also was not hampered by the ideological baggage and 
vested interests that weighed down the reform attempts of earlier years.”31 Bargaining 
was consequentially not necessary to achieve consensus, enabling the government to 
instigate a radical reform package, unthinkable in established democracies constrained 
by social dialogue and compromise-seeking. However, when ‘extra-ordinary politics’ 
gave way to ‘politics of the ordinary’, the splits within society between the losers and 
winners of transition spilt onto the political arena complicating the policy-making 
process.
In addition the initial elites did not embark on any real communication strategy, and no 
serious attempts were made to explain or predict the possible consequences of economic 
change to society. Balcerowicz justified this lack of public involvement and political 
transparency by claiming that the amount of time available to accomplish the needed
29 Balcerowicz (1994). ibid., p 173.
30 See chapter two.
31 Sachs, J. and Lipton, D. (1995). ‘Poland’s Economic Reform’, in Frieden, J. and Lake, D. (Ed.) (1995). 
International Political Economy, ibid., p 461.
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tasks was severely limited.32 However, given the ‘third-way’ elements in the tradition of 
the Solidarity trade union movement throughout the 70’s and the 80’s, as well as the 
speed with which the economic reform program was launched, there seemed little 
possibility that the Polish public could have been psychologically well- prepared for the 
radical changes taking place.
Although under the governments of PM JK Bielecki and PM J Olszewski, public 
opposition to the Shock Therapy reforms grew, the measures continued to be put into 
place, because, the right amount of consensus remained within the ruling circles 
necessary to pursue the radical stabilisation package. It also seems that while, the Polish 
economist were looking for over-simplified answers, western consultants, came readily 
with solutions that did not take into account the specificities of transition economies. 
Many of the economically liberal theories tested in Poland stemmed from applied 
assumptions from the third world. For example, commenting on Sachs’ role as chief 
advisor to the Polish government, Viceminister of Finance, S Kawalec, claimed that, 
“there were and still are many question marks about how the economy will respond. In 
this, Sachs had no knowledge at all because he was not familiar with communist 
economies. He tried to treat this economy the same as the Latin American ones.”
A. Transition Depression and growing opposition
At the beginning of transition, the economic situation in Poland was characterised by 
excessive domestic demand, unusually tight labour markets, guaranteed jobs, material 
shortages and foreign exchange over-valuation. The implementation of market reforms 
consisted of four pillars: privatisation, price reform, introduction of free entry and 
monetary control. This included stabilisation and liberalisation, tight monetary and 
fiscal policies, a restraining income policy on wages, institutional reform and a hard 
budget constraint on enterprises. Each policy was introduced quickly and from above 
through what Przeworski infamously has called the “authoritarian style of post­
communist leaders”34
The primary goal was to get rid as quickly as possible of all the remnants of the former 
system, through the embrace of the neo-liberal western paradigm of economics, and as 
PM JK Bielecki recalls, “in all discussions virtually no alternative to the western 
capitalist models of reform was seriously entertained on either side. No one in the
32 Balcerowicz (1999). Panstwo w Przebudowie. ibid.
33 quoted in Wedel, J. (1990). ‘The Economist Heard Around the World’, World Monitor, October, p 40.
34 A Przeworski (1995). Sustainable Democracy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, Group on 
East-South Systems Transformations.
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relevant policy circles from foreign advisers sent by international institutions to local 
officials considered alternatives.”
Instead of searching for ways to provide a social safety net as a means to soften the 
adjustment costs, the disappearance of queues and the wider range of goods available 
for consumption constituted the only form of popular compensation. Theoretical 
benefits of economic theory were used to rationalise the necessary changes and to 
persuade society to accept the viability of neo-liberal assumptions. M Bruno was 
“struck by the apparent universal acceptance of the drastic changes that have taken 
place so far” concluding that “the impending social problems in all the countries will no 
doubt put all the reform efforts to a serious test, as political democratisation proceeds 
and the possibility of bliss reduces.”
In retrospect, what the linear models of economics applied to the Polish transition were 
not able to figure into the equations was the enormous transaction costs associated with 
the implementation of the reforms and the scale of public opposition to the ongoing 
experiments.
Following the introduction of the Balcerowicz plan, GDP fell by 12% in 1990, and 
industrial production plummeted another 26%. A 60% devaluation of the Zloty made 
exports more competitive, but this was accompanied by a dramatic removal of input 
subsidies As a consequence of industrial restructuring, unemployment began to rise 
reaching 6.1% by the end of 1990 and increasing to 15% in 1994. The staggering rate of 
inflation, reaching 2000% in the last quarter of 1989, made production costs rise 
substantially. In the mean time, real income fell dramatically and inflation continued to 
soar, remaining at 586% at the end of 1990. The unexpected crash in output, mostly in 
state enterprises, contributed to the collapse of 100’s of firms and was only partially 
offset by the growth of the nascent private sector. It was only in 1996 that output 
recovered.37
35 Quoted in Wedel, J. (1998). ‘Western Assistance: Changing Mindsets and Relations’, in Staar, R.F. 
(1998). Transition to Democracy in Poland. NY: St. Martin's Press, p 122.
Interview with JK Bielecki, 12/09/02.
36 Bruno, M. (1994). ‘Stabilisation and Reform in EE: a preliminary evaluation’, in Blanchard, O.J.,
Froot, K. and Sachs, J. (1994). The Transition in Eastern Europe. National Bureau o f Economic Research 
Project Report. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, p 28.
37 For more see, Balzyca, G. (1998). ‘The Politics of Economic Transformation’, in White, S., Batt, J. and 
Lewis, P.G. (Ed.) (1998). Developments in Central and East European Politics 2. Basingstoke: 
Macmillan.
Levigne, M. (1995). The Economics o f Transition: From socialist economy to market economy. NY: St 
Martin’s Press.
Balcerowicz, L. (1995). Socialism, Capitalism, Transformation. Budapest: Central European University 
Press.
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Furthermore, the entire pre-existing system of social services completely disintegrated 
under fiscal austerity measures. Social expenditure was drastically cut and labour 
market policy was limited to minimal unemployment compensation. Even though a 
debate was launched on the role of ‘the state’ in guaranteeing a minimum income, PM 
Bielecki recalls that, “no EE aid recipient asked the donors to insist on a social safety 
net. We forgot, donors forgot. Nobody took it into consideration as a necessary political
T O
factor. Ultimately this strengthened opposition forces.”
As these dramatic effects of restructuring the economy began to be felt and adjustment 
fatigue set in, the politicisation of economic issues became inevitable. In Jan 1990, 
public support for the Balcerowicz plan was at 35%, but by April it had dramatically 
fallen to 9%, accompanied by open social unrest. The near-unemployed and those 
whose real income was falling lost faith in the reformers, and, in May, the Solidarity 
trade unions began striking against their own government. Later that summer, the 
farmers, who had been hardest hit by the reforms, joined their worker counterparts in 
protest, their actions cumulating in a series of road blockades and increasingly violent 
demonstrations.
Although the political timing couldn’t be worse, the government decided, never the less, 
to hold the first free presidential elections, providing even more opportunities for 
populists to criticise the neo-liberal reforms. The election campaign proved to be 
something of a farce, based on highly politicised debates between the supporters and 
opponents of the Mazowiecki government, and leading Mazowiecki to concede the 
Presidency to famous Solidarity leader, Lech Walesa. A stunning second place was 
taken by emigre Stan Tyminski. Tyminski, whose campaign reverberated the slogans of 
the real socialist era, was a self- described millionaire accompanied by a young ‘trophy’ 
wife, whose only qualification was a supposed fortune made in the Peruvian jungle. 
Although Walesa had heavily criticised the Mazowiecki government during the election 
campaign, he continued to support the reformers upon taking office, re-appointing 
Balcerowicz as Finance Minister in the newly forming liberal government led by PM 
Jan Krzysztof Bielecki. The election promises to slow down or even reverse some of the 
radical reforms that had won him the campaign were consequently never fulfilled, 
increasing the gap between rhetoric and reality, and further damaging the already fragile 
trust the public had initially given to the elites.
38 Quoted in Wedel, J. (1998). ‘Western Assistance: Changing Mindsets and Relations’, in Staar, R.F. 
(1998). Transition to Democracy in Poland. NY: St. Martin's Press, p 123.
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In that first and second year of the economic reforms, both the Presidential as well as 
the Parliamentary election campaigns were heavily influenced by the economic views of 
society. Relaxation of monetary and fiscal policy, protectionism and state intervention 
formed the three main pillars of economic programmes propagated by the populists, and 
although each time the reformist forces eventually secured political victory, public 
opinion grew more and more polarised, supportive of extremist views and critical of the 
liberal reformers.
In 1991, the deep internal transition recession was exacerbated by the loss of export 
markets in the east following the collapse of the CMEA, as well as decreased exports to 
the new markets in the west as Europe faced its own economic downturn. All of this 
severely undermined the transformation process, weakening the legitimacy of the 
government and further hurting the credibility of the liberal reformers. Sachs recalls 
that, “the confusion, anxiety and sense of bewilderment about market forces was 
inevitable when bread winners had to worry whether their income would be, next week, 
enough to feed the family.”39
In order to avoid a deeper crisis, external assistance was needed and, while it was in the 
strategic interest of the West to stabilise the transition process, the capacity of western 
governments to provide assistance was severely curtailed by their own economic 
recession, as well as by the concurring Gulf Crisis in the Middle East. These events took 
precious economic and political attention as well as resources away from the CEE 
region. Thus, while the goal to anchor Poland in western institutions and to seek outside 
support and leverage for the internal reforms became ever more pressing.40, the means 
with which to achieve it were becoming more and more limited.
III. The Strategy of the Balcerowicz team
In his memoirs, Finance Minister Balcerowicz has argued that it is the goals, conditions, 
and means constitute the three factors that determine “which strategy will be used to 
achieve a desired outcome.”41 Confronted with a political leadership dilemma, he had to 
adopt a policy style and persevere in his conviction about the right way to proceed. The 
choice lay between ruling by executive decree, technocratic mandatism, 
parliamentarism or corporatism. The latter option meant extending consultation and 
negotiation beyond the parliamentary actors to unions, employers and other interests,
39 Sachs, J. (1994). ‘Life in the Economic Emergency Room’, ibid., p 507.
40 However, in 1990 the Polish elite camp was still divided on foreign policy issues. Fears and 
apprehensions as to European integration were present in the post-Solidarity camp, while the post­
communist, Social Democratic Alliance remained ambivalent as to EU membership, while adamantly 
declaring opposition to aspirations towards NATO.
41 Balcerowicz (1999). Panstwo w Przebudowie. ibid., p 9.
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and, although this might have softened social resistance to the reforms, he chose instead 
technocratic mandatism, aware that while this was not a democratically desirable 
political route, it was necessary in this time of crisis. Convinced that “the two worst 
enemies of sustainable and responsible political economy are interest groups and 
extremist parties”, Balcerowicz, while in good faith, none the less chose to diminish the 
influence of societal actors on policy reform42, endangering the development of an 
active civil society.
A. Trade reform
Bearing in mind the importance of trade in setting in motion market mechanisms, 
discussed in the previous chapter, in 1990, the Balcerowicz team set out to implement 
shock therapy by opening up the Polish economy. The high level of political 
uncertainty, coupled with an unstable macroeconomic environment diminished the 
credibility of the reforms being undertaken. Furthermore, due to fiscal constraints, the 
ability of the government to provide the losers with compensation remained perversely 
low, meaning that the threat of economic failure could disrupt or even stall the entire 
process.
Although the beginnings were thus mixed with economic and political instability, a 
mixture of market and non-market incentives, missing legal infrastructures, as well as a 
shortage of domestic capital for investment accompanied by fear of foreign capital, the 
determination of elites to avoid the gradualist course of policy reform led to a decision 
for radical liberalisation.
Reform of the trade regime and increasing openness involved two dimensions. On the 
domestic level, strategic choices were to be concerned with appropriate policies towards 
the losers of liberalisation, while, on the external level, with securing new markets and 
improving access to the old ones through economic diplomacy. Openness for 
Balcerowicz would increase the speed of replacing the old system plus present an 
opportunity to depart from transition recession to that of resumed growth and 
production.43
The initiation of the trade policy reform was possible due to the macroeconomic crisis 
and the unique social consensus that followed the collapse of socialism, as well as the 
existence of only a few well-organised interest groups capable of resisting the reforms. 
However, by late 1990 already, this unusual unity between ‘the state’ and society was 
vanishing as the political costs of transition set in. Thus, while the government could
42 Balcerowicz (1999). ibid., p 81.
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initiate the reforms without going through the long-winded process of generating public 
consensus, it could not sustain or consolidate them without some sort of additional 
leverage.44 Hence, the goal became to strengthen the commitment to the reforms, 
diminishing the influence of domestic interests on policy-making and limiting future 
temptation towards political manoeuvring.
To do this the government attempted to reduce the scope of its policy autonomy by 
binding its national policies to external regulations. To avoid the possibility of future 
policy reversals, the Balcerowicz technocrats knew they could rely on one of three 
measures. First, they could signal their commitment to reform by joining an 
international organisation such as the WTO or the OECD. Second, they could attempt to 
alter its own incentives to pursue openness by, for example, integrating the national 
economy with global structures and consequently increasing its reliance on conditioned 
external trade or capital. The constraints from the international environment would act 
as consistent pressure for the continuity of change in the face of domestic upheaval and 
resistance. Finally, by pursuing regional integration with the European Union, the 
technocrats could combine these strategies simultaneously to enhance Polish reform 
credibility.45 Accordingly, the Balcerowicz team chose to turn to the EU for external 
support to secure its own political and economic goals.46
B. The role of the west
The key to successful policy reform lies in securing a broad enough base of support to 
enable the reformers to carry on with their program. As Nelson has pointed out, 
“especially after the initial stages, the need to generate support and consensus for reform 
is great in democracies, particularly in countries that have recently turned or returned to 
democratic politics.”47 Reforms can be interrupted by various disturbances, both 
economic, such as negative adjustment effects on the economy, as well as political, in 
the form of high transaction costs, coupled with unstable and changing governments. 
Under any of these conditions, the reform measures might not last long enough to yield 
the expected results, and attempts to maintain them might break down all together 
before any tangible benefits are achieved.
43 Zukrowska, K. (1998). ‘The Scope of Opening of the Economy in the Pre-accession Period: 
exemplified by the Polish experience’, in A. Zielinska- Gkebocka & A. Stepniak (Ed) (1998). ibid., p 299.
44 For more see, Whalley, J., (1996).‘Why do Countries Seek Regional Trade Agreements?’, NEBR 
Working Papers, No 5552.
Cable, V., Henderson, D. (Ed.) (1994). Trade blocs?: the future o f regional integration. London: Royal 
Institute of International Affairs/International Economics Programme.
45 Piazolo, D. ( 1998). ‘Quantifying’, in A. Zielinska- Gkebocka & A. Stepniak (Ed) (1998). ibid., p 147.
46 See Rosenau, J.N. (1969). Linkage Politics: essays on the convergence o f national and international 
systems. NY: Free Press and Princeton Center of International Studies.
47 Nelson, J. (1994). ‘Panel Discussion’, in Williamson (Ed.) (1994). ibid., p 474.
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As such a government embarking on reforms has to be in a sufficiently strong position 
to make policy changes and then to sustain them long enough to make it evident to most
• ♦ 4 .Rgroups in society that the new policy framework works better for them. At this point,
external leverage becomes pivotal for consolidating and sustaining the economic
programme.
Baldwin has observed,
In moving to a democracy from an authoritarian form o f government, it is generally 
necessary for the new leaders to bribe key economic groups into accepting the new 
order by significant economic rents to them. Consequently, integrating a newly formed 
democratic country into a major trading bloc eliminates this means o f undermining 
democratic institutions and, instead, creates rents that strengthen both democracy and
free market institutions.49
Aware of this, the Balcerowicz technocrats expected that once the reforms were under 
way, international agreements and binding external obligations could be used to fend off 
pressures to back track. Recognising that economic opening would be the most effective 
means to overcome the transition dilemmas, the Polish economic team began its 
diplomatic attempts to secure preferential trade agreements employing political means 
to achieve economic goals. The need for western assistance and markets created a 
superficial harmony between the Polish government and western advisers in their shared 
acceptance of neoliberal institutionalist assumptions and in their joint desire to stabilise 
the reforms. This domestic/ international coalition of technocratic elites consciously 
chose a democratically risky strategy in expectation that, in a short amount of time, 
benefits would materialise through the secured external support.
Zbigniew Brzezinski, former US National Security Adviser and Polish emigre thus 
called for generous western assistance to CEE. Dividing the process of transition into 
three phases, Brzezinski argued that, “the first phase is key to the entire process, 
determining the success or failure of the subsequent stages.”50 During this phase the 
help from the West was to be critical in developing the basis for movement into the 
consolidation phases, where the economic system would be more stable and the political 
institutions in place. Market access along with investment and direct grants were to 
provide the main sources of recovery and stimulate export-led growth. Without this 
assistance, he maintained, the transformation might not be able to reach its subsequent
48 Ardito-Barletta, N. (1994). ‘Panel Discussion’, in Williamson (Ed.) (1994). ibid., p 472.
49 Baldwin, R. (1988) Trade Policy in a Changing World Economy. London: Harvester- Wheatsheaf, p 
47.
50 Brzezinski, Z. (1995). ‘Rola Zachodu’, w Balcerowicz, L. and Targowski, A. (Red.) (1995). Wizja 
Polski. Warszawa: P.W. "Com-Tour" S.A,,p23.
I l l
\flnalite phase, where a middle-class, capitalist lobby develops domestically, 
encompassing newly emerging interests that support the market reforms from below. 
Accordingly, central to the entire process of economic reform and crucial to the 
outcome of the transition was the notion of western openness to Polish imports. Again 
and again it was maintained that “the liberalised domestic trade regimes would not 
become institutionalised unless they began to yield some material accomplishments. For 
this reason liberal internationalists should endeavor to provide generous trade access to 
countries undertaking significant reforms.”51 A highly asymmetrical and competitive 
international climate would only increase the social costs of internal reform, further 
undermining political support for liberalisation.
Conclusion
J Sachs has argued that the ability to reform has two critical components: both the 
capacity and the willingness of the country itself to reform as well as generous external 
assistance and support. Admitting that
even though foreign aid is not the main factor in policy initiation, it is crucial to reform 
consolidation, ensuring that the reforms themselves have enough o f a life time to take 
hold by bolstering the social and political situation and helping the government to 
manage its strained finances in a non-inflationary way. The political situation in 
Eastern Europe remains fragile, and i f  the reform programs o f  the new democratic 
governments fail, the meagre living conditions will fall farther, which could, in turn, 
provoke serious social conflict and even a breakdown o f new democratic institutions.52
Thus the liberal project of economic development espoused to and carried out by the 
Polish domestic elites was dependent to an overwhelming extent on the relationship of 
the domestic reforms to international support, particularly that of the EU, Poland’s most 
proximate neighbouring region and natural trade partner. Liberalisation and integration 
through the EA were to secure market access for Polish products, stimulate investment, 
both foreign and domestic, provide abundant financial and technical assistance to the 
Polish reformers, and ‘anchor’ the policy-making process in an international regime. 
Significantly the economic successes resulting from association were to spillover into 
the political arena, by creating winners of the transition, strengthening competition in 
the emerging political system and increasing support for the reforms. However, the 
institutional ‘anchoring’ arrangement would only work to the extent that the 
liberalisation schedule was indeed beneficent to the weaker partner, asymmetric in the 
opening and well-defined by objective rules and regulations.
51 Biersteker, ‘chapter four,’ in Rosenau, J.N. and Czempiel, E. (1992). Governance Without Government: 
Order and Change in World Politics. Cambridge Studies in International Relations, Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, p 126.
52 Sachs, J (1994). ‘Life’, ibid., p 504.
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\The European Union accordingly had a powerful role to play in the process of Polish 
domestic policy reform. In order to avert the rise of populism and nationalism in the 
region, and hence to secure its own interests, the EU collectively could have afforded to 
provide significant resource transfers and trade-related concessions.
None the less, a system of rules such as the EA is only as good as its implementation, 
and, in the absence of strong political commitment, the danger exists that the design of 
the new institutions will be captured by protectionist forces.53 This thesis will show that 
this is indeed what took place during the course of association, and that the declared 
objectives of the association were consistently subverted by increasing pressure for 
protection from domestic interests on both partners’ sides.
Moreover, as the architects of the Polish transformation began to adopt European 
models, so the Poles expected ‘Europe’ to open its doors and embrace new 
responsibilities. Few considered the possibility that the EU collectively would not 
accept the burden of adjustment required of it to ease the process of transition, or that, 
pre-occupied with its own internal problems, the Union would lack the political will to 
make good on its promises vis a vis the Polish side. The idealised views of Europe as 
well as the Poles’ naive belief that the Europeans actually cared enough to put their 
immediate interests second, contributed to an increasing threat of disappointment with 
the entire project of integration.54 As Whitehead concluded, “expectations were raised 
so high that there was some risk of the European option turning sour and recoiling on 
the prospects for successful democratic transition.”55
53 Bilal, S. (1998). ‘Political Economy Considerations on the Supply of Trade Protection in Regional 
Integration Agreements’, JCMS, Vol 36, No 1, March, Maastricht: European Institute of Public 
Administration, p 10.
54 Wedel, J. (1998). ‘Western Assistance: Changing Mindsets’, in Staar, R.F. (Ed.) (1998). ibid.
55 225.
Whitehead, L. (1991). ‘Democracy by Convergence and Southern Europe’, in Pridham, G. (Ed.) (1991). 
Encouraging Democracy: The International Context o f Regime Transition in Southern Europe. London: 
Leister University Press, p 49.
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4. Polish Interests, Institutions and Ideas
There is nothing that is pre-determined in history, because history is only whatpeople 
make o f it. The only thing we know for certain is that nothing is certain.
If trade reform is understood as a technique aimed at improving economic performance, 
an attempt must be made to discern which factors primarily influence the progress of the 
reform itself. Capitalism, systemic transformation or even the specific design of various 
policies and institutions should not be instigated on purely instrumental or technical 
grounds, as these processes are inseparable from the underlying structure of values, 
ideas and beliefs present in a given setting. It is the existing social, cultural and political 
milieu, the nation’s unique infrastructure that determines the emergence of new actors, 
laying down the foundation for the continuation of policy reform. Embedding the 
market in society is reciprocally linked with legitimising the new political and economic 
structures, ultimately, affecting their sustainability and consolidation. Hence, the 
chapter examines Polish domestic interests, institutions and ideas, examining in detail 
the local conditions in Poland in the early days of transition, and how they were to 
influence the initiation, continuation and consolidation of policy reform.
The foundations of this chapter stem from political theory and sociology, following 
through on chapter three, with an emphasis placed on the social barriers to economic 
transition and a focus on the legacies of the past as they determine the aftermath of 
policy initiation. As sociologist G Skapska has accurately observed, “first and foremost, 
transformation requires the changes of values, behavioural patters and normative orders, 
which underlie economic action.”2 The Polish transformation has largely been 
dependent on the various tensions and contradictions between the existing behavioural 
patterns and social ideals, on the one hand, and the applied models and actual reform 
policies of ‘the state’ and international organisations, on the other.
Understanding inter-linkages between international processes such as EU integration 
and domestic politics is only one component of a comprehensive economic strategy.
The other is grasping the pitfalls of domestic path dependency. All countries are not the 
same for the purpose of policy, as J Flemming has claimed in the preceding pages. 
Legacies of the past, combined with present-day configurations of domestic interests, 
institutions and ideas shape and determine how specific nations will respond to static 
policy models. Consequently, reform strategies are only as good as their applicability to
1 Kolakowski, L. (1992). ‘Amidst Moving Ruins’, in Daedalus, Spring, p 43.
2 Skapska, G. ‘Prisoners of Paradox: The Polish economic transformation’, in Perdue, W. (Ed) (1995) 
Modernization Crisis: the transformation o f Poland. Westport, CT: Praeger, p 37.
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specific conditions, and if the policy path is not adequately chosen to fit the 
environment of the particular country, reform once initiated can quickly be reversed.
I. Capitalism and Modernisation
To achieve the goal of economic openness, certain conditions conducive to the 
emergence of contestable markets and to the development of a capitalist society have to 
be met. Because reforms must be backed by citizens and complemented by civic culture 
to be effective, an understanding of past legacies and of the socio- political milieu of 
transition is thus a priority in prescribing policy reform. Market incentives alone will 
not change the behaviour and expectations of society.
A strategy for regime change based on the duplication and imitation of models applied 
to other societies undervalues the importance of local conditions and neglects the impact 
of social consciousness on policy performance. As Pickles and Smith have argued, in all 
the advice given to CEE, “there is a theme of under-theorisation of neo-liberal policy 
prescriptions which neglect complexity.” These models fail to take into account the 
“legacies of institutional frameworks and existing social relations in the context of 
transition. (As a result), best practice solutions of western advice are consequently not 
always implemented in the most effective way.”3
In Poland, ‘extra-ordinary politics’4 based on a technical government elite with fragile 
links to its social base, a discredited socialist opposition, lack of nation-wide interest 
mediators and a hasty decision-making process made the radical jump into capitalism 
possible. None the less, these conditions did not guarantee policy sustainability. The 
liberals, while correctly hastening the stabilisation process of the economy, neglected to 
appreciate that the ‘state’ would have to play an important role in gaining public consent 
for and enforcing compliance with the rules and reforms it was attempting to design. 
This chapter maintains that the paradox of introducing marketisation from above goes 
against the very essence of spontaneous capitalism, and, as such, has unpredictable 
consequences for the development of pro- market interests, institutions and ideas. 
Capitalist relationships artificially constructed, duplicated from the outside and imposed 
from above have little chance of being internalised and hence consolidated in the long 
run. The author’s analysis suggests that the path chosen to capitalist formation in Poland 
based on elitism and external ‘anchoring’ strategies has been insufficient in guiding the 
politics of reform and transformation.
3 Pickles and Smith (1998). Theorising Transition, ibid., p 3.
4 Balcerowicz (1994). ‘Poland’, ibid.
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A. The local context
Sweeping away static economic models and neoliberal assumptions, political
economists have identified domestic factors as the most decisive determinants of
economic policy reform and performance. In the tradition of public choice theory, J
Bhagwatti has argued that “profound commitments to policies are generally due to a
mix of ideological factors (in the form of ideas and example), interests (as defined by
politics and economics) and institutions (as they shape constraints and opportunities).”5
Because capitalism requires a change of normative social patterns and an active
participation of civil society in building the new order, an in depth study of the
interaction of the various microelements of the process, is essential to contemplate its
origins or analyse its formation.
Moreover, as sociologist M Marody has argued,
the idea o f democratic competition presupposes the existence o f social groups whose 
different interests influence the choice between alternative goals and ways o f  social 
development. Successfully functioning society requires the existence o f  social groups 
able to define their interests independently o f  the state and compliance on the part o f all 
significant interest groups to both the institutional arrangements regulating the 
negotiation o f conflicting interests and the outcomes produced within this regulated
competition.6
Because both of these conditions have been in opposition to the social habits shaped in 
Polish society during the 45 years of the socialist regime, a hybrid socio-political system 
has emerged during transformation not entirely conducive to the creation of liberalism 
or predictable according to public choice models.
The diverse variants of public choice theory discussed in chapter one all acknowledge 
the importance of interests, institutions and ideas as primary factors in influencing 
policy change. However this literature also has inherent limitations, as it neglects to take 
into account the distinct and individual make up of different nations and underplays the 
importance of international relations and external influences in determining policy 
outcomes. By not fully grasping the specificities of local and geopolitical conditions in 
different countries attempting radical systemic changes, traditional political economists
n
have been unable adequately to predict the politics of policy reform in transition.
5 Bhagwati, J.N. (1988). Protectionism: The Ohlin lectures. Cambridge, Mass., London: MIT Press, p 2.
6 Marody, M. (1994). ‘State and Society in Poland’, in Rootes & Davies (Ed.). A New Europe? Social 
Change and Political Transformation. University of Kent at Canterbury: UCL Press, p 181- 183.
7 See Szacki, J. and Kisiel, C.A. (1995) Liberalism after Communism. Budapest: Central European 
University Press.
Staniszkis, J. (1992). The Ontology o f Socialism. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Hausner, J., Jessop, B. and Nielsen, K. (Ed) (1995). Strategic Choice and Path-Dependency in Post- 
Socialism. Aldershot: Edward Elgar.
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While, in the early 90, western experts in Poland relied heavily on theories of social 
science transplanted from industrialised countries and incompatible with the realities of 
post-socialist states, the economic and political ramifications of this advice have proven 
highly different than initially expected. The entrenched public behaviour patterns and 
expectations have not proven easy to alter.
In economic terms, the existence of imperfect market structures in transition economies, 
highly monopolistic and centralised, has tilted the predictability of trade opening away 
from the classical model based on Anglo-Saxon studies. In the political realm, policy­
making has similarly not conformed to public choice theories of interest group 
balancing within institutionalised political structures.
For example, while the importance of corporate trade preferences might be central in 
accounting for protectionism in developed countries8, the explanation is deficient in 
transition economies where the basic foundation for capitalism has yet to be laid. It is 
only in the latter stages of capitalist development that clear and organised corporate 
interests emerge, while the beginnings of transition are marked by incoherent and 
blurred lines of interest representation. An advanced analysis of business trade 
preferences is hence incompatible with the early stages of transformation, where clearly 
those preferences are yet to be established.
Conditions where interests and their relative political influence over the process of 
policy making are in a constant flux, compounded by unstable and intransparent 
institutions and ideology combining legacies of the socialist past with newly emerging 
anomalies of early capitalism has made it is difficult to predict the outcome of policy 
reform and have created a unique situation whereby a single shift in any of the three 
interwoven factors has directly impacted policymaking. The domestic developments 
have been additionally shaped and influenced by evolving external relations, 
demonstrating the need to move away from simplified domestic political economy 
models as explanations for policy outcomes and towards more complex diagrams that 
incorporate the international dimension.
B. Historical background
Prior to 1989, Poland was largely a traditional society. The modernisation achieved by 
the command system was a deception, “where modem regimes of political power along 
with active industrialisation coexisted with pre- modem elements, such as agriculture
Krueger, A.O. (1993). The Political Economy o f  Policy Reform in Developing Countries, Cambridge, 
Mass.: MIT Press.
8 See Milner (1988) ibid.
Bhagwati, J.N. (1988). ibid.
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and an under-active and incoherent civil society.” While the education did improve 
literacy rates for example, in the late 70’s and early 80’s, the reforms of the school 
system9 attempted by the Communists failed, and access to as well as quality of 
teaching started deteriorating. Education thus itself began witnessing stagnation at best, 
if not regression, as higher developed countries moved into a knowledge- based society, 
based on technology and communications, while the Poles learned skills no longer 
useful in a modem capitalist economy (metallurgy for example). Additionally, despite 
some progress achieved during socialism, especially in the field of sciences, the 
university system continued to be weak in comparison to western nations, with only 8% 
of the population reaching higher-education levels.
Professions such as lawyers, doctors, craftsmen or construction engineers were 
subjected to the existence of the feudal guild system, which made it impossible to work 
within these fields without membership and prevented fair competition to improve 
availability and quality to the public. Moreover, socialism, the Church and even the 
Solidarity trade union movement discouraged individualism and liberalism in favour of 
collective action and communitarian values. Falsely created job security bred etatist 
thinking and passivity, while discouraging initiative. The population was consequently 
not forced to improve individual skills and the development of Polish human capital 
stagnated as compared to the West.10 These conditions were, according to P Sztompka, 
“unlikely to produce the desired outcome of rapid marketisation.”11 
The Polish nation could be described as backward, with a huge civilisational gap 
dividing it from Western Europe in all spheres of social, political and economic life. In 
fact, it could be argued that Polish backwardness reached as far back as the Golden Age 
in the XVII century, increasing progressively through a series of local wars, followed by 
partitions, the disappearance of the Polish State in 1795, the beginnings of the 20th 
century, during which the only respite from war took place during the short lived era of
i ^
the Second Republic, and finally five decades of totalitarianism.
The economy in 1989 was dominated by traditional heavy industry, especially defence, 
characterised by a manufacturing sector based on low processed goods and an over­
Baldwin R. (1985). ibid.
9 Especially trade/ craft schools.
10 See J Marianski, Kondycja Moralna Spoleczenstwa Polskiego, 2003.
Interview with Prof. J Szacki, GW, 12/06/03.
11 Sztompka, P. (1993). ‘Lessons of Post-Communist Transition for Sociological Theories of Change’, in 
Coenen-Huther, J. and Synak, B. (Ed.) (1993). ibid., p 15.
12 For more see Davies, N. (1982). God’s playground: A History o f  Poland. New York: Columbia 
University Press.
Halecki, O. with Polansky, A. and Grommada, T. (1992). A History o f  Poland, new edition. New York: 
Dorset Press.
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reliance on the extraction of raw materials. The dilemmas of the old, industrial regions 
such as Slask, where more people in 1989 were employed in coal mining than in all of 
the coal industry in Western Europe, could only be matched by the dramatic state of the 
Polish agricultural sector. Agriculture remained a disproportionate 30% of 
employment, and the remainder of the economy was based on out-dated production 
techniques and technologies.
Producing a 6% of the GDP, the state of Polish agriculture reflected the contradictory 
nature of socialist modernisation. The agrarian structure remained divided between 
small scale land plots scattered throughout the country, coupled with huge and 
unproductive state owned collective farms, which produced unsanitary and 
unmarketable food goods, meant mostly for export to the former Soviet Union. With 
intense emphasis placed on traditional heavy industry, the socialist economy was unable 
effectively to close the gap between urban centres and the village, widening regional 
disparities. Rural Poland continued to display the characteristics of pre-modem agrarian 
life, with most of the peasants producing for their own consumption, rather than for the 
market.13
The economy was highly dependent on an export structure within the closed system of 
the CMEA, based on low-processed goods and dominated by raw materials, agriculture, 
furniture, low-tech machinery and textiles. The third sector of trade in services could 
hardly be considered the engine of growth, as was becoming the case in industrialised 
countries, while, traditional sectors continued to produce technologically backward and 
ecologically unsound products. While western societies were modernising and 
switching their economies from steel to chemicals, electronics and finally high tech 
goods, Poland continued to ‘catch up’, repeating XIX century modernisation patterns 
and utilising archaic techniques.
Decades of policies detrimental to the private sector had left society with only a small 
number of experienced entrepreneurs. The absence of an urban bourgeoisie and the 
miniscule role of the private sector in the economy perpetuated the backwardness of the 
command structures, where enterprises were driven by top down orders rather than by
13 See Instytut Spraw Publicznych (2000). Chlop, rolnik, farmer. Warsaw: ISP.
Mroczek, W. (1995). ‘Agriulture’ in Kawecka-Wyrzykowska (Ed.) (1995). Prospects for Trade in 
Sensitive Products between Poland and the EU. Warsaw: Foreign Trade Research Institute. 
Miklaszewski, S. (Ed.) (1998). ‘Polskie Rolnictwo a Unia Europejska’, MCRD zeszyt, Nr 34, Krakow: 
Miedzynarodowe Centrum Rozwoju Demokracji.
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the incentive of profit. This, of course, led to low labour productivity, and, in turn, low 
GDP per capita.14
Corruption existed at all levels of governance infiltrating everything from individual 
enterprises to local government, to the highly bureaucratised and centralised 
administration in Warsaw.
The state of the macroeconomy was tragic, marked by recession and hyper-inflation, 
combined with a huge foreign debt, a lack of domestic capital for investment, shortages 
of basic goods required for manufacturing, shortages of consumption goods and an 
overall crisis in state and local finances, progressively deteriorating, as output fell and 
growth slummented.15 The Polish economy in 1989 faced a deeper crisis than any other 
leading CEE reformer, including the former Yugoslavia, Czechoslovakia, Hungary or 
GDR.
This brief description of the state of the Polish economy in the early 90’s does not do 
justice to the complexity of the situation, but is rather intended to portray the scale of 
some of the problems to be faced in transition and is intended to just set the background 
for the rest of the thesis.
II. Path Dependency
While economic theories tend to focus on abstract conditions for policy change,16 
institutional reform, economic liberalisation and political democratisation occur in a 
specific setting. According to Pickles and Smith, “transformation is an attempt at 
reworking social relations of communism and reconstructing the economic and political 
institutions.” The authors go on to argue that economic systems are “discursively and 
socially constituted and governed by socio-political institutions as well as the existence 
of pre-existing rationalities.”17 The word transformation itself implies an evolutionary 
process, based on stages and phases that spill into each other. It is not, nor should it be 
interpreted as a one-off act that once performed sets the course onto a predictable path.
14 See Komai, J. (1992). The Socialist System: the political economy o f communism. Princeton, NJ: 
Princeton University Press.
Roeder, P.G. (1993). Red Sunset: The failure o f Soviet Politics. Princeton. NJ: Princeton University 
Press.
Balcerowicz, L. (1995). ibid.
15 For more see Levigne (1995). ibid.
16 See Williamson (Ed.) (1994). Ibid.
17 Pickles and Smith (1998). Theorising Transition, ibid., p 206.
See also Sztompka, P. (1991). ‘The Intangibles and Imponderables of the Transition to Democracy’, 
Studies in Comparative Communism, Vol 24, No 3, October.
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The uniqueness of transformation in fact implies that elements of the old system will
1 ftremain in conjunction with the new.
Prior to the initiation of complex systemic changes required of the transformation, a 
dense social network existed in Poland, based on the interaction of individuals and 
grounded in established identities and political culture. Even though socialism had 
managed to destroy significant aspects of institutionalised civil society, by making 
formal networks dependent on ‘the State’, informal networks, such as friends, family or 
even dissident opposition groups, formed the basis of social organisation.19 Poland was 
consequently not a tabula rasa for the importation of western models.
The emergence of new structures combined with rudiments of the old created a hybrid 
system formed on the basis of heterogeneous interests, institutions and ideas. Alongside 
the social groups from the former system new ones appeared with an unclear sense of 
what was to be in their interest and what not. In short the Polish political economy 
model was underdeveloped and immature, making it difficult to foresee how new 
patterns of interest articulation would evolve.
P Bofinger pointed out in fact that the liberal models applied to transition economies 
were based on naive assumptions: “that the complete upheaval of all existing structures 
has above all reduced or even destroyed the power of those groups that had been 
dominating under the previous regime. This led to fallacious expectations that it would
70be easy to create new pro- market interests as the basis for reform.”
The initial impetus for radical reform suggested that a temporary neutralisation of 
interest groups had taken place, however what became obvious in the course of the 
transformation, was that these groups were indeed only silenced temporarily. As market 
reforms proceeded and democratisation took place, interest group pressure was revived,
• • 71and the restructuring difficulties were compounded by greater and greater opposition. 
The most powerful of the vested interests from the previous system retained close ties
77 •with various governing options and, due to the absence of an effective regulatory 
framework, compounded by inconsistent enforcement of the law, they were able to 
quickly ‘capture’ the state, paving the way for the growth of corruption.
18 Nowotny, T. (1997). ‘Economic Transition, Democratic Consolidation and the Integration of Central- 
Eastern European Countries into European Structures’, in Economic Developments and Reforms in 
Cooperation Partner Countries, NATO Colloquium, Brussels: NATO, June.
19 Crawford (Ed.) (1995). ibid.
20 Bofinger (1995). ‘The Political Economy’, ibid., p 21.
21 Gadomski, W. (1996). ‘Journey into the Unknown’, in Winiecki, J. (1996). ‘Five Years After June: the 
Polish transformation, 1989-1994’, New Series, Centre for Research into Communist Economies, No. 13, 
London: Centre for Research into Post -Communist Economies.
22 This compromises not only the Peasants and SLD as would be expected, but surprisingly the Solidarity, 
post-communists as well.
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A. Political culture
Democracy is rooted in political culture, or as sociologist G Skapska has defined it, “the 
psychological predispositions of individuals, attitudes towards the political system and 
its various parts and attitudes towards the role of the self in this system.”23 
To begin with, Polish political culture was shaped by a long and complicated pre- 20th 
century history, evolving from a diversity of encounters with different systems of 
governance and clashes of identities. This included various experiences with 
sovereignty, ranging from the enforced Christianisation of Poland in 966, to the Union 
with Lithuania, from the Eastward orientation of the Jagiellonian Dynasty, to partition 
among three separate empires, stretching from Prussia, in the West, Russia in the East 
and Austrio-Hungary, in the South. A brief flirt with (semi) democratic politics24, based 
on the notion of the infamous liberum veto and written into the formal Constitution of 
the Third of May in 1791, exposed the upper classes to the dangers of unanimity rule . 
Instead of weakening national identity, these manifold experiences of foreign 
domination paradoxically strengthened the Polish sense of nationhood, enabling it to 
withstand the external occupations accompanied by domestic turmoil, united in 
opposition to the enemy. In addition, as Szacki argues, “the situation of countries 
subjected to foreign rule imposes a certain hierarchy of priorities, pushing into the 
background the freedom of the individual as an individual and not a member of the 
community; class divisions are blurred, reducing the attractiveness of individualistic 
liberalism.”25
For two centuries Poland was a nation without a ‘state’ and thus paid special heed to 
moral unity. Divisions of values and strife within society that threatened the interest of 
this nationhood could not be accepted, and as a result, conflict between its members was 
not treated as something natural, to be embraced as a normal part of democracy and to 
be resolved through negotiations and compromise between individuals and groups. 
However, the political culture was based on uniquely high incidence of collective 
protest against the ruling authorities, and an exceptional inclination towards political 
conflict against the ‘state’, rooted in the country’s violent legacy of struggle against 
either foreign or domestic oppression. The length of the entire pre and post- war 
history stemmed from a series of confrontations between the ruling elite and various
23 Skapska, G. (1997). ‘Civic and Legal Cultures in Spain and Poland’, Polish Sociological Review, No 
1231-1413, Krakow, p 229.
24 Voting rights to the Sejm were given to Polish noblemen, written into the social contract, based on 
Constitution of the 3rd of May.
25 Szacki and Kisiel (1995). ibid., p 55,
26 Ekiert, G. (1998). ‘Legacies of Struggle and Defeat’, in Staar (Ed.) (1998). ibid., p 39.
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actors within society, evolving to what could be called a specific tradition of protest and 
crisis driven political dynamics. As a result, formal decisions unfavourable to a certain 
strategic Polish group have inevitably led to protests, confirming the permanent 
inclusion of this form of political activism in the civic culture. While these forms of 
public opposition also take place in western democracies, what makes them particularly 
unique in the Polish case is that they are perceived there as the only feasible form of 
popular participation in policy-making and the final argument in situations of social
27conflict. This behaviour is deeply rooted in socialism and experiences with foreign 
oppression, when resistance was seen as the only way of regulating relations between 
the ‘good’, oppressed society and the ‘evil’ oppressor- ‘state’, leading to the moral 
legitimisation of protests and enabling their acceptance as the basic form of popular 
participation in politics
Moreover, Polish uniqueness has had at its source a peculiar conglomeration of cultural 
intricacies such as the intelligentsia, or a very strong and proud peasant movement, 
combined with a devout embrace of Catholicism. Similarly, the country’s size, ferevent 
patriotism and geopolitical situation have all contributed to the development of 
profound contradictions in Polish group mentality. On the one side have been the traits 
associated with self-important arrogance, a sense of mission to be carried out by the 
Poles. On the other, have been deep complexes and paranoia that ‘nothing should be
9 D
about us without us!’ While the Poles have thus believed that they deserve a place in 
Europe due to their contribution to Europe’s history, culture, and political thought, they 
have simultaneously felt somehow inferior to their Western neighbours, lacking the 
sheer confidence to believe in their own national attributes. The combination of awe and 
fear of the West has reflected a complex past relationship of embrace and perceived 
betrayal.
B. Socialism
In order to understand the clash between classical liberalism and Polish society in 
transition, it is important to look at the state of ideology and values inherited from 
socialism at the onset of the reforms. Polish social consciousness in 1989 reflected the 
legacies of 5 decades of the command economy combined with a difficult and 
complicated history of international relations. J Golebowski characterised the emerging 
situation as “a paradox of introducing market rules from above without the necessary
27 Marody (1994). ‘State and Society’, ibid., p 184.
28 During the partitions of Poland this was a paraphrasing of the American ‘No taxation without 
representation’ slogan.
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changes of people's values and aspirations.”29 The market was thus introduced as an 
abundance of goods, and the possibilities of unemployment or the need to take 
responsibility for one's welfare proved surprising to most of society as elements of an 
ideology which they felt to be alien.
One of the most important elements of the planned economy was its creation of 
artificially full employment. Under command structures, jobs were created based on 
demand rather than on any meritocratic criteria, and everyone was guaranteed some sort 
of work within the centralised economy. Unemployment was thus virtually unknown. 
Furthermore, as an employer and guardian of national welfare, ‘the State’ ensured 
everyone certain basic social security rights, including universal education, healthcare, 
paid holidays, and other related benefits. Although the quality of these services rendered 
is questionable by western standards, everyone could never the less rely on some sort of 
care provided for by the paternalistic state.
As the socialist system was artificially built on the premise of equality and on the 
principle of redistribution, class divisions typical of competitive capitalism superficially 
disappeared, replaced by a system of pseudo- equality as corresponding to similar levels 
of minimum income. The main fragmentation was the division between party 
nomenclature! and the masses, between the ‘ins’ of the socialist apparatus and the ‘outs’ 
of the opposition.
When socialist distributional society and income equality were replaced with capitalist 
competition, the effect was dramatic, disorienting the public and reeking havoc on the 
entire system of values based on a particular understanding of justice as something built 
on equity, consensus and interpersonal harmony within society, but as against the
O A
authorities. The split of the post-communist society into winners and losers had an 
immediate impact on the reactions of the population, and as Weidenfeld has claimed,
29 Golebiowski, J (1992). ‘Discussion’ in Foti, G. (Ed.) (1993). ‘The Future of Eastern and Central 
Europe in the World Economy: Proceedings of the Jubilee Conference’, Papers for Hungarian Institute 
for World Economics, Budapest, Institute for World Economics, p 156.
30 Privatisation shows just how complicated the Polish attitude was towards creating capitalism- insider 
privatisation (vouchers given to workers) was chosen as the method to create capitalism without capital 
even though it was economically less effective than capital privatisation, but represented a more gentle 
and a more socially acceptable method of privatisation.
See Landesmann and Szekely. (1995). Industrial Restructuring and Trade Reorientation in Eastern 
Europe. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Tiusanen, T. (1996). Post-Communism and Capital Foreign Investors in Transition Economies. NY: 
Commack, Nova Science Publishers.
Stark, D. (1994). ‘Przetasowanie wlasnosci w kapitalizmie wschodnoieuropejskim’, in Hausner and 
Marciniak (Ed.) (1994). ibid.
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“the gaining of national and personal freedom could not compensate for the loss of 
social security and the destabilisation of future perspectives.”31 
In addition, Polish liberalism originated largely from the confrontation with socialism. 
When the enemy became the ‘state’, the opposition became liberal. Civil society was an 
emancipatory agent, containing no explicit program of political economy and rejecting 
everything having to do with the ‘state’ and its apparatus. According to Szacki, “the 
State was seen as an agent of all injustice and evil. Because communism abolished all 
classes, it just made one division obvious, the suspension of internal conflicts in the face 
of a common enemy. Liberalism became thus an anti- communist doctrine.”32 
Moreover socialist totalitarianism, based on the omnipresent state, in contrast to 
traditional dictatorship, changed the entire Polish social fabric and thus had more far- 
reaching and lasting effects. As Szacki observed, “communism made barren the soil on 
which the liberal ideology could grow, by a wholesale destruction of non-state sectors 
of the economy, circumscribing the initiatives of individuals and liquidating all 
associations and organisations that were independent of the state; everything referred to 
as civil society.”33
The enduring legacies of the real socialist system were evident in all aspects of public 
life and in particular in the technocratic and rationalist attitudes and tendencies to search 
for complete, ready recipes and abstract systemic models. Corresponding to these 
psychological predispositions, was the predominance of distrust in group-mentality, 
contributing to a political culture where compromise and bargaining, all pivotal to 
‘normal’ democratic politics were clearly absent.34
Under the socialist system, the individual expected the understanding and support from 
society in confronting the omnipotent state apparatus, and social conformity and group 
rallying were not only acquiesced to, but even anticipated, defying the basic tenants of 
liberalism and disfiguring the cultural conditions necessary for the expansion of the 
spirit of capitalism.
Finally, socialism had left behind a profound disillusion with politics as morally corrupt 
and to be avoided by ‘respectable people’, contributing to a social pattern, typical of 
past behaviour, of disowning the government when it introduced difficult reform
31 Weidenfled, W. (1995). ‘Introduction’, in Weidenfeld, W. and Altmann, F. (Ed.) (1995). Central and 
Eastern Europe on the Way into the European Union: problems and prospects o f  integration. Giitersloh: 
Bertelsmann Foundation Publishers, p 18.
32 Szacki and Kisiel (1995). ibid. p 73.
33 Szacki and Kisiel (1995). ibid. p 65.
34 Batt, J. (1991). East Central Europe from Reform to Transformation. Chatham House Papers. London: 
Pinter Publishers, p 45.
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measures.35 Society continued to reject any responsibility for government actions, 
instead isolating itself behind the protective shield of opposition and demanding 
immediate respite from the hardships encountered.
Past experiences with the symbiotic relationship between a paternalistic ‘state’ and 
rebellious population could not help but to reinforce the conviction that everything in 
the public sphere was negotiable if pushed far and extremely enough, and the social 
expectation that the new democratic governments would be responsive to its various 
postulates intensified in turn the pattern of making of direct demands on the ‘state’. This 
pattern has remained a much more dominant form of Polish behaviour than that of 
actively searching for ways of adapting to the changing situation by either individuals or 
groups ultimately contributing to rent- seeking activities and delays in economic 
reform.36
In sum, the emerging Polish society in 1989 was not a bourgeois civil society in the 
Lockean sense. The social habits learned under 45 years of socialist rule represented 
serious obstacles to the acceptance and internalisation of liberal, western democratic 
values, increasing the likelihood that disappointment and disillusion with capitalism 
would inevitably lead to social protest and policy reversals.
C. Ideas under transformation
Although Polish political culture has been undergoing profound changes since the 
beginning of the transformation, the legacies of socialism combined with elements of 
pre-capitalist traditionalism, fervent nationalism and devout religiousness, have
* 1 7
remained evident in the dominant political culture . The relationships between citizens, 
the authorities and the system has displayed anti- liberal, anti- capitalist motifs, 
reflecting what Dahrendorf has called the “clock of the citizen.”38 On the whole, the 
elites accommodated more quickly to the ideological requirements of the market than 
the masses, and most ordinary Poles continued to espouse to the ‘state’- based, etatist
• ♦ • ' I Qideology, rejecting important elements of the Anglo Saxon tradition. Entrepreneurship
35 For more see Belka, M., Hausner, J., Jasinski, L., Marody, M. and Zirk-Sadowski, M. (Ed.) (1997). The 
Polish Transformation from the Perspectives o f  European Integration, EU Monitoring. Warsaw:
Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, pp 150- 183.
36 See Wilczynski, W. (1999). Wrogie Panstwo Opiekuncze: czyli trudna droga Polski do gospodarki 
rynkowej. Warszawa: Wydawnictwo Naukowe PWN.
Winiecki, J. (1996). ibid.
37 S Wagstyl, ‘Vices of economic nationalism raised louder in Poland’, FT, 1999.
JK Bielecki, ‘Liberalism bez liberalow’, Polityka no 50 (2171), 12/12/98.
J Osiatynski, ‘ Nowy Jezyk’, GW 26/10/01;
‘Kto bedzie polskim Haiderem?’, Wprost, 30/04/00.
38 Dahrendorf, R. (1990). Reflections on the Revolution in Europe: in a letter intended to have been sent 
to a gentleman in Warsaw. London: Chatto & Windus.
39 See Beksiak, J. (1996). ‘On the Restoration of Capitalism in Poland’, in Winiecki (Ed.) (1996). Ibid.
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continues to be looked upon with suspicion, and the concept of privatisation has been 
smudged with negative connotations, as the ordinary Pole is still more concerned with 
protecting his jobs and the status quo, than with the profit and advancement incentives. 
For example, in privatised companies, like Steel Mill Ostrowiec or Tractor and Cable 
Factories Ursus and Ozarow, the workers have not even attempted to negotiate with 
their managers, instead going directly to the state apparatus to demand that their rights 
and privileges be respected.40 (See below). Moreover, the most popular form of 
searching for employment remains striking in Warsaw in front of government 
ministries. Throughout the 90’s and into the next decade, the public protests to stop the 
restructuring of SOEs, steel mills, coal mines, agriculture and state owned farms (PGRs) 
have reflected growing social frustration with the reforms and waning trust towards 
democratic institutions. Populist leaders have gained support along with distrust towards 
the established elites, with 2.78% of the voters in 1993 supporting the radical A Lepper 
of the Self- defence movement, rising to 40% of popular support in 99 !41 
According to sociologist Prof. Szacki, the Polish characteristics most detrimental to the 
development of capitalism have included, “passivity, indifference, inactivity and 
tendency to wait for or demand from the authorities to do this or that. Instead of actively 
solving problems, at the most, people in Poland get together to complain about the 
government or organise a blocade.”
He continues arguing that the difference between the Poles and the Americans, for 
example, is that while it is not considered appropriate to complain in the USA, rather 
“the person who failed will be aware of the mistakes he made, in Poland the opposite is 
true. Someone who suffered a setback will be considered a martyr, proud of himself; 
because of - the Soviets, the special forces, the government, Balcerowicz... “,42 
The population believes that it is the state’s duty to provide them with job security, as 
well as access to public services such as health care and education.43 Out of one hundred 
working Poles, 89% continue to receive welfare benefits and, in particular, disability
Polityka No 13, (2186), 27/03/99.
GW, 1-2/06/02.
GW 25-26/08/01.
See also Gazeta Wyborcza, Wprost, Polityka,various numbers and issues, June- July, 2003. 
Wilczynski (1999). ibid.
The author conducted field work and carried out interviews with a representative sample of the 
population, in the urban center of Krakow as well as village, Jaworki 18-28 July, 2003.
The author also substantiates this claim by her own experiences of living and working in Poland.
40 See Wprost 3/10/99.
41 Wprost, 26/09/99;
See L interviews with L Kolarska- Bobinska below and throughout this book on distrust and protest.
42 Interview with J Szacki, GW, 12/06/03.
43 Public Opinion Poll, ‘Social Diagnosis 2003’, July, 2003.
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pensions (which require a simple bribe to gain access to), maintaining that they 
‘deserve’ these forms of government assistance, in spite of the costs imposed on the 
budget and regardless whether in fact they are truly eligible. According to the World 
Bank, in 2003, disability pensions account for 4% of Polish GDP, an indicator twice as 
high as in the developed nations; comparable to the second place Norway with 2.8% 
GDP.44
The legacies of socialism combined with experiences of the ‘state’ giving into protest 
and buying social peace have reinforced the ‘claim-staking’ nature of public demands.
In fact Polish society still dreams of a mixed economy, such as the Scandinavian model, 
believing mistakenly that it was something of a half- socialist system, combining the 
security of socialism with the wealth of free market capitalism. Von Beyme 
characterized this embrace of the market as “ ‘phony’, because the majority of the 
people continue to long for a ‘third way’.”45 Moreover, social perceptions of capitalism 
are largely stripped down to the core concept of consumerism and based on aspirations 
towards instant gratification.
Finally, because, the basic source of social empowerment under the command system 
was one’s position within the network of informal ties, little room was left for the 
development of meritocracy, making the adjustment to the new rules and expectations 
of the capitalism very difficult for individuals not feeling any responsibility for their 
actions. Thus while the Homo Sovieticus was expected somehow to automatically 
become the Homo Economicus, the psychological reactions of the population, shaped by 
past experiences, to the rise of a new system based on individual initiative were 
disturbing and profound.46
44 www.wprost.pl/ankieta 
Wprost 17/08/03.
45 Beyme, K. von (1996). ibid., p 152.
46 Winiecki, J. (1996). ‘The Reasons for Electoral Defeat Lie in Non-Economic Factors’, in Winiecki 
(Ed.) (1996). ibid., p 85.
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Thus, a key factor in shaping the mood of Polish society after 1989 was confrontation of 
expectations with reality.47 The shock of moving from a relatively egalitarian system 
and a well-endowed social welfare network to a market based one with large income 
and wealth disparities, unemployment risks and other adverse side effects of capitalism 
led to profound public frustration with the entire course of the reforms.
Significantly, the policymaking style based on technocratic elitism, initiated by the early 
Polish elites and requires of successive governments to fulfil international obligations 
especially arising from EU integration, has increased social alienation and developed 
little capacity to mobilise the citizens. Tolerance and trust have thus been the most 
difficult concepts to learn in the new political culture (See chapter eight). In 1993, for 
example only 40% of the Poles trusted that the government would be able to create 
economic wealth under market conditions48. The figure fell further to an astonishing 6% 
by 2003.49 Ironically, the isolation of the political class from society became more and 
more pronounced as the reforms proceeded and none of the parties, with perhaps the 
exception of the Peasants, managed to secure the lasting support of a clearly defined 
group. In the words of Gadomski, “none succeeded in mobilising the ‘winners’ from the 
changes occurring in Poland.”50
III. Institutions and Interests
In Poland, shock therapy and radical trade opening resulted in a highly negative popular 
response to the reforms, resulting in popular feelings of marginalisation and 
deprivation.51 Among the candidates for EU membership, Poland had the lowest 
standard of living prior to 1989, and subsequently when incomes fell even further at the 
beginning of the transition there was vast disappointment with the liberal reforms, as the 
promised successes failed to materialise. Moreover because of the large size of the 
country and the scale of problem sectors requiring restructuring the transition dilemmas 
were more exacerbated than in the other CEE countries. Soaring unemployment levels
47 See Brabant, J. van. (1990). ‘Remaking Eastern Europe: on the political economy of transition’, 
International Studies in Economics and Econometrics, Vol 23, Dordrecht, Boston: Kluwer Academic 
Publishers.
(1993). The New Eastern Europe and The World Economy. Eastern Europe after communism. Boulder: 
Westview Press.
48 Times Mirror Surveys (1991). in Beyme, K. von (1996). ibid., pp 147-163.
49 CBOS Opinion Poll 4-7 April, 2003.
50 Gadomski (1996).’Joumey\ ibid., p 77.
51 See Fristration Has Many Faces, Warsaw Voice, 19/03/00.
52 Lower standard of living than the GDR, Czechoslovakia, Hungary or Yugoslavia, but higher than 
Rumania and Bulgaria, (statistic on the Baltics were not available).
See Hausner, J., Marody, M., Wilkin, J., Wojtyna, A. and Zirk-Sadowski, M. (Ed.) (1998). Accession or 
Integration? Poland's Road to the European Union, EU Monitoring II. Warsaw: Friedrich Ebert Stiftung. 
Hausner, J. and Marody M. (Ed.) (1999). Three Polands: The Potential for and Barriers to Integration 
with the EU, EU Monitoring III. Warsaw: Friedrich Ebert Stiftung.
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as well as polarisation of society between a minority of winners and the masses of 
losers, combined with increasing poverty and social deprivation led cognitive cultural 
shocks. Substantial output reductions accompanying restructuring process made 
unemployment levels soar in the early 90’s, reaching 16.4% in 1993, falling in middle 
of the decade and increasing to 20% by 2002.Two generations of Poles had not know 
unemployment or the new insecurities that was associated with it. Coupled with falls in 
real living conditions, the traumas could not be more dramatic for the entire population 
as well as for those specifically affected, leading to disorientation on the macro- level of 
society as well as on the micro social level of groups and individuals.
Table 4.1 Poland’s GDP growth and unemployment levels 1990-2000 in %
Years GDP growth Unemployment
levels
1990 -11.6 6.5
1991 i O 12.2
1992 2.6 14.3
1993 3.8 16.4
1994 5.2 16.0
1995 7.0 14.9
1996 6.0 13.2
1997 6.8 10.3
1998 4.8 10.4
1999 4.1 13.1
2000 4.0 15.0
2001 1.0 18.0
Source: Yearly Statistics GUS, various years; Ministry of Labour and Social Policy
A. Institutions
J Beksiak defines institutions “as more or less formalised rules defining economic 
activity and its forms of organisation.”53 In Poland, and other post- socialist states, the 
creation of institutions has required the parallel synchronisation of transition to a market 
economy and a democratic political system. As a result of this duality, it could be 
argued that no former system’s change was burdened with the same problems of 
institution building. For instance, there was no need in post-authoritarian regimes to 
create offices to administer unemployment insurance or institutions for social security. 
The market has existed prior to the change of the regime and segments of civil society 
likewise survived the dictatorships.
In transition, the economic sphere alone required a far ranging set of diverse 
institutions, beyond the scope of this paper, to be created from scratch. This included 
various new agencies and administrative bodies such as an independent central bank,
OECD, EBRD, IMF, World Bank
53 Beksiak (1996). ‘On the Restoration’, ibid., p 5.
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privatisation institutions, consumer protection offices and other state bureaucracies 
responsible for the implementation of liberal market reforms.
In the political sphere, this entailed an end to the one-party monopoly characteristic of 
totalitarianism, giving way to competitive electoral law, independent parties and 
interests groups. Where interests had blended together under the socialist system, new 
divisions began to appear, and, as a result of democratisation and the newly established 
right of mass-organisation, a proliferation of political parties surfaced to compete with 
each other within the electoral system. The political vacuum left behind by the collapse 
of communism accompanied by new civic freedoms led to the emergence of previously 
marginalised interests onto the political arena, when ‘politics as usual’ began displaying 
the dichotomies of the emerging social order.54
A.2 Political parties
A quasi-party system emerged paralleling the fragmentations within society itself.55 
The main boundary in this bi-polar system stemmed from the division between the 
former communist factions and the new Solidarity camp 9the post- communists). Within 
this ideological axis, parliament was structured around a spectrum of parties, dispersed 
in orientations and programs ranging anywhere from nationalist Catholicism (ZchN,
“S”) to liberalism (UW, KLD), Social- democracy (SLD); nationalism (LPR, KPN), 
ethnic parties, peasant movements (PSL, Samoobrona) and other more functional 
groups (Friends of Beer Drinkers, for ex). The cleavages between these parties were 
characterised by centre- periphery conflicts, divisions between secularised society and 
clericalism, the urban centres and countryside and finally the cosmopolitans and the 
nationalists. Most parties represented nothing more than a mosaic of different ideologies 
and did not stand for any particular interests, with the exception of the Peasant Party. In 
fact, the western party model that classifies parties according to their left- right political 
orientations could not be applied to explain Polish party formation. In spite of their 
rhetorical proclamations, the differences in party programmes did not reflect any real 
articulation of social voice, founded on the conservative/ liberal demarcation, but were 
rather based on the ideological divide between the ‘them’ and the ‘us’.56 As a result, the
54 See Wasilewski, J. (Red.) (1997). Zbiorowi Aktorzy polskiej Polityki. Warszawa: PAN, Instytut 
Studiow Politycznych.
55 For more see Wasilewski (1995). ‘Crystallization of Post-Communist Political Elite’, in Wnuk- 
Lipinski, E. (1995). After Communism: a multidisciplinary approach to radical social change. Warszawa: 
Instytutu Studiow Politycznych PAN.
Staar, R.F. (1998). ibid.
56 Slodkowska, I, (1997). ‘Partie i Ugrupowania Polityczne polskiej Transformacji’, w Wasilewski (Red.) 
(1997). Ibid.,
132
election campaigns were purely based on the distinction between the post-communist 
and post-solidarity factions on the one hand, and between personalities, on the other.
If the political expression of the western middle class was liberalism, in the post 
communist order, the political expression of the transition process was what sociologist 
J Staniszkis has called “authoritarianism of the oligarchy controlling hybrid financial 
and communist structures, accompanied by the populism of petty producers and 
pauperised wage labour.”57 Moreover, in Poland, where socialism eroded and a new 
system developed by corporatist negotiation between Communists and the opposition 
during the famous Round Table, participation in the political system remained weak.58 
NSZZ Solidamosc (Labour Union) and R I Solidamosc (Farmers Union Wing), the 
only legal opposition organisations allowed under the Communist party monopoly and 
both delegalised from December 1981, following the introduction of martial law, until 
April 1989, constituted the basis for the post- Solidarity camp. The double function of 
Solidarity strained its role, when the independent trade union movement was forced to 
reconcile its functions as defender of labour with performing the duties of government 
required of it after the first free elections. The initial unity of the Solidarity camp was 
thus quickly destroyed by what was accurately called the ‘War at the Top’. Between the 
spring and November of 1990, Solidarity disintegrated, further fragmenting the so- 
called, right- wing political scene and strengthening the reformed, post-communist 
camp, centred around the Social Democratic Alliance.
The deep divisions between the more liberally oriented wings of Solidarity and those 
more socially sensitive, brought to life by the 1990 Presidential election run-off between 
dissident Walesa and PM Mazowiecki, would never again be healed leading to the final 
splintering under the government of PM Suchocka. Suchocka had come to power with 
the help of Solidarity, but when her government did not act according to Labour’s 
wishes, the trade union went on strike and held repeated mass rallies.59 Although in the 
spirit of the Polish Round-Table, corporatist tradition, a temporary agreement on wage 
controls had been reached between the government and the Solidarity trade union in the 
first months of reform. When this agreement began to fray and the reformist coalition 
under PM Suchocka refused to give into the Union’s demands for wage increases60, a 
vote of no-confidence by the Union toppled the government.
57 Staniszkis, J. (1995). ‘In Search of a Paradigm of Transformation’, in Wnuk-Lipinski (Ed.) (1995). 
ibid., p 40.
58 Beyme, K. von (1996). ibid., p 131.
59 See Balcerowicz, ‘Przezyjmy to jeszcze raz’, in Wprost 24/10/99.
Planeta Demokracji, GW, 27/06/00.
60 Due to already highly strained state finances.
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In the first seven years of transformation, 3 Presidents, 7 cabinets and 3 parliaments 
held power, demonstrating the instability of the political system. The splintering of 
Solidarity, combined with the proliferation of small, fragmented and weak political 
parties led to a situation characterised by J Wasilewski as “paralised pluralism”.61
B. Interests
Privatisation in transition created interests and gave them independence from the state, 
while democratisation provided them with an ability to channel their concerns. The 
winners and losers that suddenly emerged from the process joined the social groups of 
the former system in searching for power on the political arena.
Prior to 1989, Polish interest groups included the Church, the few legalised unions and 
other bodies representing established interests, including national academies of 
sciences, the peasants and the intelligentsia. As Komai has written, this situation was 
somewhat different than a classic totalitarian system, because there were visible signs of 
an emerging civil society, but its dependence on ‘the state’ contradicted the nature of 
traditional democratic civic movements.62
The private sector, a necessary foundation for capitalism, was made up of scattered 
small scale family agricultural holdings, small family undertakings in other branches, 
sparse private and joint-ownership firms; a highly fragmentary group hardly to be 
considered as an existent middle class.
The emerging Polish society in transition was less distributional and consequently more 
prone to social conflict than the former command system. The winners were made up of 
parts of skilled workers in the surviving industries, the new entrepreneurs and top civil 
servants who managed to keep their middle positions. The beneficiaries of the changes, 
including the moderately wealthy managers and professionals, the new ‘political class’ 
of politicians and policymakers plus many of the recently turned business people, had 
usually made their fortunes by taking advantage of the loopholes in the legal system. 
However while, according to Jasiecki, the market economy had brought out the 
emergence of these groups, “this new middle class was too small to be counted on for 
support of the reforms, because it lacked local capital, strong traditions, or coherence 
and unity, and because it was bom in an atmosphere of growing social resistance to
61 Wasilewski, J. (1997). ‘Wstep’, w Wasilewski (Red.) (1997). ibid., p 9.
62 Komai (1992). ibid.
Szacki, J. and Kisiel, C.A. (1995). ibid.
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liberal reforms.” Paradoxically then only the ‘state’ could strengthen the Polish 
bourgeoisie.
On the other side of the social spectrum were unusually large segments of the losers of 
transition including lower rank employers, small entrepreneurs who had underrated the 
risks of capitalism, less-qualified and under-educated workers, village inhabitants with 
lower income brackets and farmers, pensioners, social income recipients, parts of the 
nomenclatura of the old regime, most women and some members of the intelligentsia 
and workers of the public sector.64 The majority of those hurt by transition came from 
the villages, and without access to proper education and limited mobility in terms of 
both relocation as well as labour market opportunities, these groups have had little 
capacity to raise their living standards or significantly improve their base existence. 
Because unemployment and poverty had not hit all Polish regions and sectors equally, 
in addition to agricultural regions, according to the Commission, “the most important 
problems existed in the sectors of coal mining, iron and steel industry, defence, 
petrochemical industry and shipyards. Because of the regional importance of heavy 
industry, its transformation has entailed painful consequences for the eastern and 
southern regions of Poland”, which depend on them to a large extent.65 Consequently, 
while some areas flourished with the new opportunities of capitalism, such as the 
Warsaw voyvoidship, others fell further and further behind contributing to the huge gaps 
in regional disparities.
All the literature on Polish society in the 90’s points to the gap growing between the 
highest paid and the lowest.66 This contributed to the creation of a social vacuum 
between the wealthy upper classes and political elites on one side, the impoverished
63 Jasiecki, K. (1997). ‘Organizacje Pracodawcow i Przedsiebiorcow w Polsce’, w Wasilewski (Red). 
(1997)., ibid., p 174.
64 Many women lost their jobs as a result of the transformation as the socialist system did superficially 
create gender equality (at least in the work place) and allowed women to secure work traditionally left to 
the male in conservative societies. The intelligentsia lost as a result of the state’s under-financing of the 
public sphere and dramatic income level decreases in relation to purchasing power for employees of 
sectors such as health care, education and other government bodies and agencies.
65 European Commission (1997). Agenda 2000: for a stronger and wider Union. Brussels: EC.
66 See for example Milic-Czemiak, R. (1998). Gospodarstwa Domowe w Krajach Europy Srodkowej: 
skutkiprzemian 1990-1995. Warszawa: Wydawnictwo IFiS PAN.
Amsden, A.H., Kochanowicz, J., and Taylor, L. (1994). The Market Meets Its Match: restructuring the 
economies o f  Eastern Europe. London, Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.
Waller, M., Coppieters, B. and Deschouwer, K. (1993). Social democracy in a Post-Communist Europe. 
London, Portland, Ore: Frank Cass.
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White, S., Batt, J. and Lewis, P.G. (Ed.) (1998). Developments in Central and East European Politics 2. 
ibid.
World Bank (1994). Poverty in Poland: an assessment in 2 volumes. Washington DC: World Bank, 14 
September.
135
underclass on the other, and, a missing independent, strong and organised middle class 
to fill the void.
While the beneficiaries had higher educational and income levels, more flexible 
occupations, urban dwelling and generally a more optimistic assessment of their 
personal financial prospects as well as the nation’s situation, the opposite socio­
economic factors characterised the losers. These factors were also reflected in the strong 
correlation between support and opposition to EU membership, with the most polarised 
groups in the early 90’s, represented by the managers supporting the accession process 
and opening up of the economy, on the one hand, and the farmers, opposed to the 
reforms and further integration on the other.67
In fact, an important aspect of the social changes going on in Poland has been how 
people have tended to perceive their material situation. In all the studies undertaken
r o
between 90-95’ , the majority of the Poles claimed that their standard of living had 
fallen in connection with transformation. Even more surprisingly, the public began to 
romanticise the decade of the 80’s, perceived as a time of social advance, when Party 
Chairman Gierek generously increased per capita income, while getting rid of some of 
the worst shortages of goods for consumption, (this ‘miraculous’ abundance in a 
shortage economy had been accomplished through massive foreign loans that the new 
governments after 89’ would have to reckon with.)
Finally, one could not discuss the distinctiveness of Polish interests without at least 
mentioning the role that the Church has played as both a social organisation, gathering 
diverse segments of society, as well as a political group, often resorting to publicised 
pressure on the government in order to achieve its goals. From the formal hierarchy of 
the Polish Catholic Church to informal fractions represented by extremist groups such 
as Radio Maryja69, the Church has been a formidable force to be reckoned with, actively 
engaging in politics on various levels. For example, thanks to a successful campaign led 
by Catholic organisations, abortion was made illegal in Poland from the onset of 
transition.
67 See interview with W Serafin, leader of Farmers Unions, Wprost, 20/08/00.
Interview with socilogist M Marody, GW 4/4/01.
Szerbiak, A. (1998). ‘Prospects for the Emergence of a Polish Eurosceptic Lobby’, paper preparedfor 
Poland and EU Enlargement conference, London: SSEES, 12 March, p 13.
68 See Hausner, J. and Marody M. (Ed.) (1999). ibid.
69 This Catholic radio station led by Father Rydzyk represents the extreme and marginalised segments of 
Catholic Poles, espousing to nationalist and populist rhetoric and using highly demagogic propaganda to 
criticize liberal governments’ policies, ranging anywhere from EU integration, abortion, or the selling out 
of Polish ‘treasures’ to foreign capital.
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B.2 Interest Representation
As far as interest representation and articulation are concerned, it was only in 1991 that 
institutionalisation began to emerge. In May of 1991, employers’ organisations were 
made legal after being prohibited under the previous regime between 1945 and 1980 
and again after 1983. These groups represented new players on the Polish scene, either 
non-existent in the planned economy or weak and disorganised due to their illicit nature, 
limited political power and social status. The Confederation of Polish Employers (KPP) 
became the most prominent forum for employers, gathering around it most managers of 
state-owned or newly privatised enterprises. In turn, the freshly created class of private 
entrepreneurs was represented by the Polish Confederation of Private Employers 
(PKPP), whose main goal became securing a basis for its existence next to the giant, 
and monopolistic, state- led KPP. On the labour side, three main unions remained 
active after the Round Table Agreements in 1989, with OPZZ (industry) and PSL 
(agriculture) representing the former communist party organisations and Solidarity
noTrade Union on the post-communist side.
None the less, according to von Beyme, the necessary division of labour between 
interest articulation (pressure groups) and interest aggregation (parties) was delayed 
because labour relations were underdeveloped. Trade unions did not bargain with 
independent enterprises of employers’ organisations.71 Instead they both turned to the 
‘state’. Consequently, in the absence of precise legislation in the early days of reform, 
the process of interest articulation began to take place largely outside of the party 
system, limited to the ramified structures of administration. For example, because the 
notion of lobbying did not exist legally in the Polish political constitutional system until 
(2001), those groups espousing to use this form of influence, especially interests tied to 
the former system, did so outside of any legal framework, and, as a result, in an 
increasingly corrupt manner.
In 1994, following increasingly violent strikes and civic unrest, alongside the new Pact 
fo r Entrepreneurship, the Tripartite Commission was created as the basis for a 
corporatist system of interest representation and articulation. While some authors have 
claimed that the tripartite arrangements meant to serve as a pre-emptive strike to 
demobilise unions72, this is a statement is difficult to defend, and is an assertion based 
on the current environment within the Tri-partite Commission. The concept behind this
70 See Jasiecki, K. (1997). ‘Organizacje’. ibid.
Gardawski, J., Gaciarz, B., Mokrzyszewski, A. and Pankow, W. (1999). Rozpad Bastionu: zwiazki 
zawodowe w gospodarce prywatyzowanej. Warszawa: ISP.
71 Beyme, K. von (1996). ibid., p 144.
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corporatist arrangement and dialogue between partners originated with J Kuron, at the 
time the Minister of Labour responsible for social policy, representing the more socially 
sensitive fraction of the Solidarity government. Till this day, Kuron remains one of the 
few trustworthy authorities with noble intentions, and while his original objective was 
indeed to strengthen social dialogue, in his opinion mistakenly neglected by the 
Balcerowicz liberals73, the evolution of the Tripartite Commission regrettably led to its 
paralysis and increasing politicisation.74
In 1993, hence, in accordance with Kuron’s endeavour to give liberalism a human face, 
the ‘state’ became the mediator in complicated triangular negotiations between itself, 
the powerful unions on the one side and the fragmented and weak employers’ 
organisations, on the other. However, while the idea of corporatist negotiations is highly 
desirable in a situation where labour unions and public support for them are strong75, 
due to the corporatist tradition of Solidarity and the Round Table Negotiations as well 
as deeply rooted ‘real socialist legacies and experiences of workers councils in the 
1950’s, the late legalisation of this system of interest mediation in the Polish transition 
meant that it was created in an atmosphere of political chaos76, making the entire 
environment highly susceptible to corruption.77 Corruption has been particularly evident 
in the privatisation process or the staffing of various government agencies and
78institutions. For example the privatisation of health care, postal services, banks, 
energy sector, insurance, pension funds or the pharmaceutical industry all were 
subjected to various buy- offs, insider dealing and appointments based on nepotism.
72 D Ost
73 Various press interviews with Kuron;
Interview with J Lassota, former Solidarity activist, UW founding member and later MP and close 
colleague of Kuron at time of the reforms. 12/06/02
Interview with T Syryjczyk, another former Solidarity/ UW activist and MP, former Minister for 
Transport, worked closely with Kuron. 13/02/01.
‘Zimne piece, cieple piwo’, in GW 1-2/06/02.
74 See J Osiatynski, ‘Sila przyciagania’, in GW 4-5/03/00.
75 The above description of labour union strength in Poland in the early 90’s, at the beginning of the 
reforms, is not meant to imply that the unions have not lost their many of their privileges or faced decline 
in their position of power as the reforms proceeded (as has been validly pointed out by most experts).
76 1993 was the year when internal divisions within the Solidarity camp finally made the coalition of the 
diverse post-communist grouping fall apart. The Solidarity unions voted their own government out of 
power, bringing in the former Communists as the next electoral winners.
7 This is not to say that the Unions themselves were corrupt, but rather that the initial lack of legislation 
as well as later radicalisation of the Unions made the work of the Tri-partite Commission highly 
ineffective, and so made other, less transparent forms of ‘rent-seeking’ more attractive.
See Interview with Minister of Labour L Komolowski, Wprost, 31/10/99;
‘Dialog Monologow’, in GW 13/08/99.
‘Halo Baza’, in Polityka no 22 (2195), 29/05/99.
78 See Rywin-gate, Starachowice or the privatization of Elektrim for particularly good examples.
, W Wilczynski, ‘Centralizm ma sie dobrze’, in Wprost 24/10/99.
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The paradox of Solidarity’s political and symbolical strength contributed to the 
development of this corporatist element. On the one hand, the mass Solidarity 
movement prior to 89’ opened the road to peaceful systemic transformation and created 
an umbrella for the initiation of radical reforms. On the other, this meant that strong 
Labour aspirations, at first ignored and later radicalised as a result of the early neglect, 
subsequently became a convoluted barrier to market reforms. State policies on 
privatisation and liberalisation of economic activity have, turn, become overwhelmingly 
contested by the Polish public, in support of the unions. Delays in reform began to 
appear in restructuring of the steel, gas and oil sectors, sugar industry, public transport 
and especially the train services (PKP), agriculture, coal sector, health care and defence 
sectors. According to the Pentor Public Opinion Survey, the majority of the Polish 
public in 1999, for example, supported the coal sector strikes, even if violent, and 
backed their demands; with 54% of the Poles feeling that coal miners should receive 
higher compensation than workers in other industries.79
Consequently, evident policy reversals and delays appeared in response to strikes in the 
health care, agricultural and particularly the sugar industry, defence, railway, energy 
and chemical sectors. Excellent and illustrative examples of these policy shifts in 
reaction to protest include Ursus, Stocznia Gdynia, Stocznia Gdanska, Szczecinska,
OA
Huta Jednosc, Fabryka Ozarow, Tormies, farmers at Mlawa and Rafineria Gdanska. In 
the summer of 2003 alone, union strikes at Szczecin Shipyard, Cable Factory Ozarow, 
Huta Ostrowiec and Wagon SA all led to changes in government policy. The ability of 
the Unions to affect government policy has come from their radicalisation and 
increasing frequency of protest as more institutionalised forms of social dialogue failed 
and social agreements were not implemented consistently. (See below). This situation 
reinforced the uninstitutionalised nature of interest representation and domestic 
negotiations, contributing to the dysfunctional characteristics of the Polish social- state
O 1
partnership and of the emerging corporate system. Thus while corporatism resulted 
from a model of collective labour relations, a Polish industrial relations and political
79 Gwozdz w koronie, in Wprost Pentor- Instytut Badania Opinii I Rynku SA, 22/10/99.
80 See ‘Zimne Piece Cieple Piwo’, GW 1-2/06/03;
‘Stan Chroniczny’, in GW, 12/04/00.
‘W slaskim kotle’, in Polityka nr 23 (2196), 5/06/99;
‘Smak cukru’, in Wprost 2/04/00;
‘Odprawa gomikow’, in Polityka, nr 4 (2177), 23/01/99;
‘W ramionach Leppera’, in Polityka nr 15 (2188), 10/04/99;
‘Sojusz Przeciwko postepowi’, in Wprost 28/02/99;
Koalicja przeciw rynkowi’, in Wprost 26/09/99.
81 Gardawski, J (1999). ‘Czlonkowie i zakladowi liderzy zwiazkow zwodowych’, in ISP. (1999). Rozpad 
Bastionu, ibid
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89negotiations tradition , and was in itself a positive development for democracy, the 
style of this institutional arrangement’s implementation reinforced its clientalistic 
characteristics, leading to, in the words of current Economy, Labour and Social Policy 
Minister and academic J Hausner “the pathological politicisation of the public
O '!
administration.”
Policy-formulation has not been made according to institutionalised negotiations and 
transparent agreements reached between social partners. In addition, agreements made 
were not kept due to international constraints, such as obligations arising from the 
implementation of the Europe Agreement. As a result, successive government policy 
formulation has revolved around crisis management and ad hoc responsiveness to the 
loudest domestic pressures and most threatening strikes; which grew in strength 
proportionally to the broken promises of ‘the state’. Labour has been at the forefront of 
these domestic protests, able to effectively mobilise frustrated workers to mass rallies 
and uninstitutionalised forms of rent- seeking.
In Poland, the late development of market capitalism can also explain why the 
employers/ business organisations have remained weak and unable to effectively 
balance Labour. Even though Balcerowicz originally backed employers’ organisations 
over unions, the structural weakness of the private sector in the transition economy, 
dominated by large public enterprises, has remained an ineffective institutional balance. 
Business has possessed inadequate political power, and while the strength of the unions 
did relatively decline throughout the 1990’s, with the privatisation process causing 
membership to decrease, they did manage to secure for themselves certain legislative
• 84rights, such as opinion- making; a privilege not extended to employers’ organisations. 
Moreover, Unions have remained particularly strong within the Parliament. For 
example, during the 1997-2001 AWS/UW government, Marian Krzaklewski, leader of 
Union ‘NSZZ’ Solidamosc, was, with the support of the Solidarity faction of AWS, 
able to significantly affect legislation and policy making.
GW, Wprost, Polityka, Rzeczpospolita; various issues and numbers.
82 See ‘Blokady, szance, stoly’, in Polityka, nr 13 (2186), 27/03/99.
83 Hausner, J., Marody, M., Wilkin, J., Wojtyna, A. and Zirk-Sadowski, M. (Ed.) (1998). ibid., p 137.
84 See Institute of Public Affairs, (1999). Rozpad Bastionu, ibid.
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According to the legislation passed on labour unions beginning in 1993 and later, 
employers in Poland are required to pay union activists and leaders salaries 
proportionally to the numbers of union members in the organisation and give them 
access to appropriate facilities and technical equipment to carry out their activities. An 
employer cannot make workers, who are union board and organisation commission 
members, redundant without agreement from the union and cannot change their status 
and pay during the entire time of their mandate as well as a full year afterwards. Various 
legislative acts limit employers rights and allow labour to delay or stop reforms, 
especially with regards to restructuring, liquidation and labour market policies. The 
Teachers' Card, Fundfor Worker’s Social Guarantees or popiwek statues represent 
good examples of this.
In addition, employers and business lobbies have internally remained highly fragmented
QC
and not organised, thus having little ability to mobilise public support. Because they 
have not conducted their lobbying activities through huge public events of collective 
protest, their campaigns have been less politically visible than Labour’s, and therefore 
less effective in affecting public opinion and gaining popular support. In addition, the 
rivalry between KPP and PKPP has made speaking out with a unified voice and one 
clear position strenuous, further adding to the ineffectiveness of their lobbying 
activities. Finally, because there was so little understanding or knowledge within society 
of the purpose of these employer organisations, membership amounted to a low 22% of
o /  # '
Polish businesses. This was partly due to a suspicion amongst entrepreneurs as to any 
centralised administration, compounded by the anti- capitalist political culture 
dominated by sympathy towards the unions and an unclear legal framework protecting
R7 *employers’ rights. Former Minister of Privatisation J Lewandowski observed that, 
“without a doubt, the uniqueness of Poland has been well-organised labour, both in 
unions and in local workers’ councils. This has been accompanied by weak 
representation of other interests, particularly of employers’ organisations, of export-
oo
oriented producers and business lobbies and consumers.”
Because of the late development of social dialogue and increasing strains placed upon 
various governments to carry out international obligations, the framework for interest
85 Sobczyk, A. (1995). ‘Organizacje pracodawcow i przedsiebiorcow w okresie transformacji 
ekonomicznej’, in Hausner (1995) (ed.). ibid.
Dzwonczyk,J. (1995). ‘Funkcjonowanie i rozwoj organizacji pracodawcow’, in Hausner (1995) (ed.). 
ibid.
86 Jasiecki (1997). ‘Organizacje’. ibid., p 177.
87 See ‘Musi dialog, a nie dyktat’, in Trybuna, 14/02/01.
88 Lewadowski, J. ‘Prywatyzacja polskiej Gospodarki’, w Gawlikowska- Hueckel, K. (Red.)(1999). 
Polska- Unia Europejska: Problemy prawne i ekonomiczne. Gdansk: Uniwesytet Gdanski, p 155.
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representation that has been evolving in Poland has been inadequate to balance the 
various factions. Slodkowska labelled the new system of articulation as “early 
developmental”, marked by an “underdevelopment of different typologies, a division of 
roles not typical of western institutional systems, incorporated into weak and 
rudimentary institutions and accompanied by a political class not functioning normally 
with interests representation.”89 The radicalisation of unions has been reinforced by 
early technocratic policy making in combination with external constraints on social 
dialogue, leading to a paralysis in the work of the Tripartite Commission. Promises 
made to workers by successive governing coalitions have not been kept, leading to the 
polarisation of their demands and making the ‘voice’ option of strikes and blocades 
more attractive than institutionalised dialogue.
Ironically, the losers of transition that have not belonged to the unions have had little if 
any ability to voice their interests. This situation further undermined the ability of the 
poorest segments of the population to make their voice heard or articulate their interests, 
contributing to the emergence of diverse populist pressure group representing the 
frustrated lower class and calling for collective protest against ‘the establishment’. 
Finally, the institution of the ‘state’ itself has been subject to redefinition as the 
transition has progressed. (See chapter eight). The social problems associated with the 
reforms have created serious dilemmas for subsequent Polish governments, faced with 
the need to balance market policies with social sensitivity, as increasing inequalities, 
unemployment and poverty led to popular discontent. The various strategies employed 
to ameliorate the social situation paradoxically provoked further problems90, increasing 
the transaction costs of the reforms. By 93’ already, public belief in the benefits of the 
market was on a drastic decline, and the ‘state’s’ role was becoming increasingly hazy. 
Caught between controlling elites, both national and international, and growing social 
pressure and increasing domestic demands, the Polish ‘state’s’ capacity to govern was 
ultimately depleted, and the weakness its institutions strengthened the emergence of 
protest and corruption as the most popular forms of interest articulation, destabilising 
the entire systemic transition.91
C. Civil Society 
According to Wasilewski,
in the most abstract sense, civil society can be conceived as an aggregation o f  
institutions whose members are engaged primarily in a complex o f non-state activities,
89 Slodkowska, I. (1997). ‘Partie’. ibid, p 10.
90 Such as growing indebtedness of State Owned Enterprises and rising public/budget deficit.
91 Ekiert, G. (1998). ‘Legacies’, ibid.
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economic and cultural, and who in this way preserve and transform their identity by 
exercising all sorts o f pressures or controls upon the state institution.92
Central thus to the concept of civil society is the distinction between the ‘state’ and 
society. Civil society is a domain of mediation; an attempt by the public to control the 
‘state’ and ensure its accountability to the people. Furthermore, under normal 
democratic conditions, civic disobedience is acceptable when the actions of the 
authorities deny the interests of the public at large.
In the classical western paradigm, civil society becomes gradually identified with 
commerce and industry, resulting in a diversification of interests. Nongovernmental 
organisations and other civic groups add to this growing pool of interests, resulting in 
the creation of a social foundation for democracy. Thus, gap between the ‘state’ and the 
market, between politics and economics is filled by interests.93 
This chapter has shown that in the early 90’s, civil society in this traditional western 
sense did not yet exist in Poland.94 Attempts at its creation became what the author 
would label ‘forced pluralism’. The elitist notion that one could design civil society 
proved to be something of an over-simplification. The Polish liberals, as discussed in 
the previous chapter, felt that their mission was not only to construct a new political and 
economic system through legal and other administrative actions, but also to transform 
the entire social fabric, from one grounded in socialist realities to one flourishing within 
the market. The goal was consequently not only to initiate policy reform, but to 
contribute to the creation of a whole category of people, benefiting from the market, 
who would then consolidate the changes.
The liberals, led by Finance Minister Balcerowicz, believed that the market would 
somehow automatically generate civil society, and was as such the basis for 
democratisation. Balcerowicz’s priorities were clear. First ‘build’ a market, through 
liberalisation and deregulation of economic life, and then let the invisible hand give 
birth to civil society, thus consolidating democracy. The economy was to generate new 
social structures and related interests, and the role of elites was to safeguard the 
market.95 As such, pluralism was paradoxically to develop on the basis of elitism.
The absurdity of the constructivist social experiment wasn’t however lost on all the 
reformers. According to I Pankow, certain wings of the Solidarity governments
92 Wasilewski (1995). ‘Crystallisation’, ibid. p 182.
93 Wasilewski, (1995). ibid
94 Morawski, W. (1992). ‘Economic Change and Civil Society in Poland’, in Lewis P.G. (Ed.) (1992). 
Democracy and Civil Society in Eastern Europe. London: Macmillan.
95 Balcerowicz (1999). ibid.
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questioned Balcerowicz’s assumptions from the very beginning. The crucial and 
decisive moment, when a different social philosophy could have been adopted, occurred 
during the ‘War at the Top’, between the various elite factions of Solidarity, in 1990. 
Pankow observed that this was one of the most important times in transition when 
pluralism could have taken root.96 Although there was supportive intellectual climate for 
the creation of a role for conflict in policy making, a divisive line formed between the 
liberals, who supported the notion of politics based on conflict, negotiations and 
compromise, gathered around former dissident T Syryjczyk, and those, under 
Balcerowicz’s wing, who felt it was sufficient to only ‘provide the people with strong 
leadership’ and the market would take care of the rest.97
The elitists felt that the tempo and direction of the reforms had been appropriate, and 
that society would be patient, while the pluralists questioned the successes of shock 
therapy, pointing to the growing frustration of the public, and arguing for change in the 
reforms. Moreover, as Pankow pointed out, “the elitists interpreted pluralists as giving 
into particular interests at the cost of the overall good, while the pluralists wanted 
conflict to generate social involvement and accused the elitists of alienating society.”98 
The rhetoric of this ‘War at the Top’ cumulated in the presidential elections in the fall. 
President Walesa, supporting the pluralist ideology, criticised PM Mazowiecki and his 
camp for their betrayal of society, maintaining that reforms should take into 
consideration the social costs of transformation. Mazowiecki, on the other hand, aligned 
himself with the Balcerowicz faction, endorsing the elitist blueprints for civil society. 
Ironically, although Walesa defeated Mazowiecki, the new President soon reneged on 
his election promises, continuing reforms in the spirit of elitism.99 This development set 
the groundwork for future evolution of the state-social relationship in Poland (see 
chapter eight).
Although, Solidarity had evolved from a movement of people demanding justice, once it 
turned into a political party with trade union interests to defend, the civic and libertarian 
aspects of its programme vanished. Thus the civil society, as represented by the 
Solidarity movement, that had brought down the socialist system was consequently little 
more than an initial impulse for transformation.100
96 Pankow (1995). ‘Narodziny’. ibid., p 249.
97 Interview with J. Lasota, Former Solidarity activist, MP of Freedom Union, President of Krakow. 
12/07/2002.
98 Pankow (1995). ibid. p 250.
99 See chapter three
100 Beyme, K. von (1996). ibid., p 141.
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In the first days of reforms, the Solidarity elite broke with the illusions of market 
socialism, still espoused to by the majority of the public, embracing instead a radical 
package of free market capitalism. This decision was taken without public discussion 
(for more see chapter three), and while society continued to expect the trusted elites to 
ensure the basis of its existence, the economic and political reforms instigated 
contradicted these hopes. J Federowicz argued that, “the first Solidarity governments 
committed the cardinal error of not explaining how capitalism works, its reasoning, to 
society.” Instead the government resorted to emotional pleas for individuals to accept 
short- term sacrifices for the long term good of the nation. Polemicising, Federowicz 
concluded:
When normal times would return, not only would there be no need to appeal for  
dedication and solidarity, but this would be even wrong, since life in a democratic 
society is a continual game o f opposing interests, and all attempts to create a system 
based on the principle that man will sacrifice himself for others have invariably ended 
in the greatest crimes in the history o f  humanity! 101
C.2 Pluralism or elitism?
The intensification of social conflicts that took place after the initial protests in 1990-91 
suggested that the pluralist model propagated by the liberal elitists was not gaining wide 
acceptance in the Polish public, and national civic culture was not fulfilling the 
conditions characterising competitive capitalism and liberalism. There were no well- 
organised social partners, nor was there a strong ‘state’. Instead, society perceived this 
elite endeavour at creating the pluralist model as “an attempt to forge wild capitalism, in 
the name of creating a middle class and free market.”102
What the liberals failed to appreciate none the less is that market incentives alone do not 
change the behaviour and expectations of society. What was in fact needed was a much 
more active role for the ‘state’, in combination with a transparent regulatory and 
institutional environment.
Social disillusionment with the liberal model of transformation led to mass protests in 
the summer of 92’. In 1993, 7436 strikes took place, amounting to what could be called 
a semi counter-revolution. The elites, unable to stop the flooding of civil unrest, were 
forced to reconcile their beliefs in the spontaneous rise of civil society with Polish 
realities. Consequently, in 1994, a new phase of policy making was launched, aimed at 
institutionalising interest groups in a corporate model based on negotiations. A Pact for
101 J Federowicz, (1996). ‘Capitalism- The Ugly Duckling’, in Winiecki (Ed.) (1996). ibid., p 128-130.
102 Jasiecki (1997). ibid., p 182.
103 Wprost 3/3/02.
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Entrepreneurship was signed with business, and the Tripartite Commission began 
functioning. The pluralist model had failed to take root in Poland and labour, initially 
ignored, as a result of its growing radicalisation, would now be over-privileged.104 To 
their dismay, the Polish elites realised that there was no automatic way to create a 
middle class or a civil society based on deregulation of the economy and political 
decrees. As a result, contradicting the notions of economic liberalism, the intelligentsia 
rather than the new middle class remained the backbone of the reforms in Poland. 
Moreover, because the partners in the Tripartite Commission, as discussed above, did 
not possess equal powers, it became increasingly difficult for the ‘state’ to act as an 
arbitrator between them, and the corporatist model that was being created, emerged 
already dysfunctional. Thus, in spite of corporatist rhetoric, the elites continued to 
govern by technocracy, convinced that society was immature and interests 
underdeveloped. As L Mazewski concluded, “the Polish reforms continued to have the 
character of a programme imposed by the ruling elites and carried out by the state 
bureaucracy, a programme which the citizen does not understand and in which for this 
reason he did not participate as an individual- a Polish version of Thatcherism.”105 
Hence, while the economic and political systems were being rapidly altered and 
transformed from above, social consciousness lagged far behind, constituting the main 
obstacle to the systemic reforms and the main danger to the transformation.
Conclusion
In 1991, at the time of the negotiation of the EA, the Polish economic situation was 
marked by a continuation of old tendencies from the planned economic system, violent 
fluctuations caused by shock of 89-90, as well as trends produced by 
internationalisation and liberalisation of external economic and political relations. R 
Dahrendorf correctly observed that the heart of the problem lied in the “incongruent 
time scales of the political, the economic and the social reform.”106 The political 
legacies of the early reforms led to contradictory tensions and pressures within the 
Polish transition, contributing to policy fluctuations, modifications and even reversals. 
Thus even though the radical changes of 1990 moved Poland rapidly away from 
command structures and towards the transition to market, and hence were necessary,
104 The Unions are over-privileged in the Tripartite Commission not only by having greater financial 
backing from the state than the employer groups, but also being co-financed by the employers. They are 
better organised, and, while, not formally given any real legislative-making authority, they are capable of 
stopping the government from taking numerous legal decisions, by using their opinion-making rights in 
combination with threats as to new laws and regulations.
105 Interview with L. Mazewski, Przeglad Polityczny 1992, No 3 Vol 16, p 11.
106 Dahrendorf, R. (1990). Reflections on the Revolution in Europe: in a letter intended to have been sent 
to a gentleman in Warsaw. London: Chatto & Windus.
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they were in and of themselves not enough to ensure the sustainability and consolidation 
of democratic capitalism.
While this chapter has focused on Polish domestic politics, discussing the environment 
in Poland in which the transition reforms were initiated, the remainder of this thesis 
examines how an international regime such as the Europe Agreement can enhance 
reform credibility under these types of conditions. The author argues that the attempts to 
reconcile a neoliberal doctrine, such as was the basis for the EA, with political realities 
in Poland, have led to the reinforcement of habits and social inclinations that had 
developed under a completely different systemic rationality.107
In fact, ‘anchoring’ strategies for transformation, with their over-reliance on the role of 
external conditionality and internal technocracy, have paradoxically contributed to 
strengthening these tendencies, at once weakening the ‘state’ and the democratic 
impulse, and making the government increasingly dependent on external factors for 
policy sustainability.
Policy reform in Poland, based on the simplified version of the neo-classical model and 
premised on the notion that somehow economic agents in Poland would simply adjust to 
the rules of the market did not resolve the lingering problem of social exclusion from 
and consequently outright hostility towards the reforms.
In the words of sociologist G Skapska,
the technocratic reforms and elitism have posited another passive adjustment, this time
to the conditions imposed by a new and still external systemic order, reinforcing the old
normative pattern ofpassivity with most economic actors waiting for directives from
above. 'They”, the elite, have respond by means o f  laws linked with this model o f
1/10
development, and again society is passive.
Moreover, if the basis and sine qua non of liberalism are civil rights, and to limit these 
rights is to limit the participation of citizens in political life for the price of achieving 
the desired economic goal. The author thus concludes that the technocratic attempts to 
enhance reform sustainability through external anchoring strategies and top- down 
policy making, while not ill- intentioned, did endanger the development of participatory 
democracy, paradoxically going against the very essence of liberalism and contradicting 
the main premises of the transformation to market capitalism. These strategies for 
policy reform have encountered something of a conceptual crisis in Poland, as the
107 See Marody, M. and Gucwa-Lesny E. (Ed.) (1996). Podstawy Zycia Spolecznego w Polsce. Warszawa: 
Uniwersytet Warszawski. Instytut Studiow Spolecznych.
Skapska, G. (1994). ‘Reforma Ekonomiczna i Ksztaltowanie sie Porzadku Instytucjonalnego w Polsce: 
Dziedzictwo przeszlosci, mity i wizje przyszlosci’, PrzegladSocjologiczny, Vol.XLIII.
Sztompka, P. (1999). Impoderabilie Wielkiej Zmiany: mentalnosc, wartosci i wiezi spolczne czasow 
transformacji. Krakow: Wydawnictwo Naukowe PWN.
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assumptions on which they have been founded have given inadequate emphasis to local 
conditions and attitudes, far from the idealised free market.
'08 G Skapska (1995). ‘Prisoner of the Paradox’, ibid., p 42.
5. Economic Consequences of the Europe Agreement
The negotiation o f the trade agreement between Poland and the EU in 1991 was an 
example o f enlightened self-interest on the part o f the Union. In spite o f  widely 
proclaimed praise o f liberalism, EU negotiators secured considerable protection o f  EU
markets and limited market access for so called sensitive goods; access critical fo r
Polish exporters.1
If the previous chapters set the domestic background for policy reform in Poland, this 
one takes a look at how external factors within the implementation of the EA have 
affected economic developments in Poland, influencing the economic, political and 
institutional environment of the transition. Negative externalities associated with greater 
economic openness such as a staggering trade deficit, deterioration of national industry, 
rising unemployment or an unfavourable commodity structure of exports can slow down 
the speed and the direction of reform. Openness of international markets on the other 
hand can provide incentives and ‘rewards’ to pursue difficult economic decisions, 
giving the elites in the reforming country additional time to secure internal political 
support and build social legitimisation. The pursuit of regional integration with the EU, 
within the framework of the Europe Agreement, was thus to provide Poland with access 
to markets, increased investment and financial aid, stimulating economic recovery and 
enhancing policy credibility through the so-called ‘anchoring’ effect of international 
institutions.
The author will argue that in the economic dimension, the Agreement fell short of 
fulfilling its goals. In fact, rather than benefiting the Polish side though the asymmetric 
schedule for trade liberalisation, based on the notion that the weaker associated partner 
would be allowed a longer time frame to open up its economy, the EA turned out to be 
more advantageous for the Union. The political objectives of aiding transition through 
the stimulation of export-led growth and promises of encouragement for the difficult 
internal reforms were quickly overtaken by narrow interest- based considerations within 
the Union itself, leading to wide discrepancies between the declared goals of the EA and 
its actual implementation.
I. The Europe Agreements and Transition
Because transformation has proved to be a complicated process, involving immense 
social, political and economic costs, the role of the European Union as an external actor 
was crucial in buttressing the process and pivotal in ensuring the success of the reforms
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in Poland. The simultaneous reorientation of trade patters towards the European Union 
while undergoing domestic economic restructuring created an acute dependence for the 
Polish reforms on relations with the EU, and made Poland particularly susceptible to 
changes in the terms of trade with the Community.
Initially it was recognised that association with the Union would encourage the 
development of some domestic sectors and the decline of others. However 
apprehensions remained within some policy circles in Poland that an overly rapid 
market opening could lead to unacceptable economic and social costs, possibly enticing 
trade policy reversals and backsliding on the reforms. Moreover, it was feared that this 
type of regional integration as opposed to multilateral agreements could create an 
artificial bias towards EU markets, making Poland overly dependent on business cycles 
in the Union and hampering the development of intra-CEE trade or the pursuit of third 
markets.
Thus to avoid contributing to this trade diverting effect of regional integration , it was 
important for the member states of the Union to offer various incentives to Poland 
including freeing market in agriculture and sensitive products, and as A Winters argued, 
“accepting large volumes of goods for two to three decades to ensure that the CEE were 
able to realise their trade potential.” If the aim of the EU was to help cement the 
political and economic reforms in Poland, and, in the words of Winters, “to support the 
Polish candidate in its progress to new market institutions and levels of affluence, then 
the most significant tool the EU could use was trade concessions in the form of 
generous and asymmetric market liberalisation.”
A. Unfounded optimism
In the wake of the 1989 Polish round table revolution, confidence in the future and 
general enthusiasm for the changes taking place in the former socialist states led to an 
underestimation of the difficulties to be encountered during transition in the coming 
years. It was hoped that CEE would quickly get out of recession to hit growth rates of 5-
1 Stewarska,R. (1998). ‘On Some Consequences of the Eastern Enlargement of the European Union’, in 
Zielinska- Glebocka, A. and Stepniak, A. (Ed.) (1998). EU Adjustment to Eastern Enlargement, ibid., p 
162.
2 See Wysokinska, Z. (1994). ‘The Association Agreement Between Poland and the EC: the directions of 
trade liberalization’, Osteuropa Wirtschaft, Vol 39, No 1, March.
Baldwin (1994). Towards an Integrated Europe, ibid.
Kawecka-Wyrzykowska, Synowiec (Red.) (2001). Unia Europejska. Przygotowania Polski do 
czlonkowstwa. Warszawa: IKiCHZ.
Viner, J. (1950). The Customs Union Issue: Studies in the administration o f international law and 
organization: New York: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.
3 Winters, L.A. and Wang, Z.K. (1994). Eastern Europe's International Trade. Manchester: Manchester 
University Press, p 29.
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6% a year and that the openness of world markets to their exports would contribute to 
this recovery.4
However, because Western Europe itself was grappling with an economic recession, the 
already difficult political economy process of granting far-reaching trade privileges to 
third countries was further complicated. The unbound optimism as to recovery in the 
East combined with economic slowdown in the West could, according to T Palankai, 
explain the modest concessions offered to the candidates, first within the General 
System of Preferences and later in the negotiations of the EAs.5
During negotiations of the EA, the Polish team was concentrating on the political issues, 
namely stabilising the domestic policy making process and increasing security, initially 
not taking technical or economic interests into consideration, under the nai ve 
assumption that political will in the Union would certainly win over any narrow 
economic interests. The negotiators presumed that the Communities would grant the 
Polish government unconditional market access for its exports as well as other 
concessions on the free movement of workers, capital and services. It was only during 
the subsequent rounds of the negotiations that the Polish side began to understand the 
complex process of arriving at Common Commercial Policy decisions within the Union 
itself and the enormous political and economic obstacles that stood in the way of the 
Commission giving into Polish arguments and consenting to grant bigger preferences in 
the interest of the candidate.6 May hew commented that, “the negotiations relatively 
rapidly became hard-nosed trade bargaining in which the Community side had relatively
n
clear objectives of what it wanted to get out of the negotiations.”
The Polish government was under tremendous pressure to conclude the negotiations as 
quickly as was possible, due to the ongoing needs of the transition process as well as to 
the expectations of the public. However, already during the early rounds of 
consultations, differences were obvious as to the free flow of labour, membership 
aspirations, and trade in textiles, steel and agricultural products. While the Polish
4 Collins, S. and Rodrik D. (1991). Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union in the World Economy. 
Washington DC: Institute for International Economics.
Brabant, J. van. (1999). Remaking Europe: the European Union and the transition economies. Lanham, 
Md.: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers.
Bruno, M. (1994). ‘Stabilisation and reform in Eastern Europe: A preliminary evaluation’, in Blanchard, 
O.J., Froot, K. and Sachs, J. (1994). The Transition in Eastern Europe. National Bureau o f Economic 
Research Project Report. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
5 Palankai, T. (2000). ‘The Europa Agreements from the perspective of CEE’, in Dijck, P. van and Faber, 
G (Ed.) (2000). The External Dimension of the European Union. The Hague: Kluwar Law International.
6 According to member of the Polish negotiations team ,plenipotentiary and Secretary of State for 
European Integration, J. Saruysz-Wolski, in discussions with author. See chapter six
7 Mayhew, A. (1998). Recreating Europe: the European Union's policy towards Central and Eastern 
Europe: Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, p 22.
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negotiators were aware that the concessions granted under the EA were not enough,
especially in sensitive products, the need to conclude an agreement on a FTA with the
Community in the window of opportunity available proved stronger than the desire to
obtain optimal conditions for Polish goods, services and workers.8
Assessments of the Europe Agreement differ. According to one opinion,
the insistence o f the Community on treating the sensitive sectors much less liberally, 
even though these were the sectors where the three countries could most easily export in 
order to finance the reform, showed that the Agreements were not aimed at helping 
them over the difficult second stage o f the reform, where public support was bound to
weaken.9
Deciphering the EC’s motives for limiting the asymmetric nature of the trade 
liberalisation, Winters and Wang claimed that “the EC has sought to encourage and 
support the nascent democracies in the east, but too often its good intentions have been 
undermined by powerful interest groups at home. It has granted concessions to be sure, 
but not as generously nor as willingly as we could wish.”10 Faini and Portes, in turn, 
argued that by reducing the scope of benefits available to CEE, the EC’s risk averse 
policy was aimed at trying to open up its economies in selective ways so as to minimise 
the impact on EC employment.11
None the less, the most crucial point remains that no real attempt was made on either 
side before or during the negotiations to seriously estimate the impact of the Agreement 
on the transition process or to look at what terms would have best served the
• 19transition , and while the liberalisation schedule for the removal of tariffs was indeed 
asymmetric on paper, this did not solve the issue of other trade restrictions, including 
Non Tariff Barriers and constraints from bureaucratic requirements.
For the Polish side, the biggest disappointments in the outcome of the negotiations were 
the limited concessions granted on labour mobility and the conditions of access to the 
Union’s markets for agriculture, textiles, iron, steel, and coal.13 The impact of these 
drawn-out disputes as well as multiple breakdowns in the negotiations on Polish- EU 
political relations is discussed in the next chapter. It is however important to note here
8 Interviews conducted between September 2000 and June 2001 (when the author worked with the Polish 
Committee for European Integration) with J. Saruysz-Wolski, U. Synowiec, P. Nowina- Konopka, M. 
Tabor, all former members of the Polish EA negotiating team. Warsaw.
9 Mayhew (1998). ibid., p 23.
10 Winters and Wang (1994). Ibid., p 9.
11 Faini, R. and Portes, R. (1995). ‘Opportunities Outweigh Adjustments’, in Faini, R., Portes, R. (Ed.) 
(1995). European Union Trade with Eastern Europe: adjustment and opportunities. London: CEPR.
12 Mayhew (1998). ibid., p 42.
13 Nello, S. S. (1991). The New Europe: Changing Economic Relations Between East and West. London: 
Harvester Wheatsheaf Press, p 209.
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that there were numerous discrepancies between Polish and EU interests from the very 
beginning.
Never the less, following the signing of the Treaty in December 1991, the expectations 
of the Polish public regarding the EA were very high. CBOS research indicated huge 
support for the Agreement with a massive 80% of the Polish public believing it would 
be beneficial for Poland. About 50% of the Poles assumed that Poland would become a 
full-fledged member of the Community within 5 years. 65% believed that the EA would 
significantly ease the restrictions on labour mobility, enabling willing Poles to seek 
work within the FTA. Moreover, 73% expected that the dramatic state of Polish 
agriculture would improve as a result of the Treaty, with only 19% of the public 
displaying apprehensions as to the EAs possibly negative impact on this sector.14 The 
hopes associated with the EA were even higher within elite circles, as reflected in the 
positive assessment of the Agreement during the parliamentary hearings that preceded 
the ratification procedure. The governing liberal coalition continued to uphold that 
Poland would not only be granted better access to a 340mln people market for its goods, 
services and capital, but that the obligations associated with the schedule for 
liberalisation would provide an effective incentive for sustaining difficult domestic 
reforms as well as a road map for the Polish transformation.15 Because the EA was to 
serve as tool for increasing competition on the domestic market, it was consequently to 
speed up the process of restructuring by forcing enterprises to adjust and thus stimulate 
better allocation of resources, increasing levels of productivity and economies of 
scale.16
On the whole then, it was expected that the principle of asymmetric opening to the 
benefit of Poland would prove to be sufficient to create enough opportunities for the 
Polish producers to increase their export potential, while giving them additional time to 
prepare for the opening of the Polish market to increased international competition.
B. Transition depression
Based on the principle of asymmetry, on February 1st 1992, the day of the Interim 
Agreement related to trade measures went into effect, 51.1% of Polish products gained 
duty free access to the EU market while only 10.1% of EU’s exports were allowed into
14 Centrum Badan Opinii Spolecznej (1992). ‘Opinia publiczna o stowarzyszeniu Polski z EW G\
January.
15 Kawecka- Wyrzykowska, E. (1997). ‘Effects of the Europe Agreement on Polish Economy and Pre­
accession Challenges’, in Yearbook o f Polish European Studies, Vol 1, Warsaw: Warsaw University 
Centre for Europe.
16 See Zukrowska, K. (1998). ‘The Scope of Opening of the Economy in the Pre-accession Period: 
exemplified by the Polish experience’, in Zielinska- Glebocka and Stepniak (Ed) (1998). ibid. 
Wysokinska, Z. i Witkowska, J. (1999). Integracja europejska: teoria i praktyka. Warszawa: PWN.
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Poland. However, the activation of the Interim Agreement coincided with a massive 
deterioration of economic life in Poland. Transition recession was deep, and the 
adjustment shocks following the dismantling of the former system proved much more 
dramatic than initially expected.
Moreover, there is little doubt that the radical changes in demand which took place as a 
result of the liberalisation process contributed to the overall symptoms of recession 
present during this early period. The opening of the economy in 1990 followed by the 
collapse of the CMEA in 1991 fuelled massive contractions of output and added to the
• 1 7sharp rise in unemployment.
The transformation crisis reached its lowest ebb in 1991-93, with falls in production 
reaching 2 digit proportions. For the ordinary Pole, real incomes fell and disparities 
widened leading to increased levels of deprivation. Unemployment became the most 
visible social ill and a major cause of poverty.18 By 1994, real wages were still lower 
than in 1990, and 29% of the population was living on the verge of subsistence.19
C. Trade surplus to trade deficit
The trade surplus initially noted with the European Union turned into a deficit in 1992. 
According to T Palankai, “in large areas of the economy the new enterprises were 
facing difficulties, and the syndrome of being ‘infant industries’ proved to be more 
serious than expected at the time of the negotiations of the associations.” This raised 
the question pertaining to the adequacy of the Agreement for the needs of transition and 
the lack of possibilities to effectively protect domestic producers.
In June 1993, in a letter addressed to the Communities, the Polish Prime Minister 
complained to the EU Council of Ministers of the insufficiency of the EA in stopping 
the deterioration of Polish industry and agriculture. According to the Polish side, the 
growing trade deficit and increased protectionist behaviour of the Union were proof that
,7See Kawecka- Wyrzykowska, E. (Red.) (1998). ‘Ocena Stopnia Realizacji Ukladu Europejskiego 
Ustanawiajacego Stowarzyszenie Miedzy Polska a Wspolnotami Europejskimi i Panstwami 
Czlonkowskimi’, UKIE, No 17, Warszawa: UKIE, IKiCHZ, pazdziemik.
Ministerstwo Gospodarki, (1999). Polska, Raport o Stanie Handlu Zagranicznego w Roku 1998. 
Warszawa: Ministerstwo Gospodarki.
Eatwell, J., Ellman, M., Karlsson, M., Nuti, D. M. and Shapiro, J. (1997). Not 'just another accession': 
the political economy ofEU  enlargement to the East. London: IPPR.
Czyzewski, A. i Orlowski, W. (Red.) (1993). Raport Polska- Wspolnoty europejskie: perspektywa 2000. 
Warszawa: UKIE, Urzad Rady Ministrow, Biuro ds. Integracji europejskiej.
Levigne, M. (1995). The Economics o f Transition: From socialist economy to market economy. NY: St 
Martin’s Press.
18 World Bank (1994). Poverty in Poland: an assessment in 2 volumes. Washington DC: World Bank, 14 
September, p 30.
19 Belka, M., Hausner, J., Jasinski, L., Marody, M. and Zirk-Sadowski, M. (Ed.) (1997). The Polish 
Transformation, ibid.
20 Palankai (2000). ibid. p 278.
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the Agreement was more beneficial for the EU, and that the principle of asymmetric
n I
opening in the favour of Poland was being violated.
This criticism, echoed in most other associated countries, was further supplemented by 
some rather unfavourable reports published in the West as to the restrictive nature of the 
EAs and the inadequate concessions offered to the candidates. The main part of the 
critique stemmed from the fact that while the EAs were geared towards opening up 
trade with CEE, on the one hand, they qualified the liberalisation by retaining protection 
in sensitive areas such as agriculture, food, clothing and textiles, on the other. The 
concessions and privileges granted were additionally decreased by the insistence of the 
Communities to preserve the right to deploy various forms of highly political contingent 
protection, most notably Anti-Dumping Duties and diverse safeguards actions against 
imports from the associated states.
For instance Winters claimed that,
despite the parlous state o f the CEECs economies, the EC has maintained agricultural 
protection, kept Quantitative Restrictions on textiles and clothing for 6 years, left EC 
chemicals and iron and steel producers free to harass CEEC suppliers through Anti- 
Dumping law, kept tariffs on sensitive labour-intensive products for 5 years, and 
discouraged the CEECs from processing inputs from other countries. In the meantime it 
has imposed its competition and intellectual property laws on CEECs and encouraged 
explicitly and implicitly the CEECs to adopt all the rest o f  the E C ’s commercial 
infrastructure. It has ensured its rights to establish firms and provide services in the 
CEECs. It has permitted highly CEEC skilled residents to move westwards, i f  only 
temporarily, but it has equally effectively ensured that the CEECs current abundant 
factor -  less skilled labour- can neither be efficiently utilised in producing exports for  
the EC nor improve its productivity by moving directly to the EC.22
The EU’s unwillingness to surrender its application of contingent protection against the
CEEs was demonstrated in i994, when in Essen, the European Council admitted that
it should be ready to consider refraining from using commercial defence instruments for  
industrial products conditional on the satisfactory implementation o f  competition policy 
and control o f state aids... together with the wider application o f  other parts o f  
Community law linked to the internal market, providing for a guarantee against unfair 
competition comparable to that existing inside the internal market.23
Even more critical of the liberalisation under the EAs was R Baldwin, arguing that “the 
Agreements drive the marginalisation of CE economies and strengthen the market 
position of the EC at their expense.” His main criticism of the EAs was that they 
resulted in trade diversion away from more efficient suppliers (US and Japan) and
21 Letter of the President of the Council of Ministers on 2/6/93 to the Leaders of the Member States of the 
EU before the Copenhagen European Council (1995). K1E Monitor Integracji Europejskiej, No 3, p 29- 
30.
22 Winters and Wang (1994). ibid., p 48.
23 Essen European Council, 1994
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towards that of the EC. Furthermore, Baldwin pointed out that the Agreements would 
have an investment-deterring effect stemming from the restrictive rules of origin, that 
they left too large a scope open for the use of Non Tariff Barriers and, “by concentrating 
industry in the EU rather than in the candidates, that they had the potential to 
permanently retard the development of CE.”24
Faini and Portes, Inotai, Hindley and Rodrik, in turn, all used the EU’s trade surplus to
demonstrate that the Union could have afforded more generous provisions, and that the
restrictions on CEE exports were unjustified. In addition, Eatwell et al. claimed that,
the declarations o f  the EAs were more on the rhetorical side than in any real 
arrangements to provide asymmetry for the benefit o f the candidates, and they 
concluded that the flaws o f  the EAs, especially in agriculture and sensitive products, 
combined with the comparative advantage o f European firms, have led to higher 
unemployment levels in the candidates.26
It was even maintained that the Agreements, by protecting the EU’s sensitive sectors, 
actually hindered the restructuring of trade in CEE in line with their Comparative 
Advantage. While Faini and Portes argued that, “the Treaties offered little in the short 
term to liberalise industrial policy in the EU and foster export growth from CE”27, 
Messerlin asserted that, “because of the room allotted for continued exploitation of 
contingent protection and the exclusion of sensitive products, the EAs have failed. 
Moreover, the rule making aspect of the treaty is a constitutional failure as the dispute 
settlement mechanism is dominated by bureaucracy with no direct access to private 
sector.”28
Finally, Winters et al. noted that the EAs appeared to be designed more to minimise the 
adjustment that the EC had to make in response to the changes following 1989 than to 
maximise the benefits available to the CEEs.29
24 Baldwin, R. (1994). ibid., p i39.
25 Faini and Portes (1995). ibid.
Inotai, A. (1998) ‘Eastern Enlargement: Benefits for the European Union’, in Sludja Europejskie, CEUW, 
No 3, Vol 7, Warsaw: CEUW.
Hindley, B.V. (1993). ‘Helping transition through trade?: EC and US policy towards exports from Eastern 
and Central Europe’, EBRD Working paper, No 4, London: EBRD.
Ehrenhaft, P., Hindley, B., Michalopoulos, C. and Winters, LA. (1997). ‘Policies on Imports from 
Economies in Transition’, World Bank Discussion Paper, No 22, Washington DC: World Bank.
Rodrik, D. (1992). Foreign Trade in E E ’s Transition: early results. London: Mimeo, NBER.
26 Eatwell, J., Ellman, M., Karlsson, M., Nuti, D. M. and Shapiro, J. (1997). Ibid. (Polish version 
translated by E. Czamy. (1999). Warszawa: Wydajnictwo Sejmowe, p 72.
27 Faini and Portes (1995). ibid, p 5.
28 Meaning, not an independent agency with transparent and direct access to the private sector, in the form 
of available information, consulting and/or expertise.
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Royal Institute of International Affairs, p i l l .
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156
D. The Copenhagen package
At the beginning, the Commission seemed deaf to these diverse critiques, but by 1993 it 
was becoming impossible to ignore the negative assessments coming from both the 
candidate states and from independent experts within the Union itself.
The unanticipated effects of the transformation, with their severe impact on economic 
activity and on income distribution, were leading to rising social discontent in the CEEs, 
and their trade deficits with most of the member states were making restrictions harder 
and harder to justify. Moreover the liberalisation of trade was having a positive effect 
on EC employment levels with job creation outweighing job destruction and most west 
European regions coming out as a net winners.30
By this time, economic relations between the Union and Poland, in specific, were 
becoming very difficult, as a result of a series of ongoing disputes and allegations of 
discriminatory treatment arising in the Association Council. The most infamous of these 
‘contentious issues’ involved the EU’s meat and live stock ban in 1993, justified by the 
supposed, unfounded, existence of foot and mouth disease, traced to CEE exports to 
Italy, as well as the imposition by the EU of minimum prices for sour cherries and 
blackberries.31
Under pressure from the candidates and other leading figures in the West , prior to the
Copenhagen European Council in 1993, the Commission issued a statement:
The Commission is aware o f the current shortcomings (of the EAs), but views trade 
relations as a permanent process and hopes that with continuing dialogue, a move 
toward a less distorted trade regime will take place. 33
In a report entitled Towards a Closer Association with the Countries o f  Central and 
Eastern Europe, the Commission proposed “a move towards greater inter- European 
cooperation through the creation of a larger FTA.” This led to the so- called Additional 
Protocol to the Interim Agreement on Trade and Trade Related Matters and amounted 
to what was later labelled the Copenhagen Package.
30 Faini and Portes (Ed.) (1995). ibid.
31 See chapter 6 for more trade disputes.
32 Most notably western economists and policy makers aware of the possible danger to the transition 
reforms.
See Messerlin, P. (1993). ‘The EC and Central Europe: The missed rendez-vous of 1992?’, Economics o f  
Transition, No 1.
Cadot, O. and Melo, J. de. (1994). ‘The Europe Agreements and EC-LDC Relations’, CEPR Discussion 
paper, No 1001, London, CEPR, August.
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Pinter.
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However, the minimal concessions that were actually granted to the CEE associated 
states within the Copenhagen Package signalled a rather wide discrepancy between the 
Commission’s desire towards grater trade liberalisation, on the one hand, and resistance 
to it at the national and regional levels of the Union’s member states, on the other. The 
Commission’s hands were thus tied, and domestic pressure for protection within the 
individual member states’ governments proved to be more decisive in determining the 
EU’s Common Commercial Policy towards the associates, than the collective 
declarations of unabated support.
Copenhagen, while not proposing a timetable for accession, did at least recognise in 
principle the possibility of future enlargement of the Union to the CEE candidates, 
declaring the famous Copenhagen Criteria for membership. Minor concessions were 
made on certain farm products, and the summit advanced the EU’s timetable for 
liberalisation of manufactured goods, which was to end in 1995 and not 1997 as 
originally planned. Moreover, the possibility of the cumulation of the rules of origin 
was discussed and some preferential agricultural quotas were enlarged. Never the less, 
these additional benefits were mostly symbolic and did not amount to any significant 
trade gains for the associated states. Nothing was done about the imprecision of the 
Safeguard clauses nor were the difficult issues of Anti-dumping or access to markets for 
sensitive products dealt with.34
It was not until 1997 that another additional protocol was concluded, incorporating new 
concessions, clarifying the cumulation of the rules of origin and settling the margin of 
preferences lost by CEE as a result of the EFTA enlargement and the conclusions of the 
WTO Uruguay Round.
II. General Conclusions
The goal of the EA was to contribute to the restructuring and development of the CEE 
economies and while its positive impact has in some respects been substantial, in 
retrospect, it could have been larger if it hadn’t been for several limiting aspects. 
Because the accusations against the Union and the various complaints about the flawed 
nature of the EA’s are so wide-ranging and complex, it is important to discuss each in 
more detail.
34 See Mayhew (1998). ibid.
Levigne, M. (1995). The Economics o f Transition, ibid.
Brabant (1996).
Fontenay, P.de, Gomel, G. and Hochreiter, E. (Ed.) (1995). ‘Western Europe in Transition : the impact of 
the opening up of Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union’, Banca d'ltalia., International Monetary 
Fund and Osterreichische Nationalbank Main papers, panel discussion, Rome: Banca 
d'ltalia,International Monetary Fund,Oesterreichische Nationalbank.
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In general, regional integration based on Free Trade Agreements such as the EA has the 
capacity to change many things on both micro and macro levels of the associated 
economies. RIA affects the size and structure of trade, its commodity pattern and 
orientation, changes in comparative advantage, specialisation and factor endowments . 
Free trade agreements can result either in trade creation or trade diversion. FTAs effect 
income distribution, as well as levels of employment. Moreover, by joining an FT A and 
thereby increasing its policy credibility a reforming country may reap many additional, 
indirect benefits of openness such as higher levels of investment and accompanying 
spillover effects.36
Indeed, some authors have maintained that the main benefit of the EA has been to
^7  •increase the attractiveness of CEE as a region for foreign direct investment. According 
to this argument, the EAs made the candidates more attractive to FDI by reducing the 
risks associated with investing in emerging markets and providing credibility and 
soundness to the economic reforms taking place in transition. The EA and the prospect 
of future membership in the Union thus served as a guarantee to firms looking to locate 
their activities in CEE, and, as a result, indirectly contributed to economic development 
and modernisation of the region. However highly plausible this argument might be, 
according to other studies conducted on FDI incentives, the Agreements were not the 
most significant factor in attracting investment, and other consideration such as debt
*3 n
rescheduling or the domestic business climate proved to be more important. Never the 
less, one could fairly easily assume that without the additional insurance provided by 
the EAs, the sums of investment would have been smaller, making business confidence 
one the chief benefits of the Agreements.
As far as the more direct impact of the EAs, especially on trade and trade relations, 
without a doubt, association contributed to a more rapid reorientation of trade from the 
former CMEA to Western Europe. It is important to note though that the most 
substantial reorientation took place between 1989 and 1992, well ahead of the going 
into effect of the Europe Agreement, and as S Nello has pointed out, “trade 
liberalisation as a direct result of the EA was only one factor in increasing CEECs
35 Bilal, S. (1998). ‘Political Economy Considerations on the Supply of Trade Protection in Regional 
Integration Agreements’, JCMS, Vol 36, No 1, March, Maastricht: European Institute of Public 
Administration.
36 See OECD (1998). ‘Open Markets Matter’, ibid.
37 Kaminski, B. (1999). ‘The Role of Foreign Direct Investment and Trade Policies in Poland’s Accession 
to the European Union’, World Bank Technical Paper, No 442, Washington DC: World Bank. 
Kawecka-Wyrzykowska, E. (1999). Polska w drodze do Unii Europejskiej. Warszawa: Polskie 
Wydawnictwo Ekonomiczne.
38 Ambler, M., Jones, V., Gacek, P., Stringa, G. and Horvath, M. (2000). The Strategic Impact o f  
European Union Enlargement: The Business View. London: Pricewaterhouse Coopers, Sceptre Litho.
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growth of trade by 130% in $ terms between 89-94. The other external factors, not less 
significant, included exchange rates, cyclical business cycles and a more normal return 
to a natural trade pattern following removal of artificial restrictions.”
Moreover, it was pointed out that the scope of market access granted under the EA was 
insignificant, because the most extensive access was offered under the Generalised 
System of Preferences granted in January 1990. These GSP rates, given to developing 
countries, are usually considerably lower than MFN rates, which, in the EU, were 
already low for industrialised products. Prior to liberalisation, the EU’s average tariff 
rate for CEE industrial products was only 3-5%, and thus lowering tariffs was not a 
serious concession. On the other hand, the average tariffs for CEE were much higher40, 
and so in nominal terms, not withstanding the longer time frame for liberalisation, it 
could be argued that CEE offered more in terms of trade concessions than they received 
in return from the EU. In addition, the Uruguay Round further eroded the respective 
preferences of the EA.
There was some overall positive impact on changes in the composition of CEE trade as
the proportion of machinery and value-addend manufactures in total exports increased
along with the modernisation of the transition economies. Growth of exports to the EU
has been strongest in machinery and miscellaneous manufacturing (footwear and
apparel), as well as semi-finished products. It has remained modest in steel, chemicals,
and agriculture again reflecting the restrictive nature of the EAs for sensitive products.
In general though, because export performance has depended on structural change and
economic development, the direct impact of the EA on domestic modernisation of the
economies was quickly exhausted.41
Moreover, A Winters warned that,
the Europe Agreements could have perverse effects on CEE trade structures. Exports 
from the associates could end up being only intensive in labour and relatively skilled 
labour products, not in unskilled, which the EU fears most and in which the CEE have a 
competitive price advantage. This could result in leaving huge segments o f  the economy
out o f trade.
According to Winters, the fact that most exports have come from firms with FDI, rather 
than domestic industry or agriculture also represented a huge problem, because “while
39Nello, S. (1998). ‘Consequences of Enlargement in Stages’, in Nello, S.S. and Smith, K..E, (1998). The 
European Union and Central and Eastern Europe: the implications o f enlargement in stages. Aldershot: 
Ashgate, p 40.
40 Poland’s average tariff rate was raised to 16% prior to the going into force of the EA.
Instytut Koniuktur i Cen Handlu Zagranicznego -Foreign Trade Research Institute: Annual Reports. 
Warsaw: IKiCHZ.
41 Palankai (2000). Ibid.,
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exports did increase in some fields, others never made it to the west, creating a hybrid, 
two segmented economy.”42
Other apprehensions as to the Agreements centred on whether they would not result in 
trade diversion, or the switching of demand from imports that are most efficient 
(cheapest) to those of the associated partner, thereby substituting the least-cost source of 
trade for the one with preferential access.
In addition, the negative impact of business cycles in the Union on CEE export growth 
demonstrated that the transition economies were becoming overly dependent on the EU 
for trade. This led to the suggestion that the pro-EU bias in the EAs should be corrected 
by the diversification of the candidates’ exports and markets.43 The asymmetry in trade 
dependence has been staggering. For example, while Poland has accounted for only 
about 13.3% of the EU’s exports and 8.9% of imports, the EU has registered on average 
70% of both Polish imports and exports.44
A. Sensitive products
In terms of the limiting nature of the EA itself, the main problems have stemmed from 
the limited access granted for sensitive industrial products and an even more restrictive 
stance in agriculture. These conditions were not improved in spite of the growing trade 
surplus of the Union with the candidates.
Under the EA, sensitive industrial products, characterised by over-production at world 
levels, were subject to a slower liberalisation schedule than other manufactures, 
complicating the sectoral dimension of integration by limiting the free movement of 
goods in textiles, clothing, coal, footwear, steel and chemicals. Furthermore, because 
CEECs export dynamics have been particularly dependent on products of such sensitive 
nature, any restrictions on these were bound to hinder the growth of trade and 
development in general. Between one half and one third of CEE manufactures in 1991 
was made up of steel and iron, chemicals, food, textiles and apparel, restricting access to 
the Union’s market for these products severely limited the capacity of the associates to 
take advantage of their comparative advantage, increasing the growth of trade deficits 
and contributing to the appearance of chronic current account deficits and balance of 
payments problems.
42 Winters, LA. (2000). ‘EU’s Preferential Trade Agreements: objectives and outcomes’, in Dijck, P. van 
and Faber, G (Ed.) (2000). The External Dimension of the European Union. The Hague: Kluwar Law 
International, p 202.
43 Although suggestions were made to increase regional trade integration through CEFTA, the scheme 
never really had a chance due to the scepticism of the CEE governments as to intra- CE trade, owing to 
past legacies of the CMEA.
44 Glowny Urzad Statystyczny (various years). Rocznik statystyczny handlu zagranicznego- yearbook o f  
foreign trade statistics. Warsaw: GUS.
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Concessions for agricultural goods were least generous of those for any sector and 
became the subject of much controversy when the Community’s agricultural trade 
deficit transformed into a surplus with even traditional food exporters such as Lithuania 
or Bulgaria. Limited market access was only one of the complaints made against the 
Union in agricultural trade. The massive subsidies and price supports provided by the 
EU within the Common Agricultural Policy for agricultural products and foodstuffs 
proved to be an even bigger obstacle to a mutual opening up of agrarian markets. These 
subsidies led to serious disturbances in CEE by creating unfair competition and driving 
the CEE agricultural producers not only out of domestic markets but also third 
countries; the case of the traditional Russian market being the most far-reaching 
example.45 Furthermore, the reference point taken for determining the size of the 
preferential quotas allotted for in the Agreement was based on the time frame between 
1988-90 which coincided with dramatic falls in agricultural output in the CEE region.
B. Non- Tariff Barriers
Contingent protection latent in the EA additionally negated many of the already small 
preferences granted under the Agreement, and Non Tariff Barriers, mainly Anti- 
Dumping and Counter Veiling Duties, remained the most significant source of friction 
between the EU and the candidates and the main barrier to CEE exports. According to 
Jovanovic,
(Under the EA), the safeguards that allow EU producers to protect themselves against 
CEE, as well as the Anti Dumping stance o f the EU against eastern products that have a 
comparative advantage make for uncertainty about trade relations and might have a 
negative impact on the transition countries, even though that is not their goal.46
While the associated states were also granted the right to deploy these non tariff 
measures of protection, the stronger and more experienced EU was more capable of 
exploiting the loopholes within the law of the Treaty and take advantage of the available 
commercial policy tools. By resorting to various NTBs, the EU was thus able to 
effectively increase its levels of protection against CEE products, despite the 
asymmetric removal of tariffs.
C. Free movement of workers and services
For Poland and for other CEE, one of the biggest disappointments of the negotiations of 
the EAs was the limited nature of the concessions granted for the free movement of 
labour and services. Article 41 under Title IV of the EA states that community members
45 Mroczek, W. (1995). ‘Agriculture’, in Kawecka- Wyrzykowska (Ed.) (1995). Prospects for Trade in 
Sensitive Products, ibid.
46 Jovanovic, M.N. (1992). International Economic Integration: Limits and prospects. London, New 
York: Routledge, p 402.
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should strive to allow CEE employees greater access to community labour markets and 
examine the possibility of concluding bilateral agreements with them in order to 
maintain or extend existing arrangements. As such no real progress was made as to the 
state of affairs prior to the creation of the FTA.
Free movement of workers is a crucial component of the internal market, and the 
economic and political benefits for the transition states would have been huge. 
Liberalising labour migration makes investment easier and helps to overcome many of 
the negative effects of inflexible domestic labour markets. Liberalisation likewise 
contributes to the spread of knowledge, as Eastern workers return to their home 
countries with know-how acquired in the west.
Most of the restrictions in the EA on labour mobility arose due to high unemployment 
levels within the EU and consequently widespread fears of labour migration from CEE; 
fears that have proven to be unfounded.47 While the Agreements did make room for 
self- employment as well as the hiring of key personnel, the growing difficulties with 
the actual implementation in the member states nullified most of the rights granted. 
Moreover, the EAs addressed only the ability of the associates to provide services based 
on the right of establishment on EU territories, as opposed to trans-national services.49 
This right of establishment was further complicated by various national bureaucratic 
requirements that hampered both the ability to ascertain self-employment as well as to 
hire key personnel. In sum, without the complete opening of labour markets, no real 
rights of establishment could be created and the entire possibility of the free movement 
of services was severely limited.
The transport sector provides for a poignant example of this inconsistency. 
Liberalisation of services under the EA progressed the furthest in this sector, but 
paradoxically it was excluded from the rights of establishment! Moreover, while the 
EAs strived to liberalise highly advanced sectors based on knowledge and professional 
services, labour-intensive industries were opened up to a much lesser extent. Because 
the candidates have specialised in exactly these services based on low-qualified on
47 See European Commission (2001). The Free Movement of Workers in the Context of Enlargement, 
Brussels: EC, March.
European Commission (2000). Report: Employment in Europe 2000, Brussles: EC.
Boswell, C. (2000). ‘Study on Unfounded Migration’, RIIA Paper, London: RIIA.
Boeri, T. and Brucker, H. (2000). The Impact o f  Eastern Enlargement on Employment and Labour 
Markets in the EU Member States. Commissioned by the Employment and Social Affairs DG of the 
European Commission, Berlin, Milano: European Integration Consortium.
48 Kawecka-Wyrzykowska(1999). ibid.
Miiller-Graff, P. and Stepniak, A. (1997). Poland and the European Union: between association and 
membership, ECSA-series, Vol 4. Baden-Baden: Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft.
49 For example cabotage transport across the FTA
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unqualified labour power, association again did not allow them to exploit their 
comparative advantage vis a vis the EU.
The limited ability of the candidates to take advantage of labour and services mobility 
within the framework of the EA demonstrated the ambiguity in the Union’s declaration 
of far-reaching support for the process of transition.
D. Rules of origin
Rules of origin are defined as the minimum content of a product to be qualified as 
originating in a given area and thus enjoying preferential trade access.50 Because CEEs 
have lacked the technological and managerial skills necessary to produce complex 
products in a fully integrated way, regional production has largely depended on 
international flows of parts and services. This has been especially true for intra-industry 
trade between multinational companies. According to Mayhew, “the cumulation of rules 
of origin is an important incentive for developing regional trade and opens wider 
location choices to businesses establishing in the region.”51 On the other hand, a 
restrictive definition of local origin can be used as a non tariff barrier, reducing potential 
volumes of exports made up of components coming from outside the FTA.
Accordingly, the so- called rules of origin were established within the EAs to define the 
local origin of a product; whether it has been wholly obtained in a given area, 
sufficiently worked or processed. The controversial discussion over the EA rules of 
origin initially revolved around diagonal versus pan-European cumulation for the 
Viseghrad four.52 The debate stemmed from Baldwin’s conclusions that the cumulation 
allotted for in the Agreements would create a hub-and-spoke arrangement whereby the 
candidates, as hubs, would be restricted to trade with the Union, the spoke, thus not
c l
having any real incentive of trade amongst themselves. Moreover, the requirements 
that raw components must come from within the FTA would drive out third countries as 
sources and ultimately be a deterrent to foreign direct investment. It was argued that the 
rules, calling for 60% local content requirement, were too strict and consequently a 
discouragement to non- European FDI.54
This controversial prerequisite for determining preferential access to the EU market was 
only abolished in 1997 when pan-European cumulation was established, enabling all the 
associated countries within CEFTA, EFTA and the EU to trade amongst themselves 
without having the additional non tariff barrier of local content.
50 Kawecka- Wyrzykowska, E. (1997).’Effects\ ibid., p 121.
51 Mayhew (1998). ibid., p 69.
52 Czech Republic, Slovakia, Poland, Hungary
53 Baldwin (1994). ibid.
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E. Competition policy and legal harmonisation
As far as competition policy and legal harmonisation are concerned, Title V of the EAs 
obliged the candidates to adopt competition policy and intellectual property laws within 
three years of the going into effect of the Agreement.55 Moreover, while the EU 
expected the candidates to fully adopt its competition law, it reserved for itself the right 
to continue to apply anti- dumping duties. Because in previous enlargements the Union 
had only expected legal harmonisation from future members once it itself lifted the 
threat of AD actions, this one-sided adjustment burden on the candidates once again 
contradicted the declared objective of asymmetrical support.
The granting of state aid to individual enterprises in the associated states, on the other 
hand, was subject to an exceptional 5 year delay in expected harmonisation with EU 
requirements, with a possibility of extension for another five, conditional upon 
agreement from the Association Council. Never the less, most experts agreed that the 
provisions regarding the approximation of legislation on state aids and competition 
policy in the EA were unduly strict and “appeared to be intended that approximation 
precede CE-EC free trade. This pattern reversed the normal order of integration” and, as ■ 
Winters observed, “left a distinct impression that the EC was willing to trade freely only 
on its own terms.”56
Apprehensions also appeared about the appropriateness of these competition and state 
aid policies, clearly developed with reference to industrialised countries such as France 
or Germany, for countries in transition. Regardless of whether the adoption of these 
policies could indeed have been detrimental to modernisation and economic growth in 
lesser-developed economies, the EA’s offered no alternative but to appropriate all EU 
regulations. While U Plowiec, for example, has worried that the provisions of the EA 
concerning public aid, income policies, and social and environmental protection were
*7
too rigid to take into account the growth potential of the associated countries , Mayhew 
concluded that,
perhaps the most serious criticism o f the position o f the European Union is that it is 
forcing the associated countries into adopting its own competition and state-aid rules 
without any guarantee o f  trade access to Union markets and without any guarantee on 
accession. No other applicant was ever forced to take on the Union’s laws before
accession58
54 Winters and Wang (1994). ibid.
55 Miiller-Graff, P. (1993). East Central European States and the European Communities: legal 
adaptation to the market economy: ECSA series, Vol 2. Baden-Baden: Nomos Verl.-Ges.
56 Winters and Wang (1994). ibid., p 45.
57 Plowiec, U. (1998). ‘Poland’s preparation for membership: foreign trade problems’, in Zielinska- 
Glebocka and Stepniak (Ed.) (1998). ibid., p 289.
58 Mayhew (1998). ibid., p i00.
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F. Not just another accession
In combination, the above factors have posed a significant threat not only to trade 
liberalisation between the EU and the associated states, but also to the reform efforts in 
the transition economies themselves. The Commission has justified its inability to grant 
bigger concessions to the CEE by existing widespread fears in the member states that 
eastern exports and migrants would threaten jobs in the EU. The slow pace at which 
trade has been liberalised has often been attributed to the presence of net EU losers from 
the processes that have had a big political influence of the evolving Common 
Commercial Policy.
While on paper this seemed a plausible explanation for limiting both Eastern imports 
and labour migration, especially at a time when Europe itself was in an recession, the 
fears proved to be overstated, and as Faini and Portes claimed there was no economic 
rationale for this. The authors found that the EC, as a whole, would invariably gain from 
the liberalisation, as consumer surplus increased and prices fell on the internal market, 
and suggested that intra-EC transfers be used, rather than protection, to address 
distributional issues and regional difficulties.59
Hindley also maintained that, “the tariff lowering in the EA involved very small 
changes in EC welfare because of the small share of EE suppliers in total consumption”, 
while having dramatic, proportionate effects on CEE exports to the EC market.60 Thus 
overall analytical arguments and empirical estimates clearly supported granting bigger 
market access to CEE and suggested that import competition from the eastern 
neighbours was not a significant factor in either the declining share of manufacturing in 
the GDP of the EU or in the rise of unemployment.61
Moreover, evidence of various studies produced after 1993 indicated that the EAs were 
not causing a trade imbalance in favour of CEE, disrupting the EU's economy or making 
it more difficult for EU producers to compete in third country markets. Faini and Portes 
even demonstrated that,
the Agreements did not introduce localised differences for specific sectors or regions o f  
the EU, and, i f  anything, the resulting job creation in the EU outweighed job
59 Neven, D. (1995). ‘Trade liberalisation with Eastern nations: How sensitive?’, in Faini and Portes (Ed.) 
(1995).ibid.
Cadot, O. and Melo, J. de(1995). ‘France and the CEEC’s’, in Faini and Portes (Ed.) (1995). ibid.
60 Hindley, B.V. (1993). ‘Helping transition through trade?: EC and US policy towards exports from 
Eastern and Central Europe’, EBRD Working paper, No 4, London: EBRD.
61 Dittus and Andersen (1995). ‘Sectoral and Employment Effects of the Opening up of Eastern Europe’, 
in Fontenay, P.de, Gomel, G. and Hochreiter, E. (Ed.) (1995). Western Europe in Transition. (1995). 
ibid., p 58.
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destruction. In fact, the authors concluded that the impact has been favourable or at 
worse quite small, and the fears have been exaggerated.62
Not only were the apprehensions about eastern competition unsubstantiated by 
economic analysis, but they were also subject to statistical manipulation due to the 
obvious disparity in income and GDP levels between the current and future member 
states of the Union.
Finally, while in previous enlargements, the Community budget was used to
counterbalance the costs of adaptation for new members by offering them fiscal
transfers in exchange for their economic opening up, the financial commitments of the
EAs, mainly Phare and other pre-accession tools introduced later, remained very
modest, representing less than 0.5% of the EU’s GDP, only 10% of the assistance
granted to Greece and Portugal, and fraction of the transfers to Germany’s eastern
lander.64 As Inotai concluded,
the trade deficits with the Union o f all the advanced candidate countries indicates the 
main flaw o f the construction o f  the Association Agreements, namely that in the past, 
deficits o f associated countries were in effect neutralised by community transfers, while 
no such opportunity exists in the present situation.65
Consequently it could be argued that while association was promoted as a reward for 
the CEE countries for their bold reform efforts and a demonstration of the Union’s 
recognition that this enlargement was unique due to the nature of the radical changes 
required of the candidates, the actual effect of the EAs was paradoxically to protect the 
current member states’ interests and to minimise the level of disruption felt by the EU-
f\fs • •15. As such, this accession has indeed been unmatched. For the first time in successes 
processes of EC enlargement, the costs of adjustment seem to have fallen mainly on the 
candidates.
III. The Polish case
As far as the assessment of the EA specifically for Poland, all of the criticism discussed 
above as to the limits of the Agreement has proven applicable. Because of the limited 
scope of this paper the author will thus refrain from repeating most of the 
generalisations of the impact of the EAs on CEE trade with regards to Poland.
62 Faini and Portes (1995). ‘Opportunities Outweigh Adjustments’. Ibid., p 6.
63 Friedrich Ebert Stiftung (1996). ‘The costs of eastern enlargement of the EU are exaggerated’, Study 
Group o f European Integration, Working paper, No 2, Bonn: Friedrich Ebert Foundation, December. 
Blanchard, O.J., Froot, K. and Sachs, J. (1994). The Transition in Eastern Europe. National Bureau o f 
Economic Research Project Report. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
64 Mayhew. (2001). Enlargement and the Community Budget, Warsaw: UKIE, March.
65 A Inotai, Eastern Enlargement: Benefits for the European Union, In Studia Europejskie, CEUW, No 3 
(7) 1998, Warsaw p 32.
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f x lAs far as the macro effects on the Polish economy , trade policy has often resulted in 
outcomes at conflict with the aims of stabilisation, particularly at the onset of the 
transition. For example, tariff reform caused revenue loss and contributed to a bigger 
fiscal deficit, while the devaluation of the zloty, while increasing international 
competitiveness, also caused inflation. Moreover, the radical import liberalisation 
aggravated balance of payment problems and current account deficits.
Finally, the most obvious and yet most significant effect that trade opening has had on 
the Polish economy has been in terms of employment levels. As the WTO has 
maintained, “trade reform can both create and destroy markets. Extreme poverty shocks 
are often associated with disappearance of a market, while poverty alleviation arises 
when new markets are introduced.” According to economic theory, exports affect 
employment levels by leading to increases in demand for jobs, especially if the trade 
pattern is based on labour-intensive industries. Because more people are needed to 
provide the work in order to create new exports, employment rises. By the same token, 
increasing imports leads to the destruction of work places, and as worsens income 
distribution and poverty levels in society.69
This phenomenon has been additionally complicated by the multi-faceted environment 
of the transition process. If, for example, if foreign competition from the EU led to 
massive redundancies in industries based on low qualified workers coupled with the 
destruction of the agricultural sector, the effect on employment and labour markets 
could have been permanent and of structural nature.70 Furthermore, in a transition 
economy, not only do workers suffer from potential job losses due to increased imports, 
but because whole enterprises go bankrupt, the toll of the trade deficit can extend to the 
managerial level. The World Bank has thus asserted that even if decreases in 
employment in some industries are compensated by job creation in other more 
competitive, export oriented sectors, short term unemployment is bound to take place
66 See Eatwell, J., Ellman, M., Karlsson, M., Nuti, D. M. and Shapiro, J. (1997). Not 'just another 
accession', ibid.
67 Ben- David, D., Winters, L.A. and Nordstrom, H. (2000). ‘Trade, Income Disparity and Poverty’, 
World Trade Organisation Special Studies, No 5, Geneva: WTO., p58.
68 WTO, 1999, ibid, p 5.
69 Winters, LA. (2000). ‘Trade, Liberalisation and Poverty’, Poverty Research Unit Discussion Paper, No 
7, Sussex: SEI, p 54.
70 See Plowiec, U. (Red.) (2000). Polska i Unia Europejska: stan obecny i wyzwania na przyszlosc. 
Warszawa: Placet.
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under the simultaneous pressures of transformation, restructurisation and
71liberalisation.
Moreover, as M Levigne pointed out, “in a situation where a satisfactory social safety 
net cannot be put into place because of budgetary constraints, the easiest way to cushion 
effects of the austerity programme for the governments in transition is to refrain from 
closing down large state enterprises and to protect agriculture.”72 A trade deficit thus 
creates additional pressure for protection of domestic producers.
In Poland, the liberalisation of trade and the opening of markets led to an enormous 
inflow of imports in the early 90’s, contributing to falling levels of domestic production 
and higher unemployment. The level of unemployment radically increased from 3.5% 
in 1990 to 9.2% in 199land 12.8% in 1992. After fluctuating in the mid-nineties, the 
percentage of those without work again began to rise by the end of the decade, reaching 
a staggering 18% in 2002.
In the European Union, in turn, low and unstable levels of employment in the early 90’s 
created, according to economist W Orlowski, a need to export unemployment to the 
candidates by limiting imports while supporting exports.74 The effect of the trade 
surplus for the EU has thus been to have a positive impact on the Union’s employment 
levels at the expense of jobs in Poland.
A. Trade deficit and commodity pattern
By the late 1990’s Polish economist were claiming that there was no clear correlation 
between the liberalisation timetable in the Europe Agreement and trends in the growth 
of Polish exports. To prove this assertion, E Kawecka-Wyrzykowska pointed out that 
paradoxically, under the EA, the exports of products liberalised fastest grew the slowest, 
while exports with small preferences developed rapidly.75
Other assessments of the EA, relying on simulation results, demonstrated that the EA 
had contributed to the growth of Polish- EU trade by increasing Polish exports to the 
Union by 2.4bn US$ and imports by 3.4bn US$ by the beginning of 2000. These 
conclusions signified an overall increase of exports by 2 and half times and of imports
71 Thomas, V. and Nash, J.D. (1991). Best practices in Trade Policy Reform. Oxford: Published for the 
World Bank by Oxford University Press.
72 Levigne, M. (1995). The Economics o f  Transition, ibid., pl46.
73 World Bank (1994). Poverty in Poland ibid.
74 Orlowski, W. (1997). ‘Polskie Przedsiebiorstwa a Jednolity Rynek Unii Europejskiej: koszty i 
korzysci’, UKIE pracowanie zrodlowe, Nr 14, Lodz, Warszawa: UKIE, NOBE, p 18.
Hausner, J., Marody, M., Wilkin, J., Wojtyna, A. and Zirk-Sadowski, M. (Ed.) (1998). Accession or 
Integration, ibid., pp 54-63.
75 Kawecka-Wyrzykowska, (1997). ‘Effects’, ibid.
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by 3 and half times, from the moment of the going into effect of the interim agreement 
until the end of the decade.
By the end of 2000, Poland was the Union’s 4th largest export market following the US,
iL
Japan and Switzerland. It was also the 7 largest provider of imports to the EU, again 
following the previous three, plus China, Norway and Russia. At this time, the EU was
lf\absorbing 69.2% of Polish exports and providing 61.4% of imports.
Table 5.1 Polish export, import and balance of trade 1989-2000 
in current prices mln zloty, for 1989 in bln zloty
Year Export Import Balance
1989 19476.0 14864.0 4612.0
1990 13605.5 9051.3 4554.2
1991 15771.6 16425.9 -654.3
1992 17968.7 21995.0 -4026.3
1993 25756.8 34018.3 -8261.5
1994 39246.1 49072.3 -9826.2
1995 55515.1 70502.3 -14987.2
1996 65819.4 100231.3 -34411.9
1997 84479.6 138897.8 -54418.2
1998 98647.9 162963.0 -64315.1
1999 108757.9 182400.0 -73642.1
2000 137908.7 213071.8 -75163.1
Source: Yearly Statistics, GUS, various years.
76 For Polish detailed analysis of Polish trade reorientation see: www.mg.gov.pl/ewg/www raml.htm 
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Table 5.2 Polish export to the European Union 1991-2000
Year Export to the EU 
Min ECU/euro
Year 1991 = 100 Export to the EU in % 
Of total export
1991 5559 100.0 51.5
1992 5880 105.8 57.9
1993 7644 137.5 63.3
1994 9083 163.4 62.7
1995 12260 220.5 70.0
1996 12755 229.4 66.3
1997 14573 262.1 64.2
1998 17188 309.2 68.3
1999 18088 325.4 70.5
2000 24017 432.0 69.9
Source: ‘Handel Polski z UE’, RCSS, Warszawa 2002.
Table 5.3 Polish import from the EU 1991-2000
Year Import from the 
EU mln 
ECU/euro
Year 1991=100 Import from the EU in % of 
total import
1991 6093 100.0 48.2
1992 7617 125.0 62.1
1993 9210 151.1 57.3
1994 10427 171.1 57.5
1995 14358 235.6 64.6
1996 18695 306.8 63.9
1997 23807 390.7 63.8
1998 27676 454.2 65.9
1999 27957 458.8 64.9
2000 32456 532.7 61.1
Source: ‘Handel Polski z Unia Europejska w okresie obowizywania 
Ukladu Europejskiego’, RCSS, Warszawa 2002.
Table 5.4 Polish share of EU’s external trade in %
Year Polish % of EU import Polish % of EU export
1991 1.26 1.86
1992 1.45 1.87
1993 1.56 2.05
1994 1.69 2.03
1995 2.25 2.67
1996 2.11 3.19
1997 2.12 3.48
1998 2.28 3.85
1999 2.26 3.81
2000 2.26 3.60
Source: ‘Handel Polski z Unia Europejska1, RCSS, Warszawa 2002.
However, if as Kawecka- Wyrzykowska has maintained “the trade deficit as well as the 
resulting commodity pattern can be used as two yardsticks to measure the advantages of
171
the EA for the Polish economy”, than the developments in both have not been 
favourable to the assessment of the EA. The commodity pattern includes elements such
• • 77as the size and structure of trade, orientation and direction, specialisation and CA , 
while a trade deficit is defined as the difference between a country’s total exports and
70
imports of goods and services.
In 1992, Poland’s trade surplus with the Union turned into a deficit and has remained so 
throughout the next decade, deteriorating to highest levels in 1998 when a record 
-11,757.5mln US$ was reached, a staggering 6.5% of Polish GDP. While Poland was 
recording a large overall trade deficit, the main source of this imbalance stemmed from 
trade with the European Union. This situation contributed to other macroeconomic 
difficulties, leading to the deterioration of the current account and to worsening balance 
of payments problems between 1995 and 1998.
D Rosati has argued that prior to 1992, the high growth rates of trade with the EC in 90’ 
and 91 ’ “suggest that a substantial trade creation effect, stemming from the general 
liberalisation of trade and currency convertibility, must have been reinforced by a trade 
diversion from CMEA markets to the West.”79 In 1992, exactly at the time of going into 
effect of the Interim Agreement, the situation noticeably turned for the worse. This 
appearance of the deficit could be attributed to both the conditions prevalent in the 
domestic transition, particularly the appreciation of the zloty, and to restricted market 
access in the West.
Although increased flows of imports are a natural phenomenon for states in transition, 
explained by an augmented propensity to import due to high growth rates and the need 
to bring in equipment and materials for supply and production, particularly for FDI 
firms, the levels of the deficit suggest that the import/ export structure was much more 
complicated than could be explained simply by reference to the growth of domestic 
demand. For example, Orlowski maintained that while it was true that the trade 
imbalance could have been attributed to rising demand for imports, as a result of falling 
domestic output and production and better competitiveness of imported products, the 
deficit never the less has been caused “less by the desire of Poland to import and more 
by the desire of the EU to export.”80
The import structure has likewise exhibited worrying tendencies, and thus far the Polish 
tariff structure created under the EA has been deficient in accomplishing long- term
77 Kawecka- Wyrzykowska (1997). ‘Effects’, ibid., p 125.
78 Baldwin (1988). ibid. p 255.
79 Rosati, D. (1994). Changes in the Structure o f  Manufactured Trade between Poland and the European
Community. Warsaw: Foreign Trade Research Institute, p i4.
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trade policy objectives such as increasing national competitiveness. While, bringing in 
foreign capital and technological goods intended for investment is not a problem for the 
deficit, a significant proportion of Polish imports has been made up of consumer 
products, a phenomenon for which the framework of liberalisation within the EA has 
been partially to blame. The abrupt growth of consumption products and services 
exacerbated the growth of a structural current account deficit and suggested a need for 
the government to intervene.
Table 5.5 Polish import structure 1993,1995,2000 in %
Import Investment Supplies/equipment Consumption
1993 14.7 64.8 19.9
1995 13.0 68.4 17.8
2000 14.7 66.3 18.8
Source: Handel Polski z Unia Europejskaw Okresie Obowiazywania UE, RCSS, Warszawa, 2002
Moreover, the deficit itself suggests that Polish producers, due to both internal and 
external factors, have had limited capacity to generate exports, until well into the decade
o  1
following the going into effect of the Agreement. On the domestic front, supply side 
impediments to export growth have included the exchange rate policy (appreciation of 
the zloty) which has had adverse effects on the export competitiveness, shortages of 
export credits and insurance, low production capacities, low quality of goods and 
services, lack of proper marketing, export promotion or distribution. All of these factors 
can generally be attributed to the neglect of subsequent Polish governments as well as 
the policy framework of the EA to provide for a long term, coherent industrial and
O'}
export promoting policy in Poland. The low competitiveness of Polish manufacturing 
has mainly resulted from an outdated structures of fixed capital and production 
combined with low levels of scientific and technological absorption, all legacies from 
the socialist command economy.
On the external side, the ability to export has been curtailed by the recession in the EU 
itself, various non- tariff barriers that have curbed the possibilities of taking advantage 
of the concessions offered under the EA, as well as the structure of Polish exports,
80 Orlowski (1997). ibid., p 16.
81 Even when export did begin to grow, such as was the case in 2002, national ‘competitiveness’ has 
shown little improvement as Poland continues to export mainly low-tech, goods. Moreover, the recession 
in the EU, and Germany in particular, has forced Polish exporters to seek other markets such as Russia, 
the CIS, and Asia, where, again, low-processed goods have tended to dominate. Finally, precise 
comparisons in the growth of exports have been difficult as Polish government statistics have been 
inconsistently based on both the dollar and the Euro accounts and have fluctuated accordingly.
82 Orlowski (1997). ibid.
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which has been dominated by products considered as sensitive and therefore subject to 
additional restrictions in the EU. Polish dependence on cyclical business situation in its 
main partners’ economies has additionally compounded the situation. Finally a lack of 
information amongst Polish producers, as well as government officials, as to export
• • • • STopportunities in the EU, for which the Union side should be mostly held responsible , 
and the complicated procedures on the internal market have contributed to lowering 
Poland’s capacity to export as well as ability to make full use of the preferential quotas.
B. Enterprise adjustment
As far as the microeconomic impact of the EA, on the import side the main positive 
effects stemmed from increased economies of scale, changes in market structure and 
productivity increases in individual enterprises, due to increased competition. The 
Polish consumer has likewise felt the benefits of liberalisation, as prices fell and diverse 
goods were made more readily available. The main costs and largest negative 
consequences for Polish enterprises came from the adjustment requirements of legal 
harmonisation with the Union’s acquis communautaire and preparation for entry into 
the EU’s internal market. As a result of the signing of the Agreement and the initiation 
of the adjustment process, Polish enterprises were confronted with the necessity to 
introduce changes and adapt themselves to the principles of Community law. These 
adaptation efforts to meet EU standards in areas such as environmental protection, 
regulatory alignment or social policy increased the costs of production for Polish firms,
Q A
thereby having the effect of lowering their price- advantage competitiveness. The huge 
costs of upgrading Polish businesses to the Union’s norms, without adequate financial 
and technical support from the EU, have been difficult to absorb for Polish industry and 
agriculture.
Problems, stemming directly from legal harmonisation with the acquis, have included 
lengthy procedures of approval and granting of quality certificates in the EU, the 
discontinuation of sale of certain products and large reductions in state aid to ailing 
enterprises. Both small and large businesses have encountered immense difficulties in 
putting Community certification procedures into effect and implementing Community 
law on social and environmental policy. Moreover, most businesses have not been able
Munko, A. (1998). ‘Wspieranie polskiego Eksportu w Kontektscie Integracji z Unia Europejska’, 
Wspolnoty Europejskie, Nr 11, Vol 87.
83 The new, post-socialist Polish governments did not have sufficient resources, financial or 
informational, to be capable to adequately assist Polish exporters.
84 See Kundera, J. (1998). ‘Obroty Handlowe Polski z Unia Europejska’, w Studja Euopejskie, No 3, Vol 
7, Warszawa: CEUW.
Kundera, J. i Ostrowska, E. (1998). Wymiana Towarow i Inwestycji Miedzy Polska a Krajami Unii 
Europejskiej. Wroclaw: Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Wroclawskiego.
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to afford the high expenses and long waiting periods for standardisation, and, in the end, 
the costs for them have often exceeded the profits earned. While the institutional 
rationale for the approximation of laws is solid, from the point of view of economic 
considerations, it could be argued that harmonisation proceeded to quickly and without 
adequate attention paid to the flexibility requirements of transition.
The lack of EU advice on implementation of a complex and coherent strategic trade or 
industrial policy in Poland or requirements within the EA to do so, coupled with 
increasing levels of EU imports, have contributed to the destruction of many key sectors 
in Poland as well as hindered the development of modem industries in their infant 
stages, both which needed additional protection before being opened up to
Of
competition. This was especially tme for the textiles and clothing industry, 
pharmaceuticals, telecommunications, electronic, paper and wood industry and 
automobiles. Polish government reports confirmed that sectors such as the steel, milk 
and food processing industries were and are still not ready to face open market forces 
without special protection.
In addition, the problems of over-production capacity in Poland and growing surges of 
EU imports were exacerbated in those in those sectors classified as sensitive within the 
EA and fell disproportionately on Polish in infant industries. In accordance with new 
trade theories, Orlowski concluded that “rather than liberalising strategically and 
selectively, the government opened up too quickly in these sectors, thereby knocking 
them out.”86 (see chapter seven). According to this author’s analysis, the gains to be 
gained from transparent and temporary protection, even picking winners, would have 
far outweighed the costs, and in the long run would have been a better tool in achieving 
consistent liberalisation than excessive opening, followed by ad hoc reversals in 
response to social crises and illicit rent-seeking activities.
In sum, the liberalisation schedule within the framework of the EA seemed to neglect 
the realities of Polish backwardness suggesting that the main flaw in the EU’s strategy 
for Polish modernisation was to underestimate the enormous difficulties to be overcome 
by Polish enterprises and not provide for a much more active policy-mix within the 
framework of the EA. On the internal supply side, radical liberalisation and a 
dismantling of tariff barriers was not accompanied by a coherent industrial and export 
promoting strategy. The EA failed to provide a strategic approach to trade liberalisation, 
which would grant selective and temporary protection to certain key industries in order
85 Michalek, J. (2000). ‘The Europe Agreement and the Evolution of Polish Trade Policy’, in Yearbook o f 
European Studies, No 4, Warsaw: CEUW.
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to allow them to successfully restructure, adjust to the changing environment and reach 
minimal levels of competitiveness. On the external, demand side, the asymmetry 
granted under the EA was not enough to induce the development of Polish 
competitiveness and lead to an increasingly technologically advanced and sustainable 
export-led growth. Domestic flaws in trade and industrial policies were thus deepened 
by the structure of the liberalisation schedule in the EA, whereby sensitive products in 
which Polish producers had a comparative advantage in were protected most fiercely in 
EU markets.
Polish enterprises were unable to overcome the various informational, technological and 
organisational barriers in order to effectively expand their activities and conquer EU 
markets. On the other hand, EU enterprises had a huge comparative advantage of not 
only better quality goods and services, but more importantly knowledge and experience 
of functioning in an open, market based and global economy. The final outcome was to 
increase calls for protectionism from Polish industry and agriculture ultimately 
contributing to reversals in liberal economic reform measures themselves.
C. Sensitive industries
Because the commodity pattern of Polish trade has been based on specialisation in 
sensitive products, the importance of these sectors for the domestic economy was 
crucial for various reasons. In the first place, the majority of sensitive products come 
from ailing traditional industries that were being forced to undergo rapid restructuring 
to overcome their backwardness inherited from the socialist economy. Due to the over­
emphasis of the command system on these traditional sectors, they remained the main 
source of employment for many Polish regions and for large segments of the 
population. At the same time, the stagnating structures of the socialist system as well as 
its isolation from world markets did little to induce these industries to increase their 
effectiveness, thereby hindering the type of modernisation processes going on in the 
West. When socialism collapsed and the transition to the market was initiated, the over­
capacity and over-employment levels in these traditional sectors was much higher in 
Poland than in the EU, where restructuring had been taking place since the early 70’s. 
This meant that the adjustment of these enterprises would have to occur at much faster 
speed that was permitted in the West, thus having higher economic and social costs. 
Since 1990, all Polish enterprises have been operating in a troublesome external 
environment, due to falling domestic demand, loss of the traditional CMEA markets, the 
inability to enforce payments of outstanding debts, rising prices of supplies, increasing
86 Orlowski (1997). ibid. p 14.
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tax burdens, increasing competition and the credit trap resulting from high interest rates 
as a part of governments macroeconomic stability programme. Many of the loss making 
enterprises never recovered from the shock of 1990 where sales losses grew immensely. 
Those that did were further subject to the increasing pressure of competition as Poland 
began to open up as well as to reorient its trade pattern from East to West. A carefully 
planned out strategic trade policy, based on gradual opening on the one hand and 
securing markets on the other, as well as fair competition on world markets was crucial 
for the survival of these sectors, guaranteeing their successful modernisation and future 
development.
However, while Polish commodity structure of trade has continued to display 
comparative advantage in these traditional labour and resource intensive industries, the 
exported products were classified as sensitive in the EA and subject to extra-ordinary 
protection. In the early 90’s, over 60% of Polish exports to the EU were made up of 
sensitive products, in textiles and clothing, leather, ores and metals, food, beverages and 
tobacco, and chemicals. Experts therefore considered it unjustifiable that the timetable 
for liberalisation of the EU’s markets was slowest for these goods.
In 1992, the EC’s highest trade barriers were spread across different sectors in capital- 
intensive factors (food processing, metallurgy, motor vehicles), labour intensive 
(textiles, clothing and footwear) and energy intensive (iron and steel, starch and sugar). 
The highest protection levels were against labour intensive products, a total of 16.65% 
of Polish exports in 1992 and Poland’s specialisation.®7 In 1993, 30% of Polish 
industrial exports fell into the group with highest tariff rates in the EC.
Moreover, because economists do not consider tariffs as the primary import barrier for 
industrial goods in the EU, their liberalisation reductions in the subsequent years did 
little to significantly improve market access for these Polish products. Rosati observed 
that,
in the short term, the impact o f tariff reductions in imports from Poland to the EC has
been negligible, because these are not the most important factors in restricting access 
to the EC. On the other hand, the impact o f  removing other Non-Tariff Barriers and 
Quantitative Restrictions has not been very pronounced.88
QRs continued to be concentrated on those commodity groups, which were most 
important for Poland, namely textiles and metals, affecting 20% of Polish exports in 
1993. 60% of products continued to be subject to other NTB’s.
87 Rosati (1994). ibid.
88 Rosati (1994). ibid., p 62.
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The sectoral implication of radical trade liberalisation coupled with restricted market 
access to Poland’s main trading partners in the Union was to have serious consequences 
for employment levels as the centrality of sensitive industries for the Polish economy 
could not be undervalued. While still in 1995, Poland’s trade deficit with the Union 
amounted to -3 , 058 mln Euros, by 2000 it had reached -10,559, contributing to 
macroeconomic instability as the current account deficit increased and strengthening the 
overall symptoms of a recession. In turn, the growth of the trade imbalance signified 
that jobs in Poland were being lost to those in the Union. By 2000, unemployment 
levels in Poland had reached 15.1%, rising to 18.1% by 2002.89 (See chapter seven).
In addition, under the EA, the EU side has expected Poland to restructure these sectors 
to avoid EU markets being destabilised by large supplies of cheap Polish products. The 
Association Council has been directly involved in overseeing the adjustment efforts in 
Poland, pressuring the candidate to reduce production capacities and making state aid 
and delays in tariff reductions conditional upon the Polish side presenting restructuring 
programmes based on employment and output reductions. The government has been 
faced with some rather difficult dilemmas in order to meet the conditions set out by the 
Association Council and framed within the EA and restructuring has proceeded hap- 
hazardously. While production quotas have been introduced and employment levels 
curtailed in some industries and at random intervals, other sectors have undergone 
minimal restructuring and have instead continued to display socialist command 
structures.
D. Agriculture
If sensitive industrial products have constituted an important part of the Polish economy 
and of Poland’s export specialisation, this has even more been the case for agriculture. 
The significance of the agrarian sector stems from the fact that it makes up about 26% 
of Poland’s work force. Typical of traditional agrarian societies, the productivity of this 
sector is low, reflected in the disproportionate share of the gross national product, which 
tends to fluctuate around 6%. Since the beginning of transition, Polish agricultural 
policy has evolved through three very separate stages, marked by radical liberalism 
between mid 1989 and mid 1991, followed by return to protectionism until 1994, and 
finally a more coherent agrarian development and rural policy from 1995 onwards.
89 Export growth creates jobs by expanding demand for certain products and thus increasing demand for 
the supply of labour, while the opposite is true for the growth of a trade deficit. This is particularly true in 
transition economies where the adjustment costs are high and there are large market distortions 
contributing to wage and price rigidities as well as general domestic factor immobility. Economists in 
these cases suggest temporary protection as a superior alternative to permanent or inconsistent protection. 
See trade theory.
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The problematic nature of Polish agriculture is beyond the scope of this chapter, but its 
importance should be stressed here as far as Polish trade is concerned. The complexity 
of world trade in agricultural goods has been further compounded in the Polish situation 
where the destruction of the sector would have meant destabilisation of the entire 
economy, threatening a social and political crisis. For example, 35% of total 
unemployment in Poland has its sources in the agricultural sector and rural areas, where 
unqualified farmers have been unable to find work outside of their trade.90 In fact, the 
majority of these rural inhabitants might never find work again as their potential 
employers tend to be those industries undergoing restructuring and cutting employment 
levels.
On the other hand, self- adjustment for individuals in the villages has been particularly 
difficult in Poland because of various market-distortions. Often incompatible economic 
policy goals have tended to complicate the situation further on an already inflexible 
labour market. High interest rates, due to the need to curb inflation, have stifled 
investment, and an increasing tax burden combined with rising prices of production 
have led to drastic falls of income for family farms. The educational degradation of the 
village has made seeking employment outside of very low qualified trades virtually 
impossible, leading to a situation whereby transition has actually made it harder than 
under the previous system for young rural people to advance socially. Moreover, the 
poor state of rural infrastructure has been deteriorating, thus far largely neglected by 
the government due to budgetary constraints.
Finally, the lack of demand and structural problems accompanying the privatisation 
process have negatively affected investment in the agrarian sector.91 Fiscal concerns 
have decreased the possibility for public financing, and the question of land ownership 
has been an obstacle for foreign investment.
Between April and August 1989, agricultural reform centred around the liberal notion 
that the market should be introduced with as little government intervention as possible. 
Production processes were thus freed, and nearly all subsidies to farmers abolished. 
Rising costs, due to inflation, led to cuts in output levels and paradoxically resulted in
Dillon, et al.( 1990). Assessing the Usefulness o f Trade Theory fo r  Policy Analysis, ibid
90 See Hausner, J., Marody, M., Wilkin, J., Wojtyna, A. and Zirk-Sadowski, M. (Ed.) (1998). Accession 
or Integration? Poland’s Road to the European Union, EU Monitoring II. Warsaw: Friedrich Ebert 
Stiftung.
Hausner, J. and Marody M. (Ed.) (1999). Three Polands: The Potential for and Barriers to Integration 
with the EU, EU Monitoring III. Warsaw: Friedrich Ebert Stiftung.
91 Kawecka-Wyrzykowska, E. (Ed.) (1995). Prospects for Trade in Sensitive Products between Poland 
' and the EU. Warsaw: Foreign Trade Research Institute.
Mayhew (1998). ibid.
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an increase in food prices. 1990 witnessed a 41% fall in agricultural output. As the rest 
of society underwent adjustment shock, incomes fell and consumption was reduced to a 
bare minimum, leading to further falls in demand for agricultural products.
Following a wave of strikes in July, the government partially reinstated some subsidies 
as well as introduced minimum prices for certain products. However this provided little 
relief to the Polish farmers because it coincided with massive increases of agricultural 
imports, which served to drive out many local producers. The falls in farmers’ revenue 
were further complicated by a hard drought between 1992-1993, as well as ongoing 
land reform and restitution problems. Debts and bankruptcy were on the rise amongst 
the family farms, and the pressure on the government to protect agriculture from foreign 
competition increased. To make matters worse, the collapse of the CMEA took away 
traditional food markets, while it seemed that the EC was unprepared to absorb the extra 
import surplus from Poland. The villages in turn responded through a growing wave of 
violent protests and demonstrations.
As discussed in chapter two, the Europe Agreements did little to liberalise trade in 
agricultural products between the Community and Poland. Moreover, the standstill 
clause pertaining to industrial products, preventing a return to restrictive measures 
following their liberalisation, was not applied to agriculture. However, because was
09once considered a traditional exporter of agricultural products , one might have 
expected Polish exports to grow to the Union despite the lack of formal liberalisation. 
The fact that the agricultural trade surplus still recorded in 1992, turned quickly into a 
deficit suggests that the concessions granted under the EA were too small to balance the 
disadvantages of the Polish producers. It also implies that perhaps the restrictive nature 
of the EA actually reinforced the EU’s general protectionist stance in agricultural trade. 
Criticism of agricultural liberalisation within the EA has been based on two 
observations. On the one hand, the access granted to Polish exporters was not enough 
seriously to provide them with the opportunities to develop their potential and take 
advantage of their comparative advantages, while, on the other, the system of 
preferential quotas used by the Union, even within these minimum concessions, further 
hindered the ability of Polish producers to export. The two main food groups that 
Poland has been exporting to the Union have consisted of live animals and meat, and 
fruit and vegetables, both characterised by an intensely restrictive import system in the 
CCP and the CAP. Czyzewski thus observed that “undoubtedly, the EU’s dominating 
position in trade exchange of agricultural-food products with Poland became much
92 Especially in the inter-was period.
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stronger since the EA was signed.” In addition, Radzyminska demonstrated that the 
effect of creation and shift in trade calculated since the going into effect of the Interim 
Agreement in 1992 was twice as high for the EU agricultural goods as for Poland.94 In 
sum regardless of the criteria used to assess the EA, the existence of the dramatic trade 
deficit means that thanks to Polish consumers, jobs were secured for many producers of 
food in the Union, exporting to Poland.
The EA concessions consisted of reductions in levies within preferential tariff quotas as 
well as some lowering of custom duties. The planned quotas remained unused when 
prices on the EU market fell below minimum levels, established within the CAP. In 
addition, the small EA concessions were even less significant quantitatively than they 
appeared on paper, because they did not correspond to the potential trade pattern of 
post-1989 Poland. The preferential tariff quotas were based on the pre-transition period, 
under the command economy, and established on an irrelevant historical pattern, while 
changes in production structure following the introduction of the free market made it 
very difficult to utilise many of them. For example, a rather substantial quota was 
granted for the export of Polish buckwheat, a crop Poland no longer specialised in 
producing after 1989. Furthermore, the quotas were fixed on the basis of production 
between 1989 and 1990, where agricultural output had witnessed the most dramatic 
deterioration.
The complicated procedure required to obtain preferential access to the EU’s agrarian 
markets, combined with a lack of information, time and money by Polish producers 
wishing to export to the Union further lowered the potential utilisation of the quotas. 
Under this system, the Union has imposed obligations on possible importers to 
participate in tenders and pay a deposit, to be kept indefinitely, in case the planned 
transaction was not carried out. Additionally, exporters have had to prove that they have 
been caring out the activities involved in the application for at least 12 months and that 
their firms have been registered in EU countries. The lack of an informational system 
which would provide the Polish producers with the necessary knowledge about the 
needs of the EU market, how the quotas are to be applied for and used, or the 
availability of credits in the importing countries, together with other political barriers 
and bureaucratic obstacles have seriously hindered their ability to make full use of the 
concessions granted. As Grzelak concluded, “taking advantage of the preferential quotas
93 Czyzewski, A. and Grzelak, A. (1998). ‘Initial Experiences of Integrating the Polish Agricultural Food 
Sector with EU Markets’, in Zielinska-Glebocka and Stepniak (Ed.) (1998). ibid., p 279.
94 Radzyminska, T. (1996).‘W ktora strone asymetria?’, Zycie Gospodarcze, Nr 24, p 29.
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requires time and money, and it is by no means sure that the preferences (margins) 
obtained will provide sufficient compensation, for the procedure required.”95 
Meanwhile, the EA foresaw the possibility of further negotiations on concessions in 
agricultural trade, and, in the spirit of Copenhagen, the Community did indeed declare 
to further open up its market on a unilateral basis. Never the less, the concessions 
actually granted were minimal, causing some to observe that they were nothing more 
than a political move and not a wish to facilitate the access to unions’ markets for Polish 
products.96 In 1997, the Additional Protocol adjusting agricultural trade to the effects of 
the EFTA enlargement and to the Uruguay Round also increased some agricultural 
quotas by 10%, but the real breakthroughs in agricultural liberalisation were not
0 7achieved until 2000, when the double zero agreement was signed.
Moreover, issue of fair competition in agrarian trade between the Union and Poland, on 
both domestic and third markets, has evolved around the controversial subsidies 
provided to EU farmers within the Common Agricultural Policy. Direct payments to 
farmers as a compensatory mechanism for reduced prices do not exist in Poland, and 
subsidies were only partially reinstated in 1992 following their total elimination in 
1989. Because the Polish government has not been granting these kinds of price 
supports to its farmers, they have been unable to compete with the cheaper foods stuffs 
exported by the Union, both within the FTA and to third markets such as Russia. Thus 
highly price competitive and attractive EU imports, especially processed foods, sugar, 
diary, beef and pork, coupled with restrictive trade barriers have contributed to the 
Polish domestic agricultural problems as well as had a destabilising effect on world 
prices, making Polish producers uncompetitive in third countries entirely due to external 
factors.
The question of level playing fields competition has not only concerned the EU’s 
subsidy scheme. In general, Polish farmers have been granted considerably less 
protection than their equivalents in the Union. The net percentage Producer Subsidy 
Equivalent98 of the value of Polish agricultural production was 15% in 1990, compared 
with 47% in the EU, rising to 28% in 1996, and still well below the 42% in the Union. 
Moreover, intervention prices during this time were 30% of those in the EU for beef and 
28% of those for milk, the two most protected sectors in the EU. Generally most other
95 Czyzewski & Grzelak (1998). ibid., p 281.
96 Kawecka-Wyrzykowska (1999). ibid., p 36.
97 This agreement called for both sides to lower their tariff levels to zero and eliminate subsisides on 
unprocessed agricultural products.
98 Producer subsidy equivalent- established by the OECD, reflects state support to farmers, such as direct 
payments, tariff and non-tariff protection and other benefits,like VAT or tax exemptions.
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farm gate prices were well below those in the Union." This leads one to the observation 
that in order to be able to effectively compete with the Union’s agricultural products and 
ensure level playing fields in agrarian trade, the Polish government would have to 
accordingly raise the levels of price supports and other types of domestic protection 
provided to its farmers.
Taking all the above factors into consideration, Mayhew concluded that,
the agricultural articles in the EAs were not supportive o f economic reform in the 
associated countries, and they contributed greatly to a sense o f disillusionment with the 
market economy. It seemed paradoxically that Community political leaders were 
forever preaching market reform in CE while at the same time closing Community 
markets for farm products. This was interpreted as some sort o f  cynical managed- 
economy game at the expense o f the reforming countries!100
E. Contingent protection
An assessment of the EA on the Polish economy is not complete without a remark on 
contingent protection.101 While this issue is examined more thoroughly in chapter seven, 
it is worth mentioning here the possible economic consequences of this type of 
protection.
Despite the standstill clause, the Europe Agreement left a large scope for manoeuvre 
within the various loopholes in the law that allowed both partners to effectively protect 
domestic producers through various Non Tariff Barriers. These NTB’s have often been 
applied based on discretionary decisions and subject more to political influence than 
economic motives. Kaminksi pointed out that, “clearly the EA has not deprived the EU 
of resort to its most favoured import restricting tool- ‘voluntary’ quotas in the name of 
safeguards and tariffs against dumping.”
Moreover, the share of NTB- affected exports has been significantly larger for Poland
• 109on average than for other developing countries exporting to the EU. In 1995, NTB- 
affected measures accounted for 30% of all Polish exports to the Union. 60% of these 
were subject to Voluntary Export Restraints, whereby the Polish producer agrees to 
limit exports in order to avoid imposition of mandatory restrictions by the EU. 12% of 
the NTB- affected measures were exposed to “other entry charges”, like fees paid for
99 Mayhew (1998). ibid.
100 Mayhew (1998). ibid., p 250.
101 See Ehrenhaft, P., Hindley, B., Michalopoulos, C. and Winters, LA. (1997). ibid.
Bofinger, P. (1995). ‘The Political Economy of the Eastern Enlargement of the EU’. ibid.
Wang, Z.K. and Winters, L.A. (1993). ‘EC Imports from Eastern Europe: iron and steel’, CEPR 
Discussion paper series, No 825, London: CEPR.
Rzadowe Centrum Studiow Strategicznych (2002). Handel Polski z Unia Europejska w Okresie 
Obowiazywania Ukaldu Europejskiego. Warszawa: RCSS, Departament strategii i integracji 
miedzynarodowej.
102 Kaminski (1999). ibid., p 7.
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product certification. Another 8% was affected by variable levies designed to raise the 
price of an imported good to that of a corresponding domestic product. The remaining 
20% of NTB- affected exports faced seasonal duties, Anti Dumping investigations and
1 n i  •Countervailing Duties. Moreover, even though agricultural products and animal feed 
have faced the highest levels of nominal tariff protection, they have also been some of 
the most NTB-ridden products on the EU market. For manufacturers, leather and leather 
goods, textiles, yam and fabrics, as well as clothing and footwear have displayed the 
highest incidence of NTB’s .104 Because of the deterrent effects of these measures, 
discussed in the following chapters, Polish producers have chosen to restrict their 
exports voluntarily, or, alternatively, to increase their prices in order to avoid the 
cumbersome investigation process and the numerous sanctions that could potentially be 
applied.
In short, Kaminski concluded:
NTB’s have constituted an important impediment to Polish exports and, in specific 
sectors, they might have put a brake on trade expansion. Export expansion (especially 
o f sensitive goods), price distortions and implicit subsidies which have yet to be 
removed seem to have made Polish exporters an easy prey to EU vested interests. 
Therefore, one may suspect that Polish exports might have been significantly larger in
the absence ofNTBs.m
Conclusion
The objective of the Europe Agreement was to improve the competitiveness of Polish 
industry and agriculture by stimulating productivity levels and changes in the 
commodity structure of both imports and exports. However, as E Kawecka- 
Wyrzykowska has demonstrated, the commodity pattern of Polish trade has not 
responded explicitly to the liberalisation under the EA. In some cases, for example, 
preferences offered by the EC were granted for products, like microwave ovens, never 
exported by Poland!106
While, the structure and composition of Polish exports has experienced some positive
changes in the last ten years, as is reflected in the increasing share of labour and capital 
1
intensive goods , by the end of the 90’s, 60% of Polish exports continued to be
103 Kaminski (1999) ibid., p 8.
104 These amount to 31% of Polish manufacturing exports and 20% of total exports.
105 Kaminski (1999). ibid., p 9.
106 Kawecka-Wyrzykowska (Red.) (1998). ‘Ocena Stopnia Realizacji’. ibid.
107 In 1998 for the first time, the trade structure began reflecting growth of higher value added and 
technologically advanced goods, at the expense of semi-finished and raw materials. By 1999, higher value 
added goods constituted about 18% of exports, and increase of 6% over 1992. This was apparent in the 
increases of Poland’s largest three commodity export groups, namely electrical machinery products, 
furniture and lightening equipment, and textiles and apparel. However, because the biggest share of 
Polish foreign trade turnover in advanced products has come from firms with foreign direct investment, it 
is difficult to attribute this change in the commodity structure as directly related to the EA.
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resource and labour intensive products, such as clothing, furniture, copper, coal, textiles, 
live animals, fruits, vegetables, steel & iron products, shoes, and paper products, with 
only motor vehicles representing the more technologically advanced goods. Moreover, 
the Polish commodity structure to date still displays comparative advantage in 
traditional sectors, characterised by unqualified labour, natural resources and energy 
intensive products. This is especially evident in raw labour-intensive, agricultural 
products such as soft fruits and vegetables, as well as some processed foodstuffs, such 
as apple juice, meat and meat products. These Comparative Advantage sectors display 
output that is relatively unprocessed, employing traditional production technologies, 
and, while the demand for them is income inelastic, strong competition on markets 
world wide, especially among developing and emerging countries, makes the prospects 
for trade expansion very limited. The openness of markets to these exports thus 
determines their success; and, unfortunately, they are still prone to highest protection 
levels in the EU.
Another significant problem of the pattern and composition of trade that has developed 
between Poland and the EU within the framework of the EA is that top quality goods 
based on highly skilled labour have tended to flow mainly in one direction, while low 
skilled labour, mass-produced goods have been shipped in the other. This has led to 
inter-industry rather than intra-industry trade specialisation and increased demand for ✓ 
skilled labour in the EU, while reinforcing Poland’s comparative advantage in 
unqualified labour. The country’s dependence on price competitiveness, subject to 
cyclical downturns in the partner’s economy, has thus been further exacerbated. 
Moreover, because modem industries have been located on EU territories rather than in 
Poland, this has had a negative impact on the outflow of qualified Polish labour, leading 
to the so-called brain drain phenomenon.
Other criticisms of the sectoral impact of the EA, have included the negative effects of 
the outward processing traffic rules on textiles, which seemed to have been designed to 
keep fully made Polish products out of EU markets, while favouring semi-finished 
goods produced by EU multinationals. These overly restrictive rules have discouraged 
Polish exporters and producers from developing their own independent capacity, 
making their manufacturing contingent on orders and inputs from the outside.
In addition, from 1999 onwards, other factors that have contributed to Poland’s strengthening national 
competitiveness and decreasing trade deficit have included a devaluation of the zloty, higher productivity 
as firms were forced to cut costs and decrease wages in response to an economic recession and Russian 
crisis, and falling levels of investments/ savings due to political instability and falling attractiveness of 
emerging markets. Thus export growth and gains in effectiveness of national firms were once again not 
attributable to the EA.
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Similarly, the EA has contributed to trade diversion in several key Polish sectors. In the 
automobile industry, for example, the additional annex provided for in the EA created 
voluntary import expansion schemes in Poland that have favoured the EU car industry 
at the expense of third countries , while various EU multinationals have lobbied the 
Polish government for increased tariff protection, angering the United States and 
provoking reservations from the WTO.109
The fact that the Polish structure and commodity pattern of trade has not changed 
enough to clearly improve the country’s competitiveness, despite twelve years of 
reforms, suggests that the application of contingent protection and of restrictive rules of 
origin within the EA as well as the restricted liberalisation of sensitive products could 
have had a deterrent effect on investment, hindering the modernisation of the Polish 
economy. Regardless of the effects on investment, it could be argued that in general the 
EA did not serve to promote the development of Polish competitiveness, but has rather 
contributed to prolonging an outdated and backward composition of trade. From the 
point of view of integration theories, rather than evolving towards complementary 
structures of trade, Polish-EU exchange has continued to be dominated by competitive, 
inter-industry trade.110 As such, the composition of Polish trade has been a barrier not 
only to the development of Polish exports, but also to the entire process of integration 
with the European Union and ultimately to long-term sustainable domestic growth in 
general.
Thus, following detailed analysis of the impact of the EA on the Polish economy, 
Kawecka Wyrzykowska concluded that, “while a change in the commodity pattern is 
highly desirable in Poland’s trade with EU, and the Europe Agreement has done little to 
help this.”" 1
The effects of the Europe Agreement on the Polish economy analysed above seem to 
suggest that the direct and short-term benefits of the liberalisation schedule have been 
stronger for the European Union than for Poland. There appears to be an inherent flaw 
in the make up of the EA, whereby the declared asymmetry in favour of Poland has 
turned out to either be too limited to provide the necessary incentives for sustainable 
export-led growth and modernisation of the Polish economy, or that the dismantling of
108 See Flemming & Rollo (1992). ibid.
Mayhew (1998). ibid.
109 Especially Fiat and Phillips.
Levigne, M. (1995). ibid., p 216.
110 Plowiec, U. (1998). ‘Polands preparation’, ibid, p 289.
See also Pawlas, I. and Tendera-Wlaszczuk, T. (1999). Poland’s Economy Competitiveness with Respect 
to the Integration with the European Union. Warsaw: University Centre for Europe, Warsaw University.
111 Kawecka-Wyrzykowska (1997) Stosunki. ibid., p 250.
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tariffs in some sectors has been offset by continued restrictiveness in others. Moreover, 
the introduction and increasing incidence of application of various Non Tariffs Barriers 
by the Community have greatly eroded the margin of preferences granted to Polish 
producers. Because NTBs have been the main source of protection on the EU market, 
the full benefits of trade liberalisation could not be achieved until these procedures were 
limited and bound by clear rules. In this respect, the EA did little to help liberalise trade 
because as Kamiski pointed out, “while the Agreement is very specific on tariff 
measures, it does not embrace any special provisions that would limit the use of NTBs. 
Therefore tariff levels have been unlikely to change the level of protection.”112 
By having reserved for itself the right to invoke contingent protection and diverse 
safeguard clauses at any time and under any alleged reason, the European Union has 
created a large element of uncertainty pertaining to trade relations between itself and the 
associated partner, disrupting not only economic relations, but having negative 
repercussions for political cooperation and finally exacerbating the difficulties of the 
transformation.
Inotai accused the Union of creating through the EA, an ‘asymmetric dependence’ 
whereby the candidates, much more dependent on trade with the EU than vice versa, 
have been in a much weaker position in the process of bargaining and have thus had to 
concede to the Union’s demands even at the price of internal considerations.113 
Moreover, the provisions of the EA were probably not flexible enough for developing 
economies and did not provide sufficient support for the process of transformation or 
opportunities for the associates to fully integrate with the Union.114 Finally, because the 
Agreements did not provide adequate transfers to balance the growing trade deficits,
112 Kaminski (1999). ibid., p 7.
113 Inotai, A. (1998) ‘Eastern Enlargement’, ibid.
114 See Maresceau, M. (Ed.) (1997). Enlarging the European Union: relations between the EU and 
Central and Eastern Europe. London: Longman.
Dijck, P. van and Faber, G (Ed.) (2000). The External Dimension of the European Union. The Hague: 
Kluwar Law International.
Keren, M. and Ofer, G. (1992). Trials o f Transition: economic reform in the former Communist bloc. 
Boulder: Westview Press.
Winters, LA. (Ed.) (1994). Foundations o f  an Open Economy: trade laws and institutions for Eastern 
Europe. London: CEPR.
Maliszewska, M. (1997). ‘Kontrowersje Wokol Tempa Rozszerzania Unii Europejskiej na Wschod’, 
Gospodarka Narodowa, Nr 10.
Pelkmans, J., Gros, G. and Nunez Ferrer, J. (2000). ‘Long Run Economic Aspects of the European 
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they made adjustment highly one sided, clearly diverging from the classical Community 
method of enlargement.115
The negative balances that have occurred in trade of all the countries in transition with 
the European Union, emerging commodity patterns, continued application of CP, 
minimal progress in agricultural liberalisation, restrictive rules of origin and limited 
freedom of movement for services, labour and capital have demonstrated the deviation 
between the EU’s rhetorical support for the transition process and reality. These 
developments have also indicated an ambiguity in the Union’s collective conduct of its 
relations with CEE and Poland in particular. The increasingly protectionist stance of the 
EU as well as restrictive approach to budgetary transfers, as reflected in the financial 
framework of Agenda 2000116, have demonstrated the low political urgency of 
enlargement for the Union and the expectation of the member states that it could be 
achieved at minimum cost to themselves.
Finally, because of the lack of clarity as to the outcome of enlargement, best 
demonstrated by the inability of the Commission to propose any concrete dates until 
2000, the uncertainty as to future membership has additionally lowered potential levels 
of investment in the region.
The current member states have proven reluctant to accept that the new members will be 
more competitive in some sectors and have instead continued to pressure the 
Commission to apply controversial restrictions to CEE exports, leading to numerous 
trade disputes, retaliation and growing pressure for protection within the candidates.
This in turn has created mistrust and apprehension on both sides, contributing to a 
deterioration of relations in general and reducing or threatening to reduce the benefits of 
integration and future enlargement. For these developments in political relations, the 
author now turns to the next chapter.
1.5 In previous enlargements, large fiscal transfers, unavailable this time, were used to help the new 
members not only to adjust, but also to balance their trade deficits with the Union. Moreover, complete 
harmonisation and opening up of markets were only expected after accession.
1.6 Mahyew, A. (2001). Enlargement and the Community Budget, Warsaw: UKIE, March.
Mayhew A. (2002). The Brussels European Council: historical step forward or short-sighted short- 
termism. Warsaw: UKIE.
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6. Political Consequences of the Europe Agreement: trade disputes
The management o f trade disputes arising under the EAs has been an important stage in 
the policy alignment process. The extent to which both sides have been vulnerable to 
domestic interest group pressure presages more serious potential issues ahead during
full accession negotiations.
Chapter five assessed the overall impact of the Europe Agreement on the Polish 
economy and suggested that the asymmetry granted under the Agreement turned out to 
be more in favour of the EU than of the Polish partner. This chapter, in turn, focuses in 
on the development of political relations between the associated partners within the 
framework of the EA and as affected by its implementation, by describing a range of 
trade disputes, accompanying tensions and consequently increasingly strained 
cooperation.
The scope for discussion on this issue is huge, not only because the Agreement covers a 
multitude of aspects of the association process, but also because regional integration is 
by nature a highly political process, subject to controversial compromises and often 
contradictory aims. Thus, the prospective points of contention and their impact on the 
partnership between Warsaw and Brussels could range anywhere from macro questions 
of budgetary transfers to micro issues such as the weight of herring. While recognising 
that it is impossible clearly to separate the diverse layers of integration, the author will 
restrict herself to a discussion of the major trends in relations, deliberately covering a 
small number of outstanding trade disputes and omitting the other contentious issues 
surrounding eastern enlargement, such as the free movement of labour, services and 
capital, direct payments to CEE farmers, questions of future institutional arrangements, 
Schengen procedures, ESDP or budgetary transfers. Although it is evident that these 
issues have represent the most difficult areas in the accession negotiations between the 
Union and the candidates, this paper concentrates rather on the difficulties encountered 
in trade relations during the phase of association.
It is the author’s belief that the psychological impact of these contentious issues, as well 
as the economic consequences discussed in the previous chapter, have contributed to 
Polish disillusionment with the EU as well as with liberal trade policies. Because the 
EA has proven less beneficial to the Polish economy than initially expected and the 
political damage surrounding various aspects of the Agreement’s implementation has 
been pronounced, the result was to reverse the trend towards greater policy
1 Preston, C. (1998). ‘Poland and EU Membership: Current issues and future prospects’, European 
Integration, Vol 21, OPA, N.V., p i52.
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liberalisation in Poland, threatening to negate the most crucial benefit of association, 
namely enhanced policy stability and reform credibility.
I. Trade disputes and the Europe Agreement
Chapter one provided the reader with a theoretical background to international trade 
negotiations, maintaining that international bargains are not simply about relations 
between nations, but are more about the distribution of costs and benefits among 
domestic groups. Contrary to the expectations of neoliberal institutionalists, that policy 
stabilisation takes place when domestic reforms are externally ‘anchored’, this thesis 
contends that during association, it has been the two-way relationship between domestic 
interests and international politics that has determined the outcomes of the negotiations, 
conditioning national policy preferences and shaping the bargains eventually struck.
In spite of warnings from political economist, in the early euphoria following the 
collapse of socialism, Prime Ministers, Presidents and Foreign Ministers in the elitists 
circles of high Europeans politics enthusiastically signalled their readiness to ‘reunite 
Europe’, undervaluing the future implications of interest group resistance to economic
* 9 •integration. Convinced that eventually society would recognise their great historical 
accomplishment, the elites underplayed the potential threat to the integration project that 
would come from divided domestic opinion on the issue of enlargement and reluctant 
interests across the European continent. The political advantages of a generous approach 
to the applicants should have been obvious to EU governments, but despite what the 
Heads of States said, at the lower level, established attitudes and interests maintained 
their resistance to concessions.
In addition throughout the 90’s, most EU leaders remained ambivalent about Eastern 
Enlargement, focusing on other priorities, while, due to abruptly changing government 
coalitions, Poland’s ability to remind the Union of what was at stake in the relationship 
was reduced. Thus, while trade and mutual opening up of markets was considered to be 
the most important element in building partnership between Poland and the EU, trade, 
as A Mayhew has pointed out, “not only brings prosperity; it also brings conflict. 
Accordingly, since the signing of the Association Agreements, almost all the 
Association Committees with Hungary and Poland have been dominated by contentious 
trade issues, which have frequently soured relations.”
2 Rollo, J.M.C. with Batt, J. et al. (1990). ibid.
Brabant, J. van. (1993). The New Eastern Europe and The World Economy: Eastern Europe after 
communism. Boulder: Westview Press.
Winters (1994). ibid.
3 Mayhew (1998). ibid., p 60.
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Consequently, while the champagne was still pouring over the collapse of the Berlin 
Wall, petty trade disputes over banal technical issues, such as the size of cucumbers or 
the weight of baby calves, were already beginning to take over the economic, political 
and security calculations of the benefits of Enlargement for the whole of Europe. As W 
Wallace aptly observed, “politics was following its own logic, not simply that of 
economics and technology.”4
In previous chapters it was shown that for the EU as a whole, the economic costs of 
opening up would have been marginal, even in the most favourable from the point of 
view of Poland variant of liberalisation. While the Commission recognised this 
argument, its initiative to be more generous to the weaker Polish partner was blocked by 
the interests of multiple regions and sectors within the individual member states. This, 
in turn, bred growing exasperation from the Polish side.
Concurrently, the complicated political economy process of trade policy making in 
transformation was proving to be an obstacle to the Polish government’s initial desire to 
liberalise, and domestic pressures led to progressive failures to fulfil Poland’s trade 
obligations.
As the atmosphere of tension increased around sensitive trade issues, highly visible to 
the public in the media, the association process was starting to amount to little more 
than tedious tit- for- tat bargaining. Regrettably, the political will for enlargement faded 
with each passing year, and the Commission was unable to take the political risks which 
might have lessen the domestic rent seeking activities, on both sides. While both 
associated partners were putting their short-term interests ahead of long-term European 
interest, attempting to secure for themselves the best possible terms of trade, the 
institutions of the Union remained too weak and divided to provide the leverage needed 
to stop the deterioration of relations. To reiterate the arguments of political economists, 
“it was political reverberations rather than economic consequences that became the 
obstacle to reaching agreement between a developed (EU) and a developing (CEE)”5, 
and the unfortunate result was increasing levels of protection in the Polish candidate.
A. The negotiations of the Europe Agreement
! The informal discussions towards association between Poland and the Communities
j  t h
| began on July 25 of 1990. Not having the experience, information, or knowledge that 
\ is available today, the Polish negotiators could not predict that, “by the end of the
4 Wallace, W. ‘Introduction: The dynamics of European Integration’, in Wallace (Ed.) (1991). The 
Dynamics o f European Integration. London: Pinter for the Royal Institute of International Affairs, p 15.
5 Fontenay, P.de, Gomel, G. and Hochreiter, E. (Ed.) (1995). ‘Western Europe in Transition : the impact 
of the opening up of Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union’, ibid., p 95.
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negotiations, the distance between Polish expectations and the Community’s 
concessions would be significant.”6
Already at the first meeting, the Commission, delegated to bargain in the name of the 
member states, refused to speak in any binding terms of possible Polish membership, 
even though this was a crucial issue for Poland and the Polish government’s ultimate 
goal. The Commission claimed that the political and economic costs of putting into the 
Agreement a formal declaration as to the possibility of Poland’s future accession were
n
too high, and that neither COREPER nor the parliaments of the EC-12 would have 
accepted or ratified this binding statement.
Moreover, differences over economic integration were also evident. The Commission 
rejected the idea of setting up a customs union between Poland and the EC, only 
conceding to a possible creation of a Free Trade Area, but even within this limited 
framework, disagreements arose as to the free flow of labour, as well as trade in textiles, 
steel and agriculture. The least controversial aspect of the first meeting was the issue of 
political cooperation, resulting in the decision to set up formalised political dialogue 
between the associate and its partners.
At the second meeting of the delegations, it was thus confirmed that an FTA would be 
established according to the rules of article XXIV of the GATT, with a separate 
protocol provided for agricultural trade on the EC’s insistence.
o
On December 22, the real negotiations began , and it quickly became obvious that even 
if the Commission was ready to give Poland greater concessions, the member states 
steadfastly rejected any formula providing additional benefits to the candidate. 
Coinciding with the touchy issue of membership aspirations, another dispute arose as to 
the formal composition of the Agreement. The Polish side wanted the incorporation of a 
financial protocol within an annex of the Agreement, formally institutionalising the 
priorities of the financial aid to be to Poland and giving Polish authorities greater say in 
the decision making over the allocation of the resources. Thanks to the persistence of P 
Benevides- Sales, the Chief EC negotiator, some general statements as to PHARE and 
loans from the EIB were eventually included in the EA, but the Commission was unable
6 For detailed description see , Tabor, M. (1994). ‘Dynamika i uwarunkowania procesu negocjacji Uktadu 
Europejskiego’, w Wysokinska (Red.) (1994). Polska wprocesie integracji ze Wspolnotami 
Europejskimi.
The author had the chance to work with M Tabor, member of the Polish EA negotiating team, and discuss 
the details of the negotiations.
7 European Committee of Permanent Representatives
8 Poland was represented by the Ministry for Economic Cooperation with the Abroad, Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs, Council of Ministers, and until March 1998, the government plenipotentiary for European 
Integration, Minister J Saruysz-Wolski. The economic part of the EA was negotiated by the newly created 
Ministry of the Economy under Minister J Kaczurba.
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to fully formalise the entire protocol, again giving in to the interests of the member 
states. Access for Poland to structural funds remained a taboo topic throughout the 
negotiations.9
In April of 1991, the then current President of Poland L Walesa spoke of the insufficient 
preferences granted to CEE within the EA negotiations and warned that this would lead 
to the creation of ‘a new gold curtain’ to replace the old one made of ‘iron’. Walesa 
argued that the Visegrad three needed trade concessions and investment more than 
direct financial aid or technical assistance, and that by failing to provide for these, the 
Community did not understand CEE aspirations to eventual membership. The 
divergence between the CEE goals and the limited concessions granted by the EU was, 
according to Walesa, damaging the development of relations. In response,
Commissioner Andriessen proposed partial affiliate membership for CEE, an offer that 
was quickly rejected by both sides for very different reasons.10 
The third round of negotiations began, after a certain impasse in the talks, on the 22nd 
April 1991. Because the Commission had now been given a wider mandate to negotiate 
in the name of the Member states, a somewhat better atmosphere prevailed between the 
Polish and the EC delegation. However, this reconciliation did not last for long, as 
serious disagreements arose on the notion of asymmetrical trade liberalisation 
particularly in sensitive products. Ireland joined France in rejecting bigger agricultural 
concessions for Poland, while Portugal stood its ground on giving better access for 
textiles. An already tense situation was made worse by the EC’s decision to decrease the 
import quotas for Polish veal, mushroom and soft fruits, granted earlier in 1989 as a part 
of the GSP preferences.
In August of 1991, the association negotiations were overshadowed by the situation in 
the former Soviet Union, where Yeltsin was staging a coup to outstead Gorbachev. 
While the stability of the entire European continent was being threatened by daily 
events in the East, the French were busy complaining that the size of the quota for 
Polish beef and sheep meat was too generous. The French government backed by the 
Irish, who for their own reasons wanted to stall enlargement, managed to expeditiously 
secure credits for Polish products to be exported east, thus guaranteeing that the surplus 
of agriculture would not find itself on the EC’s markets. Thus, the French farmers
9 R Stewarska served on the government negotiating team.
Stewarsaka, R. (1998). ‘On some consequences of the Eastern Enlargement of the European Union’, in 
Zielinska- Glebocka and Stepniak (Ed.) (1998). ibid., p 167.
10 Commissioner Adriessen presented an offer of partial- membership which was too far-reaching for the 
EC member states, while not enough for the Poles.
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coupled with the Irish fearful of losing structural and cohesion funds to the poorer 
regions in the east brought the negotiations down to a battle of particular interests.
In hindsight, Faini and Portes observed that, “the trade ministers were much less 
enthusiastic than their colleagues in foreign ministries and more inclined to bend to the 
pressure of their domestic and sectorial constituencies than to rhetoric of the cold 
war.”11
On the 30th of November, 1992, the first serious dispute between the EC and Poland 
took place over the terms of dividing up the duty- free quota for cars imported into 
Poland amongst the member states.12 This disagreement delayed the taking effect of the 
automobile protocol and consequently the liberalisation of the Polish automotive 
market. Finally, under the special annex devoted to automobiles, Poland agreed to a 
voluntary import expansion scheme in favour of the EC car industry. The government 
granted the Communities a duty free quota of 25,000 cars with catalytic converters and 
5,000 without. According to Mayhew, “this extremely bizarre arrangement was clearly 
made to satisfy European companies.”13
Moreover, EC multinationals were at the forefront of seeking protection during the 
negotiations by pushing the Polish government for higher tariffs against third countries, 
before agreeing to invest. Fiat was the most glaring case, lobbying throughout the 
negotiations of the automobile protocol agreement for higher protection against US and 
Asian counterparts.14 As a result, Poland raised overall customs duties for motor 
vehicles from 15 to 35% in January of 1992 and excluded car tariffs from the Uruguay 
Round, thus breaching GATT GSP obligations granted prior to signing of the EA.15 
Developing countries and India in particular were agitated by the duty free quota 
granted to the EC and took the dispute to the WTO. Under international pressure, 
Poland finally agreed to open up a temporary zero tariff quota for small passenger cars 
originating in developing countries.
Throughout the negotiations, the Polish side never had full certainty as to whether any 
issue already settled would not again be modified by the Communities. According to J 
Saruysz-Wolski, the government plenipotentiary for European integration and chief
11 Faini, R and Portes, R. (1995). ‘Opportunities outweigh adjustments’, Faini & Portes (ed.) (1995). ibid., 
P 6.
12 English and French producers were somehow left out of the first version, allegedly because Poland did 
not want to give duty- free quotas to countries not willing to invest.
13 Mayhew (1998). ibid., p 102.
14 Kawecka- Wyrzykowska (Red.) (1998). ‘Ocena Stopnia Realizacji Ukladu Europejskiego’. ibid. 
Levigne (1995). The Economics, ibid.
Rollo and Flemming (1992). ibid.
15 Financial Times, 26/02/92.
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Polish negotiator, even after certain problems were resolved and agreement had been 
reached between the two sides, COREPER would at the last minute and without prior 
consultation, change the given proposition and send back the altered version to Poland. 
This particular method of bargaining was taken to its most absurd level when 90 
minutes before the signing ceremony of the Association Agreements took place, Spain 
attempted to force the CEECs to accept voluntary export restraints on steel, something it 
had been demanding throughout the entire process of negotiations. The Spanish 
government insisted that without an additional protocol for steel, it would not sign the 
Agreement. Never-the-less, after joint consultations, the Prime Ministers of the 
Viseghrad three together refused to accept this protocol and, in order to avoid 
humiliation, Spain was forced to concede. After much ado and already frayed relations, 
The Europe Agreement establishing association between Poland and the Communities 
was finally signed on 13 December, 1991.
Even though the Polish side was prepared to wait longer to end the negotiations until it 
could secure more favourable conditions, the window of opportunity was closing 
quickly, and the public was expecting some sort of concrete result of the protracted 
talks. Moreover, the deteriorating economic situation at home was making reaching an 
agreement on market access crucial for the Polish elites to provide relief for the 
transition depression. From the point of view of Poland’s negotiators, the economic 
parts of the EA were critical to allow the expansion of Poland’s most competitive 
sectors while simultaneously protecting those industries which were threatened most by 
the huge costs of the reforms.
While some Polish academic circles insisted that transition and restructuring of the 
economy required subsidies and protection at home with unconditional access to 
markets abroad, other more liberal wings of the Polish elites supported the 
Commission’s drive for tougher demands from the Polish liberalisation schedule, 
believing that the pressure from the EU would be essential to keep the government on 
track with the reforms and help it resist future protectionist pressures from threatened 
sectors. Former negotiator J Kaczurba even exclaimed following the negotiations: 
“Brussels was right! Integration had become a political football. I wish I had not 
negotiated such long transition periods for our steel works, refineries and banks. A dose 
of competition would have done them good.”16
Thus the anchoring strategy was chosen for the reforms and the Polish liberal elites tied 
their own hands to avoid future policy manoeuvring. However despite internal
16 Polityka, ‘Interview with J. Kaczurba’,01/02/97.
195
disagreements on the speed and scope of the Polish economic opening, all policy circles 
within Poland were in accord that the principle of asymmetric liberalisation was a 
fundamental prerequisite to a successful transition at home. In the meantime, the 
asymmetry provided for in the EA seemed to favour the Community, and the Polish 
government expressed its disappointed in the scope of concessions granted by the EC on 
the free flow of goods, services, capital and labour. Simulation results obtained by
1 7Polish economists, and confirmed by western studies , indicated that even with a 
variant of trade liberalisation most favourable to Poland, it would still be the 
Community that would have the biggest benefits from the creation of an FTA. 
Summarising, M Karasinska- Fendler, another former member of the Polish negotiating 
team and subsequently Secretary of State for European Integration, commented that,
“the behaviour of certain member states used to exasperate me during the negotiations 
of the EA. They claimed that Polish food and agricultural products would flood the EU
1 ftmarket. That in itself was clear and conscious misinformation.”
While the EC was thus formally insisting that the basic instrument of integration would 
be mutual market opening and compensation to the weaker partner through asymmetric 
liberalisation, its declarations were far divorced from the concrete preferences granted. 
Real asymmetry remained an intent on paper, but even before the ink was dried, it was 
obvious to the Polish negotiators for whom the Agreement would be beneficial.19
B. Implementing the Agreement
Well before the EA became operative, EC producers were already threatening Anti-
• * 20Dumping actions against their Polish competitors in iron, steel and chemicals.
Moreover, throughout the course of the negotiations, various EC firms were busy 
actively lobbying their causes to both the individual member states and to the 
Commission.
17 Faini and Portes (1995). ibid.
Fontenay, P.de, Gomel, G. and Hochreiter, E. (Ed.) (1995). ibid.
Padoan, PC. (1994). ‘The Changing European Political Economy’, in Stubbs and Underhill (Ed.) (1994). 
ibid.
Rollo, J.M.C. and Smith, A. (1993). ‘The Political Economy of Eastern European Trade with the 
European Community: why so sensitive?’, Economic Policy, Vol 8, No 16, April.
18 Unia & Polska, ‘Interview with Maria Karasinska-Fedler’ (former Secretary of UKIE)’, 4/12/98, p 5.
19 Already in 1991, several members of the Polish team admitted being aware of the short-comings of the 
EA for Poland; interviews with E Synowiec, M Tabor, J Saryusz-Wolski, J Kaczurba., J Pietras.
20 See Hindley, B.V. (1993). ‘Helping transition through trade?: EC and US policy towards exports from 
Eastern and Central Europe’, EBRD Working paper, No 4, London: EBRD.
Ehrenhaft, P., Hindley, B., Michalopoulos, C. and Winters, LA. (1997). ‘Policies on Imports from 
Economies in Transition’, World Bank Discussion Paper, No 22, Washington DC: World Bank.
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For example, according to J Rollo,
EUROFER was in the room next door throughout the crucial stages. Not only did the 
EC iron and steel producers start to prepare wholesale AD cases in preparation for  
tariff liberalisation, but Eurofer even invited Czech producers to agree to a minimum
price arrangement. 1
The EA reduced tariffs on EC steel by 20%, leaving the European steel industry more 
open to cheaper eastern imports. The over-capacity of the EC steel industry coupled 
with the coinciding economic recession led to increased pressure on Brussels to protect 
domestic producers of steel pipes. After an 18 month campaign, in November of 1992, 
the EC steel makers finally won the AD case against the 3 CEEs and Croatia. An AD 
duty of 10.8% was placed on Polish seamless tubes and pipes of iron or non-alloy steel 
and a variable levy on pig-hematite. Thus, when Quantitative Restrictions in steel were 
removed, the EC introduced other measures of protection, and a trade war erupted 
between Poland and the Communities in February and March of 1993. Moreover, for 
the purpose of the anti dumping investigation, Poland was treated as a State Trading
Economy and consequently its AD duty was adjusted higher according to this non-
00market economy classification. M Levigne claimed,
that while public opinion in the west was mobilised against the invasion o f  eastern 
goods, which was held responsible for losses o f  jobs in the industry, the highly 
cartelised western steel industry was deliberately increasing unemployment by its own
trade practices,23
By 1992, 50,000 employees had lost their jobs in the Polish steel mills and were left 
without any additional social safety nets, unlike their counterparts in the west. This 
however did not constitute an important enough reason for the EC to give up its use of 
AD duties.24
In the meantime, an agricultural trade war erupted in April of 1993. The EC had put a 
ban on Polish even-toed animals and products thereof due to the supposed detection of
21 Eurofer- Association of European iron and steel producers.
Rollo, JMC. (1992). ‘The EC, European Integration and the World Trading System’ in Flemming and 
Rollo (1992). ibid., p 48.
Also see Faini and Portes (1995). ibid.
22 Financial Times. 17/02/93; 22/02/93; 29/03/93.
23 It has been questioned whether the EC steel products were not being sold at satisfactory levels due to 
their own lack of competitiveness.
Levigne (1995). ibid., p 220.
24 In 1994, another AD complaint was launched by the EC steel industry, against Polish structural steel to 
be used in construction.
Financial Times. 2/8/94.
Hindley (1993). ibid.
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foot and mouth disease.25 Later this proved to be an unfounded; in some cases CEE had
9 Ahigher levels of veterinary control than many member states. However, the political 
and economic damage had already been done. The foot and mouth case caused outrage 
in CEE at being treated as part of some unified bloc, and the Polish side itself retaliated 
by banning the import of the same goods from the EC, using the same pretext and 
formally claiming its rights according to the General exceptions clause in the EA (art 35 
on retaliatory measures).
Moreover, according to J Pietras, a member of the Polish delegation, “the issue of trade 
restrictiveness in the case of foot and mouth disease damaged the perception of the state 
of relations between the Communities and Poland much more than any other such
97incidence.” The dispute also served as proof that even the minimal concessions 
granted formally under the EA were subject to further erosion to NTB’s and were not in 
and of themselves enough to enable the growth of Polish exports.
Nowhere was this observation more clear than in the EU’s infamous restrictions on 
Polish soft fruits. Each year the Commission was responsible for setting high minimum 
prices for German sour cherries and British raspberries. While these should have been 
consulted with the Polish side and adjusted to the current situation on the fruit market, 
the Community instead established the prices unilaterally and expected Poland to adjust 
accordingly. The soft fruit case led to marketing problems for Polish producers and had 
a negative effect on their ability to take advantage and utilise all preferential quotas 
granted. While the imposition of minimum prices on sour cherries was according to 
Mayhew,
a purely political measure with trivial economic consequences, it led to massive ill 
feeling in CE where it was considered to be a real response o f  the Union to these 
countries ’ needs. The fact that these prices were being used as a simple protectionist 
tool rather than a way o f  taking care o f sudden import surges was shown by the fact 
that the request was made from member states to establish price minima frequently well 
ahead o f harvest, when cherries were still green on the trees!28
On the Polish side, the first sign of protectionism appeared in December 1992, when the 
government imposed a 6% import tax. The Polish authorities justified this by balance of 
payments difficulties caused by falls in official revenues, due to the adverse 
consequences of the 1992 drought. Calling on the Balance of Payments Difficulty
25 Italy claimed tracing foot-and-mouth disease to its imports from Croatia. Although this was never 
proven, what irritated the Polish delegation even more was that the Member States were treating the 
CEEC as a unit rather than as individual countries.
26 Mayhew (1998). ibid., p 250.
27 Pietras, J. i Harasimowicz, A. (1994). ‘Stan i Perspektywy Stosunkow Polski z Unia Europejska’, 
Sprawy Miedzynarodowe, Nr 1.
28 Mayhew (1998). ibid., p 49.
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Clause under article 64 of the EA, Poland took its case to the GATT. Paradoxically, 
while the GATT Balance of Payments Committee accepted this measure under GATT 
Art. XII, based on macroeconomic analysis, the EC partners were more than reluctant to
OQgive into the Polish arguments. In the end, Poland agreed to cut this import tax to 5% 
by the beginning of 1995, to 3% in 96’ and to fully withdraw it by 97’.
These spurs represent only a few of those that took place during and shortly after the 
negotiations of the Europe Agreement. Below the author takes a look at some of the 
other most outstanding disagreements that have transpired during the period of 
association. Poland has had the biggest number of trade disputes with the European 
Union of any of the other associated states. As a result of these contentious issues, the 
relationship between the Polish side and the EU delegation has often been on the brink 
of a trade war. Misunderstandings have taken place from a very different interpretation 
of the EA rules and the principle of asymmetric opening. By the time of the 
Copenhagen proposals for improvement in 1993, trade relations between the Union and 
the Polish delegation were very difficult and causing major political friction.
Another problem in resolving the various trade disputes has stemmed from the fact that 
the Association Council (AC) was meeting quite infrequently, and, according to the 
Polish delegation, that “form and procedure tended to dominate over content.” In the 
first two meetings of the AC, for example, only one hour was allotted to high-level 
consultations, and there was a glaring absence of the majority of EU ministers, who sent 
their deputies as replacements. The agenda tended to be monopolised by minor 
technical and trade problems, with very little time left for more cooperative political 
dialogue and long- term, strategic accession policy. Moreover, because the number of 
candidates negotiating on accession had risen to ten, the situation deteriorated further 
during the course of association.
29 Michalek, J. (2000). The Europe Agreement and the Evolution of Polish Trade Policy’, in Yearbook o f 
European Studies, No 4, Warsaw: CEUW, p i00.
30 Urzad Komitetu Integracji Europejskiej (various issues). Monitor Integracji Europejskiej. Warszawa: 
UKIE.
Instytut Koniuktur i Cen Handlu Zagranicznego -Foreign Trade Research Institute:
IKiCHZ. Wspolnoty Europejskie, Biuletyn Informacyjny. Nr 77, 78, 81, 88, 90, 91, 92,94. Warszawa: 
IKiCHZ.
Ministerstwo Gospodarki, Departament Integracji Europejskiej I Organizacji Miedzynarodowych. 
http://www.mg.gov.pl
Kawecka- Wyrzykowska, E. (1997). Stosunki Polski ze Wspolnotami Europejskimi od 1989 Roku. 
Warszawa: SGH.
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To conclude, a member of the Polish negotiations team aptly observed that,
little by little as the agreements were implemented and the countries ’ economic 
transition progressed, it turned out that the EA was a lopsided deal with built in 
mechanisms preventing equality, and that there is much to be read between the lines.31
Holzman has echoed this sentiment by claiming that the incidence of trade restrictions 
on Polish exports shows the extent that hidden protection is latent in the EA. “To repeat 
the Minister -  President’s of Saarland words, Saarland’s economy is doing fine. The 
only thing it needs is protection against cheap imports of EE coal and steel.”32
II. Dispute Resolution at the Association Council 
Trade and economic problems between Poland and the EU were discussed 
simultaneously at the meetings of the Association Council, the Association Committee 
and various Subcommittees, who were, according to the EA, charged with overseeing 
its implementation.
The first meeting of the Association Council took place in March of 1994. It was to be 
the last joint consultation not marked by any specific issues of contention. The agenda 
was set and regulatory issues hammered out as to the implementation of the Agreement. 
However, at the second meeting already, on July 17 1995, the EU side questioned 
Poland’s restrictions on exports of raw leather and leather goods. Poland had called on 
the re-export and serious shortage clause (art. 31 of the EA) to prohibit the export of 
various skins and leathers between Sep 4 1993 and Dec 31 1993. In addition in 1995 an 
import quota for leather was established. The problem escalated rapidly and because a 
compromise was unable to be reached within the AC, the EU side proposed to subject 
the case to the arbitrage procedure at the European Court of Justice. The Polish side, 
convinced of its right to use the safeguard clause, agreed. This case marked the only 
time where a trade dispute between Poland and the EC went to the highest level of 
conflict resolution.33 In the end, thanks to continued consultations at the level of the 
Association Committee, the arbitration procedure could be discontinued and an 
agreement between the two sides was reached.
The modernisation and restructuring of the Polish steel and iron industry became the 
second disputed issue and a topic that was to occupy all the Association Council, 
Committee, and Subcommittee meetings well into the negotiations for accession. To 
this day, the issue of steel and iron restructuring has not been fully resolved. From the 
beginning, the EU delegation questioned the compatibility of the Polish restructuring
31 Stewarska, R. (1998). ibid.
32 R Holzman, quoted in Fontenay, P.de, Gomel, G. and Hochreiter, E. (Ed.) (1995). ibid., p 49.
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programme with the EU’s own plans. The conflict revolved around tariff reductions, 
state aids and reductions in employment and production capacities of the Polish mills. 
By the beginning of 1997, the Polish authorities had finally decided formally to apply 
the restructuring clause of the EA (art. 28), to protect the steel and iron industry. 
However, under political pressure from the EU, the Polish side agreed to avoid a formal 
procedure, giving way to a Gentlemen’s Agreement, where the EU agreed to delay the 
Polish steel liberalisation schedule, conditional upon Poland presenting a programme 
for restructuring compatible with the EU’s requirements. (See below)
In addition, the delays in the Polish liberalisation of motor vehicles became another 
contended issue. Using the general safeguard clause of the EA (art. 30), the Polish 
government was trying to develop its automotive industry behind barriers.34 By July 21, 
1994 most liberalised principles of imports from EU, EFTA and CEFTA on utility 
motor vehicles were withdrawn, and Poland prohibited the import of motor and special 
vehicles older than three years as well as harvester combines older than six. Because the 
Polish side had applied art. 30 without going through the formal procedure required by 
the EA, of proving the threat to Polish domestic industry, the EC side questioned its 
rights under the Agreement. The problem escalated quickly, leading to another possible 
case of arbitration, but thanks to the work of the Association Committee, a formal legal 
settlement was avoided when Poland agreed to extend the age limits to six years for 
both motor vehicles and combines by 1996, followed by total abolition of restrictions by 
1997.
The third meeting of the AC, on 16 July 1996, was completely dominated by unresolved 
trade disputes. These ranged from Poland’s restrictions on imported telecommunications 
components and equipment in 1995, to rising protectionism in the petrochemical 
industry as well as the ongoing dispute over the industrial assembly of motor vehicles.
In August of 1995, the Polish government had raised tariffs on telecommunication 
equipment and in September on components, claiming the need to protect this infant- 
industry. Then in January 1996, the authorities announced their intention prolong the 
period of custom duties reductions for refining products from the original EA 
timetable. In both the telecommunications and in the petrochemical industry cases, the 
Polish side argued that the import limits met formal requirements of the restructuring
33 Kawecka- Wyrzykowska (Red.) (1998). ‘Ocena Stopnia Realizacji Ukladu Europejskiego’. ibid.
34 Another problem revolved around the import of car-components from third country markets; See 
below.
35 To be cut to zero by the beginning of 1999; including petrol imports, diesel, light and medium oils and 
gas oil.
Instytut Koniuktur i Cen Handlu Zagranicznego (various years). Annual Reports. Warsaw: IKiCHZ.
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clause under art. 30 of the EA and thus were not in breach of it. This however did 
appease the EU delegation.
Moreover, during this time a long drawn out dispute began over the standards and rules 
set for the assembly for motor vehicles in Poland. The AC questioned Poland’s 
temporary imposition, between 24/8/96 and 1/7/97, of an obligation for foreign 
producers to apply for permits for the parts intended for the industrial assembly of 
vehicles. As a result of these rules, different components of cars became either exempt 
or subject to custom duties, in effect resulting in very different prices for the final 
product. A competitive war ensued between EU automobile car producers and Daewoo 
on the Polish market, demonstrating how the classification of products could serve as a 
NTB. The Commission was highly displeased with the favourable terms negotiated for 
Daewoo, which was able to dismantle vehicles into 8 sections and then import them as 
car parts to be reassembled in its Polish plant and exported to the EU on a preferential 
basis.36
The other extended trade difficulty that began at this AC meeting, revolved around the 
system of Polish certification, and as was the case with other contentious issues, these 
negotiations proved more difficult than anticipated.37 The problem that escalated in the 
Polish certification case was about the compatibility of the associated partners’
i o
regulatory systems with the EU’s New Approach Directives , and consequent access to 
the Polish market for imported products required to undergo lengthy national standards 
control tests.
In early 1994, the Polish authorities approved a list of ‘B’ Safety certificates necessary 
to import over 1400 types of manufactured goods, ranging anywhere from shampoo or 
steel pipes to capital equipment, electronic products to textiles and clothing. These 
imported products became the subjects of mandatory and lengthy testing procedures by 
the Polish Certification, Testing and Standards Centre, (PCTSC), in order, according to 
official rationale, to protect the Polish consumer. According to EU producers, the 
requirement of introducing mandatory quality certificates in Poland and the refusal of 
Polish authorities to accept foreign firms’ self-certification of conformance to domestic
(2000). Zagraniczna Polityka Gospodarcza i Handel Zagraniczny Polski 1999-2000. Warsaw: IiCHZ
36 Rzeczpospolita. ‘Najbardziej zaszkodzi nam Daewoo’, 27/1/97.
37 Preston, C. and Michonski, A. (1999). Negotiating Regulatory Alignment in Central Europe: the case 
o f the Poland/ EU European Conformity Assessment Agreement. Sussex: Sussex European Institute.
38 The New Approach Directives were designed to establish mutual recognition of national standards and 
thus help to avoid prolonged procedures in product regulation within intra-Community trade. CEE firms 
exporting to the EU were obliged by the EA to meet these Community products’ standards.
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standards made it extremely difficult for them to sell their products on the Polish 
market.39
The EU industry associations claimed that system introduced in 1994 constituted a 
breach of the standstill clause in EA by erecting a new technical barrier to trade, and 
consequently, they threatened legal action in the Polish Supreme Court. The issue was 
also raised at all the Association Council and Committee meetings between June 1994 
and 1998, where Poland was rebuffed for breaking the rules of the EA.
The Polish side continued to defend its system of product regulation as a precaution to 
guarantee the safety of consumers, but subsequently, under pressure from the EU, the 
government agreed in 1995 to review the contentious ‘B’ list and eventually remove a 
number of problematic products.
However, it took until July 30,1998 to only get the Polish authorities to formalise the 
Protocol to an eventual Agreement on European Conformity Assessment into the Polish 
legal system and voice its intention to have a fully EU compatible conformity 
assessment law before the end of 2000.40
Prior to this third, key AC meeting, Kawecka-Wyrzykowska claimed the EC had been 
using political pressure to get the Polish side to concede in the most controversial of 
issues. In the run up to the official publication of the Commission’s Avis on Poland’s 
membership application, the Commission complained about the amount and scope of 
trade policy reversals in Poland. Using the application process as a trump card, the EU 
was able to take advantage of the candidate’s weak bargaining position to achieve its 
own economic goals. The political statements issued right before the AC meeting were 
overly critical of Poland’s progress in legal harmonisation. According to the EC 
delegation, Poland’s slow pace of harmonisation and the administrative difficulties in 
the adjustment to and implementation of the aquis were the main reasons for the 
ongoing disputes in trade liberalisation. In light of the fact that the harmonisation 
process had just begun, the criticism was probably unjustified, and the harsh analysis 
was subsequently withdrawn. However, the toned-down opinion as to Poland’s progress 
in harmonisation actually delivered during the AC’s meeting did little to change the fact 
that the application process had been exploited by the EU to pressure Poland to give in 
to its interests. Kawecka-Wyrzykowska maintained that this was only the first instance 
where the EU consciously linked discussions of Poland’s progress in legal 
harmonisation and the compatibility of Polish and EU regulatory alignment systems
39 Kamisnki, (1999). ‘The Role’, ibid., p 31.
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with ongoing trade disputes. In the future, the issue would be tied up again in 
discussions over steel restructuring as well as in Poland’s prohibition to produce and 
trade smokeless tobacco products.41
At the fourth AC meeting, on 30/4/9742, the ongoing controversy over the cumulation of 
the rules of origin was finally resolved, giving way to the Additional Protocol to the EA 
establishing Pan-european cumulation. At this meeting, Poland’s National Strategy for  
Integration with the EU  was also discussed and many of the ongoing problems began to 
be gradually resolved.
By the time the Avis was published in July 1997 some of the tension about trade had 
eased after numerous consultations. Under pressure to begin the accession negotiations, 
the Polish government conceded to many of the EU’s demands, getting rid of the limits 
on the import of law leather in 1998, agreeing to abolish QRs on steel products by 1999 
and liberalising the petrochemical trade regime. In addition, the Polish side completely 
yielded to the EU’s postulates on petroleum products by agreeing to remove all price 
and quantitative restrictions by January of 1999. In February, in turn, the government 
freed oil and petrol prices on the domestic market and agreed to gradually lower tariff 
levels on benzene and diesel oil until their total elimination by 2001.
Furthermore, progress was made on the mutual recognition of standards of product 
quality and the restrictions on the telecommunications imports were lifted. In the 
automotive industry, Poland began to reduce the 35% tariff level on used vehicles, by 
5% per annum, and extend the age of banned products from 3 to 6 years of age. The 
Polish side also conceded on the dispute over Daewoo, which according to one 
negotiator, “was beginning to develop into a serious political conflict that Poland 
wished to avoid.”43
1998 began on a mixed note in terms of the progress made in bilateral trade relations.
t hJust following the official opening of the accession negotiations in March, the 5 AC 
meeting was marked by increased tension over the export of milk to the EU market. 
Following the EU’s embargo of Polish milk and dairy products in 1997, due to 
questionable veterinary standards, by 1998, five Polish milk plants had fulfilled the 
stringent standards and safety criteria and in theory gained the right to preferential 
market access in the EU. However, due to back up and delays in the EU’s
40 Ministerstwo Ekonomii, Strategia dostosowania Polski w zakresie oceny zgodnosci, certyfikacji, 
normalizacji i regulacji technicznych, Warszawa, 1998.
41 Monitor Integracji Europejskiej. (1998). Nr 17. 
http:://www.ukie.gov.pl/dase/publikacje/monitor/ml7.pdf
42 KIE, (1997).‘Czwarte posiedzenie rady stowarzyszenia Polskiej z UE’, Wspolnoty Komunikat Prasowy, 
Monitor Integracji Europejskiej, nr 12.
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administration system, the access had been severely delayed, causing the Polish milk 
industry to lose millions of ECUs. Polish Foreign Minister B Geremek tried to convince 
the EC delegation to speed up the bureaucratic apparatus and give the plants the consent 
to export. Finally, after a series of high-level interventions, EU Commissioner H van der 
Broek promised that by November official permission to allow the uptake of exports for 
the five milk plants in question, would be granted, and, in addition, that the Polish 
veterinary authorities would gain the right, according to their own standards and 
controls, to add to the list of approved firms any milk producers having past inspection. 
This way, van der Broek argued, “we will at some point get back to the level of exports 
prior to the embargo.”44
That year was also characterised by a series of disruptive disputes over steel and other 
restrictions on trade, including Poland’s unilateral ban on the import of gelatine from 
Great Britain as well as the issue of Poland’s eastern borders following accession.45 In 
the meantime, van der Broek ignored further calls from the Polish side for bigger 
agricultural concessions, arguing that the Poles should first themselves abolish the 
various barriers to EU exports, including certifications and QRs on EU fruit, vegetables, 
poultry, beef and pork.
The 1998 Regular Report on Polish Accession to the Union praised the candidate on a 
number of resolutions of the ongoing trade disputes. The Commission saw the lifting of 
hides and skins and ferrous metal restrictions, as well as the removal of the quota on 
spirits as a sign of Polish good will. However, according to the report, “this trend 
towards significantly improved cooperation had suffered some serious reversals with 
notable difficulties persisting in the field of processed and unprocessed agricultural 
products.” The Commission also mentioned the delays in the field of certification, 
where the agreed upon Protocol had not yet been implemented, as having a negative 
impact on Polish-EU trade and Poland’s internal market preparation.46
On the 29th of April 1999, the discussions of the seventh session of the AC revolved 
around the ongoing restructuring of Polish steel and coal mines, the system of 
concessions for the assembly of motor vehicles, and technical consultations over the 
issue of certification. The EU delegation questioned once again Poland’s granting of 
undue (according to the Commission) public aid to Daewoo. Moreover the Partnership
43 Rzeczpospolita. 01/02/97.
44 Gazeta Wyborcza. ‘Trudna Rada’, 15/03/98.
45 It was argued that closing Poland’s eastern border (required by the EU even prior to accession) would 
lead to the disruption of the ‘grey’ economy (consequently hurting overall economic growth) as well as 
damage relations between Poland and its eastern neighbours.
46 European Commission, (1998). Poland Regular Report, p 8.
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fo r Accession and the National Programme for Preparation for Accession were jointly 
approved, and the issue of Poland moving into the second phase of association under the 
Europe Agreement was deliberated.
According the subsequent Regular Report on Poland,
although the EA provides for entry into its second stage since February 1999, a number 
o f legal requirements have yet to be fulfilled to permit this transition. A range o f  
difficulties in the implementation o f  the EA by Poland remain, from complex long 
standing issues such as steel restructuring and certification, to more recent issues such 
as trade in agriculture. The tendency noted in the last regular report towards reversal 
o f the close cooperation on trade matters identified in the Opinion has unfortunately 
continued. There has been a protracted dispute relating to the import o f yoghurt- an 
issue in many respects symptomatic o f broader difficulties in the processed and 
unprocessed agricultural sectors. Furthermore, in mid September Poland decided to 
raise a number o f agricultural tariffs to their WTO bound level, without prior 
consultation foreseen in the EA. Elsewhere, the restructuring o f  the steel sector has
stalled.
Since the entry into force o f the EA, discussions on a resource agreement and fisheries 
have not made any progress. The lack o f progress identified in the 1998 report 
concerning the certification o f industrial products remains. The short term result is the 
continuation o f a number o f market access difficulties which have an impact on the 
bilateral relationship as a whole. In the longer term, the lack o f  harmonisation with the 
acquis is having a negative effect on the competitiveness o f  Polish firms on their largest
export market, the EU. 47
The report was critical of the minimal progress made in getting rid of ‘B’ products for 
mandatory certification, and the Commission continued to criticise Poland for public 
aids and competition policy with particular reference to the export subsidies to coal, 
Special Economic Zones and steel restructuring. Although by October, Poland had 
provided the Commission with an updated programme for restructuring the steel and 
iron industry, its slow implementation as well as the continuation in breaking the EA 
rules on steel state aids were heavily reproached. In terms of the liberalisation of the 
Polish motor vehicle market, the most important change in the rules of trade took place 
through the WTO, where the Polish government agreed to reduce import duties on 
passenger cars produced outside the EU from 35 to 17.5%. However, the reduction 
applied only to cars with engines bigger than 2.5 litres, and, the EU authorities observed 
cynically that this change in duties for large-capacity cars came about because of 
continued pressure from the U.S. government.
On the other hand, some things were finally resolved such as the elimination of Polish 
tariffs on steel by 2000 and the opening of the negotiations on reciprocal concessions in 
agricultural trade.
47 European Commission, (1999). Poland Regular Report, p 6.
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Between the Association Council meetings in Dec 1999 and in Oct 2000, the Double­
zero agreement on agricultural trade had been concluded, allowing freer access for 
3/4ths of bilateral trade in agricultural products (see below).
In addition, in July 2000, negotiations also opened in field of fish and fisheries products 
as well as in trade of processed agricultural goods. The Regular Report on Poland in 
2000 states that as far as agricultural trade, “the negotiations, which form a part of the 
overall accession process, have been carried out on a reciprocal basis and with the aim 
of leading to a fair equilibrium between the interest of the European Community, the 
EU Member States and those of Poland.”
Never the less, many of the trade difficulties remained, leading the Comission to 
conclude that Poland was still not ready to move towards the second stage of the EA, 
and that, „since the identification of reversals in close cooperation on trade matters in 
the last report, the situation has been rather mixed.” 48
By 2001, the balance of stabilising and destabilising effects of the various trade disputes 
on Polish EU trade relations had taken its toll and was not boding well for building the 
trust so fundamental to European integration. The deterioration of relations was further 
exacerbated as large amounts of information had been leaking out to the media on the 
disputes in the AC. For the Polish public, these disagreements were perceived as proof 
that the Community was using blackmail rather than cooperation to resolve the 
conflicts. As the sense of partnership was weakened and the Polish delegation became 
increasingly exasperated with the EU side, Poland adopted an ever more defensive 
attitude.
For the EU, on the other hand, C Preston has argued that,
to a large degree, the rigidity o f the EU ’s public position was a reflection o f  tensions 
within the EU over wider implications o f  enlargement. The focus on the classical 
method concealed major conflicts between member states as to how their own interests
would be affected by enlargement.49
Some of the most contentious trade issues had been resolved and the majority of 
industrial products in mutual trade faced tariff and QRs free access to both partners’ 
markets.50 On the other hand, protracted disagreements remained over agriculture,
48 European Commission, (2000). Poland Regular Report.
49 Preston, C. (1995). ‘Obstacles to EU Enlargement: The Classical Community Method and the prospects 
for a wider Europe’, Journal o f Common Market Studies, Vol 33, No 3, p 167.
50 With the exception of motor vehicles imported into Poland on which duties were to disappear by 
January 2002.
Foreign Trade Research Institute (1992-1998). Annual Reports.
http://www.paiz.gov.pl/macro.htm
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contingent protection, competition policy and state aids. For a closer look at these 
ongoing controversies, we turn to below.
A. Agriculture
Negotiations on market access for agricultural products in the Association Council 
meetings have been dominated by the subjects of mutual trade concessions as well as 
veterinary and phyto-sanitary controls required to btain the EU’s safety quality 
certificates.
A Mayhew has noticed that the Community always took an extremely hard line on 
agriculture, sometimes adopting positions that were hard to justify. For example, 
attempts by the associated countries to raise duties on agricultural imports from the 
Community on the basis of the EA article allowing changes in agricultural policy were 
met for some time with the argument that, because they did not have an agricultural 
policy like the CAP, but only a series of measures, they could not apply this clause, 
invented for the benefit of the Community. Furthermore, the candidates’ multiple 
requests to shift the composition of exports within the overall quota between the 
different components of that quota were often bitterly contested by the Union, even 
though the overall quotas themselves were very restrictive.51
Following a very liberal trade policy phase from 1989 to the middle of 1991, the Polish 
government in turn began increasing its own levels of agricultural protection. The 
average tariff level was raised from 10.4% to 17.4% in early 91’ and again to 26.6% in 
August. Other hefty hikes included a 120% rise in tariffs on tobacco products and 145% 
increase for certain alcohol. The Polish authorities justified these increases in customs 
duties by pointing to the decline in agricultural output and the worsening balance of 
trade in agricultural products. The average tariff was then established at 21% in 1993 to 
prepare for negotiations in the GATT.
Moreover, in early 1994, Poland introduced a system of variable levies and subsidies for 
143 products, designed to provide effective protection of the domestic agricultural 
market under conditions of fast growing imports. Even though this system was 
analogous to the one used by the EU within the Common Agricultural Policy, at the 
second Association Council meeting in July, the Polish government was heavily 
criticised for it. Justifying the decision to raise tariffs based on the excessive import 
safeguard for agriculture under the EA, the Polish delegation produced The Report
http://www.mac.doc.gov/eebic/countrvr/poland/polcg98.htm
Verblane, U. (1999). ‘The trade policy implications of joining the EU: comparison between Poland and 
Estonia’, ibid.
51 Mayhew (1998). ibid. p 250. See chapter 5
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about the State o f Polish Agriculture as well as Conceptions for Social Policy in 
Agriculture which both justified rising protection under the rules of the EA. The EU 
side rejected the arguments, and thus the problems in agricultural trade began.
In June of 1994, The Polish government introduced another complicated system (MOB) 
for calculating agricultural products that resulted in rising protection from the previous 
tariff levels initially for 15 new product groups and subsequently for another 43. In the 
AC meeting on 1/12/94, the Polish side was reproached for these trade policy reversals,
• •  Oand the issue remained unresolved till well into 1995.
In addition, in July 1995, the Polish authorities once more introduced higher tariff rates 
on 19% of imported foodstuffs and agricultural products in connection with the WTO 
membership, and the government again sought refuge under the agricultural safeguard 
in the Agreement, permitting the reintroduction of protectionist measures under
STconditions of excessive imports that cause injury to domestic producers.
In critique of the EU, on the other hand, up until 1996, the Polish delegation tried, 
without success, to convince the Communities to make the agricultural quota system 
more flexible and to grant the Polish exporters bigger concessions. For example, the 
milk quota system used by the EU was creating many difficulties for the Polish dairy 
industry, as it required that the quota be calculated on bases of production in the period 
between 92-94. Because this was the time of the deepest decline in milk production in 
Poland, the insistence on these lower than average production limits was hampering the 
development of the Polish dairy sector and related food processing industry. None of 
Poland’s demands were met by the Community, and that year it was decided that any 
further liberalisation in agricultural products would only take place within negotiated 
agreements on mutual trade concessions.
Furthermore, the Additional Protocol that was to adjust the agricultural trade articles in 
the EA to the EFTA enlargement as well as to the results of the UR, proved more 
difficult to implement than anticipated due to the Union’s protracted and lengthy 
bureaucratic delays. The Additional Protocol was important for Poland for a number of 
reasons, granting a rising quota of 5% per annum for agricultural products and making 
the ability to take advantage of the quotas more elastic. Moreover, because there was no 
discussion between Poland and the Communities on trade in fisheries until late 1996, it
52 Kawecka-Wyrzykowska (Red). (1998). ‘Wdrazanie Przez Polske Zobowiazan Przyjetych w Ukladzie 
Europejskim’, UKIE, No 15, Warszawa: UKIE, p 28.
KIE, (1995). ‘Informacja o przebiegu drugiego posiedzenia Komitetu Stowarzyszenia RP-UE w 
Brukseli’, Monitor Integracji Europejskiej, No 1, p 7.
53 Instytut Koniuktur i Cen Handlu Zagranicznego (2000). Zagraniczna Polityka Gospodarcza i Handel 
Zagraniczny Polski 1999-2000. Warsaw: IiCHZ, p 311-313.
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was only in the Protocol that the Polish side was allotted for the first time some 
concessions, including a tariff free quota for 5 products. It is important to recall, 
however, that these additional preferences provided by the Protocol were in fact only to 
compensate Poland for the margin of preferences lost as a result of both the EFT A 
enlargement and the UR.
In addition, the minor concessions gained themselves were subject to massive backlogs 
from the EU’s side. Even though the protocol had been signed in 1997, each year, the 
Polish delegation claimed the Community had failed to put the agreements into practice, 
because of endless delays in the publication of annual ordinances. As a result, in the 
early months of every year since 1997, Polish products were being discriminated upon 
against those of the other associated states. While the Polish side had been trying to 
intervene in this matter for over three years at the Association Council, Association 
Committee and Subcommittee for Agriculture, no progress had been made on resolving 
the issue. The Polish side argued that, in the year 2000 alone, for example, the 
publication of the essential ordinance was over two months late, effectively making it 
impossible for Polish producers to take advantage of the duty free quotas and thus 
voiding the concessions granted under the Protocol. Complaints of these administrative 
backlogs echoed well into 2001, when the Polish delegation continued to question the 
EU’s fulfilment of its obligations under the Additional Protocol. According to Pietras, 
then Polish Under-secretary for European Integration and member of negotiating team, 
“these kind of petty technical details, which perhaps in the end were not just entirely 
technical, obstructed the taking effect of the Protocol.” Pietras recalled that each time a 
technical difficulty was brought up in front of the Association Council, the group then 
translated the complaint into 15 languages prior to any consultation, subsequently 
sending the modified version back to the Polish side. Poland would than find another 
small mistake and procedure would begin all over again.54 In the meantime, Poland was 
fulfilling her side of the bargain each year by the January first deadline and as such was 
demanding compensation for the losses incurred thus far.
A.2 VAT for citrus fruit
Another infamous issue of contention involved the level of VAT over citrus fruit. The 
dispute began in 1997 when Spain complained that the Polish tax system was 
discriminating against foreign fruit producers, as the VAT collected on imported citrus 
fruit amounted to 22%, while domestic fruit growers including apple, plum and pear 
planters, were only required to pay 3%. The AC wanted Poland to lower the VAT on
54 J Pietras, in interview for PAP 12/01/01 and various discussions with author.
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imports to 7%, and the Polish side agreed not wanting to prolong the disagreement prior 
to the publication of the Commission’s Avis on the accession negotiations. In 1998, at 
one of the most important meetings of the Association Council, VAT levels dominated 
the agenda, and Spain even threatened to bloc the entire discussions over the continuing 
citrus controversy. By now Poland had lowered the VAT level on imported fruit to 7%, 
but the EU delegation persisted in its complaints that it was still too high in relation to 
the 3% VAT collected on fruit produced locally. The EU side argued that during the 
meeting of the AC in 1997, the Polish Foreign Minister D Rosati had agreed verbally to 
not only lower the VAT to 7% for imported fruit by 1/1/98, but also to equalise it for 
foreign and domestic producers. Minister Rosati maintained on the other hand, that he 
had made no such promises. He claimed that, “we had indeed agreed to lower the VAT 
on imported fruit to 7%, by January 1998, but had made it clear that raising the VAT on 
domestic fruit to 7%, in order to make the levels equal, would only take place by 
2003.”55
Never the less, Brussels continued to insist that the Polish side had agreed to equalise 
the VAT by 1998, and the dispute persisted over the exact words of Minister Rosati in 
the Agreed Minutes of the 1997 Association Council meeting. Kawecka-Wyrzykowska 
recalls that,
the pressure on Poland to give in was intense, and the matter could have been taken 
advantage o f at any minute as more proof that Poland not only has massive delays in 
agricultural reform and was lagging behind the other candidates in legal 
harmonisation, but, in addition, was failing time and time again to make good on her 
promises. The impasse was not resolved until much later in the accession
negotiations.56
A.3 Tariff war over yoghurt and grain
In March 1999, Poland introduced higher custom duties for yoghurt, pork, milk, wheat 
and muslin. Preferences for imports of yoghurt with a higher fat content were 
withdrawn, and the 9% preferential rate for all yoghurts was replaced with 25%. Other 
rises in custom duties both for EU and CEFTA exporters included livers of swine, 
ossein and bones, parings and waste of raw hides and skins as well as malt to be used in 
brewing. These reversals in trade opening sparked off the infamous tariff war over 
yoghurt and grain between the EU and Poland.
Even though April’s rise in tariffs for yoghurt caused an uproar with the Commission, 
that autumn, the Ministry of Agriculture requested many other tariff increases, blaming
55 Gazeta Wyborcza. ‘Jak cytrusy z szafy’, 02/03/98.
55 IKiCHZ (1998). Wspolnoty Europejskie, Biuletyn Informacyjny, Nr 93, p 17.
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the excessive liberalisation for the Polish trade deficit and the deterioration in Polish 
agriculture. While the government was initially reluctant to agree to the Ministry’s 
demands, aware that this would cause major friction with the EU, it eventually gave in 
under tremendous pressure from the farmers. In September, thus, the average tariff 
levels were raised on butter from 40% to 117%, yoghurt and pork, from 25% to 83.35% 
and poultry, wheat, rape seed and sugar from 170 Euro per ton to 450 Euro per ton.
To justify its decision on the increases in protection of the dairy industry, the Polish side 
claimed that it needed to limit the import of milk in order to stabilise the situation on the 
Polish dairy market. The delegation argued that prices for butter had been falling on 
world markets, while those in Poland had slightly risen, making it consequently 
profitable to export to Poland. The Polish government feared that in order to get rid of 
their surplus and take advantage of the rising prices in Poland, foreign producers would 
now attempt to shift their exports to Poland, thus swamping the dairy market and 
destabilising the Polish milk industry. Because Poland has been self-sufficient in the 
production of butter, any increase in imports would be followed by rising difficulties for 
national firms trying to sell butter at home. Accordingly, the government justified its 
decision by claiming excessive imports that cause domestic injury and, calling on the 
agricultural safeguard in the EA, raised duties to the highest level allowed by the WTO. 
As far as yoghurt was concerned, the Polish delegation presented various studies 
showing that the rise in imports of foreign yoghurts had increased 40 times over in the 
last two years. According to these studies57, between 97’ and 99’, the imports had taken 
over a third of the domestic market consumption of yoghurt. The agricultural industry 
claimed that the main source of the problem came from yoghurts with a higher fat 
content than those produced in Poland. To avoid this market-share situation from 
deteriorating, the Polish government raised tariffs in March on yoghurt with a fat 
content of between 3-6%. However, the agricultural ministry subsequently complained 
that this had not solved the problem, as the higher fat content yoghurt was replaced by 
those with only slighter lower contents of fat, which were still subject to preferential 
access. Thus in the first half of 99’ alone, 31,000 tons of yoghurt were imported into 
Poland. Based on these facts, the Polish delegation continued to uphold the claim that it 
had the right to raise duties according to both the rules of the EA and of the WTO.
57 ‘Instrukcja na posiedzenie podkomitetu ds. Rolnictwa i Rybolowstwa w dniu 16/3/2000’, Warszawa: 
Ministerstwo Gospodarki, Departament Integracji Europejskiej.
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Whatever the government’s official rationale was for the sudden introduction of higher 
agricultural tariffs, a trade war with Brussels erupted, leading to a situation described by 
the Polish media whereby,
Polish farmers burned tires on the streets in protest against imports o f subsidised food  
& food products from the EU, and when the government raised tariffs, under 
tremendous social pressure, Brussels warned us (Poland) o f the consequences o f  such
action.58
Calling the tariff rises a breach of the EA, the EU threatened to retaliate and increase 
duties on both fresh and frozen fruits and vegetables.
Needless to say, the tension was high at the concurring Association Council and 
Committee meetings in 1999, and to make matters worse, by January 2000, the Polish 
government introduced more import duties on imported flour made of other than wheat 
cereals, malt, bruised grain and bam. The decision was once again explained as 
appropriate under the EA due to domestic injury caused by excessive imports.59
A.4 Liberalisation in unprocessed agricultural goods 
Under this strained atmosphere, the negotiations for the so- called Double-zero 
Agreement began in September 1999, between the Polish side led by Agricultural 
Minister A Balazs and the EU represented by Agricultural Commissioner F Fischler. 
The goal was gradually to abolish all tariffs and export subsidies in agricultural trade of 
unprocessed goods, until their total elimination by 1/1/2001. Although both sides 
aspired to finish the negations by the end of that year so that the Agreement could go 
into life by January 2000, the task proved impossible due to the escalating dispute over 
Polish tariffs. Fischler complained that Poland had failed, according to the obligations 
of the EA, to consult the EU side prior to the introduction of higher duties, while Balazs 
stood his ground, justifying the decisions as in accordance with Poland’s international 
trade agreements.60
t hFurthermore, on the 16 of March 2000, during the meeting of the Subcommittee for 
Agriculture and Fisheries, the Polish delegation protested against the EU’s level of 
tariffs for apples, cherries, plums and cucumbers. According to the argument, the 
introduction of additional, specific- tariffs on these products had caused their levels to 
be actually ten times higher than those agreed upon in the EA. These special specific-
58 Gazeta Wyborcza. 17/3/2000.
59 Kaliszuk, E. and Synowiec, E. (1995). ‘Klauzule Ochrone z Ukladu Europejskiego: gdzie zastosowano 
i w czym pomogly obu stronom’, Rynki Zagraniczne, No 24, February.
Mroczek, W. (1995). ‘Agrculture’, in Kawecka- Wyrzykowska, E. (1995). Poland's Foreign Trade 
Policy. Warsaw: Foreign Trade Research Institute.
60 Gazeta Wyborcza. ‘Pieniadze to nie wszystko’. 20/10/99.
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tariffs thus resulted in the discrimination of Polish products and in an unclear and 
unpredictable environment for Polish exporters. Moreover, even the agreement on the 
Additional Protocol on Agricultural Trade had failed to resolve the issue.
The Polish delegation also complained of the various NTB’s to the EU market, in the 
form of veterinary and photo-sanitary controls, against, for example, Polish mushrooms 
and potatoes, arguing that there was no justification for these restrictions. The EU, on 
the other hand, brought up the ongoing dispute over Polish yoghurt, and the Polish side 
reiterated that it was monitoring the yoghurt market and that there were no apparent 
decreases in the imports from the EU, despite the higher tariff levels. Moreover, Poland 
persisted that it could not open up the tariff quota until the EU stopped subsidising its 
processed foodstuffs.61
In May, the early consultations on the Double-zero Agreement ended in a fiasco. The 
EU was refusing most of the Polish postulates and its stance caused an uproar in the 
Polish press. According the media, Poland would not be given any derogation after 
accession on unilateral agricultural tariff rises, even in the case of imports flooding the 
domestic market and consequently leading to a serious deterioration of Polish 
agriculture.62 The candidate would also not be allowed to keep national forms of state 
aid to farmers, while simultaneously, there was no possibility of securing the direct 
payments provided to EU farmers through the CAP.63 This, in turn, the Polish 
delegation maintained, would lead to unfair competition between the subsidised EU 
producers and the unsubsidised Polish farmer. In addition, the size of production quotas 
to be granted to Poland continued to be a problem. The EU was insisting that the time­
frame between 1995-99 should be taken as a reference point for the establishment of the 
quota, while Poland demanded 1989-91 production volumes, claiming that output had 
dramatically fallen in 1992 due to excessive liberal trade policy, a rise in imports, a hard 
drought and a domestic recession.64 In addition, the EU refused to consider the 
possibility of extending the CAP to Polish agricultural specialities such as potatoes, 
apple juice concentrate, frozen fruit (raspberries, strawberries, cherries) or herbs, while 
wanting Poland to adopt some of the most contentious aspects of the CAP, like the
61 ‘Instrukcja na posiedzenie podkomitetu ds. Rolnictwa i Rybolowstwa w dniu 16/3/2000’, Warszawa: 
Ministerstwo Gospodarki, Departament Integracji Europejskiej.
62 Gazeta Wyborcza. 25/5/00.
63 The EU maintained that the state aids received by Polish farmers were not in accordance with EU 
competition rules, particularly the fuel subsidies, subsidies for the purchase of fertiliser, subsidised credits 
and investment rebates.
64 Czyzewski, A and Grzelak, A. (1998).’ Initial Experiences of Integrating the Polish Agricultural- Food 
Sector with the EU’, in Zielinska-Glebocka and Stepniak (ed.). (1998). ibid.
Miklaszewski, S. (Ed.) (1998). ‘Polskie Rolnictwo a Unia Europejska’, MCRD zeszyt, Nr 34, Krakow: 
Miedzynarodowe Centrum Rozwoju Demokracji
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banana regime, which would consequently lead to trade diversion and a rise in the price 
of bananas on the Polish market.65 The EU likewise rejected the Polish request that 
Polish fruit wine be labelled as ‘Polish Wine’, claiming that this would suggest a wine 
made of grapes and thus mislead the consumer. Accordingly, a ‘Fruit Wine’ label would 
suffice, and would not compete with the interests of EU wine makers.
Another problem that contributed to the breakdown in the Double-zero talks was the 
issue of pork. The EU wanted to establish a duty free quota for pork, but the Polish side 
refused, claiming that this would only benefit the EU producers. Due to the supposed 
presence in Poland of hog cholera disease, the EU closed its borders to Polish pork in 
1993. The Polish veterinary commission pointed out that the existence of this disease 
had never been documented in Poland, and that no other trade partner including the US 
had any doubts as to the safety of Polish pork. Moreover, according to the President of 
Polish Meat Plant Zaklady Sokol, J Augustynowicz, Poland was losing tens of millions 
of zloty per year due to this embargo and thus had no real motivation to further 
negotiate on a quota opening with the Community until the ban was lifted.66 Finally in 
May 2001, after seven years of embargo and under increasing pressure from the Polish 
side, the Communities allowed Poland to regain her status as a country free from hog 
cholera, thus enabling the resumption of pork exports to the EU. It remains to be added 
that within those seven years, not a single case of cholera was found in Polish pork, 
additionally damaging already strained political relations and adding to Poland’s 
growing exacerbation.67
In spite of the various disputes and the protracted negotiations and after a long hard- 
fought battle by both sides, the Double-Zero Agreement on unprocessed agricultural
fhproducts was finally signed in September 2000, freeing 3/4 of agricultural trade 
between Poland and the Communities from tariffs and subsidies. A duty free quota 
growing 10% a year was established for sensitive products, and all duties and 
restrictions were abolished for the non-sensitive product category. This, however, was 
not to end the trade war in agriculture, as already preparations were being made for a 
new round of negotiations to be launched over trade in processed goods.
A.5 Liberalisation in processed agricultural goods
In October 2000, consultations began between the Polish delegation and the EU side on 
further liberalisation of processed agricultural goods. However, by the time of the
65 Instead of importing from cheaper producers of bananas in Latin America, Poland would now have to 
give preferences to the EU’s former colonies banana planters!
*6 Wprost. 24/10/99.
67 Gazata Wyborcza. ‘Swinskim targiem’, 12-13/05/01.
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meeting of the Subcommittee for Agriculture and Fisheries in March 200168, no real 
serious progress had been made. Poland was seriously criticising the EU for failing to 
meet its obligations under the Double- Zero Agreement and consequently being in 
breach of Art. 35 of the Europe Agreement. While pointing out that it had had fulfilled 
all the requirements of the Agreement by the first of January, 2001, the Polish 
delegation charged the EU with delays in the implementation of its side of the bargain. 
By March, according to the Polish side, the issue of subsidy elimination for butter, 
wheat and rye, exported in the form of processed goods, was still unresolved. When 
Poland proposed to discuss this topic within the framework of the negotiations for trade 
in processed goods, the EU showed no flexibility towards compromise. According to 
Fischler, the subject of export subsidies had not been formally dealt with within the EA, 
and thus the Commission did not have a mandate to negotiate on it. There was no 
further discussion on this Polish complaint for months.
Meanwhile, at the same Subcommittee meeting, the issue of Polish yoghurt resurfaced. 
This time, it was Poland’s restrictions on aromatised yoghurt, justified on the basis on 
Art. 30 of the EA, that were being questioned by the Community. The Polish delegation 
again reiterated that it would be willing to abolish these restriction and further open up 
the quota to EU producers, once the Community eliminated subsidies of raw 
agricultural products that go into processing yoghurt. Poland argued that while the EU 
did get rid of subsidies for milk in July 2000, it continued to refuse to do the same for 
eggs, grains, sugar and rice, the other main ingredients of yoghurt. Under these 
circumstances, the Polish side felt that the EU had yet to fulfil the conditions for 
complete liberalisation.
J Plewa, Deputy Ministry of Agriculture and chief Polish agricultural negotiator, 
contended that Poland would not agree to liberalise duties without the EU first getting 
rid of subsidies that were breaking the rules of fair trade. Echoing his minister, Balazs 
himself demanded that the EU agree to get rid of all subsidies of products that go into 
processed foods, just as it had done in the agreement for trade in unprocessed 
products.69 Fischler retorted that it had been made clear from the very beginning that the 
elimination of export- subsidies concerned only the Double-zero Agreement from which 
the currently negotiated arrangement on processed goods differed considerably.
The current mandate o f the European Commission, which is negotiating in the name o f  
the member states, is based on the postulates o f  the Associate Agreement between
68 ‘Instrukcja Na Posiedzenie podkomitetu RP-UE DS. Rolnictwa i Rybolowstwa 26-27/3/01’, Warszawa: 
Ministerstwo Gospodarki, Departament Integracji Europejskiej.
69 Gazeta Wyborcza. 13/5/2000.
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Poland and the Union. This agreement doesn ’t anticipate the abolishment o f  export 
subsidies. For this reason, any kind o f concessions made towards Poland in this case
70would require legal authorisation (a new mandate) from the 15.
Balazs, in turn, upheld Poland’s willingness to continue negotiating, but stated that he 
saw no possibility of a compromise due to the Union’s hard-line and unconciliatory 
attitude.
The Commission is ready to grant Poland only marginal duty free quotas, increasing 
the quota size which has been minuscule for some time, while expecting the Polish side 
totally to liberalise its tariffs and abolish all Quantitative Restrictions on imports. 
Moreover, while Poland wanted to link the reduction o f duties in processed foodstuffs 
with the abolishment o f  export subsidies, the Commission would not even hear o f it.
While the negotiations should continue 
(Balazs warned), they should be based on the principle o f  equal treatment for both sides 
according to international standards. This principle should contribute to Poland's 
further integration with the internal market. Any other conditions would result in 
unequivocal exchange o f  concessions and would intensify the Polish trade deficit in
these processed products.7
The Polish side persisted in upholding its demands, arguing that the EU was still trying 
to protect those industries in which it was not very competitive, while trying to force 
through further liberalisation in products where it had a definite competitive advantage 
and could dominate the Polish market. The new agreement was to deal with several 
hundred product positions such as biscuits, chocolate, pasta, jams, yoghurt and alcohol. 
In contrast to the EU, where tariffs on processed foods were relatively negligible, in 
Poland they remained very high, particularly for alcohol, confectionery goods and dairy 
products, in which, due to the ongoing transformation needs of restructuring and 
privatisation, Poland was continuing to protect domestic producers through a high 80% 
import duty. As a result of this imbalance, the Polish delegation claimed that it made no 
economic sense for Poland to give into the Union’s demands. The team also pointed out 
that if they agreed to the EU’s conditions, just the Polish producers of chocolate, 
confectionery and other baking goods would lose a total 39% of the value of all 
processed exports.
Thus, the negotiations over processed foods came to an impasse, with nether side 
willing to give an inch. Moreover, the EU negotiators observed that all the other nine 
candidates had agreed to the liberalisation in processed goods and declared that 
Poland’s refusal didn’t bode well for her accession to the Union. Poland was prompted 
to liberalise its agricultural trade now if she wanted to get into the EU in the next two
70 PAP. ‘UE/ Rozmowy o handlu artykulami spozywczymi na jalowym biegu’. 05/03/01.
71 PAP. 05.03.2001.
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years. Brussels gently reminded the Polish team that eventually they would have to give 
in, as they had for the double-zero agreement, once all the other candidates had signed 
on, otherwise Poland would lose out to competitors with preferential access. In the 
couloirs, talk was heard of Poland’s unduly stubbornness which eventually turns into
» • • « 77acquiescence when the candidate is forced to give in at the very last minute...
During 2001, a series of other disputes evolved concurrently to the difficulties in the 
processed food negotiations. In April, Poland was unexpectantly classified as a country 
with a high risk of BSE, even though no such case had even been documented. Minister 
Balazs observed that Poland had never actually used the EU feeds to nourish its 
animals, and that,
two years ago when I banned the import o f  this animal based feed from the EU, the 
Community accused me of damaging Polish-EU relations. And now they are charging 
us with using the very same feeds. At the time of the Polish restrictions, the EU claimed 
that these feeds had met all the EU safety and health requirements and thus were 
perfectly safe.7i
B. Competition and state aids
B.l Steel and iron
Coal and steel products were treated separately in the ECSC Protocol 2 of the Europe 
Agreement, which concentrated on mutual trade opening in steel.74 According to the 
original timetable of the EA, custom duties in the EU were to be eliminated on
n c
European steel by 1/1/96 , while Poland, based on the principle of asymmetric opening, 
had more time to liberalise, with a schedule that envisaged gradual annual reductions of 
tariffs over a span of 7 years until their total elimination in i999.
In addition, the EA included specific rules on competition and state aids in the ECSC 
Protocol. The provisions state that agreements between undertakings, abuse of 
dominant position and excessive public aid are incompatible with the Agreement and 
any dispute arising from anti-competitive behaviour of the giving of state aids is to be 
judged on the basis of practice in the Community. However, the Polish side was granted 
a special five-year derogation period in which it could provide extensive public aid to 
the steel and iron industry for the purpose of restructuring, conditional upon reductions
72 Zycie. ‘Bitwa o jogurt’, 05/03/2001.
73 Gazeta Wyborcza. 03/04/01.
74 See Treaty of Paris. European Coal and Steel Community, 1951.
Treaty of Rome. Establishing the European Community, 1957.
Tsoukalis (1997).
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in production capacity and employment. Under art. 63.4 (a) of the EA, the Polish state 
has been considered as a European ‘region’, where the standard of living is below 60 % 
of EU average (all the Polish regions except Mazowsze), and is consequently allowed 
greater flexibility and scope in the provision of public aids for modernisation as well as 
social and environmental purposes. When the five year period for state aids ran out in 
January 1997, the EA provided for the possibility of extension subject to the approval of 
the Association Council.
Thus far the restructuring of the steel industry, which had begun in 1989, has had mixed 
effects and has remained a thorny issue subject to repeated chafferring in Polish EU 
relations.76
The National Programme for the Restructuring o f the Iron and Steel Industry11, which 
was first prepared in Poland in 1992 and revised several times since, was to be 
completed by 2002. At this point production capacity should have been lowered to 12.3 
million tons of steel per year, accompanied by a level of employment at about 23,000 
people and an implementation of major technological changes. In the early 90’s, taking 
into consideration the falls in demand on the Polish market, the Union feared that the 
Polish production surplus would be re-oriented towards the EU market, and thus the 
Commission generously applauded various studies conducted on the Polish steel-mining 
industry, suggesting that production should be drastically reduced. An early Canadian 
study insisted that production should be lowered from 18mln to 11.7 million tons of 
liquid steel per annum. The government’s programme for the restructuring in 1992 was 
accordingly based on these estimates. However, several economists were pointing out 
already at this time that the scheme was far from perfect because it underestimated the 
growth of the Polish economy and with it the rise in demand for steel. It turned out that 
the GDP growth in Poland in the mid-nineties was twice as high as the Canadian study 
predicted.
75 With the exception of specific products or ‘regions’ such as Germany or Spain.
76 Instytut Koniuktur i Cen Handlu Zagranicznego (1999). Wspolnoty Europejskie, Biuletyn 
Informacyjny, No 91, Warszawa: IKiCHZ, marzec.
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In the first part of the decade, Polish steel exports to the EU remained at pretty steady 
levels of 4 million tons of steel products per year. Import levels from the EU, on the 
other hand, grew 7 times over between 1991 and 1997, from .2 to 1.4 million tons per 
annum. This fast growing rate of imports did not help the restructuring efforts. By 1997, 
employment levels in the Polish steel mills stood at 60,000 people and the plan was to 
make another 40,000 redundant in order to make the mills competitive. Despite high 
economic growth in the first half of the 90’s, the restructuring programme was only 
partly implemented, and, in 1997, the European Commission demanded that Poland 
meet its obligations regarding the opening up of its market.
In response, the Polish Ministry of the Economy attempted to extend the deadline for 
abolishing customs duties, arguing the need for protection of the domestic market while 
the restructuring programme was being carried out. Moreover, the government proposed 
to the EU that production capacity levels should, based on estimates of the new 
Gliwicka study conducted nationally, be decreased to only 13.5 mln tons by 2002, a 
level considerably higher than the EU had initially expected. This caused an uproar in 
the Commission, and protests especially from Spain and Germany, the EU’s main 
producers of steel. Commission claimed that the program’s estimates for demand were 
methodologically wrong, and that it was over-simplified and too primitive to properly 
calculate cost. Commissioner for Enlargement, van der Broek accused the Polish 
government of postponing restructuring for political and social reasons, noting that 
many enterprises were as yet “untouched” by reforms and portraying their extended
70
protection as very “short-sighted”.
This Gliwicka analysis was later confirmed by a study done by a British consultancy, 
Beddows & Co., which published a prognosis for the demand for steel on the Polish 
market.79 In its report to the European Commission, the Steel Market Evolution in 
Poland -1/4/98, Beddows & Co. maintained that the demand for steel products in 
Poland in 2010 would be approximately 9.2 mln tons per year. In this situation, the 
Canadian firm’s early recommendations to reduce raw steel capacity to 11.7 mln tons 
would be irrational and would allow the EU steel producers to reap the benefits of
Q A
Poland’s economic growth. This scale of reduction would require of the Polish 
government to close down several of the largest steel mills in Poland and radically
77 Ministry of Economy, National Programme for the Restructuring o f the Iron and Steel industry, 
30/06/98.
78 Rzeczpospolita, 19-20/10/98.
79 Demand on the Polish market being the main determining factor for the restructuring programme.
80 Instytut Koniuktur i Cen Handlu Zagranicznego (1999). Wspolnoty Europejskie, Biuletyn 
Informacyjny, No 91, Warszawa: IKiCHZ, marzec.
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reduce employment. The conflict over steel escalated quickly as 1,8 mln tons of 
processed liquid steel is worth 1.5 mln$.
In the ongoing dispute, Germany and Spain demanded a complete removal of duties on 
imported steel. The Polish side, on the other hand, wanted to maintain certain customs 
barriers, to protect the Polish market and give Polish steel mills time for modernisation 
in preparation for operations on the free market.
O |
When Poland decided to formally call on the restructuring clause of the EA , the EU 
toned down its critique and recommend not using this clause. Eventually a Gentlemen’s 
Agreement was accepted and on September 1997, Poland’s time allotted for public aid 
was extend until at least 1999, with a possibility of another extension until 2001. 
Moreover, the government was granted the right to delay its steel liberalisation schedule 
envisaged in the EA, and the Commission agreed to allow Poland to keep tariff rates at 
9% in 1997, rather than reducing them to 6% as was established in the original tariff 
reduction timetable. Poland had also requested to keep this 9% tariff level throughout 
1998, lowering it to 6% by 1999 and abolishing it only by 2001. Under protests from 
Spain and Germany, the Commission was pressured to reject this extensive delay in 
opening up and agreed only to a schedule based on 6% tariff levels in 1998, 4% in 99, 
2% in 00’ and 0% in01’.
The Polish programme for restructuring was hastily updated and the changes proposed 
by the Community included in order to win the Commission’s approval and to secure a 
financial support package worth 30mln Euro for the benefit of the iron and steel workers 
who had to be made redundant. Both sides also agreed that that the association 
committee would be informed and consulted on all state aid planned, and that this 
would be dependent on a new restructuring programme as well as further production 
capacity and employment reductions.
On 16/12/97, the EU Council of Ministers accepted a final version of the Polish 
liberalisation schedule, whereby tariff levels would amount to 6% in 98, 5% in 99, 3% 
in 00 and 0% in 01 ’. While this was an obvious compromise on the side of the 
Community, the Polish government continued to feel political pressure even after 
initially accepting the Community approved schedule, and in July 1998, for tactical 
reasons, decided to further reduce tariffs by half from 6% to 4% in 1998, then to 3% in 
99 and total elimination by 2000. This was all provided for in the new and updated 
National Programme for Restructuring o f the Steel and Iron Industry, which the
81 To which Poland had a right due to the difficulties of restructuring and the high social costs involved.
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Commission praised and received with approval. Simultaneously, however, Spain, Italy 
and Germany continued to question the viability of Poland’s plans and openly display 
doubts as the Commission’s endorsement of the programme.82
From hindsight, the slower pace of liberalisation combined with additional protection of 
the Polish steel industry allowed several of the steel mills to pull themselves out form 
the verge of collapse, effectively restructure and create a modem raw steel sector. The 
role of the duties was crucial, as the slowing down of the anticipated tariff decreases 
allowed the Polish steel mills to accumulate the capital needed for investment and keep 
the potential for steel production at the level of 13.5 mln tons of raw steel per year, the 
amount, according to the Polish government, that would give Poland a strong 
competitive position in Europe.
Kawecka- Wyrzykowska has argued that,
without these duties and other forms o f state aid, it would have been impossible to carry 
through such a massive investment plan, and that, quite probably, the quicker pace o f 
tariff liberalisation envisaged in the EA would have been the best method to bring 
Polish production levels well below the 13.5 mln goal, consequently, and unnecessarily 
lowering production capacity in order to give the EU steel mills a competitive 
advantage. (The author further maintained), that most likely, this original timetable o f  
tariff reductions was decided on arbitrarily and without due consideration o f the tempo 
and progress o f the Polish steel sector restructuring. 83
The main problem with all the subsequent restructuring programmes has been that there
has been no clear vision on who is to cover the costs. Not only is the Polish government
budget too limited, but most importantly the role of the state is severely curtailed due to
the restrictive competition and state aid rules of the EA. The state cannot use direct
grants or donations to the steel mills, while other forms of public aid, such as profits
from privatisation, are not allowed by the EU’s competition rules under art 68 of the
EA.
Kaliszuk i Synowiec (1995). ibid.
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usage of state (public) aids not allowed for in the Union, plan was too costly for the state budget to send 
3,000 people on early retirement, and the plan did not take into account the condition on the world market 
for steel, especially the Asian and Russian crisis.
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By 1999, the EU was again encouraging Poland to cooperate in steel liberalisation and 
restructuring. However, the economic downturn in 1998-1999 had a deeply negative 
impact on the Polish iron and steel industry, and the issue of delays in restructuring has 
continued to dominate the various meetings of the Association Council. In 1999, 
Brussels wanted quick privatisation of the Huta Katowice and Sendzimir Mills, and 
when the Polish government stalled under social pressure, the Commission was again 
furious. All the subsequent Progress Reports on Poland in 1999, 2000, and 2001 have 
paid particular attention problematic lack in progress in the restructuring of the Polish 
steel and iron industry.
In 2001, during the writing of this paper, the Polish side was again negotiating with the 
Commission on annual production levels in the Polish steel mills. Under pressure from 
the Commission, the Polish authorities had lowered their original estimates of 13.5mln 
tons per year, to 12.8 mln. The Communities, on the other hand, continued to insist on 
11.6 mln tons. That summer more negotiations on reductions in capacity and 
employment led to another updated and modified restructuring programme which was 
supposed to take into account the suggestions pushed by the Commission for the last ten 
years.
B.2 Special Economic Zones
Art. 63 point 4(b) of the Europe Agreement obliges Poland to adopt the EU’s 
competition policy. One of the main problems encountered in the time of association as 
far as this requirement is concerned has revolved around Poland’s Special Economic 
Zones (SEZ). Seeking to address high unemployment rates in some regions, the 
government has bee introducing investment- related tax rebates, or more specifically 
temporary tax holidays, and establishing local ‘zones’ in which these additional 
privileges are granted to firms as an incentive to invest.
The goal of SEZ has thus to bring in capital into those regions and sectors where either 
unemployment is particularly high or the infrastructure is good, but hasn’t thus far been 
used effectively.84 It is hoped that the investment will improve this infrastructure and 
create zones in Poland that offer wide ranging opportunities for the development of 
high-skilled and technologically- advanced industries. Moreover, SEZ have been 
created to help relieve the regional and sectoral disparities resulting from the transition 
process, by improving the situation on a tight labour market and lowering
84 Budzowski, K. and Wydymusa, S. (1999). Handel Zagraniczny: metody, problemy, tendencje. Krakow: 
Akademia Ekonomiczna.
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unemployment levels in regions that would otherwise have little hope of attracting 
capital and know how.
The Commission has argued that Poland’s granting of income tax exemptions to these 
enterprises is not in line with the EA competition rules. Even though the issue of SEZ is 
dealt with by the WTO, and thus the Commission’s judgement on the matter is not 
legally binding, political pressure has been used on Poland to abolish these Zones and to 
eliminate the special privileges granted to those investors that have already set up 
operation therein.
The Commissions has had a particular problem with the Polish state’s use of measures 
in the Zones directly supporting exports, which are treated as a violation of the fair 
competition principle and forbidden by the EA. These include corporate income tax 
allowances with possibility to deduct over 50% of the investment expenditure from 
income, export credits and export credit insurance, subsidies to interest rates on long 
term credits and programmes of support for export contracts. Enterprises in these zones 
have been granted these forms of state aid for export promotion, which, according to the 
Commission is a breach of EU competition rules and consequently needs to be 
modified. The Polish side has been slowly conceding to the EU’s demands. In 1997, for 
example, after severe criticism from the Commission, the government abolished the 
preferences for export promotion in SEZ Mielec.85
Finally, in January 2001, Poland adjusted its SEZ regulations to Community law by 
passing a new legislative act on competition and public aids. According to this law, 
investors in SEZ will only be able to receive a tax exemption worth at the most 50% of 
their investment costs. At this time, there were 14 functioning SEZ in Poland , and the 
Polish government had asked the Commission in its negotiations position to keep the 
tax rebates until 2017, for the investors who had set up their businesses in SEZ prior to 
January 2001. This postulate has been rejected. In addition the Commission has accused 
Poland of being 9 years late in harmonising her competition and state aids law with 
Community regulations. According to the EA, Poland was supposed to adjust its 
competition law to the acquis on the day of going into effect of the Interim Agreement, 
namely 1st February 1992.
In defence of its negotiating position, the Polish delegation has argued that giving into 
the EU’s demands for the abolition of these zones would require tremendous
85 Instytut Koniuktur i Cen Handlu Zagranicznego (1998). Wspolnoty Europejskie, Biuletyn 
lnformacyjny, No 77, Warszawa: IKiCHZ, January.
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expenditure from the state’s already limited budget. Because the EU has refused to 
accept the regulations and agreements signed by the Polish state with the investors in 
the Zones, the Polish government would now have to somehow compensate the firms 
for losing their already-acquired privileges. While many Polish economists maintain 
that SEZ are not an effective way to restructure backward segments of the economy87, 
they do point out that the Commission’s persistence in the matter and the inflexible 
position adopted on the abolishment of SEZ is unjustified.
C. Anti-dumping actions
C.l Polypropylene sheaf- binding rope
In January 1998, the Commission put a 20.3% AD duty on Polish producers of 
polypropylene sheaf- binding rope, used in agriculture to ‘tie’ straw and hay. Most 
Polish exporters were also forced to accept minimum price arrangements within certain 
allotted quotas. Moreover, the management of the conflict resolution process within the 
AC left much to be desired. While the Polish authorities were informed of the intention 
to apply AD duties on 30/12/97, the procedure was set in motion only 2 days later! This 
behaviour was an obvious breach of the dispute settlement procedure provided for in the 
EA, whereby each side is required to inform the other of the intent to begin AD action 
considerably in advance of the procedure. By failing to act in accordance with this 
system of early warning, the Commission’s AD suit had done double the damage to the 
Polish producers, who were unable even to prepare for the upcoming proceedings
In the name of France, Belgium, Great Britain, Ireland, Portugal, Austria, Sweden and 
Finland (70% of the European wire industry), the association of European producers of 
rope and nets (EUROCARD) filed a complaint to the Commission in November 1997, 
claiming that Poland was selling the rope in Europe at prices that barely cover the 
production costs. According to their analysis, the Polish rope was being exported and 
sold at a 20-30% margin of dumping , which determines the difference between 
imported prices and those in the EU.
EUROCARD had been arguing that the Polish exporters, thanks to abnormally low 
prices, were completely wiping out European rope production, and that in order to 
remain competitive on the EU market, EU firms would have to lower their prices to 
such an extent they would not be able to cover production costs. Furthermore, because
86 17 SEZ existed initially; 3 were abolished b 2001, two due to pressure from the Commission.
87 Orlowski, W. (2000). The Costs and Gains from Poland’s Membership in the EU: Methods, Models, 
Estimations. Warsaw: CASE.
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these producers had just incurred large investment costs to move from the production of 
sisal type rope to polypropylene, due to a shift in demand on the market, they expected 
that they would now profit from this outlay. Instead, due to dumped Polish products, 
they were losing out to Polish producers.
Prior to this, in January 1996, all quantitative restrictions on polypropylene sheaf- 
binding rope were abolished by both sides in accordance with the Multi Fibre 
Agreement and the GATT. Moreover, on 1/1/97, as was anticipated within the 
liberalisation schedule of the EA, tariff rates for polypropylene rope imported into the 
EU were abolished. Thanks to the liberalisation of trade, the EU has become Poland’s 
most important market for sheaf-binding rope, taking over 90% of her global exports, 
Germany on its own dependent on 70-75% of its rope market on Polish products while
• O Qthe Union’s collectively dependent on 26%. Thus, because Germany had ceased to 
produce the rope domestically due to obvious comparative disadvantage, it did not take 
part in the group of European producers filing the AD suit against Poland!
Because of the dumping accusations, the Polish exporters obliged themselves to provide 
the EU authorities with a monthly report from July 1996 onwards, on the changing size 
and value of the European market for rope. However, this monthly update did not stop 
the EU producers from filing the harmful AD suit. It is worth mentioning, in addition, 
that the EU producers of textile-based products, to which rope belongs according to the 
MFA of the GATT, and particularly of goods made from artificial fibres, had been very 
active during this time, accusing other external exporters of using dumping methods. 
Suits had been filed against India, Pakistan, China, Turkey and Thailand, and the 
concurrence of these actions with the trend towards greater liberalisation in the trade of 
textiles within the WTO could not be but noticed. 90
C.2 Binder/baler twine and steel wire ropes and cables.
In July of 1998, the Committee of European Wire Producers (EWRIS), representing 
90% of wire production in the EU, filed an anti-dumping complaint to the European 
Commission against Polish exporters. Poland, among 7 other countries, was accused of 
dumping as well as causing injury to European wire industry and was charged with very 
high dumping margin of 35%. In February of 1999, a temporary AD duty was imposed
88 Analysis of past cases shows that the Community’s dumping margin is biased in favour of Community 
producers; Mayhew (1998). ibid., p 98.
9 Between 1994 and 1997, the Polish rope producers increased their share of the EU rope market from 
4.7% to 10.2%, and in first half of 97’alone, the value of this export grew from 2.1 mln$ to 5.7 mln$. 
Ministerstwo Gospodarki, Centrum Informacji Handlu Zagranicznego.
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on steel wire ropes and cables while in August a final duty ranging from 27.9% to 
48.3% was levied.
Meanwhile, the percentage of the wire market was gradually falling for EU producers 
from 75% in 1994 to 66% in 1997, while it steadily rose for the countries in question 
from 12% in 1994 to 23% in 1998. Because a substantial 20% of the Polish wire 
production was being exported to the Communities, the mere threat of AD measures 
would serve to practically eliminate the Polish producers from the EU market. 
Furthermore, because the duty was also aimed at keeping out even cheaper producers, 
such as the countries of the former Soviet Union, the latter would now most likely 
reorient their sales towards the Polish market, increasing imports and contributing to a 
further deterioration of the Polish producers’ position.
In their defence, the accused countries pointed out to the Commission that some of the 
producers filing the complaint were themselves importing the same product that they 
argued was being dumped. The Commission called this normal practice, and the matter 
remained unresolved. Moreover, there were huge discrepancies within the statistics used 
to determine the amount of Polish exports to EU market, some studies claiming that the 
Polish share actually fell between 1994 and 1997, while other demonstrating that it rose.
In spite of these controversies, the Polish wire producers continued to defend 
themselves against dumping allegations. According to their arguments, using lower than 
on the domestic market prices in the EU was justified by a very different situation on 
both markets. While, for example, the sales on the EU market were geared towards 
large enterprises, and thus were available more cheaply due to bulk rates, in Poland the 
sales went to small producers, where the quantity demanded was less and so the costs of 
production were higher. Moreover, the Polish producers claimed that they were able to 
sell cheaper products in the EU because they were also guaranteed there to receive their 
due payments within 14 days, while in Poland they had to wait for 3-4 months to be 
reimbursed.
The Commission in turn did not accept these arguments and claimed that they did not 
justify dumping. In addition to the AD duties, the Polish firms "DRUMET S.A." and 
"LINODRUT" agreed to minimal process, within an agreed quota, that were 35% higher 
than those used at time of suit. It was agreed that the dismissal of the AD duty would
90 Instytut Koniuktur i Cen Handlu Zagranicznego (1999). Wspolnoty Europejskie, Biuletyn 
Informacyjny, No 90, Warszawa: IKiCHZ, luty.
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only take place after the producers filed a petition with details as to the new terms of
sale.91
D. Coal
In 1999, The British Confederation of Coal Producers filed an AD complaint to the 
Commission against the Polish firm Weglokoks, the biggest supplier of Polish coal to 
the United Kingdom. The problem again seemed to be rising imports of Polish coal, a 
threat to the British mines. An AD investigation was lunched against alleged Polish 
state subsidies to the coal industry that were making the export prices of coal too low 
for British producers to compete with.
The Polish side defended itself maintaining that it actually sold coal in Britain at much 
higher prices than in Poland in order to be reap greater profits, and that the price 
currently stood at 34$ per ton, a world market level, and not the 26$ as the 
Confederation was claiming. Moreover, the government pointed out that cheaper coal 
was being sold on the British market by importers from Colombia and South Africa, and 
that the type of coal Poland sold on the British market differed considerably from the 
kind sold by British mines, and thus was in no way a competitive threat.
In order to avoid a formal AD duty, Weglokoks decided to accept minimum prices and 
Voluntary Export Restraints for at least a year. In the meantime, several British coal- 
using producers and other interested consumers lobbied the Commission in support of 
Poland, arguing that any restrictions on import of Polish coal would hurt the British 
economy. ICF, the biggest British firm importing Polish coal onto the UK market, wrote 
to the Commission in defence of the Polish producers, claiming that not only was the 
Polish coal not the cheapest import on the British market, but in addition the British 
coal mines were never interested in selling their coal to British power plants. The type 
of lower quality Polish coal was better suited for the needs of power plants, and limiting 
the imports from Poland would cause supply problems on the British market, disrupting 
the economy.
During the year that Weglokoks lowered its export levels to the UK, according to the 
self-imposed VER, not a single British coal producer took Poland’s place. Instead, 
cheaper coal from Colombia and South Africa replaced the energy supply to the power 
plants. On the other hand, the AD investigation and VER’s took their toll on the Polish 
mines, not only entailing serious losses for the coal industry, but also stalling the 
process of restructuring.
91 Instytut Koniuktur i Cen Handlu Zagranicznego (1999). Wspolnoty Europejskie, Biuletyn 
Informacyjny, No 91, Warszawa: IKiCHZ, marzec, p 33-34.
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By early 2000, the end of the conflict was in sight, when Richard Budge, President of 
RJB, the biggest coal mining firm in the UK, as well as representative of the 
Association of British Coal Producers, visited the Polish Slask coal mining region in 
order to resolve the issue through consultation. The AD suit in Brussels was eventually 
dropped, but Budge threatened to launch another complaint unless Weglokos stuck to its 
VER agreement. Budge defended the abandonment of the suit by saying that the price 
of Polish coal had in the meantime risen. The Polish side claimed, on the other hand, 
that the dispute was ended peacefully, because the British government had given into
Q'y
the Association’s demands and began subsidising British coal.
E. Petrochemical industry
Other infamous cases of AD investigations against Polish imports involve the 
petrochemical industry. In 1994, the first year of the functioning of the EA, two suits 
were filed against Polish and other CEE portland cement producers. In April, the 
European Association of Cement Producers accused Poland, the Czech Republic and 
Slovakia of dumping on the EU market. Sometime later, these firms were themselves 
charged by the Commission for price fixing in the Community.
That very same year, another dispute began over the import of Polish ammonium nitrate 
(RSM). Polish producers, in order to avoid a protracted investigation, agreed to 
minimum prices on the export of RSM for a period of 5 years. When this time frame ran 
out in 1999, according to the EA, Poland gained access to the EU ammonium nitrate 
market without the restrictiveness of minimum prices. However, immediately after this 
breakthrough for the Polish exporters, an AD investigation was launched, and in July 
1999, without attempting to reach a consulted compromise, the Commission imposed a 
temporary AD duty of 25.2-30.5% on the Polish RSM plant, Zaklady Azatowe.
The RSM producers, in turn, feeling that the duty was unjustified and the procedure of 
putting it forth was questionable, accused the Communities of being in breach of the 
EA, by making exports to the EU even more restrictive than had been the case under the 
prior imposition of minimum prices.
In addition, Lord Inglewood as well as representatives of the National Farmers Union 
in the United Kingdom pressured Brussels to drop the suit, arguing that AD duties 
restricting Polish imports of RSM into the Communities were hurting British farmers 
who rely on this type of fertiliser. Because 80% of the UK RSM market came from 
Polish exports, the duties were making production costs rise. The NFU claimed that the 
AD duty had been dictated by two EU chemical giants, namely the German BASF and
92 Unia & Polska, ‘interview with Steinhoff, 22/11/10.
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the French Grand Paroisee, and that the damage incurred by the British farmers had not 
been taken into consideration by the Commission in its AD investigation.
In 2000, in addition to the action against RSM, AD duties were also placed on other 
Polish chemical industry products such as lime nitrogen, and an AD investigation was 
launched on urea and saltpetre. The urea investigation against Zaklady Chemiczne 
Police S.A. ended in June 2001 with no dumping found by the Commission. However, 
the Polish chemical industry has been experiencing losses worth thousands of dollars
O'Xyearly as a result of all these AD complaints.
Moreover, cases such as the portland cement one also demonstrate, as Mayhew has 
noticed “how firms can use an AD duty for narrow private gain and to maintain a 
monopoly situation in the Community market, at the expense of the consumers.”94 
Trends and Conclusions
There seems to have been more friction in Polish- EU relations than in the case of any 
other applicant. Moreover, the issue of trade relations became increasingly controversial 
in Poland, owing to a series of high profile disputes and questions of agricultural trade 
access under the EA. These contentious and often bitterly fought political battles were 
widely covered in the Polish press, leading many Poles with a distinct impression that in 
the future Union their interests, already neglected during association would be further 
marginalised or even ignored.95
It is important to point out that the asymmetric dependence of Poland on access to the 
EU market increased the relative political strength of the Union and consequently its 
ability to unilaterally affect the terms of trade. This, in turn, as Baldwin observed, was 
translated into an instrument of political power.96 On the other hand, the low proportion 
of EU imports from Poland97 did little to justify the protectionist stance of the Union. 
Moreover, while most studies commissioned by the EU showed that the liberalisation of 
trade would bring about more advantages than disadvantages for the Community and 
bigger concessions would ease protectionist pressures in the associated countries, the
QO
EU, collectively, chose to remain deaf to these calls for greater openness. The
93 Gazeta Wyborcza. ‘Sir anty-dumping’, 03/2000.
94 Mayhew (1998). ibid., p 96.
95 R Bugaj, former head of the Polish Worker’s Union Party 
Unia & Polska, ‘interview with Bugaj’, 11/99.
96 Baldwin, (1994). Towards an Integrated Europe, ibid., p 152.
97 See table 5.4, chapter five.
9H von Ow, B.(1995). ‘Problems and Perspectives of the Accession of the Countries of CEE’, in 
Weidenfeld, W. and Altmann, F. (Ed.) (1995). Central and Eastern Europe on the Way into the European 
Union: problems and prospects o f  integration. Giitersloh: Bertelsmann Foundation Publishers, p 19.
See also Czyzewski, A. i Orlowski, W. (Red.) (1993). Raport Polska- Wspolnoty europejskie: 
perspektywa 2000. Warszawa: UKIE, Urzad Rady Ministrow, Biuro ds. Integracji europejskiej.
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influence of established interests in the sectoral and fragmented policy-processes of the 
EU meant that it would only have been possible to ensure that the EA was implemented 
in a generous fashion through active political engagement and demonstration of will. 
However almost all EU governments remained ambivalent about Eastern enlargements, 
and, while recognising the political imperative, they were more preoccupied by the 
detailed economic difficulties.
Both Poland and the EU applied the safeguard clauses provided in the EA on numerous 
occasions. Although both sides, according to the EA, had the right to apply these 
measures, it could be argued that the EU, as a state superior in political and economic 
strength, should have, even for the sake of example, refrained from extracting 
concessions from the weaker trading partner. This became particularly the case when 
the EU trade surplus appeared and the pressure increased in Poland to stop the further 
deterioration of the trade balance.
Likewise, the EU’s application of anti-dumping actions deserves serious criticism. 
Kawecka- Wyrzykowska pointed out that although formally the EU had the right to 
apply these protective measures, the practice of their implementation suggested that 
they were not always driven by economic considerations. Kawecka described the AD 
procedures, “or rather lack of procedures” as “arbitrary, exemplified by the declaration 
to introduce import barriers on Friday when the action was to begin on the following 
Monday. This not only made it difficult to reach Polish producers on time with the 
relevant information, but also left a number of exports already on the way into the EU in 
a curious situation.” In addition, because the firms in the candidate countries have been 
organisationally, financially and strategically weaker than their EU counterparts, they 
have been unable to defend themselves against AD charges, even if the accusations 
were unfounded. Kawecka observed that “these occurrences as well as overly restrictive 
barriers which had no economic or real basis (referring to the foot and mouth disease 
never detected in Poland) not only had a negative impact on Polish exports but also on 
the atmosphere of political relations!”99
The application of contingent protection was thus not only economically damaging for 
Poland, but also had a psychological impact on economic policy preferences, 
undermining the viability of the market reforms in Poland by discrediting liberal
99 (Red.) (1998). ‘Ocena Stopnia Realizacji Ukladu Europejskiego Ustanawiajacego Stowarzyszenie 
Miedzy Polska a Wspolnotami Europejskimi i Panstwami Czlonkowskimi’. ibid., pp 68-69.
See also Kawecka- Wyrzykowska (Red). (1998). ‘Wdrazanie Przez Polske Zobowiazan Przyjetych w 
Ukladzie Europejskim’. ibid.
Kawecka- Wyrzykowska, E. (1999). Polska w drodze do Unii Europejskiej. Warszawa: Polskie 
Wydawnictwo Ekonomiczne.
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economic policies100 (see chapter seven). For example, a popular topic of technical
assistance in Poland became how to avoid AD measures. The unfortunate by-product of
this exercise in harmonisation was to encourage anti-competitive behaviour in Polish
economic policy making which, according to the preliminary objectives of association,
was to be going in the direction of liberalisation and de-monopolisation.101
To conclude, in the words of B Kaminski,
it became clear that the disciplines o f the EA have focused mostly on preventing 
negative externalities on the EU associated with various measures, rather than on 
compelling the Polish government to adopt policies that would increase national
welfare. 02
Given the theoretical arguments in favour of non-discriminatory trade, with which the 
author agrees, the phenomenon of reciprocal agency capture verifies that regional 
integration is a highly complicated process dominated by narrow calculations of costs 
and benefits as well as the political influence of domestic interests.103 Thus, it could be 
argued that in the design of the EA, not enough political attention at high level was paid 
to its implementation, and, while the instrument was heralded as the bedrock of liberal 
economic policy, the fulfilment of its obligations by both sides turned into a battle by 
protectionist domestic interests.
The next chapter takes a look at the political economy of trade policy making in Poland, 
assessing the impact that the liberalisation experiences under the EA have had on Polish 
domestic politics, policy preferences and outcomes.
100 See Winters (Ed.) (1994). Foundations, ibid.
Ehrenhaft, P., Hindley, B., Michalopoulos, C. and Winters, LA. (1997). ‘Policies on Imports from 
Economies in Transition’, ibid.
Eatwell, J., Ellman, M., Karlsson, M., Nuti, D. M. and Shapiro, J. (1997). Not 'just another accession'. 
ibid.
Mayhew (1998). ibid.
101 Mayhew (1998). ibid., p 98.
102 Kaminski (1999). Ibid., p 29.
103 Bilal, S. (1998). ‘Political Economy Considerations on the Supply of Trade Protection in Regional 
Integration Agreements’, JCMS, Vol 36, No 1, March, Maastricht: European Institute of Public 
Administration.
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7. Explanations for Polish Trade Policy Reversals
Under representative democracy, individuals don V have the opportunity o f  using their vote 
to influence trade policy directly, but they can seek to secure the election o f  a 
representative whose views on the issue ofprotection for a particular industry reflect their 
own, in the representative democracy, contestability o f  policy may occur, and this is to be
expected.1
Having assessed the impact of the Europe Agreement on the Polish economy and on 
Polish-EU political relations (chapters 5 & 6), as well as discussed the domestic conditions 
for reform initiation in Poland (chapters 3 & 4), this chapter will now try to tie all these 
elements together and examine the most important factors responsible for Polish trade 
policy outcomes. The author will identify whether it has been the international 
repercussions of trade negotiations, domestic politics or both that have shaped and moulded 
policy preferences in Poland, maintaining throughout that the neoliberal institutionalist 
expectations about policy anchoring have proved insufficient in predicting the direction of 
policy reform.
The Europe Agreement was designed not only to assist the Polish economy in overcoming 
the transition recession, through its impact on export growth and trade reorientation, but 
most importantly to anchor the Polish trade regime in an irreversible process of 
liberalisation, thereby adding credibility to the market reforms. This liberalisation however 
has not consistently taken place, and the Polish institutions of trade have become subject to 
various manipulations and haphazerdous tinkering. The evolution of Polish trade policy, m 
fact, has been driven in multiple directions by social tensions and increasingly better- 
organised domestic interests seeking protection from foreign competition, on the one hand, 
and international commitments to trade liberalisation, on the other.
The author asserts that the reasons for this policy instability have been several fold and can 
be partially attributed both directly and indirectly to the liberalisation experiences within 
the framework of the Europe Agreement. The economic and political repercussions of the 
association process, discussed in preceding chapters, suggest that integration between 
Poland and the European Union has provided a fertile ground for domestic politics to 
impact inter- state cooperation, demonstrating the increasingly complex linkages between
1 Hillman, A.L. (1990). The Political Economy o f Protection: Fundamentals o f Pure and Applied Economics. 
London: Harwood Academic Publishers, p 43.
2 See B Kaminski (1999). ibid.
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domestic and international relations as well as the difficulty in separating the internal 
political economy of policy reform from external influences.
I. The Europe Agreement and Trade Reform Viability
For neoliberal institutionalist expectations to be fulfilled and for external policy anchors, 
like the EA, to work in stabilising domestic reform, several assumptions have to hold. To 
reiterate these assumptions, in setting the conditions for association, the EU was to find an 
appropriate balance; giving support both to the process of democratisation and to the 
introduction of markets. The EA was thus to not only furnish additional pressure for reform 
continuation, by providing binding requirements, but also to bolster economic growth in 
Poland, thereby strengthening the hand of the reforming elites through incentives and 
rewards and contributing to the development of political pluralism. On the level of support 
for democracy building, the EA was to serve as an institutional model, and its legal 
framework was to be devised in such a way as to grant the Polish authorities enough leeway 
to respond to domestic demands and conflicts. In this way, the external leverage was not to 
contribute to complicating the policy dilemmas for the polish authorities, by forcing them 
to chose between responding to international pressures on the one hand and to domestic 
needs on the other. The government’s social responsiveness, in turn, was ultimately to 
contribute to building internal legitimisation of the economic policies pursued and increase 
the public support for the programme.
Finally, in implementing the EA, it was important for the Union to itself act and pursue the 
policies proposed consistently as well as uphold the conviction that both partners’ interests 
were being weighed equally in the process of arriving at common positions and 
compromises on the level of the bi- lateral negotiations. Because the recognition that the 
partner with whom one is interacting is an equal and has the right to be respected regardless 
of his position is crucial to international cooperation, the EU’s acknowledgement of the 
Polish side’s needs and respect for its postulates would constitute the minimum 
requirement for pacifying potential conflicts.3 As such, the settlement of disagreements, the 
resolution of contentious issues though joint consultation and the pursuit of negotiations 
within the framework of association was to be based on partnership, designed to ultimately 
serve both partner’s long-term objectives.4
3 Sztompka, P. (1996). ‘Trust and Emerging Democracy: lessons from Poland’, International Sociology, Vol
II, No 1, March.
4 It is the author’s belief that the obvious asymmetry in bargaining power between the candidates and the 
Union does not need to be an obstacle to reaching mutually satisfactory solutions, if “Europe’s” long- term
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However, this author’s analysis suggests that the trade disputes discussed in the last chapter 
and the actual implementation of the liberalisation framework within the EA have served to 
erode Polish trust, damage relations and contribute to not only an ever increasingly 
defensive position from the Poles, but also to policy backsliding in Poland. The Polish 
liberals were increasingly placed in the awkward position of having to argue for a ‘free’ 
trade policy in the face of very different behaviour of Poland’s main trading partner. 
Because of the asymmetry in bargaining power between the associated sides, stemming 
from the nature of the membership application procedure, the weaker Polish partner was 
forced to accept many of the EU’s terms, even if they later proved harmful to its economic, 
social or political interests. Moreover, the way some of the difficult issues were bitterly 
contested as well as their final resolution demonstrated that the EU’s upper hand in the 
accession process was often used as a trump card to pressure the Polish side into conceding, 
and reinforced the Polish conviction that the transition process had become one in which 
the targets set were being imposed from the outside by the dominant Union.
In addition, Poland as a smaller country was unable to use the retaliation technique to 
seriously threaten the Union, as this strategy had the potential to bring about even bigger, 
self- inflicted economic damage as a result of counter-retaliation. Thus even though the 
Union’s often quite domineering demands forced the Polish authorities to stop certain 
practices and accept certain terms of trade, these concessions took place at the price of 
worsening political relations. The Polish side perceived many of the techniques employed 
by the EU to pressure it to accept its requests as exploitation of the EU’s stronger 
bargaining position and, in the words of W Wallace, “highly asymmetrical relationship.” 
The refusal of the member states to put accession as a goal into the preamble of the EA in 
1991 was already an indicator of how the bilateral relations would unfold. Moreover, the 
divergence between the Commission’s generosity and the member states’ minimal 
concessions granted to the candidate forebode how incoherent the Community’s policies 
could be and how unprepared the Union was to send aid to any region outside of the third 
world. In the Polish perception, the tit for tat bargaining which took place during the 
negotiations of the EA pointed to a lack of commitment from the EU’s side to Eastern 
enlargement and transition in general. According to W Wallace,
interests are kept in mind, and if there is sufficient political will on the side of the stronger Union to fulfil the 
objectives aimed to benefit all parties.
235
the negotiations on AAs between the EU and the Polish government during the course o f  
1990-91 were thus a painful and disillusioning experience. The willingness o f  post-socialist 
governments to adopt western models, rebuild and redefine the structures o f  domestic 
sovereignty and the boundaries between 'state ’ and civil society was met by the imposition
o f detailed conditions.5
Publicly, even the chief Polish negotiator J Kulakowski, a man known for his knowledge of 
and many years of experience in the negotiations in ‘Brussels’, called the attitude of the EU 
“arrogant”, questioning whether it was based on “partnership or blackmail.”6 Mayhew also 
blamed the Union on the breakdowns and delays in integration, whereby “the member 
states have continued to be tempted to put short-term national interest before medium term
•j
strategic European interests.” While focusing on the criteria for the candidate rather than 
on any minimal changes required from its side for eventual enlargement, the EU 
demonstrated that it was more interested in securing its own advantages rather than in 
achieving compatibility between transition and accession or providing the kind of declared 
support for the building of market democracy in Poland officially declared in 1990.
The incoherent strategies pursued by the member states and mercantilist approach to trade 
policy making have not only furnished arguments for trade reform reversals in Poland, but 
have provided an example of the methods of managed trade to the Polish candidate. The 
Union’s collectively protectionist policies were criticised by the Polish side as an 
irresponsible model undermining the credibility of the liberal reform attempts in Poland and 
the reformers themselves. Polish economists complained that in responding to protectionist 
pressure at home they have been unable to even look to the Union to provide an example of 
economic openness. Thus, not only have the Polish authorities been faced with having to 
defend their own difficult economic decisions, but they have also had to justify the
5 Wallace, W. (1999). ‘Europe after the cold war: international society or interstate order?’, Review o f  
International Studies, p 10.
6 Unia & Polska. ‘Interview with J Kulakowski’, Nov 1998, No 2.
7 Mayhew, A. (2000). ‘Enlargement of the European Union: An analysis of the negotiations with the Central 
and Eastern European Candidate Countries’, Sussex Working Papers in Contemporary European Studies, No 
39, Sussex: Sussex European Institute, December.
8 Winters ( Ed.) (1994). ibid.
Weidenfeld, W. and Altmann, F. (Ed.) (1995). Central and Eastern Europe on the Way into the European 
Union: problems and prospects o f  integration. Gutersloh: Bertelsmann Foundation Publishers.
Dijck, P. van and Faber, G (Ed.) (2000). The External Dimension of the European Union. The Hague: Kluwar 
Law International.
Ciamaga, L. (Red.) (1997). Zagraniczna Polityka Gospodarcza Polski w teorii ipraktyce dostosowan doUnii 
Europejskiej.Warszawa: SGH, Elipsa.
Mayhew (1998). ibid.
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continuation of liberalisation in face rising protectionism in the EU. To conclude, in the
words of Polish Under-Secretary of State for European Integration, J Pietras,
the Union is partially to be blamed for the backsliding on trade obligations. The 
restrictions and impediments to the Union’s market for our products, in particular 
agricultural goods, have discouraged a large proportion o f  our society from liberal
reforms.
A. Recourse to protectionism
The section below briefly covers some of Polish trade policy reversals and is designed to 
demonstrate that the radical opening of the Polish economy in the days following the 
introduction of the Balcerowicz plan was quickly followed by a swing back towards 
protectionism. The three following sections discuss the interwoven factors most likely 
responsible for these developments.
While the aim of the EA was to cement the political reforms in Poland and help the 
government avoid recidivism in economic policy by committing it to international 
obligations, as R Staar has observed, “Polish authorities have displayed considerable 
ingenuity in exploiting loopholes and circumventing corresponding provisions of respective 
international agreements.”10 Many of these trade policy reversals were discussed in chapter 
six as a part of the ongoing trade disputes and will not be repeated in this section.
The first months of 1990 represented the most open phase of Polish trade policy making 
with an introduction of a far ranging trade liberalisation programme into the transformation 
shock therapy package. This included a new customs law, unification of the exchange rates 
and convertibility of the Zloty and a uniform application of tariffs (see chapter 2).
However, already by June of that year, extra import taxes were placed on consumer 
electronics, and by 1991, the government responded to increasing pressure from various 
sectors by devaluing the Zloty to increase export performance. In August of 1991, a new 
trade regime was introduced counteracting the liberalisation of 1990, and by September, 
outright trade policy reversals began to take place when tariff cuts and duties were 
discontinued.11 The trade regime was step by step becoming increasingly subjected to ‘fine-
9 J Pietras, member of Polish negotiating team of the EA.
Unia & Polska, ‘interview with Pietras’, 6/12/99.
10 Staar, R.F. (1998). Transition to Democracy in Poland. NY: St. Martin's Press, p 4.
11 See Levigne (1995). ibid.
Bobinska (1999). ‘Liberalizacja Handlu Zagranicznego’, w Budzowski, K. and Wydymusa, S. (1999). Handel 
Zagraniczny: metody, problemy, tendencje. Krakow: Akademia Ekonomiczna.
Kaminski, B. (1999). ‘The Role of Foreign Direct Investment and Trade Policies in Poland’s Accession to the 
European Union’, World Bank Technical Paper, No 442, Washington DC: World Bank.
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tuning’ by domestic interests, able to capture the ‘state’ because of large scale deficiencies I 
the institutional structures underpinning the policy making process.
In the early 90’s, there was little knowledge on the Polish side as to which sectors of the 
economy should be protected by tariffs and which ones should be exposed to competition. 
Tariffs and customs were seen as a source of fiscal revenue and a part of the stabilisation 
package and not as tool for protection or as instruments for increasing competitiveness. 
However by 1993, trade policy began to be used to protect domestic producers and respond
• 1 9 *to social demands , and in the next ten years, state intervention has gradually crept back 
into the trade regime. After an initial period of liberal orthodoxy, Polish authorities began 
applying various instruments of trade management, including safeguard clauses, Non Tariff 
Barriers and intransparent measures of export promotion.
In terms of tariff reductions, the trade regime displayed considerable, but differentiated 
liberalisation of imports, with a quick reduction in custom duties on imported industrial 
products, to be entirely abolished by 2000, combined with insignificant reductions in duties 
on imported agricultural products. However, even in industrial products the lower tariffs 
were gradually replaced with various NTB’s, such as national mandatory quality 
certificates, control systems, frontier charges, & export restrictions.
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Institute.
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While B Kaminski has observed that by the standards of highly developed countries, the 
1 ^NTB coverage- ratio in Poland has remained very low (3%, while 16.5% in EU), less 
prevalent and less diversified than in the EU, NTB’s have never-the-less increasingly been 
applied to a number of imported products, such as beverages and tobacco, live animals for 
meat and motor vehicles.
The general doctrine of protection has been to use infant industry and restructuring 
arguments to slow down trade liberalisation, as well as to introduce import surcharges to 
protect ailing Polish industry. The most protected Polish sectors have included agriculture, 
coal, motor vehicles, defence, energy, oil, shipyards, and pharmaceuticals. Moreover, while 
protection was mainly achieved through the application of quotas and other import 
prohibitions, tariff suspensions and exemptions have also been used to controversially 
accomplish other objectives such as the attraction of foreign direct investment.
As far as the application of safeguard clauses provided for in the EA, subsequent Polish 
governments applied the General Safeguard (Art. 30) to protect the motor vehicle sector, 
petrochemical products, oil and the steel industry. The Balance of Payments Clause (Art. 
64) was used to introduce a special import tax, and the Serious Shortage Clause (Art. 31) to 
restrict exports of various products such as skins, leather goods and other steel and iron 
industry products. The Polish authorities also applied the General Exceptions Clause (Art. 
35) to retaliate against the EU’s restrictions on import of even-toed animals, as well as the 
Infant Industry Clause (Art. 112) to impose additional tariffs on telecommunications 
components and equipment. Finally, the Restructuring Clause (art. 112) was formally 
employed to raise tariffs and delay the liberalisation schedule of petrochemical products.
In addition, since 1993, the Polish legal system has evolved to introduce stronger 
contingent protection provisions. In January 1998, a New Customs Code became effective 
which in most respects approximated the EU’s instruments of commercial defence 
regulations14, however, in 1999, a controversial Anti-Dumping bill was introduced, despite 
the fact that the 1998 law had dealt explicitly with contingent protection. None the less the 
ability to carry out the AD investigations by Polish producers did not in effect increase the 
levels of protection between 1990-99, because the exporters, inexperienced, lacking
Kaliszuk, E. and Synowiec, E. (1995). ‘Klauzule Ochrone z Ukladu Europejskiego’. ibid.
13 Percentage of Polish imports subject to NTBs.
Kaminski (1999). ibid., p 16.
14 See Plowiec, U. (1998). ‘Poland’s Preparation for Membership: Foreign Trade Problems’, in Zielinska- 
Glebocka and Stepniak (Ed.) (1998). ibid.
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information on the availability of this form of protection as well as deficient in lobbying 
skills, rarely attempted to defend their interest in this way.15 
The issue of subsidies, competition policy and state aids have continued to remain 
contentious in the accession negotiations, never the less, in these areas, the Polish trade 
regime has been progressing consistently towards legal harmonisation with the acquis and 
application of the Union’s standards and practices, and could thus be considered stable.
In general the Polish trade regime has displayed policy making on a case by case approach, 
lacking a single, long term and coherent strategy of liberalisation. Moreover, the 
institutions of the trade regime had not been built around a functional and transparent 
framework, constraining both inappropriate rent-seeking activities16 and policymaker’s 
responses to them. According to the World Bank, the institutional design of the foreign 
trade policy process in Poland is not conducive to sound policies and the process of policy 
formulation has been increasingly captured by narrow sectoral interests. Although the trade 
regime is not NTB ridden, the temptation to resort to NTB has been on the rise, as private 
lobbying activities, conducted outside of any legal framework, have intensified.17 Due to 
the lack of regulation of these rent-seeking activities, the element of uncertainty and 
unpredictability of the changes in trade policy making has grown.
In sum each subsequent government, following the first Liberalisers, has reacted in an 
inconsistent manner to pressure from both domestic lobbies and to the requirements of the 
EA and WTO membership, and as Kaminski has summarised, “the focus of foreign trade 
policy has been on finding ways of maintaining if not increasing protection in face of
1 ftdeclining border protection as required by international treaties.” Moreover, when the 
authorities did rely on formal application of protection by calling on the EA, the EU side 
made its disapproval apparent, contributing to the rising tendency in Poland to seek 
protection outside of transparent and institutionalised mechanism provided for by 
international institutions. By the mid- nineties there was an apparent shift in policy making 
to a grater use of non- border protection as a substitute for lowered tariffs.
15 Kawecka- Wyrzykowska, E. (Ed.) (1995). ibid.
Gawlikowska- Hueckel, K. (Red.)(1999). Polska- Unia Europejska: Problemy prawne I ekonomiczne. 
Gdansk: Uniwesytet Gdanski.
16 Corruption based. Powerful interconnections between industry, finance, media and politics which lead to 
blackmail, bribery, buy off, backhanded enticements, etc...
17 Kaminski (1999). Ibid.
18 Kaminski (1999). ibid., p 198.
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J Michalek, for example, pointed out that
the application o f safeguard clauses by Poland can be regarded as a manifestation o f  
backsliding in the trade liberalisation policy, these delays in liberalisation were policy 
steps explicitly foreseen in the EA and thus could not be treated as illegal or unfairJ9
In the overwhelming majority of cases, where the Polish side did endeavour to apply 
transparent instruments of protection, it met the formal criteria necessary for application of 
a given clause. In addition, the government never raised its tariffs above the level of bound 
duties contained in the WTO schedule of concessions, and the extent of safeguard clauses 
applied was quite limited in time and scope. The most ambiguous cases concerned 
agriculture, where, the Polish authorities did often increase protection under powerful 
pressure from the farmers’ lobbying groups.
Because subsequent governing coalitions have attempted to continue the fa9ade of 
liberalisation in order to meet international obligations, much of the policy backtracking 
has taken place through NTB’s and other measures of administrative control. Powerful 
vested interests, with strong ties to the ruling governments, have blocked policy reform or 
configured them to the benefit of a relatively narrow group in the population. Corruption, in 
turn, has distorted the administrative responses to domestic pressures, allowing bureaucrats 
to intervene in areas where they should not, while undermining their capacity to act 
efficiently in those areas where their attention was urgently needed, such as export 
promotion, industrial policies or the enforcement of competition policy.
The overall development of the Polish trade regime has revolved around ad hoc 
management of quotas and tariff exemptions (procedural protection), as well as an 
intransparent and unpredictable structure of tariffs. These instruments, by granting erratic 
favours of duty free import for some while restricting the access for others, not only 
displayed signs of mercantilist policy making but, in addition, create a patronage 
relationship between the government and the affected firms. They have thus not only 
reversed many of the early liberalisation efforts, a highly regrettable development, but 
simultaneously contributed to increasing illicit rent-seeking activities and corruption in 
Polish regime trade, reinforcing the dysfunctional policy formulation environment.
19 Michalek (2000). ibid, p 115.
20 The variation of tariff rates, diversified custom schedules and administrative complexity increase the 
discretion of the bureaucracy, and inevitably the lack of transparency opens the door to corruption. Tariff 
exemptions (duty suspensions) and quotas are granted by the government for a limited period of time and in 
Poland have covered a wide range of products, including pesticides, electronic equipment, lightening 
equipment, building materials and medical equipment.
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Incomplete economic reform during the initial phase of reform, characterised by neglect of 
institutional and regulatory frameworks, contributed to the capture of the weak state by 
powerful economic interests, particularly the ‘winners’ of this early phase. This, in turn, 
played a significant part in concentrating market power within a very narrow group of
7 Ibeneficiaries, able and willing to prevent further reform or even instigate policy reversals. 
II. Economic Explanations for Trade Reversals
Economic explanations as to why a nation would raise its levels of protection after initially 
lowering them centre on arguments of transaction costs. According to economic theory, a 
country chooses to protect its industry for either one of three reasons; to improve the 
difficulties associated with a deteriorating trade balance and balance of payments situation, 
to strategically protect its infant industries, or to retaliate against unfair behaviour of the 
trading partner. In the Polish case, all three reasons were present and were used by various 
governments to justify the increasing levels of protection.
Table 7.1 Foreign Balance of Trade of CEE’s with the European Union 1995 and 2000
Country Trade in mln ECU/euro
1995 2000
Bulgaria -217 -162
Estonia -461 -42
Lithuania -50 -410
Latvia 184 -138
Poland -3058 -10549
Czech Rep -2660 -2401
Rumania -405 -1090
Slovakia -105 343
Slovenia -934 -1844
Hungary -1120 -1280
Total -8827 -17572
Source: “Handel Polski z Unia Europejska w okresie obowizywania, Ukladu Europejskiego”,
RCSS, Warszawa 2002.
In the words of economist R Baldwin, “showing a substantial trade deficit, or failure of 
exports and imports to grow at approximately the same rate from a particular base period, is
• 79 •regarded as sufficient evidence to warrant raising protection.” Thus, the competitive 
pressures stemming from imports combined with rising unemployment can explain the
23frequent withdrawals by the Polish government from commitments adopted under the EA.
Kaminski (1999). ibid., pp 17-18.
21 EBRD, Transition Report 1998
22 Baldwin (1988) Trade Policy in a Changing World Economy. London: Harvester- Wheatsheaf, p 255.
23 Orlowski (1997). ‘Polskie Przedsiebiorstwa a Jednolity Rynek Unii Europejskiej: koszty i korzysci’, ibid., p
1 1 .
242
Because the first liberal government liberalised too soon, many Polish producers were 
effectively wiped out before they even had time to adjust to the changing environment. In 
addition, while the EA was designed to support the transition process in Poland24, by 
providing an outlet for Polish producers to sell their products once demand fell on the 
domestic market and increasing inflows of capital investment, the development of trade 
relations during association did not meet these textbook expectations.
As the number of Polish enterprises recording net losses grew and production plummeted, 
the dilemma faced by subsequent authorities revolved around what to do with firms 
recording losses while at the same time continuing market reforms and not reneging on 
international agreements. In addition, the opening of the Polish market to EU enterprises 
took place without adequate financial assistance from the EU25, and as K Popowicz has 
observed “the principle of asymmetry declared in the EA, under this kind of disproportional 
economic potential, could not have been a barrier to the growth of a huge trade deficit.” 
Because the process of restructuring has been unusually difficult in Poland, it has been 
crucial that the government carry out the reforms under conditions of high economic 
growth, enabling it to provide social safety nets to compensate the losers for their 
adjustment costs. Enforcing large-scale competition, required for the leap from state to 
market, on the other hand, has had negative effects on both growth and stability. Although 
the growing transition difficulties should be attributed to both internal and external factors, 
there is no doubt that the liberalisation schedule within the EA as well as its actual 
implementation contributed to multiplying the problems. According to Belka et al., “the 
radical changes in demand which took place as a result of the speed of integration and 
liberalisation processes with the Communities contributed in Poland to the symptomatic 
appearance a recession.” The recession, in turn, coupled with a sudden surge of imports
24 To ease the short-term costs of transition, provide an outlet for Polish products once internal demand fell 
due to transition recession and assist the Polish authorities in jump-starting the economy following the 
introduction of shock therapy.
See chapter two.
25 As was granted to Spain, Portugal or Greece in previous enlargements.
See Inotai, A. (1998) ‘Eastern Enlargement: Benefits for the European Union’, in Studja Europejskie, CEUW, 
No 3, Vol 7, Warsaw: CEUW.
Padoan, PC. (1994). ‘The Changing European Political Economy’, in Stubbs and Underhill (Ed.) (1994). ibid.
26 Popowicz, K. (1999). ‘Polska- UE: trzy scenariusze’, w Kolarska-Bobinska (Red.) (1999). Ibid., p 341.
27 More difficult than in the other CEE due to the larger scale of the problems.
28 Belka, M., Hausner, J., Jasinski, L., Marody, M. and Zirk-Sadowski, M. (Ed.) (1997). The Polish 
Transformation from the Perspectives o f European Integration, EU Monitoring, ibid., p 32.
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raised the benefits, both economic and political, that subsequent governing coalitions had to 
gain from reneging on parts of international trade agreements negotiated by the Liberals.29 
While increasing competition on the Polish market, the EA did not provide the incentives 
and opportunities to increase Poland’s international competitiveness or the conditions for 
export- led growth. This was mainly due to the implementation of the trade liberalisation 
schedule which proved to be more favourable to the Union than to the weaker candidate, as 
well as to the EU’s intensifying application of contingent protection, restrictive rules of 
origin and little progress made on the free movement of services and labour (discussed in 
chapter five).
It could even be argued that the terms of trade provided under the EA did not create a level 
playing field for Polish firms and that the attention paid to microeconomic enterprise 
adjustment in Poland or to the domestic social ramifications of the liberalisation process 
was not adequate. The years of association have indeed proved that Polish firms have not 
been sufficiently prepared for the radical trade opening as envisage under the EA, and that
A
the Agreement has done little to overcome this situation , maybe even perpetuating the 
backwards composition of the Polish export structure. According to K Marczewski, for 
example, the strong penetration of the Polish market by EU high-tech products in the early 
90’s led to the destruction of many important Polish sectors, such as electronics, necessary 
for the modernisation of production networks. Marczewski concluded that, “this had the 
effect of cementing the command economic structure of commodity trade and solidifying
o 1
backward production, leading to a trade deficit with a structural, long-term character.”
In conclusion, the initially premature liberalisation of the trade regime combined with 
restricted access for sensitive products to Poland’s main market and indispensable outlet as 
well as application of CP by the EU had negative consequences for macroeconomic 
stability in Poland, income distribution, government revenues and employment levels and 
contributed to the deterioration of national industry and agriculture. All of these 
developments can partially explain Polish trade policy reversals.
29 Dixit, A.K. (1996). The Making o f Economic Policy: a transaction-cost politics perspective. Cambridge, 
Mass, London: MIT Press, p 78.
30 See Kawecka- Wyrzykowska (1997). Stosunki. ibid.
Kawecka Wyrzykowska 91997). ‘Effects of the EA on Polish Economy and Pre-accession Challenges’, in 
Studja Europejsie. ibid.
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A. Strategic Trade Policy
Normative economic theory, and in particular New International Economics and Strategic 
Trade Policy, can also be used to explain rising levels of protection in the Polish trade 
regime. The justifications for rising protection centre around efficiency considerations, such 
as those espoused to by the newly growing literature on strategic intervention.32 While 
upholding the case that free trade is optimal, new trade theories relax the assumptions as to 
‘ideal’ economic conditions and allot for intervention under very specific circumstances. As 
such, these theories do not neglect issues such as unemployment, adjustment costs or factor 
mobility, making their economic prescriptions more appropriate for transition economic, 
than the more traditional neo-liberal variants.
According to these arguments, and those supported by the author, even from an economic 
point of view it made sense for Poland, as a state in transition, to establish slower, more 
gradual, but consistent liberalisation instead of rapid and complete trade opening followed 
by policy reversals. Temporary protection could have been granted to the sensitive sectors 
to allow the to effectively adjust, restructure and increase national competitiveness.
Strategic Trade policy, maintains that “the case for free trade does not require complete
33laissez faire”, and that “theories should not be judged independently of their application”. 
Conditions, such as transition, where externalities are present, might not represent instances 
where laissez faire is a good idea. For example, while export growth creates jobs by 
expanding demand for certain products and thus increasing demand for the supply of 
labour, and the opposite is true for the growth of a trade deficit. This effect is exacerbated 
in an environment of rapid restructuring and liberalisation of an entire economic system. 
Under conditions of transition, in addition, adjustment costs are particularly high, and there 
are large market distortions contributing to wage and price rigidities, as well as general 
domestic factor immobility. Modem Trade Theory suggests that temporary protection, in 
such a case, is a superior alternative to permanent or inconsistent protection.
According to this author’s analysis, the Polish conditions represent a case in which 
temporary deviation from a completely open trade policy would have been more desirable
31 Marczewski, K. (1992). ‘Wspolpraca gospodarcza z zagranica w okresie transformacji’, in Zienkowski, L. 
(Red.). (1992). Gospodarka Polska w Latach 1990-1992: doswiadczenia i wnioski. Warszawa: GUS i PAN, p 
120.
32 Corden, Krugman, Lancaster, Helpman, Brander and Spencer
33 Dillon, P., Lehman, J. and Willett, T. (1990). ‘Assessing the Usefulness of International Trade Theory for 
Policy Analysis’, in Odell, J.S. and Willett, T.D. (Ed.) (1990). International trade policies: gains from  
exchange between economics and political science. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, pp 24- 25.
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than rapid liberalisation followed by reversals. Intervention was needed to help the 
government avoid a long-term structural current account and trade deficit and break the 
vicious cycles of industrial decline, coupled with rising unemployment. In this type of 
situation, a government, due to complex reform dilemmas and multiplied problems, is 
forced to adopt short- term, ad hoc policy management in order to avert a political or 
economic crisis.34 As a result, modernisation is stalled and competitiveness cannot budge. 
Selective and transparent liberalisation in contrast to radical opening followed by ad hoc 
policy reversals, could have contributed to evading these developments, boosting long­
term and viable liberalisation.
Strategic trade policy provides the rationale for domestic protection under circumstances of 
revitalisation purposes, when a sector is affected by imports and the protection can increase 
its competitiveness for a temporary amount of time, or as phase down protection, to limit 
job losses and the concentration of social and other transaction costs in a sector that does 
not have a Comparative Advantage and will remain uncompetitive. In Poland, the speed 
and scope of the transition and internationalisation changes provided rationale for both of 
these types of protection.
Liberalisation caused major shocks to an overwhelming part of Polish enterprises, 
households, regions and sectors. Those that were able to effectively adjust remained a 
minority, while those that witnessed falling income and standards of living, a rising
♦ *5 cmajority. The sectors hurt most by the excessive opening up included steel, machinery 
equipment, electronics, chemical synthesis, transport vehicles, processed agricultural 
goods, coal mining, shipbuilding, textiles, defence industry, fuels and electrical energy. 
Under the pressures of liberalisation, these industries were unable to modernise and fell trap 
to the vicious circle of debt and delays in restructuring. In the electronic industry, for 
example, the Polish producers were initially doing quite well and had considerable 
accomplishments, but the government liberalised prematurely, and most of the national 
producers were destroyed before even having a chance to adjust. These kinds of 
experiences led subsequent governing coalitions to avoid repeating the experience, and 
arguments for re-introducing various protective measures gained ground even in liberal
34 Orlowski (1997). ibid.
35 See for ex Eatwell, J., Ellman, M., Karlsson, M., Nuti, D. M. and Shapiro, J. (1997). ibid.
Belka, M., Hausner, J., Jasinski, L., Marody, M. and Zirk-Sadowski, M. (Ed.) (1997). ibid.
Milic-Czemiak, R. (1998). Gospodarstwa Domowe w Krajach Europy Srodkowej: skutkiprzemian 1990- 
1995. Warszawa: Wydawnictwo IFiS PAN.
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policy circles. For these economists, the authorities were able, from both an economic and a 
political/social point of view, to justify the increasing domestic protection.
Never the less, strategic trade instruments were not explicitly provided for in the Europe 
Agreement and consequently were criticised by the EU side when the Polish authorities 
suggested their application. At the beginning the transformation, the first Polish 
governments did not engage in an active industrial or strategic trade policy, nor did the EA 
require them to. When it became obvious that the market itself would not increase Poland’s 
competitiveness and the EA was insufficient in providing the incentives and opportunities 
to modernise the Polish export structure, in 1993, the Ministry of Industry began to develop 
a strategic policy programme.
However, the Union’s technical and financial assistance and institutional guidance did little 
to aid the Polish authorities in preparing a complex and coherent policy-mix programme. In 
addition, when the Polish side argued for the slowing down of liberalisation schedule under 
the EA, using the same rhetoric as employed by the Union for over three decades to 
restructure its own industry, gradually increasing its effectiveness behind protective 
barriers38, their demands were met with unwarranted criticism from the Union.39 What’s 
more, while the Polish authorities’ use of the infant industry clause, for example, was 
successful in improving competitiveness in several key sectors, the EU side continued to 
disapprove, leading to various disputes in the Association Council. In the motor vehicle 
sector, for instance, under the new protective barriers, motor production did expand 
significantly and by 1998 was attracting 23% of Poland’s foreign investment.40 
Subsequent governing coalitions in Poland maintained that without protection and extra 
time allowed to give ailing industries extensive state aids, domestic producers would never 
be able to increase their labour productivity and thus would have no way of competing with 
European firms on the internal market. For example, sectors such as telecommunications
36 Orlowski (1997). ibid., p 32.
37 For example, agriculture and textiles were left completely unprotected although neither sector was prepared 
for the competition to come, and, by 1993, almost all state farms went bankrupt or were liquidated. Similarly, 
the textile industry based in Lodz witnessed total destruction with only a few firms surviving the protracted 
years of association; and only two managing to successfully restructure and remain commercially active. 
Hausner, J. and Marody M. (Ed.) (1999). Three Polands: The Potential for and Barriers to Integration with 
the EU, EU Monitoring III Warsaw: Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, p 93.
Hausner, J., Marody, M., Wilkin, J., Wojtyna, A. and Zirk-Sadowski, M. (Ed.) (1998). Accession or 
Integration? Poland’s Road to the European Union, EU Monitoring II. Warsaw: Friedrich Ebert Stiftung.
38 Orlowski, (1997). Ibid., p 20.
39 Michalek (1997). ibid.
See chapter six.
40 WTO (2001). Trade Policy Review Poland 2000. ibid., pp 104-105.
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required additional protection and investment to enable them to develop sufficiently before 
being opened up to global forces and consequently better cope with the strong pressures of 
international competition.41 Likewise, the protection of the petroleum and energy sector 
was justified by the necessity to restructure, bring in investment and eventually privatise. 
Protecting the iron and steel industry was on the other hand was warranted by phase down 
protection42, while revitalisation purposes could warrant the protection of the agricultural 
sector.43 By 1998, 27% of the Polish labour force was still actively employed in agriculture, 
and the huge trade deficit that had developed with the EU was contributing to rising levels 
of bankruptcy not only among the previously state owned farms, but also among small and 
medium sized farms, unable to effectively compete with subsidised EU products. Thus, 
even though the Polish farmers had a comparative advantage, due to cheaper labour and 
output costs, as well as more ‘ecological’ methods of production, they were unable to take 
advantage of the leverage, due to the restrictive nature of agricultural market access to the 
Union under the EA.44
On the issue of export subsidies, credits and state aids for the promotion of export growth, 
Marczewski pointed out that, “Poland has also been under constant pressure from the EU 
pushing it to eliminate these instruments of industrial policy and consequently, lowering the
41 Orlowski (1997). ibid.
Narekiwewicz, J. (1999). ‘Zmiany w systemie funkcjonowania polskiego handlu zagranicznego w drugiej 
polowie lat dzieidziesiatych’, w Budzowski, K. and Wydymusa, S. (Red.) (1999). ibid.
Ministry of the Economy. (1999). ‘A Conception of the Medium-term Development of the Country Until the 
Year 2002’, Government Document, Warsaw: Ministry of Economy.
Council of Ministers, Republic of Poland (2000). Raport w Sprawie Korzysci i Kosztow Integracji 
Rzeczposolitej Polski z Unia Europejska. Warsaw: Council of Ministers.
Council of Ministers, Republic of Poland (various years). The National Programme o f Preparation for  
Membership in the European Union. Warsaw: Council of Ministers.
42 This sector has remained one of the biggest employers in Poland, providing for 90,000 jobs in the Silesia 
region alone. Privatisation has been highly problematic, due to the high share of production by State Owned 
Enterprises. The government approved redundancy scheme and high social and economic costs have been 
further exacerbated by fiscal constraints and the EU’s state aid restrictions.
Ministry of the Economy (various years). National Programme for Polish Steel and Iron Industry 
Restructurisation. Warsaw: Ministry of the Economy.
Miklaszewski, S. (1998). ‘Polska Wobec Reformy Unii Europejskiej’, MCRD zeszyt, Nr 26, Krakow: MCRD.
43 According to strategic trade policy arguments, if trade liberalisation contributes to a growing deficit and 
leads to the loss of work for thousands of farmers who might never be able find another job, the state is 
justified in abandoning its liberal philosophy and instead actively engaging selective protection to arrest the 
development of permanent structural unemployment.
Winters, LA. (2000). ‘Trade, Liberalisation and Poverty’, Poverty Research Unit Discussion Paper, No 7, 
Sussex: SEI.
44 Especially, the EU’s continued application of contingent protection, export subsidies and limiting/ rigid 
quota system.
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ability of Poland to develop high tech production and intra -firm trade.”45 Thus, while, the 
Union pressed hard for restructuring if Polish industry, it did not help to speed up the 
process through its extensive use of Anti-dumping measures against Polish producers, low 
levels of pre-accession funds and competition and state aids rules that were probably too 
strict from the point of view of transition 46
In sum, the initial underdevelopment of a coherent industrial and strategic trade policies in 
Poland could explain the over-reliance of Polish authorities on non- tariff protection and the 
development of a policy formulation environment characterised by arbitrary law 
enforcement and intransparent and frequent changes.47 The initial negligence of a 
comprehensive policy- mix, combined with the belief that restructuring would happen on 
its own accord gave rise to major socio-economic and political problems which would take 
years to resolve and increased pressure from Polish domestic interests group to slow down 
the opening up of the economy. Thus instead of applying warranted and transparent trade 
defence instruments, such as those stemming from New Trade Theories, the Polish 
government instead ended up reacting to various crises situations and protecting sectors 
such as steel or agriculture which represented the loudest voices in the social protests. This, 
in turn, contributed to the uncertainty of the decision-making apparatus, inconsistency in 
policy making and an incoherent trade regime.
45 Marczewski, K. (1992). ‘Wspolpraca gospodarcza z zagranica w okresie transformacji’, w Zienkowski, L. 
(Red.). (1992). ibid., p 138.
See also, Neider- Marcinek, D. ( 1999). ‘Nowe Warunki Dostaw w Handlu Zagranicznym’, w Budzowski i 
Wydymusa (Red.) (1999). ibid.
46 See Pelkmans, J., Gros, G. and Nunez Ferrer, J. (2000). ‘Long Run Economic Aspects of the European 
Union’s Eastern Enlargement’, WRR Working Documents, No 109, The Hague: WRR Scientific Council for 
Government Policy.
Zielinska- Glebocka, A. (1998). ‘Industrial Competitiveness Policy of the European Union. Meeting the 
Challenges of a Stronger and Wider Europe’, in Zielinska- Glebocka and Stepniak (Ed.) (1998). ibid. 
Orlowski, W. (1998). ‘Poland and structural funds: a short list of regional problems’, in Zielinska- Glebocka 
and Stepniak (Ed.) (1998). ibid.
Blanchard, O.J., Froot, K. and Sachs, J. (1994). The Transition in Eastern Europe. National Bureau o f 
Economic Research Project Report. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Pawlas, I. and Tendera-Wlaszczuk, T. (1999). Poland’s Economy Competitiveness with Respect to the 
Integration with the European Union. Warsaw: University Centre for Europe, Warsaw University.
Preston (1998). ‘Poland and EU Membership’, ibid.
Sedelmeier, U. (1994). ‘The EU’s Association Policy Towards Central and Eastern Europe: political and 
economic rationales in conflict’, SEI working report, No 7.
Smith, A., Holmes, P, Sedelmeier, U., Wallace, H. and Young A. (1995). ‘The European Union and Central 
Eastern Europe: Pre- Acession strategies’, Sussex European Institute Working paper, No 15, Sussex: Sussex 
European Institute.
Wallace, H.S. (1998).‘Coming to Terms with a Larger Europe: Options for economic integration’, SEI 
working paper, January.
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III. Political explanations
While the economic passages above have shown how the repercussions of trade 
liberalisation within the framework of the EA can be used to explain Polish trade policy 
backsliding, this section, in turn, demonstrates that many of the policy reversals can also be 
partially attributed to political factors on the international level and issues such as 
retaliation, reciprocity, and fairness in trade relations.
As the 90’s progressed, relations gradually deteriorated, as a result of the crisis in trade 
disputes, discussed in chapter six, between Poland and the EU. Many of the details of the 
disputes leaked out on to the media and as R Baldwin has pointed out, “because typically 
the news media tend to give wide and sympathetic circulation to their own countries view 
point, the disputes quickly became a matter of national pride.”48
The number of incidences suggesting a lack of strong outside support from the Union and 
signalling competing motives from the individual member states increased the risk of 
Poland reversing its initially open trade policies. The protectionist bias in the EU’s CCP, 
documented in chapter six, made political arguments for protection a formidable force in 
determining policy outcomes in Poland. Although further liberalisation on the EU’s side, in 
the 90’s, would certainly have eased the pressure for protection in the candidate, the 
Union’s continued demands that Poland open up, while simultaneously restricting access to 
its own markets was perceived by the Polish side as expectation of unilateral adjustment. In 
addition, the belief that the domestic reforms were being coerced through from the outside 
by the EU began to dominate public opinion and the ‘Europe’ debate began to be used by 
Polish opposition parties for internal reasons.
It was perceived by the Polish side, that in order to avoid EU markets being destabilised by 
increasing supplies of cheaper Polish products, the member states expected Poland to limit 
production in the sensitive sectors already characterised by surpluses; namely coal, steel, 
agriculture and chemicals. Through this behaviour, the Union strengthened the Polish 
conviction that its pre-accession strategy was not based on a balanced assessment of what 
was best for the future EU as a whole, but rather on what was in fact in the short-term 
interest of the current member states.
47 It is also worth mentioning that even after the official industrial policy documents had been passed through 
legislature, these instruments were used minimally, due to serious budget deficit problems and fiscal policy 
constraints.
48 Baldwin (1988). ibid., p 257.
250
Thus, when examining the political implications of the trade liberalisation experiences
under the EAs, one is tempted to agree with Csaba that,
while the agreements have indeed been legally binding, they have never the less been 
politically damaging and have led to piecemeal policy reversals in the candidates. The 
E A ’s have only played a marginal role in the process o f reform in the candidates and have
served as insufficient anchors. 49
The failure of the EU to live up to its initial political commitments reinforced the image of 
a self-interested and protectionist Union, and weakened the position of the liberal reformers 
within Polish politics. Moreover, the restrictions encouraged retaliatory responses from the 
Polish side, and as W Orlowski observed, “by limiting imports but encouraging exports, 
and thus exporting unemployment to Poland, the EU has itself directly contributed to policy 
reversals in the Polish trade regime.”50
A. Political relations under association
Because the Union has had such a far ranging influence over many of the most important 
domestic decisions in Poland, its credibility as a fair and equitable partner has been crucial 
in legitimising the liberal reforms as well as affecting the outcome and performance of the 
economic measures themselves. The Commission has had a say over not only the Polish 
trade liberalisation schedule under the EA, but over many other key policy areas such as 
restructuring, industrial and competition policy and privatisation. The importance of how 
these EU strategies were presented to the Polish side, in another words the image factor, 
was clearly demonstrated by the impact that the disputes have had on political relations 
(discussed in chapter six), and, in turn, on the policy responses from Polish authorities. As 
Bhagwatti has claimed,
it is hard enough to cope with the demise o f an industry in pursuit o f  the gains from trade i f  
another country has a market determined advantage. But i f  the foreign industry is backed 
by artificial support from its governments, that often raises the angry question offairness.51
The difficulty of separating trade liberalisation within the framework of association from 
the concurring accession negotiations further complicates the assessment of the impact of 
the EA or Polish-EU political relations on economic policy-making Poland. The two 
concurring processes have been inseparable in the Polish debate over Europe, disputes over 
trade concessions coinciding with bigger issues of future budgetary repercussions or
49 Csaba (1994). ‘The Political Economy of Trade Regimes’, in Winters ( Ed.) (1994). ibid., p 68.
50 Orlowski (1997). ibid., p 18.
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transition periods after membership. The already tense atmosphere in Poland over the 
problematic developments in trade relations was further antagonised by the difficulties 
encountered in the accession negotiations themselves and served to reinforce the Polish 
conviction that the EU was unwilling to accommodate Polish interests.
In the Polish side’s perception of the evolving relationship, integration has been 
characterised by discriminatory conditions set out by the Union and to be accepted by the 
candidate. Moreover, the apprehension has grown that not only has the principle of 
asymmetry been trampled upon throughout association, but the criteria for accession itself 
has been considerably higher than under previous enlargements. The chief politicians 
responsible for EU affairs during the period of 1997-2001, J Kulakowski and J Saryusz- 
Wolski have both publicly displayed their personal disapproval of the EU’s position, 
calling the Union’s expectations of Poland’s acquiescence a double standard. They have 
argued that, the present candidates for EU membership have not had the same flexible 
options to opt out of areas of the acquis as in previous enlargements and at the same time 
have not received the same level of transfers in exchange for opening up their economies. 
While before, trade barriers to the candidates’ market were totally eliminated only after 
accession, and so membership was seen as a reward for liberalisation, this time it has been 
expected of the candidates to fully open up without the secured benefits. Mayhew has 
echoed this sentiment by observing that, “the Berlin decision (Agenda 2000) suggests that 
the member states were trying to demonstrate that enlargement could be achieved at 
minimum cost to the Union.”53
In fact, the Union was demanding that the candidates take on many of the obligations of 
membership, prior to being granted the privileges, such as introducing migration 
restrictions or taking on the Common Commercial Policy, even though these might have 
been detrimental to an economy undergoing radical systemic reform and requiring a 
minimum level of elasticity. J Saryusz-Wolski remarked that, “so far the flexibility is 
lacking, and it seems that the EU wants to apply very strict rules, while receiving all 
innovative proposals with reservations.”54
51 Bhagwati, J.N. (1988). Protectionism: The Ohlin lectures. Cambridge, Mass., London: MIT Press, p 36.
52 Saruysz-Wolski, J. (2000). ‘EU Enlargement- East European Perceptions’, International Yearbook o f  
Centre d ’lnformacio I  Documetnacio Internationales a Barcelona. Barcelona.
53 Myhew, A. (2001). Enlargement and the Community Budget, Warsaw: UKIE, 2 March.
54 Saruysz-Wolski, J. (2001). ‘The Enlargement of the European Union- The Current State of affairs: The 
view from Poland’, speech given at ESCA Forum, Brussels, December.
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He also observed, for example, that while the EU has been very harsh in demanding and 
forcing through the programmes for restructuring in Polish industry, especially with regard 
to state aids and competition policy, it has simultaneously continued to apply AD 
procedures not used amongst the member states that have fully complied with the rules. By 
2000, the EU was still applying AD measures. In addition, the Union has been unwilling to 
agree to a “flexibility” clause for state aids, in even though this would have been justified 
through the experience of the New Bundeslander as well as by the objective needs of an 
economy undergoing transformation.
Finally, certain parts of the association process such as the Accession Partnerships were not
even agreed upon by both sides, but were instead imposed upon the Polish government,
which was expected to unilaterally adjust or risk losing EU funding and approval. In the
words of A Mayhew, advisor to the Polish government and negotiating team,
both the strengthened notions o f  conditionality as well as the insistence on verification o f 
the acquis depart from previous enlargements raising the threshold to membership and 
demanding more o f the candidates than was in the past. While previously conditionality 
has been often imposed, usually at least a facade o f agreement by the recipient state was 
preserved, and that verification has been an attempt to create 'perfect member states ’, with 
higher levels o f  compliance required from the candidates than from existing member
states.55
By presenting the Polish side with stringent, inelastic criteria the member states have often 
ignored the gravity of Polish social fears and apprehensions, while simultaneously 
invocating their own public moods and emotions to justify lengthy post- accession 
transition periods for the candidate. This has been particularly true of the behaviour of 
Germany and Austria over liberalisation in services and labour mobility.56 These
55 Mayhew (2000). ‘Enlargement of the European Union’ An analysis of the negotiations with the Central and 
Eastern European Candidate Countries’, ibid.
56 Germany and Austria have insisted on the longest transition period (7 years) for free labour mobility after 
enlargement, based on social fears of cheap eastern migrants flooding national labour markets; apprehensions 
yet to be substantiated by any relevant report. Germany and Austria have also demanded a five year transition 
period before the Polish cabotage/ transport firms can freely provide their services on the internal market, 
Austria demanding transition periods for construction services, cleaning and laundry, mechanical/repair 
services, gardening, beauty salon services, printing, medical sector, and other such sectors where Poland has 
an obvious comparative advantage.
Boswell, C. (2000). ‘Study on Unfounded Migration’, R1IA Paper, London: RIIA.
European Commission (2001). The Free Movement o f  Workers in the Context o f Enlargement, Brussels: EC, 
March.
European Commission (2000). Report: Employment in Europe 2000, Brussles: EC.
PAP. ‘interview with R Prodi’, 06/03/01.
Unia & Polska. 11/99, No 23.
OBOP ‘study 28-30/10/00’, in Gazeta Wyborcza. Praca- tak, ziemia- nie’, 08/12/00.
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developments as well as the norm compulsion that has rarely taken into account the 
specificity of transformation have served to reinforce the Polish belief that the EU expects 
Poland to adjust unilaterally, if it wants to be granted membership, leading to the 
expectation “that in the future Union Polish interests would be further marginalised.”57 
In sum, the Union’s failure to live up to its commitments provided material to Poland’s 
media to portray the EU as malign rather than benevolent. Relying on many of the 
contentious issues described in previous sections, the Polish press, both liberal and 
nationalistic, has been able to present the EU collectively as dominating in the negotiations. 
The Commission has been portrayed as commanding, ordering, designating, pressuring, 
urging, wanting, demanding, requiring and insisting. Hardly ever has the Commission been 
seen as yielding, conceding, permitting or allowing the Polish side to act as it deemed 
essential for an economy in transformation, rather treating Polish propositions with cold 
reservation.58
It is important to point out, never-the-less, that the media coverage has implied that this has 
not necessarily been the fault of the Commission itself, which has had to answer for its 
policies to the member states. This presentation of the unbalanced relationship between the 
member states and the Commission was particularly evident in the depiction of the steel 
dispute59, when, the press maintained that it was the moderate Commission that was asking 
for compromises from the much more unyielding member states, who were demanding 
tougher rules and bigger concessions from the Polish side.
In the meantime, Poland has been described as a petitioner, a powerless aspirant, that must 
unconditionally and unilaterally comply with the Union’s requirements. The Polish side has 
been depicted as feebly demanding, asking for and attempting, trying to convince, begging
Rzeczpospolia. ‘Szlaban na piec lat’, 21/03/01.
Rzeczpospolita. ‘Za praca po 2007 roku’, 11/01/01.
Gazeta Wyborcza. ‘Uslugi z przeszkodami’, 16/05/01.
57 See Kolarska-Bobinska, L. i Kucharczyk, J. (1999). ‘Negocjacje z Unia Europejska- opinie Polakow’, w 
Kolarska-Bobinska (Red.) (1999). Polska Eurodebata. ibid.
Skotnicka-Illasiewicz, E. (1998). ‘Poland on its Way Towards Membership of the EU and NATO: Hopes and 
Anxieties in a view of Public Opinion Polls’, in Yearbook o f Polish European Studies, Vol 2, Warsaw: 
WUCE.
Kucia, M (1999). Public Opinion in Central Europe on EU Accession’, Journal of Common Market Studies, 
Vol 37, No 1, March.
Kuklinski, A. and Pawlowska, K. (Red.) (1998). Kreowanie Obrazu Polski wSwiecie, Tom II. Nowy Sacz: 
Wyzsza Szkola Biznesu.
58 Lubienski, M. (1999) ‘Polska-Unia, Analiza prasy’, in Kolarska-Bobinska, L. (Ed.) (1999). Polska 
Eurodebata. Warszawa: Instytut Spraw Publicznych, pp 277-296.
See also Unia & Polska, various issues.
59 See chapter six
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and getting on its knees, vocabulary as extreme as colonisation or dictatorship even being 
used, putting in doubt in the whole idea of partnership and cooperation in the eyes of Polish 
public opinion.60
In the media, the lethal trade deficit argument has been combined with issues ranging from 
legal harmonisation or compliance with the EU’s state aids and competition policies to 
observations over the proportionally minuscule and inflexible pre-accession budget, 
questions over future access to the direct payments and structural funds, the Schengen visa 
arrangements and other contentious points, contributing to Polish doubts whether it will not 
be effectively be granted second class membership.
Agriculture and restructuring of heavy industry, particularly the various difficulties 
encountered by Polish farmers when exporting to the Union, have provided fertile ground 
for rationalising populist rhetoric and public fears associated with accession. In 1998, for 
example the restrictions on the import of gelatine, the disputes over steel, the export of 
Polish milk as well as the eastern border issue of visas and potential trade losses towered 
above all other questions of integration in the press coverage, making the issue of 
enlargement in Poland subject to a quite negative campaign by anti-EU groupings. The 
papers have concentrated on the frequent visits of various EU ‘control commissions’ to 
check on Polish industry, agriculture and other public agencies, intervening in their internal 
affairs. The fulfilment by Polish producers of the EU’s stringent standards criteria has been 
portrayed as an uncompromising condition for being granted any of the Union’s privileges, 
including market access.
In addition, the negative perception of the EU’s sensitivity to Polish public opinion has not 
been helped by the presence of foreign capital both as investors and in the privatisation 
process. Naturally, most European multinationals have pursued their own aims often at 
odds with certain Polish domestic objectives. Thus, as the initiators behind many 
controversial directives and investigations, business and EU producers have often been 
conceived in Poland as the biggest threat to national interests. Kaczurba, former Polish 
negotiator of the EA, representative to the WTO and responsible for trade in the Ministry of 
Economy, observed that, “in the EU, economic interests and the EU producers are usually 
the culprits behind decisions that are unfavourable to Poland.”61 Moreover, such incidences 
as the European MNCs’ demands that the Polish government grant them greater protection
60 Lubienski, M. (1999). ibid.
61 Unia & Polska, ‘interview with J Kaczurba’, 13/10/99, No 18.
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against third countries, devalue the exchange rate or even delay the liberalisation schedule 
of the EA have not assisted in convincing Polish society of the benefits of openness. For 
example, Kaminski provided evidence that specific protectionist measures were introduced 
into the Polish trade regime in direct response to pressures from European investors and 
producer lobbies, such as the exemption of lightening equipment from duties that coincided 
with decision of Philips to invest in Poland. This behaviour of EU business has reinforced 
the belief that the Union is mostly interested in what is best for the current member states 
and that particular interests dominate the EU’s agenda while political will for enlargement 
remains largely a declaration on paper. According to ISP polls, 12 years after the beginning 
of the transformation, the Polish public is convinced that foreign capital has been the 
biggest beneficiary of association.
Finally, the press has also tended to emphasise the negative portrayal of Poland in the 
western media, where the Polish side has been said to be described as an arrogant, 
stubborn and unpredictable. Moreover, the Poles themselves have been subjected to rather 
negative stereotypes within the Union’s coverage of the ongoing association and accession 
processes, reinforcing the image of Poland in the eyes of western public opinion as 
backwards, zealously religious and corrupt, and suggesting that little was being done by the 
European elites to overcome these damaging cliches.64 The Polish papers have thus echoed 
the warnings of their EU counterparts that Poland’s over-confidence might prove 
illusionary, insinuating that the candidate could loose its place on the list of frontrunners for 
the next accession.
The inclusion of the Polish media coverage in this section has been meant to demonstrate to 
the reader the amount of political damage done to Polish- EU relations by the trade disputes
62 Kaminski (1999). ibid. p 19.
63 Gazeta Wyborcza. ‘interview with L Kolarska Bobinska’, 12/07/01.
64 Poland is perceived by west Europeans as a country that is as Catholic, poor, backwards, corrupt, associated 
with crime, (especially car theft), out-of-date state of agriculture and rural/village areas, and incompetent 
authorities. On a more abstract side, the West Europeans associate Poland with World War II, Walesa, the 
Solidarity movement and the Pope. The statistical Pole is primarily perceived as religious, conservative and 
backward, albeit kind and disciplined.
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and other unresolved issues of contention discussed in chapter six. The author believes that 
the development of this negative press coverage in Poland (or on the EU side for that 
matter) has been indicative of the lack of dialogue between the partners as well proof of 
waning trust, and has served ultimately to increase protectionist responses from the Polish 
side.
B. Anti-Dumping
If policy reversals in Poland can partially be attributed to issues of reciprocity or 
observations that EU is not an open liberal trader, nowhere is this more evident that in the 
Union’s application of contingent protection. Initially, while the EU made wide use of AD 
measures, the Polish side, due to the lack of experience in applying CP, resorted to them 
considerably less frequently. However, by 1999, Polish authorities learned to apply such 
defence policy instruments, launching their first AD investigation against German exporters 
of X-ray film.65
Protection in the EA has proven to be sector-specific and increasingly based on AD 
investigations. Polish exporters have been an easy prey to EU vested interests’ abuse of 
these measures because of initially inadequate harmonisation and implementation of the 
Union’s state aids and competition policy legislation with Polish law.66 However, even 
when the Polish government was preparing to comply fully with this acquis requirement, 
the Union did not cease to use AD duties, further provoking criticism and damaging 
political relations. Thus, Poland’s ‘non discriminatory’ access to the EU’s market has been 
offset to a large extent by the subjection of exports to such NTBs.67 Moreover Mayhew 
noted that, “it is not just the conclusion, but also the opening of an AD enquiry which does
/Q
enormous economic and political damage.”
Anti- dumping legislation, based on art 113 of the CCP, is where the authority rests in the 
hands of the European Commission rather than on the member states.69 However, for the
Interview with J. Kucharczyk, sociologist at ISP, Warsaw, April 2000.
65 http://www.mg.gov.pl
66 Kaminski (1999). Ibid., p 9.
67 Including QRs (MFA and agricultural products), VERs, AD investigations and undertakings, licenses and 
import surveillance.
68 Mayhew (1998). ibid., p 97.
69 Article 30 of EC-Poland EA permits either party to act against dumping, and Art. 31 allows either to take 
safeguard action. Concurrently, art. 34 provides that before taking actions under art. 30 & 31, the party 
contemplating the action... shall supply the Association Council with all relevant information with a view to 
seeking a solution acceptable to the two parties. The importing party may take appropriate measures if no 
such solution is reached after 30 days or if the exporting party has not taken a decision putting an end to the 
difficulties. Apart from the requirement to seek cooperative solutions through the Association Council, the 
EA places no formal constraints on the use of CP.
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procedure to be opened up by the Commission an official complaint must first be made by 
EU producers. This in turn can breed lobbying, corruption, and rent-seeking activities, 
opening up the possibility that the AD investigation will be used for political reasons to 
protect domestic industry at the expense of not only efficiency considerations but also of 
the consumer and relevant importer.
While the economic justification for launching an investigation revolves around the threat 
of predatory dumping , and, while most economists agree that protection against this sort 
of pricing may be desirable, the evidence strongly suggests that this is not the actual 
motivation for initiating AD cases because predatory pricing is so rare.71 In addition, 
Mayhew has pointed out that, “it is extremely difficult to believe that it could be practised
77by companies from the associated countries.”
Finally, because these instruments of managed trade, unlike other measures of protection, 
have an extremely attractive delivery campaign, accompanied by an impressive public 
relations programme in the press73, they have not only done enormous damage to political 
relations between the associated partners, but have eroded Polish public confidence in the 
EU’s motives. It has not just been the frequent use by the EU of AD that has caused such a 
stir in Poland, but also the actual implementation of the procedure itself.74 The proceedings 
have often been extended to firms not even exporting to the EU, and the system of early 
warning has frequently been disregarded. Finally, R Stewarska has shown that AD
See Winters, LA. (2000). ‘EU’s Preferential Trade Agreements: objectives and outcomes’, in Dijck, P. van 
and Faber, G (Ed.) (2000). ibid.
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74 For example, instead of using the firms’ cost data, EU AD authorities applied the concept o f the so-called 
constructed normal value, including hefty profit rates.
See Bilal, S. (1998). ‘Political Economy Considerations on the Supply of Trade Protection in Regional 
Integration Agreements’, JCMS, Vol 36, No 1, March, Maastricht: European Institute of Public 
Administration.
Bhagwati, J. N. (1992). ‘Regionalism and multilateralism : an overview’, Columbia University Discussion 
Paper Series, No 603, New York: Columbia University, Dept of Economics.
Bhagwati, J. N. and Panagariya, A. (Ed.) (1996). The Economics o f  Preferential Trade Agreements. 
Washington DC: AEI Press.
258
investigations have been used by the Union in Poland not only for protection, but also to 
lower the market value of an enterprise to be privatised in order to obtain a better price for
* j c
interested EU business. The documentary burdens and apparent arbitrariness of the 
investigations were discussed in more detail in chapter six, but their political impact has 
been to serve as an example to the reforming candidates of the self-interested methods of 
managed trade.
IV. Political Economy Explanations
In the previous sections the author has covered political and economic explanations for 
Polish trade policy reversals. The section below provides political economy explanations. 
According to political economy arguments, it becomes very difficult for the government to 
liberalise externally and restructure internally for political reasons originating in domestic 
interests, institutions and ideas. The main obstacles to policy sustainability are socio­
economic and distributional consequences of the reforms, as they relate to direct interests 
that either stand to lose or benefit from the changes taking place. According to S Haggard,
because trade opening creates both winners and losers, both the density and composition o f  
these societal groups and how they express their interests through state institutions then 
shapes policy outcomes and determines the incentives fo r  leaders to either liberalise or
protect the economy. 6
Political economists of the liberal interdependence school argue that conflict, bargaining, 
and eventual responsiveness to domestic interest group pressure demonstrates nothing more 
than the growing influence of internal factors on foreign policy making, and that domestic 
politics has the most lasting intervening effect on policy choices and outcomes.
Political economy explanations are the most complicated and problematic of the three 
justifications for Polish trade policy reversals, because they involve many unquantifiable 
factors, including mental legacies of the past, evolving ideas in the present, perceptions and 
other sociological determinants.
This is also the domain where future implications for policy sustainability tend to be most 
hazy, and the realm where the ‘state’ has the least room for manoeuvre, as the evolution of 
reform is largely contingent on the slow process of creating domestic interests, institutions 
and ideas and their future impact on policy making. This is also the area of political
75 Stewarska, R. (1998). ‘On some consequences of the eastern Enlargement of the European Union’, in 
Zielinska-Glebocka and Stepniak (Ed.) (1998). ibid., p 162.
76 Haggard, S. (1995). ‘Inflation and Stabilisation’, in S Haggard, Frieden, J. and Lake, D. (Ed.) (1995). ibid., 
p 457.
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science, where the relationship between the market and democracy is most crucial in 
determining policy outcomes.
A. Political economy in transformation
The phenomenon of agency capture is exacerbated by the conditions of transformation 
where, in the words of B Kaminski,
the barriers to trade stemming from ad hoc administration tend to be more pervasive due to 
the legacies o f central planning, inherited bureaucratic structures, less respect for property 
rights and bigger efforts from the state administration to maintain direct influence over
economic activity.77
Moreover, the political instability accompanying the transformation process, coupled with 
the low status of the law means that the government is more easily influenced by pressure 
groups, and policy makers have to be extremely sensitive to the demands of producers, and 
particularly the ‘winners’ of the early transition phase, threatened by further reform. 
Simultaneously, because of the ongoing process of democratisation, the ‘state’ must 
explicitly respond to the demands of both the winners and the losers to strengthen its 
political mandate.
In addition, because the Polish system of interest representation has not been fully 
institutionalised, successive governments have tended to respond to pressures in a distorted 
manner, not balancing the demands of winners and losers, to strengthen their political 
mandate, and in a transparent policy environment, but reacting to rent-seeking activities on 
the part of powerful groups with the closest ties to the authorities or to the loudest and most 
politically aggressive interests. The legal system has remained complex and nontrasparent
• 7 0and frequent changes have bred uncertainty.
The Polish ‘state’ has thus been less able to represent national interests on the international 
arena, and the negotiators of international agreements have been deprived of important 
information coming from businesses, trade unions or other institutions and organisations. 
With a lower level of information available, there has been less direct involvement and 
support from Polish interest groups for international negotiations, increasing the threat that 
international agreements reached by statesmen might not be domestically ratified or 
implemented following their introduction to the Parliament.
77 Kaminski (1999). ibid., p 18.
78 Kaminksi (1999). Ibid.
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Moreover, while in established pluralist democracies, the diversity of interests allows for a 
certain symmetry between pro-reform and etatist groups, between the winners and losers of 
openness, and policy outcomes reflect their political balance within national institutions, in 
Poland this equilibrium has been lacking. The Polish political landscape continues to be 
dominated by a conglomeration of powerful groups from the old system, intermingled with 
only emerging new interests that have yet to develop their political power (see chapter 
four). Thus, even though the process of internationalisation has consistently taking place, 
the decision-making apparatus has not been reflecting pro-trade objectives, and the pattern 
of interest articulation and balancing, as modelled by political economists and expected by 
the liberal interdependence school, has yet to emerge.79
While Bhagwatti for example remains “confident that in the long-run pro-trade forces that I 
have identified and the institutional reforms to harness them and to inhibit the protectionist
OA
forces that I have proposed will work” , in Poland, protectionist tendencies have tended to 
dominate policy outcomes, as the older, more powerful interests, threatened by the process 
of trade liberalisation have fought for survival. The winners of the liberalisation process in 
Poland have been few and widely dispersed, and their organisational strength weak due to a 
lack of both political and economic resources. On the other hand, the losers and potential 
losers from opening up process have grown in strength proportionally to the costs of the 
reforms, and their political weight has increased, both due to a lack of an institutional 
policy framework and because of increasing economic shocks.
Because lobbying activities have not been formally institutionalised, an exceptional role has 
been created for Polish ‘state’ as simultaneously the mediator between diverse interests, the 
guardian of overall national objectives, the defender of liberal policies and the initiator and 
driver of policy reform. In the words of B Kaminski,
The lack o f  well-designed and established policy making arrangements and deficiencies in 
the institutional structure underpinning the foreign trade policy process in Poland has 
made devising sound economic policies, taking into account public rather than sectoral
interest, a formidable challenge.8
Prior to 1996, the Ministry of Economic Cooperation with the Abroad was responsible for 
trade policy-making. After 1996, the function of foreign trade policy making was taken 
over by the Ministry of the Economy, but the establishment of one super economy ministry
79 See Keohane, R. and Milner, H. (Ed.) (1996). Internationalisation and Domestic Politics. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press.
80 Bhagwati, J.N. (1988). Protectionism, ibid., p 2.
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was accompanied by the introduction of a rule allowing for trade officials to take seats on
boards of industrial companies. Imbalances and incomplete reform of the institutional and
regulatory framework, neglected during the first reform phase, has yielded extremely high
benefits for small groups and various interests82, whose ties to successive governments
have grown in strength, as the capacity of the state to sustain support for its measures was
weakened. These groups and winners have subsequently captured the policy making
process and attempted to prevent further reform. Naturally, corruption followed.
The problem has been additionally exacerbated by the giving of authority to take foreign-
trade related actions to various branch ministries, including the Ministry of Agriculture and
Industry, each maintaining control over their sectoral aspects of trade. The officials in these
ministries have clearly been more representative of specific interests than of national
interest as a whole, and in the absence of an independent institution responsible for foreign
trade, the balance has been usually tilted in favour of import-competing producers.
Additionally, discussions over modifications in trade policy have taken place at the Council
of Ministers, where again the different ministries represented have each tried to pressure the
government for protection for their own individual sectors. According to Kaminski,
These arrangements have undoubtedly bred a protective bias into the Polish trade regime 
as the framework to balance the interests o f import-competing versus exporting groups and 
consumers has been inadequate and domestic actors depending on imports or exports have 
not be able to voice their voices in the policy setting process on equal footing with import-
competing producers.83
Corruption, in turn, has distorted state behaviour by allowing bureaucrats to intervene at 
their own discretion and weakening the ability of the state to enforce compliance with the 
rules and institutions of the trade regime. Ultimately this has undermined the public’s trust 
that these rules and institutions were designed to be fair.84
B. The Europeanisation of Polish domestic politics
The developments in political relations between Poland and the Union during association 
discussed above and in previous chapters have not only damaged political relations between 
the partners, but have also spilled over into divisions over Polish domestic politics, the 
European option being linked to disputes over the pace of the internal reforms and
81 Kaminski (199). ibid., p 5.
82 Particularly vested interest from the previous system such as large trading companies and other SOE’s.
83 Kaminski (1999). ibid., p 28.
84 EBRD, Transition Report 1998.
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becoming a controversial topic in political campaigns. Additionally, the contentious 
issues arising during the implementation of the EA have provided Polish populist forces 
with powerful anti- EU rhetoric and justification for increasing national levels of domestic 
protection, shaping the emerging political economy of trade policy reform. Accordingly, 
the political repercussions of the international negotiations can be partially held responsible 
for Polish trade policy reversals.
Not only has Polish public opinion been negatively influenced by the appearance of 
difficulties during association, but the political damage of the disputes has affected both the
os
parliament’s and subsequent governing coalitions’ stance towards economic openness. 
According to the Polish Press Agency report in April 1997, “the Parliament has obliged the 
government to submit a program of ‘an all encompassing and coherent foreign trade 
policy’, and there are signs that it may contain measures severely curbing imports even if it 
involves renegotiating international economic treaties.”87
The mixed signals sent from Brussels created a perfect opportunity for populist leaders in 
Poland to manipulate the facts to their own advantage and contributed to strengthening their 
position at the expense of more liberal, reformist government factions. While many of the 
arguments relied upon by anti- EU forces have been built around moral/ cultural 
propaganda and national sovereignty themes, making extensive use of typical populist 
rhetoric such as “the selling out of Polish land and treasures to aggressive foreign capital 
impoverishing the Polish population”88, they have never the less been able to substantiate 
their claims that Poland is losing out on integration by concrete examples in the 
developments of Polish-EU relations.
The League of Polish Families has openly presented evidence of the negative impact of the 
EA both on the Polish economy as a whole and on particular socio-economic interests and 
has called for “the re-negotiation of this destructive arrangement, detrimental to the 
development and modernisation of Poland.” The party has been able to appeal to a wide 
segment of the population, especially the farmers, not only losing from and thus fatigued by
85 Blazyca, G. and Kolkiewicz, M. (2000). ‘Poland and the EU: Internal disputes, domestic politics and 
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87 PAP. 22/04/99.
88 Lubienski (1999). ibid.
Zycie. 06/03/98.
263
the internal process of transition, but also hurt by the liberalisation of trade under 
association and apprehensive as to the future impact of enlargement.
Current Our Party leader and former Prime Minister J Olszewski, in turn, publicly 
polemicised:
The restructuring programmes in Poland are the realisation o f Brussels’s expectations, and 
that the Polish nation which has just regained its sovereignty and independence is now 
expected to resign from this freedom on many important domestic issues in the name o f 
foreign bureaucracy! The lack o f gestures o f  good will from the EU and its continued 
demands on Poland such as limiting production capacities in Polish steel mines has
o ncontributed to weakening support for integration and liberalisation.
The trade deficit argument has been used by the populists to demonstrate to the Polish 
public that Poland’s current status in the association has been to serve as a market for 
dumping EU products and not an equal partner. Members of several parliamentary 
grouping contended that, “the hostile intervention of the Commission within the framework 
of the EA was limiting Polish production potential through administrative measures in 
industry, agriculture and services, the result of which was the closing down of enterprises 
and liquidation of work places.”90 According to the protectionist forces, the trade creation 
occurring in favour of the EU under the EA was thus limiting employment in sectors which 
were unable to withstand western competition, and consequently, further exacerbating the 
already very difficult situation on the Polish labour market.
For parties such as the Peasant Movement or Self-defence, the main issue has been 
agriculture and the present and future treatment of Polish farmers. J Kalinowski, leader of 
The Peasants, has often described the EU’s agricultural trade policy as “limiting Polish 
national potential in the agricultural and food processing industry”, contributing to rising 
unemployment and deteriorating conditions in the village, arguing that the Polish 
government should use the same instruments of support and intervention on the agricultural 
market as those employed by the Union.91 The Polish Agricultural Council has admitted 
that while from 1990 onwards the farmers had been hoping that the process of integration 
would lead to the modernisation and restructuring of Polish agriculture and food processing 
industry under terms of fair and equitable competition, the disappointing developments
89 Gazeta Wyborcza, ‘Ujawnili sie zniecierpliwieni’, 11/10/99.
90 Unia & Polska, ‘Osi Sporu’, 16/12/1999.
91 Unia& Polska, ‘interview with Kalinowski’, 16/12/99.
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under the EA suggested that, “the market opening has been one sided without any readiness 
on the part of the EU to open its markets to Polish products.”92
By pointing to the various discriminatory conditions of association, these groups have thus 
not only been able to criticise the Union, but also to question the credibility of the reformist 
governments in charge of negotiating and implementing the EA as well as conducting 
Polish-EU relations to date. A main line of division over ‘Europe’ has centred around the 
assessment of how well have the different governing coalitions and their appointed EU 
negotiators have defended Poland’s interests. While, pro- EU, reformism parties have 
contended that the government has done a good job protecting Polish concerns and has 
negotiated the best possible conditions for association and future accession, the anti-EU 
opposition forces have criticised the ruling coalitions for negotiating too softly and failing 
to defend Polish rights or the welfare of Polish citizens. Opposition parties throughout the 
90’s have maintained that the liberal governments in power, between 1990-93 and again 
1997-2001, had been too submissive and conciliatory in their approach towards the Union, 
agreeing to too many demands and basing their programme on too many illusions 
concerning the advantages of a market economy in general and of competition and 
integration in particular.94 The opponents of the reforms regularly asserted that the 
reformist elites have destroyed Poland’s bargaining position vis a vis the EU already in 
1991, during the negotiations of the EA, by giving away Poland’s main card in the 
accession negotiations, namely the 40mln consumer market.
Kalinowski, for example, has blamed the rise in prices of foodstuffs and energy on the 
Polish market on the excessively liberal trade policy and lack of government intervention, 
and under his leadership, the Peasant Party has loudly criticised the initial liberal 
government economic policies, that had in early 90’s completely given up subsidising 
Polish agriculture while simultaneously dismantling industrial tariffs and not applying any 
measures of contingent protection. The Peasants claimed that these policies had left the 
Polish economy open to unfair outside competition and substantiated their arguments by 
pointing to the fact that even after 1994, the EU continued to subsidise 46% of its
92 Quoted in PAP. 12/11/02.
93 Kucharczyk, J. (1999). ‘Porwanie Europy’, w Kolarska-Bobinska (Red.) (1999). Eurodebata. ibid., p 297- 
332.
94 Sapir, A.(1994). ‘The Europe Agreements: the implications for trade laws and institutions’, in Winters 
(Ed.) (1994). ibid.
Nagy (1994). in Winters (Ed.) (1994). ibid.
Steil, B. (1993). Competition, Integration and Regulation in the EC Capital Market. London: RIIA.
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agriculture, while Poland subsidised only 8-12%, and that under these conditions Polish 
domestic agricultural production would be completely priced out of the market in a few 
years time.95
As a result, in 2001, 41% of the Poles believed that the liberal AWS-UW coalition, in 
power between 90-93’ and 97-01 ’, was too yielding towards the EU side, while only 10% 
thought that they were effective in protecting Polish interests.96 With 43% of the public not 
trusting the negotiators, accusations even appeared that the liberal elites had motivations of 
personal gain.
Opposition experts contended that the trade deficit was being caused by the restrictive 
liberalisation of sensitive products under the EA, NTB’s used by the EU and the resulting 
structure and commodity pattern of Polish trade. To stop the excessive growth of imports 
and retaliate against unfair competition from the EU side, the critics warned that the only
• * • Q 7solution was active intervention on the part of ‘the state’ in protecting domestic industry.
C. The fall of Polish liberals
As various protectionist forces became more influential in policy circles, they undermined 
the liberal factions’ attempts to reform and negatively impacted the sustainability of open 
economic policies. Moreover, the critique of the reformist coalitions by anti-EU forces 
contributed dramatically to a decline in public support for the parties responsible for 
negotiating association in 1991 or implementing the majority of liberal transition reforms 
throughout the nineties. Consequently, both Freedom Union (UW) and Solidarity Election 
Action (AWS) failed to get over the minimum threshold required for parliamentary 
representation in the 2001 elections. Instead the right wing League of Polish Families and 
populist Self-defence, both highly opposed to enlargement, critical of the Union and of any 
kind of market reform secured their parliamentary representation, followed by even more 
astounding local government victories in 2002.
95 See Wysokinska, Z. (Red.) (1994). Polska wprocesie integracji ze Wspdlnotami Europejskimi. Warszawa, 
Lodz: Wydawnictwo Naukowe PWN.
96 See CBOS Opinion Poll. 03/01.
OBOP Opinion Poll. 10/00 
PAP. 01/12/00.
97 Ciamaga (Red.) (1997). ibid.
Budzowski i Wydymusa (Red.) (1999). Ibid.
Gawlikowska-Hueckel, K., St?pniak, A. i Zielinska-Gl?bocka, A. (1993). Polska - EWG, Wybrane aspekty 
dostosowan w swietle rynku 1992 i umowy o stowarzyszeniu. Gdansk: Uniwesytet Gdanski.
Wilczynski, W. (1999). Wrogie Panstwo Opiekuncze: czyli trudna droga Polski do gospodarki rynkowej. 
Warszawa: Wydawnictwo Naukowe PWN.
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At the beginning of the transition, the radically liberal faction of the reformers belived that 
the Market would take care of everything. However, by 1990 already, large scale social 
protests were being staged by anti reformist forces, and in 1991, populist Stan Tyminski 
came in second in the Presidential elections, beating intellectual, liberal reformer, former 
Solidarity dissident and first post-socialist Polish Prime Minister Tadeusz Mazowiecki. The 
role of the ‘state’, regulation and institution building none the less continued to be 
underrated by the governing elites.
Throughout the 1991 election campaign, the Peasant Party, with its Framers Union wing, in 
coalition with their industry counterpart, Trade Union NSZZ RI S, actively protested 
against shock therapy, calling for reversals in the economic programme, including 
protection in face of a growing trade deficit, excessive liberalisation and unfair foreign 
competition. Growing protests in 1992 under the Olszewski and Bielecki governments led 
to the liberals being dealt a profound blow in 1993, when the Solidarity government under 
PM Suchocka was toppled by its own trade union, NSZZ S, with a vote of no confidence. 
NSZZ S claimed that the government was too liberal and was choosing to protect European 
values at the expense of national virtues, not taking into account the social costs of the 
drastic reforms. (See chapter four).
The Social Democrats98 in coalition with the Peasant Party were the next to be elected and 
the leader of the Peasant Party and staunch defender of mercantilism, Pawlak, was charged 
with the office of the Prime Minister. However, his government suffered the same fate as 
his predecessors and Pawlak was replaced in 1995 by former Communist activist J Oleksy. 
Up until 1995, all the Polish political parties were expressing their more-or-less pro- 
European view99, that year The Movement for the Restoration of Poland (ROP) became the 
first real contender for a radical, populist Eurosceptic party, under the leadership of former 
Solidarity PM J Olszewski. By November of 1997, Our Party (Nasze Kolo), a faction of 
Solidarity Election Action (AWS), emerged as another party outright hostile to EU 
membership, followed by the appearance of Polish Family (Rodzina Polska), another party 
with roots in Solidarity, supported by the right wing religious radio station Radio Maryja.
98 Formerly the Polish United Workers’ Party
99 With the exception of Konfederacja Polski Niepodleglej which later disappeared.
See for example Szerbiak, A. (1998). ‘Prospects for the Emergence of a Polish Eurosceptic Lobby’, paper 
prepared for Poland and EU Enlargement conference, London: SSEES, 12 March.
Taras, R. (1995). Consolidating Democracy in Poland. Boulder CO: Westview.
267
In the 1997 parliamentary elections, the victory of the reformist coalition Solidarity/ 
Freedom Union proved to be an illusion that liberal values had triumphed, as soon after 
their elections, Solidarity, dependent on the support of its trade union wing, demonstrated 
that it was more protectionist than the previous Social Democratic/ Peasant alliance. Unable 
to continue any of its planned reforms or implement its desired liberal policies, the weaker 
coalition partner, Freedom Union under the leadership of shock therapy architect and 
Minister of Finance L Balcerowicz, withdrew from the coalition in 2001, and a crisis 
ensued in the political arena. As already mentioned, neither UW or any part of the AWS 
Party crossed the parliamentary threshold in the 2001 elections, opening the door for 
another Social Democratic Alliance victory. While the post-communists are themselves a 
pro-European party, the electoral loss of AWS/ UW coupled with weak minority support 
for the centre-right Law and Order and Civic Platform, paved the way for other anti-EU 
forces to enter Parliament.100 Thus, populist Self-defence, directly nationalistic, anti-EU 
League of Polish Families, together with the rightists, conservative and EU sceptic Law and 
Order as well as the Peasants101, as the weaker coalition partner, joined ranks in the 
Parliament criticising liberalism, the liberal reformers and ultimately key elements of EU 
aspirations, as espoused to by the wining SLD.
By 2001, thus a serious anti- EU lobby had formed in Poland representing a political force
actually capable of channelling and mobilising an otherwise passive public opinion into a
1 00coherent movement opposed to Polish EU membership. In the 2001 parliamentary 
elections, to everyone’s surprise the League of Polish Families passed the threshold 
required for parliamentary representation with 8 % of the electorate and found convenient 
partners not only in the more powerful Peasants (PSL), but also in another new political 
force led by populist A Lepper, the Self-defence Movement, which had taken 10% of the 
parliamentary seats. Twelve years after the peaceful revolution, Freedom Union and 
Solidarity, both parties made up of the liberal, intellectual reformers who had initially set 
Poland forth on the road to a market-democracy and who were the Polish architects of 
association with the Communities as well as negotiators of the Europe Agreement, were
100 Such as ZchN, KPN Ojczyzna, AWS ‘S’, Samoobrona, LPR.
101 The Peasants have agreed to support EU accession, but only if Polish farmers are treated as equals to their 
western counterpart and get access to the same levels of direct payments and other forms of aid.
102 Wprost. 24/11/2002.
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barely able together to secure 10% of the national vote103, effectively being cleared off of 
the Polish political scene.
D. Interest articulation and representation
Because the negative effects of radical Shock Therapy in Poland lessened the enthusiasm 
for the transformation, the impetus of the reforms slackened in the 90’s, and the revived 
interest groups become increasingly resistant to the continuation of change. The initial and 
broad political consensus supporting the reforms and constituting the liberalisers’ most 
valuable asset was quickly destroyed by the focus on rapid marketisation and liberalisation, 
without adequate attention paid to microeconomic foundations.104 The failure of concrete 
and visible benefits to materialise for the majority of the public, due to lower economic 
performance than was initially expected especially in light of association, led to large-scale 
social tensions.105 In addition, as a result of the democratisation process, the reformers in 
Poland were faced with the problem of having to secure a political mandate for continuing 
to implement the difficult economic measures, initiated under conditions of extra-ordinary 
politics.
Trade unions and directors of state industry as well as a mounting group of workers and 
farmers and even some managers of Small and Medium Enterprises began demanding 
protection, and the weak and unstable government coalitions were finally forced to attempt 
various domestic negotiations and endeavours at social dialogue.106 However, more often 
than not these efforts amounted to little more than official aspirations to reach national 
consensus, as either a compromise was never attained or the long fought after agreement 
was never implemented, due to fiscal constraints and international credibility requirements. 
Eventually, the losers of transition initially neglected had become too radicalised in their 
opinions and too obstinate in their postulates to be able to negotiate or compromise.
Within the Tripartite Commission, various governments, beginning in 1993, have tried to 
arrive at corporate arrangements between the labour unions, employers organisation and 
themselves, but due to the complicated and unresolved legal standing of the social partners,
103 Prominent figures include T. Mazowiecki, B. Geremek, J.K,.Bielecki, T. Syryjczyk, D. Tusk, W. 
Frasyniuk, L. Balcerowicz, J.S. Wolski, J. Kuron, J. Lewandowski, Osiatynski, etc...
Wprost. 7/10/2001
104 See E Wnuk-Lipinski, ‘Dziesiec lat pozniej’, in Polityka, nr 1 (2174), 2/01/99.
M Marody ‘Dlaczego Wygra SLD?’, GW 4/04/01/
105 Ost, D. (1995). ‘Labour, Class and Democracy: Shaping Political Antagonisms in Post-Communist 
Society’, in Crawford (Ed.) (1995). ibid.
Sachs (1994). ‘Life in the Economic Emergency Room’, in Bates (ed.) (1994). ibid.
106 See Winiecki (Ed.) (1996). ibid.
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well as their radicalisation, most of the difficult issues were never agreed upon, and those
1 ft7that were finally past by one parliament, were ignored by the next. The labour unions, in 
turn, have claimed that their postulates are not respected, taking to the streets to voice their 
concerns. Employer organisations, in the same fashion, have dismissed the work of the 
Tripartite Commission, because it has “favoured unions”108, resorting to other less 
transparent forms of lobbying the government. The ‘state’ itself has subject to ‘capture’ by 
one or the other of the warring domestic interest groups or by its obligation to follow 
through on international agreements, making it impossible for the administration to create a 
coherent, consistent and predictable policy making environment, based on a long -term, 
strategic approach to policy formulation.
The lack of symmetry or balance between the labour unions, supportive of protection, and 
the employers organisation, divided on the issue of economic policies, has made the 
functioning of the Tripartite Commission clumsy and the results erratic. Primarily, this has 
been because of the imbalance in power between the unions and the employers 
organisation. As a result of the workers council experiences beginning in 1956 and 
reinforced during the active Solidarity phase in the 1980’s, followed by the Round Table 
Negotiations, Polish labour unions and managers of state owned industry were able to keep 
their special status and many legal privileges, despite falling rates of membership. The legal 
status of employers’ organisations, on the other hand, has remained vague, fluctuating with 
the changing laws. In addition, the differences in opinions on policy stances have also been 
evident within the employers’ coalition itself.109
After seven years of failure, only in 2001, the AWS government passed a new act on social 
dialogue to break the impasse. Up until then, The Polish Employers’ Confederation (KPP) 
was the only employers organisation formally recognised in Poland and granted legal status 
to participate in the Commission. KPP has represented the state industry employers, of 
sectors such as coal, steel mining and power, and has generally represented quite a 
protectionist stance in its lobbying activities.110 The managers of state owned enterprises
Hausner (1992). (1993). (1994). (1995). ibid.
107 Gazeta Wyborcza. 06/02/03.
108 Interview with H Bochniarz, President of the Private Polish Confederation of Employers 
J Drygalski, ‘Stan chroniczny’ GW 12/04/00.
A Smolar, ‘Rewolucja bez utopii’, GW 25-26/08/01,
‘Koalicja przeciw rynkowi’, Wprost, 26/09/99.
109 Gardawski, J., Gaciarz, B., Mokrzyszewski, A. and Pankow, W. (1999). ibid.
1,0 Wprost. 7/11/99.
Gazeta Wyborcza. ‘Prawo lobbysty’, 06/03/03.
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have been able to count on the support of their workers in their demands for protection, as 
both have had a large incentive to lobby, motivated by the perspective of losing their job. 
Moreover, because the members of this state sector organisation have been in effect 
employed by the government, their autonomy as an independent social partner has been 
questionable to say the least. On the other hand, the more liberal and economically open 
Polish Confederation of Private Employers (PKKP), made up mostly of small and medium 
size enterprises, has been considerably weaker, lacking in political and organisational 
power, and as such not as efficient in lobbying or able to compete with the more, powerful 
KPP. Until 2001, PKKP has not been even able to negotiate within the Tripartite 
Commission and has had no legal rights.
Finally, because both the employers organisations and the trade unions have had to turn to 
the ‘state’ as a mediator, and not to each other, for conflict resolution, the emergence of 
these domestic negotiations has taken place at the expense of further eroding the 
government’s capacity to mange its multi-functional role. The complex and inconsistent 
legal system, a legacy of the early reform days, has provided a fertile ground for corruption 
and over-politicisation of economic decision making, resulting in policy outcomes based 
more on values assigned to certain options than on concrete cost and benefit calculations. 
This has been evident in labour market reforms111, retirement and disability pensions, or 
policies towards the coal miners and farmers, making their privileges considerably higher 
than the rest of society. Connections between the Polish ‘state’ and the powerful state- 
industry and agricultural lobbies have slowed down the reform process in key Polish 
sectors, including the automotive112, oil, gas, health care, railways, defence, sugar, coal, 
steel, chemicals and textiles. (See chapter four). These groups and their labour unions, 
particularly under the AWS/ UW government coalition, have been extensively represented 
in the Tripartite Commission and have managed to successfully block subsequent
1 1 -5
privatisation, restructuring and liberalisation attempts.
111 See paid leave, especially sick days, insurance and other benefit related reforms,
112 For example there are 230 different positions of tariffs in the automotive tariff code.
See Verblane, U. (1999). ibid.
113 M Krzaklewski was simultaneously a leader of AWS Solidamosc faction and NSZZ Solidamosc union; 
See ‘Zwiazkokracja’, Polityka nr 15 (2171), 12/12/98;
‘Rewaloryzacja Rzadu’, Wprost 3/10/99;
R Kalkulkin, ‘Dialog monologow’, GW, 6/06/99.
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The coal mining industry in Poland, is a perfect example of the complexity of the political 
economy of the transition process.114 The sector has been plagued by severe indebtedness 
towards the state budget115, excessive employment and liquidity problems. The 
deteriorating conditions of the coal mines have in turn led to higher production costs, 
decreasing the price competitiveness of Polish coal extraction. Because of social 
considerations, initially, radical restructuring was not undertaken, and the coal companies 
have tried instead to increase coal output in order to retain financial liquidity. This 
heightened the already high production levels and drew criticism from the EU as a breach 
of state aids rules.
Due to the existence of powerful labour unions, particularly Solidarity, the coal sector has 
had a huge influence on economic policy making, receiving more state support than any 
other industry undergoing restructuring. Thus even though by 1993 direct subsidisation of 
coal was abolished, other indirect forms of state aid, such as massive tax exemptions were 
introduced. Between 1989-1999, the labour unions were able to organise a series of 
massive strikes and protests, until finally the Minister for Labour and Social Policy L 
Komolowski agreed that no group redundancies would be made and that those leaving the 
sector would get high compensation packages. Thus, throughout the 90’s, the coal miners 
were more or less bought off with various social policies including wage increases twice as 
high as other public sectors and large one-off compensatory payments for the loss of 
employment. Even though coal was not protected by tariffs, it was pumped full of other 
types of intransparent state aid instead.
Similarly, the farmers lobby has successfully brought agricultural protection to levels 
almost comparable to those of many highly developed countries and has vehemently 
opposed privatisation and restructuring. In Poland, farmers have represented the most 
powerful and best-organised of any socio-economic interest group, capable not only of 
effective political lobbying, but also of various public manifestations, including road 
blockades, parliamentary sit-ins and other forms of protests like dumping grain. In addition, 
the lobby has been extremely well represented in the parliament116 and has managed to 
push trough its agricultural agenda at the expense of other segments of society.
114 Coal is still the most important export commodity of Poland.
1,5 Amounting to 70% of annual output.
116 Especially during the years of 1993-1997 and 2001- 2003, when the Peasant Party formed the government.
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In late 1998-1999, for example, the farmers’ protests intensified, while the active 
manifestations of discontent organised by the unions attracted high levels of social support. 
92% of the Polish population supported the farmers in their quest for higher tariff
117protection against EU agricultural producers. The representatives of the farmers have
used the trade deficit argument and issue of state subsidies for agriculture in the market- 
oriented EU to warrant their grievances against the government, claiming the farmers were 
not only deprived of subsidies, but also exposed to unfair competition from their western 
counterparts. The government, wanting to appease the agricultural lobby, has usually given 
into its demands, even at the price of breaking international agreements.118 The politically 
powerful sugar lobby, for example, has been able to ensure that the growth of the Polish 
sugar industry has taken place behind very high levels of protection. Consolidation, as 
opposed to privatisation and restructuring, has thus become the chosen path for the 
development of the sugar sector, ensuring it more power as a lobby and future protection 
from external competition.119
In sum, the complicated political economy of policy making in Poland, cannot be 
oversimplified by a reductionist analysis of either domestic or international factors. While 
the development in Poland of ‘ordinary politics’ and state responsiveness to domestic 
pressure has been a positive development, the type of institutional environment that has 
emerged has not allotted for transparent and legally regulated interest mediation. In its 
place, a policy making process based on discriminating state intervention, inconsistent law 
enforcement and intransparent rent- seeking activities has evolved. These developments 
can be attributed to both the domestic style of technocratic policy making chosen and 
implemented by the early Polish liberals and to international factors that have made 
abandoning this method of policy making impossible for successive governments, required 
to fulfil external obligations.
Conclusion
This chapter has argued that the developments in Polish-EU relations during the period of 
association can be used to explain Polish trade policy reversals. The political and economic
117 OBOP opinion poll, Polacy o integracji z Unia Europejska, 09/98.
Giza-Pleszczuk, A., Marody, M. and Rychard, A. (2000). Strategie i System: Polacy w obliczu zmiany 
spolecznej. Warszawa: Instytut Filozofii i Sociologii PAN.
Instytut Spraw Publicznych- Institute of Public Affairs (various years). Opinion Polls.
(2000). Chlop, rolnik, farmer. Warsaw: ISP.
1,8 Hausner, J. and Marody M. (Ed.) (1999). Three Polands: The Potential for and Barriers to Integration 
with the EU, EU Monitoring III. ibid..
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repercussions of the implementation of the EA have not only damaged mutual relations, but 
have also undermined the EU’s credibility as a fair trading partner, discrediting open 
economic policies in Poland and indirectly contributing to trade policy reversals.
The author concludes that Polish policy backsliding, as in the other CEE countries, cannot 
simply be explained by domestic political economy considerations, in isolation from the 
external environment. As far as economic explanations go, the EAs have had a pronounced 
negative impact on CEE economies, providing justification for the demands for protection. 
In the political realm, questions of reciprocity and fairness in trade relations have likewise 
been partially responsible for undermining liberal reforms, domestic perceptions of the 
EU’s handling of various contentious issues influencing policy preference and outcomes. 
The growth of trade deficits with the Union, throughout the region, combined with the 
disappointing asymmetry of the EAs, weakened the position of domestic reformers, giving 
ammunition to opposition groups and populist parties, while providing material to the 
media to call for economic closure. Because the Union has loudly been preaching liberal 
economic virtues, while itself retaining high levels of protection, its policies have had a 
detrimental effect on public support in CEE for both the liberal reforms and for the liberal 
governments.
Finally, in the political economy domain, the EAs, while binding CEE governments to 
uphold their liberalisation targets, were not implemented in such a way as to enable the 
authorities to respond adequately and flexibly to the emerging public expectations. The 
magnitude of this development was especially evident in the Polish case.
When successive Polish governments attempted to reach an agreement between themselves 
and the social partners, the implementation of this domestic compromise was often made 
impossible due to EU obligations. This has been evident, for example, in the application of 
state-aids or in the restructuring of the steel industry. Breaking promises made within 
institutionalised arrangements, has meant that less transparent and more corrupt options of 
influencing government policy have become more pervasive. The radicalisation of large 
and powerful Polish interests, especially groups tied to the former system , has led to 
policy delays and reversals. Technocratic policy making, a method chosen by the early 
Polish liberals and required by the European Union to implement its association and
119 Verblane (1999). ibid.
120 Not necessarily socialist groups but rather workers of SOEs, farmer on SO farms, public sector employers, 
union members...
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accession targets, has thus made social dialogue appear like a mirage, contributing to the 
alienation of social partners and increasing the frequency of uninstitutionalised forms of 
rent-seeking and political reactions based on ad hoc state responses proportional to the 
amount of pressure.
Indirectly, then, the EAs impacted the policy-making process in transition by increasingly 
straining the relationship between the ‘state’ and its social partners, complicating the 
internal search for consensus and policy legitimation and contributing to the weakening of 
state capacity and authority in Poland. These issues are elaborated on in the next chapter.
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8. Democratisation, Institutionalisation and Policy Reform: the Europe Agreement
and the transformation paradox
Why is that which was to be irreversible turning out to show so many disturbing signs o f  
reversibility? Social processes are not pulled by some ultimate single end, rather they 
are pushed by innumerable actions and decisions o f  human individuals, acting on their 
visions, moved by variable and often conflicting images o f  desired goals. There is no 
absolute progress, but only relative and variable mixtures o f progress and regress, o f  
betterment and deterioration o f the human condition. Is it progressive to have full shops 
but lower wages, stop inflation but raise unemployment, open free markets but limit 
local production, give power to a democratic parliament but make the country 
ungovernable, liberalise the law enforcement but suffer an upsurge o f crime, abolish 
censorship and witness a flood ofpornography and third rate literature. I f  this is 
progress, than progress o f what, progress for whom?1
As an integral part of the socialist system was a complete disjunction of the domestic 
economy from external influences by means of special instruments and institutions, the 
first step in the market transition revolved around creating the tools and institutions 
necessary to enable the re-kindling of open external economic relations. Accordingly, 
the role of the newly elected Polish government in 1990 was to find an appropriate 
political and economic strategy that would serve as the basis for long-term sustainable 
growth under conditions of a parliamentary democracy.
The path of reform chosen by the Polish liberal elites was based on ‘anchoring’ 
domestic policies in international institutions. This was to not only increase the 
credibility of the domestic reform efforts, but also to secure the benefits of economic 
openness, and meet the criteria, required by the European Union, for association. 
However, the chosen ‘anchoring’ strategy was based on several assumptions made by 
the Polish reformers.
It is not the author’s intent to disregard the case made by neoliberal institutionalists for 
improved policy credibility through ‘anchoring’ strategies2, however, a closer study of 
the political economy of policy reform in Poland suggests that there are distinct limits to 
the scope of these arguments. While the external confidence in the government’s 
commitment is in fact strengthened through international obligations, these conditions 
are insufficient to adequately address the lingering problems of public expectations, the 
social consensus-seeking and internal legitimisation in policy consolidation and finally 
the institutionalisation of the reforms.
1 Sztompka, P. (1993). ‘Lessons of Post-Communist Transition for Sociological Theories of Change’, in 
Coenen-Huther, J.and Synak, B. (Ed.) (1993). ibid., p 13-14.
2 Neoliberal institutionalist arguments rest on the premise that the process of ‘anchoring’ domestic policy 
in international institutions will consolidate the internal changes and guarantee the stability of economic 
policy making. See chapter one and two.
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To be successful and transition needed two things: economic performance and 
democracy. The Balcerowicz technocrats expected that the speed and breadth of their 
initial reforms would be generously rewarded by the European Union and that the EU 
would readily support the domestic transition process. The assumption was that the 
material benefits of integration and the economic successes that would come about 
within a few years time, would be spill over into the political arena, strengthening the 
balancing of power between interests, as new actors, winners of the transition emerged. 
This was not only to provide a solid base of support for the elites and their continued 
reform efforts but also to create healthy political competition and pluralism in a system 
previous monopolised by one over-arching Party in symbiosis with vested interests tied 
to its structures.
However, while the liberalisers were not wrong in principle to chose Shock 
Therapy and ‘anchoring’ as the basis of the transition reforms, they never the less 
presumed that external leverage would be sufficient to ensure the continuity of domestic 
changes, neglecting to appreciate that this international dimension of the transition 
would have to have legitimate linkages to other national policy and institution building 
areas, in order to pass the tests of sustainability and consolidation. As such they paid 
inadequate attention to building an adequate microeconomic foundation for the 
transition. This is particularly true with regards to investing in social capital. The 
Balcerowicz team neglected to conduct any kind of information campaign or begin the 
social dialogue and public consensus-seeking necessary for the development of social 
trust; itself an indispensable ingredient in the formation of capitalistic relationships. By 
the time the government, under the leadership of the more socially oriented Minister of 
Labour J Kuron, in 1993 attempted to begin consultations with social partners on policy 
options, interests, such as labour unions, had become too frustrated and their views too 
polarised to make dialogue constructive and agreement possible. (See chapters four and 
seven). Protests increased and in order to avert a social crises, successive governing 
coalitions were forced to respond to the loudest and most threatening of these, causing 
reform delays and even reversals.
Moreover, to make the corporate model function in the Polish system, agreements 
reached between social partners had to be respected. However, the Polish ‘state’, 
constrained by obligations arising from EU integration was often forced to break the 
promises made within domestic negotiations, further radicalising the interest groups. 
Finally, the macroeconomic stabilisation package chosen by the early liberals and 
required by the EU for association excessively emphasised privatisation and
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liberalisation, without adequate consideration as to institution building or setting up 
regulatory frameworks (such as contract enforcement, property rights etc.)
Finally, while the benefits of economic openness and free trade expected by the 
Balcerowicz team are not to be questioned, even the most devout free traders agree that 
“the tendency of many to equate trade theory with free trade policies and (not 
infrequently) with complete laissez faire is a misunderstanding”. Modem trade theory 
does not show that free trade is always the best policy. This does not however diminish 
the overall case made for free trade nor does suggest that a strategy of protectionism is a 
viable policy option in the long- run.
In the author’s opinion, the path chosen by the liberals and supported by western 
advisers as well as the EU, did not adequately set the foundations in Poland for an 
economically functional trade policy in the long mn. To expose a nation in its infant 
stages of economic development to radical liberalisation, experience profound shocks 
and witness massive trade policy reversals, is in itself an unconstructive path to 
achieving the desired effect of liberalism.4 Consequently, arguing that the author’s 
criticism of excessive liberalisation coupled with support of a strategic trade policy 
during the initial stages of transition is itself an argument against free trade is thus an 
unfounded assumption.
In sum, while there seems to have been no better alternative to the early radicalism of 
Polish Shock Therapy combined with the ‘anchoring’ strategy, the programme could 
have been carried out more cautiously and based on less assumptions. Because the 
entire project has been depended to an over-whelming extent on external support while 
not paying sufficient attention to domestic microeconomic foundations (including social 
policies), the possibility of backlash was in fact quite high.
While the Union was presumed to be able and willing to generously reward the 
liberalisers for their dramatic efforts and allow them enough leeway, by strengthening 
the economic transition, to continue to reform under conditions of a parliamentary 
democracy, this is fact did not follow. In the Polish case, the EU’s protectionism, 
combined with the technocrats’ top- down, elitist approach and neglect of a coherent
3 Dillon et al. (1990). ibid.
4 The main argument of J Sachs against strategic trade policy centeron the notion of criticizing the state’s 
ability to ‘pick winners’. In the case of transformation, however, the state could have applied protection 
for the purpose of revitalising and phasing down certain industries and sectors (see chapter seven) without 
randomly picking winners. Moreover, the author assumes that modem economics does in fact chose 
winning, ‘future’ industries, particularly high technology goods and services, communications, bio­
related sectors and others which are crucial to modernisation and development of a knowledge-based 
economy, (see the EU’s Lisbon Agenda, for example).
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policy mix, discredited the liberal reforms and undermined the reformers’ efforts, 
leading to policy backtracking.
In this chapter the author does discusses the political legacies of the early economic 
reforms and of the developments during association. Assessing the role played by the 
EU in supporting the process of transformation in Poland, the chapter examines whether 
the EA has hindered, supported or had no effect on internal political change and 
ultimately the viability of the policies initially pursued. By focusing in on issues such as 
state authority and capacity, the role of social consensus and mobilisation in policy 
making, past mental legacies, present civic culture and the design and evolution of 
domestic interests and institutions, the author evaluates the effectiveness of the EA, as 
an institutional tool, in fulfilling the criteria required for an external anchor to work in 
enhancing domestic reform.
I. Economic Policy Making
At the beginning of the Polish transformation, the reformers felt that the Market would 
take care of almost everything. This unfounded optimism and faith in the ‘invisible 
hand’ led to a neglect of the role of the ‘state’. However, as the tension between the 
democratic political reforms and the process of marketisation increased, the ‘state’s’ 
role, initially undervalued, became ever more important. One cannot bolster economic 
growth without strengthening the ‘state’, public institutions and law enforcement. In 
turn, to do this, democratic legitimacy itself must be reinforced, as the economy, state 
and society constitute an inseparable whole.
In chapter seven the author showed that Polish trade policy reversals cannot be 
explained by relying on a simplified domestic political economy model, and that the 
influence of the international dimension, as exemplified by the EU, has been pivotal in 
affecting domestic change and shaping policy preferences. This chapter in turn 
concludes by further breaking down the intertwined factors that have influenced Polish 
trade policy reform; focusing in on the interdependence of changes in the political and 
economic realms of transformation and the extent to which these domestic processes 
have been shaped by the EU’s conditionality criteria and external leverage. The author 
thus identifies the conditions necessary for the mechanisms of international leverage to 
work in positively affecting domestic change
Central to this analysis of economic policy making and accordingly to the assessment of 
the role of international agreements as buffers against future policy instability is the 
capacity and authority of the ‘state’, on both international and domestic levels. 
Moreover, it is the combination of domestic interest group and the design of national
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institutions that provides incentives for leaders to open up their economies. Once 
liberalisation has been initiated, the ‘state’ must rely on a stable social base to sustain 
the envisaged reforms.
Dixit summarises the process of policymaking:
Tariff cuts and rules o f regimes do not eliminate the domestic political pressure for  
protection in any country, and these pressures will find  a way into other protectionist 
measures such as NTBs. And so government tie their hands, but without political desire, 
this tying o f hands is empty and shallow. Political desire has to be born out o f domestic
consensus. While tariffs are lowered, domestic groups will look for other ways and 
measures to protect themselves and the agreements become lip service to the merits o f
trade.5
A. The economics of trust
Because democracy and economic reform are intertwined, to understand the neoliberal 
expectation of the role to be played by international institutions in domestic policy 
consolidation, it is important to take a step back and begin with a general discussion of 
policy legitimacy. According to D McKay, “legitimacy is made up of those beliefs 
which, through the operations of democratic institutions, provide moral authority for 
government action and those beliefs which define the proper ambit or scope of 
government action.”6 Because the effectiveness of policy reform depends on the 
willingness of economic agents to alter their behaviour, it is to a large extent dependent 
on their legitimacy. Legitimacy on the other hand stems from the credibility of the 
government in carrying out the reforms and in doing so, acting on behalf of society. 
Legitimised institutions, which form the basis of the democratic order, fulfil their role, 
in turn, by strengthening the legitimacy of entire system. Moreover, the link between 
long- term economic performance and legitimacy indicates that to complete and 
consolidate the transition, a strong an efficient democracy is needed.
The conceptualisation of the legitimation dimension sheds light onto the importance of 
trust in democratic policy consolidation and economic reform viability. Concepts such 
as ‘trust’, ‘socialisation’ and Tegitimisation’, however, are all imprecise terms used by 
political economists to explain policy performance. These theoreticians none-the-less do 
not clarify the sources of these concepts or how they are to be incorporated with
5 Dixit (1996). The Making o f Economic Policy, ibid., p 79.
6 McKay, D. (1991). ‘Policy Legitimacy and Institutional Design: comparative lessons for the EU’, in 
Beetham, D. (Ed.) (1991). The Legitmation o f Power. London: Macmillan, p 26.
280
traditional economic theory to provide the conditions indispensable for successful 
policy reform. For this reason it is useful to turn to the work of sociologists.7 
According to sociologist P Sztompka, the existence of trust as an essential component of 
all human relationships is a fundamental concept in sociological analysis.8 Trust is the 
foundation of all human interactions, a primary source of the legitimisation of political 
decisions and ultimately the source for the consolidation of a market democracy.
Without trust, people avoid taking responsibility for their actions, and the relationships 
within which capitalism can flourish are weakened. Trust, for example, institutes the 
basis for investment, which in turn is the source of long term and sustainable economic 
growth.
To establish legitimacy in the social order, human being bestow trust upon institutions
and organisations as well as the rules and procedures through which these function.9
Sztompka asserts that,
institutional trust is given to those who have constructed the constitutional frame, 
perform governmental functions and monitor and supervise their performance. Trust 
may be located in our own society -  internal legitimacy- or may also be located in 
foreign societies- externalised trust. The grounds for trust are either directly justified 
through reputation or appearance worth trustworthiness, or indirectly transferred from  
those controlling the object in question and expected to enforce the trust.10
Hence, coexistence and interaction in all spheres of social life is based on a general trust 
in other people and institutions. In a democracy, in order for rules and arbitrator 
procedures to be legitimated, they have to be built on trust, and subsequently, trust can 
turn into a normative expectation, becoming embedded in the political culture of a 
country, turning it into either a culture of trust or distrust.11
B. Conditions for successful international leverage
Trust, as relevant for ‘anchoring’ strategies, such as the EA, is a necessary factor 
enabling the mechanism of international leverage to work in successfully stabilising 
domestic politics and positively affecting internal reform. According to K Zukrowska, 
primarily, what is needed is “trust of the elites towards the international organisation 
based on the assumption that equipped in new powers they {the international partners}
7 The legitimation dimension of democracy is contingent on establishing a national political culture, 
compatible with the basic democratic values, and depends on the psychological predisposition of 
individuals, attitudes towards the political system and the role of the self in this system.
See Schmitter, P, C. (1992). ‘Consolidation and interest systems’, in Diamond and Marks (Ed.) ibid. 
Schmitter, P. (1995). ‘Zagrozenia, dylematy I perspektywy konsolodacji demokracjii’, w Hausner, J. 
(Red.) (1995). Studia nad Systemem Reprezenlacji Interesow. ibid.
8 Sztompka, P. (1996). ‘Trust and Emerging Democracy: lessons from Poland’, International Sociology, 
Vol 11, No 1, March.
9 Marody (1994). ‘Polska’ in Rootes and Davis (Ed.) (1994). Ibid.
10 Sztompka (1996). ibid., p 42.
281
will not misuse them.” On the second level, Zukrowska has identified the existence of 
domestic trust of the voters towards their government, “in the sense of giving credit to 
the ruling political elites in power, as also a sine qua non of consolidating systemic 
changes.”12 Without these two factors present, international leverage is not able to fulfil 
its function in stabilising domestic reform or improving credibility.
This author in turn assumes that ‘trust’ on the international level stems from the 
perception that cooperation and partnership, as opposed to power politics or blackmail, 
form the foundations of inter-state relations, and that each partner’s interests are 
weighed equally in the process of arriving at optimal solutions. In addition, the only 
way to maintain the ‘trust’ given by national elites to an international organisation is for 
the external actors to fulfil their initially declared promises and carry through their 
obligations. The willingness of national elites to reform has to be backed by generous 
outside support and assistance.
On the domestic level, in turn, the ‘state’ earns social trust when the public is reinforced 
in its conviction that the authorities are willing and able to listen to its postulates and 
consult policy decisions with social partners. Moreover, social trust is strengthened, 
when the government fulfils the promises made and when public institutions function 
according to clear and consistent rules. Non-discrimination in the enforcement of the 
rule of law and a transparent legal framework are crucial. The when these factors exist, 
society domestically legitimises the policy reform process, giving confidence to the 
authorities who, in turn, externally legitimise the international strategies pursued, by 
displaying trust and confidence in the authority of the international organisation. In sum, 
in order for external leverage to work in stabilising domestic reform, it has to be based 
on trust; trust of the elites in the international organisation, and also trust of the voters in 
the elites.
The complicated transformation experience raises a number of additional issues in 
policy reform and tightens the conditions required for international leverage to be 
successful. Because the ability of the reforming governments to compensate the 
growing pool of losers and manage social tensions is more curtailed than in developed 
nations, due to tighter monetary and fiscal policy constraints, many social and political 
dilemmas are exacerbated.13 Thus, the trust on which the mechanism of international 
leverage is built should be backed by specific knowledge, which is not limited to the
11 Sztompka, P. (1992). ‘Dilemmas of the Great Transition’, Sisyphus: Social Studies, Vol 2 (Viii).
12 Zukrowska (1998). ‘The scope of opening’, in Zielinska- Glebocka and Stepniak (Ed. ) (1998). ibid. p 
303.
13 Amsden, A.H., Kochanowicz, J., and Taylor, L. (1994). ibid., p 204.
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economy, but incorporates politics, social problems and psychology. This expertise, in 
turn, allows the policy makers to decide which is the most effective way of getting from 
point ‘a’ to ‘b’, in a flexible and creative way, and predict what will happen in certain 
circumstances when a tool is applied.
Finally, as Winters has maintained, an international institution can only increase 
domestic policy credibility if the international organisation charged with providing 
outside support “has sufficient interest and power to discipline policy, and if the 
reforming government’s capacity to readjust to changing circumstances is preserved.”14 
Thus the international organisation responsible for exerting external leverage should 
demonstrate a minimum level of “moral authority” as well as flexibility in its strategies 
pursued towards the reforming state to strengthen the trust bestowed upon it by national 
elites. In setting standards consistently and following through on its own obligations the 
international institutions strengthens its own political credibility, a vital factor in 
increasing investment flows into the reforming country, ultimately encouraging growth 
and competitiveness.
C. From reform initiation to consolidation
Because anchoring policies can have destabilising effects on domestic politics, 
intensifying internal tensions and conflicts by increasing national disparities, such 
strategies cannot be separated from a theoretical discussion on the intricate linkages 
between democracy and the market. An analysis of this kind must also differentiate 
between the processes of democratic and market reform initiation and consolidation, as 
the dynamics of the two are substantially different.
While, initiation involves setting up formal rules and institutions, the so-called 
procedural democratic dimension, consolidation rests on the premise of participation 
and contestation of the citizens within already established institutions. This type of 
substantive democracy is characterised by the development of free and lively civil 
society, a relatively autonomous political society, enforcement of the rule of law, stable 
state bureaucracy, and institutionalisation of economic society15. It is accompanied by 
various negotiations and compromises between society and the ruling authorities and is 
centred around the crucial role to be played by the ‘state’ as the source of institutions 
and a forum for conflict resolution.
In democracies, the process of arriving at policy decisions and consequently the 
fulfilment of international obligations is based on the internal mechanisms of consensus
14 Winters (2000). ‘The external economic dimension’, in van Dijck and Faber (Ed.) (2000). ibid., p 210.
15 See Linz and Stepan
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seeking, subject to different opinions and interests. Regardless of external obligations 
and conditionality entailing sanctions, these diverse voices within domestic politics 
need to be listened to for the mechanisms of legitimisation to work. This is particularly 
true in countries undergoing transformation, where the fragile process of 
democratisation is just being initiated, and political decision-making is just beginning to 
show signs of institutionalisation.
For consolidation to be completed, civil society must learn to function within these 
newly established institutions and accept the rules of the game behind them. Otherwise 
economic strategies can paradoxically create political backlash and ultimately produce 
greater resistance to the reform measures themselves.
Przeworski has maintained that a “stable democracy requires that government be strong 
enough to govern effectively but weak enough not to be able to govern against 
important interests.”16 These conditions are crucial to the functioning of contestation 
and participation, as their presence suggest that the authorities are able and willing to 
respond to public demands, confirming the role of consensus seeking and mobilisation 
in policy making. In democracies thus, disputes are not settled by imposition from 
above, but are rather resolved through negotiation, compromises and agreements 
between the ‘state’ and society. The resolution of differences revolves around elections 
and campaigns, where unsatisfactory leaders and their governing programmes can be 
removed. A O Hirschman has argued that “the development of social ‘voice’ through 
the articulation and aggregation of opinions and interests is synonymous with the 
history of democratic control.”17 Moreover, if “in a democracy trade policy must 
ultimately stem from the legislature in response to public demands”, as A Winters has 
claimed18, than it is society’s ‘voice’ in the realm of domestic politics that is the crucial 
factor in determining policy preferences, outcomes, and ultimately performance. 
Another pivotal part of democratic consolidation hinges upon the development of a 
democratic political culture compatible with liberal economic reform. This “intangible”, 
as Przeworski observed centres on the linkages “between the performance or 
effectiveness of new democratic governments and their legitimacy, or the extent to 
which elites and publics believe in the value of the democratic system.”19
16 Przeworski (1991). Democracy and the Market, ibid., p 37.
17 Hirschman, A.O. (1970). Exit, Voice and Loyalty, responses to decline in firms, organisations ans 
states. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, p 55.
18 Winters, LA. (1994). ‘Who should run trade policy in Eastern Europe and how?’, in Winters (Ed.) 
(1994). Foundations, ibid., p 33.
19 Przeworski (1995). Sustainable Democracy, ibid., p 61.
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Finally, the legitimisation of democratic regimes cannot be built solely on consensual 
agreement between conflicting interests and the ‘state’. The process of arriving at these 
agreements is just as important. The way in which the political elites respond to public 
demands, the presentation and procedure of reaching compromises, resolving problems 
and handling disputes is as significant to their legitimisation as the outcomes 
themselves.
In sum, social trust, the foundation for a democratic political culture, and the source of 
the legitimation of power given to the elected authorities to govern is reinforced when 
policy making is characterised by uncertain outcomes but certain and institutionalised 
rules, and when public opinion is convinced that the political leadership will not impose 
reform measures at all costs or exploit problems to their own advantage, but instead will 
seek public participation and negotiation in the process of arriving at political decisions.
D. Democracy and market reform
For neoliberal institutionalists, the main danger is that in a democracy, the losers of the 
adjustment process will indirectly influence future policy through the mechanism of 
voting and consequently change the desirable course of economic reform. The theories 
are premised on the belief that democracy can slow down the economic decision 
making process by making consensus-seeking a prerequisite to legislative decisions. 
Olson for example has claimed that democracy is dysfunctional for capitalism because it 
allows for the crystallisation of specific interests, favours redistribution and rent-seeking 
and hinders the efficient allocation of resources.20
However, if the assumptions about the role of legitimacy in economic reform hold true, 
than participatory democracy is much more than an end goal in and of itself, but in also 
the means to create the foundations of a market society and increase economic reform 
viability. In contrast to neoliberal expectations, democratic legitimacy might in fact be a 
necessary condition to sustain economic change in the long-run and ultimately ensure 
market performance.
Moreover, because the development of domestic political culture and of the social 
‘voice’ is itself largely subject to change as it becomes influenced and moulded by 
developments on both national and international levels, it is the task of the reforming 
‘state’ supported by international institutions and external leverage to not only to create 
the mechanisms of the market by far ranging liberalisation, but also to safeguard the 
mechanisms of democratic rule. For this to happen and for the legitimacy of the new 
regime to be secured, some measure of economic success must take place, and the
20 Olson, M (1982). as quoted in Amsden, A.H., Kochanowicz, J., and Taylor, L. (1994). ibid. p 183.
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transaction costs of the reforms, be they social, political or economic, must not be so 
great that the government is forced to chose between authoritarian means to achieve 
economic goals, on the one hand, or the continuation of democratic politics at the 
expense o f economic growth, on the other.21
In another words, for people to accept temporary hardships and support policy reform, 
they must have confidence in the government’s capacity to carry out the reforms and be 
convinced that their own situation and material conditions will eventually improve.
To conclude, for successful economic reform two things are needed: democratic rule 
and economic performance. The role of the international leverage is to strengthen 
these two impulses, and the focus of this chapter primarily is to assess how the 
European Union, within the framework of the Europe Agreement, has buttressed these 
two mechanisms in Poland. To successfully exert pressure on Polish domestic change, 
the EU would have to be highly effective in regulating the Polish reforms, and its moral 
authority would have to be derived from expertise knowledge coupled with fulfilment of 
its declared obligations. Shortly, the Union would have to set the standards and be 
accountable for the strategies advocated to the Polish associated partner as well as for its 
own collective actions.
On the second national level, to ensure democratic rule and economic performance, 
domestic elites themselves have to be held accountable for the policy implementation. 
The top- down, technocratic approach characteristic of the early reform efforts can 
endanger the development of the social voice, precisely at the time when the population 
is expecting a more elastic and representative form of politics. Secondarily, thus, this 
chapter assesses what effect the reform methods used by the technocrats and type of 
elitist policy- style implemented throughout the twelve years of transformation has 
had on the new policy-making environment in Poland, and how the political legacies of 
the early reform phases have impacted current policy performance.
II. Association and Reform Consolidation
In the early 90’s, the EU’s official aim was to ensure that “Community policy shall 
contribute to the general objective o f developing and consolidating democracy and the
9 Trule of law and that of corresponding human rights and fundamental freedoms.” In 
Poland, as in the other CEE states, the Union’s objective was to support the processes of
21 See Deschouwer, K. and Coppieters, B. (1993). ‘A western European Model for Social democracy in 
East-Central Europe’ in Waller, M., Coppieters, B. and Deschouwer, K. (Ed.) (1993). Social democracy 
in a Post-Communist Europe, ibid.
22 Nowotny, T. (1997). ‘Economic Transition, Democratic Consolidation and the Integration o f Central- 
Eastern European Countries into European Structures’, in Economic Developments and Reforms in 
Cooperation Partner Countries, NATO Colloquium, Brussels: NATO, June, p 198.
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policy institutionalisation, strengthening market forces through economic integration, as 
well as buttressing the political development of nascent democratic structures and 
encouraging the emergence of an active civil society. According to the endorsed 
rhetoric, the Community’s motives for association with the Polish state were based on 
the desire “to help consolidate political democratisation, even at the price of
. ,2 4economics.
On the Polish side, in turn, during the first phase of the transformation, the reformist 
elites were seeking outside support for their internal reform efforts. The main 
assumption behind locking in Polish systemic changes within institutionalised structures 
with the Communities was that association was to serve as an ‘anchor’ for domestic 
economic and political changes, enhancing the stability of the reforms pursued. 
Economic and political integration with the EU, a key component of the transition
strategy, was itself dependent on the viability and credibility of the domestic reforms.
1 ^For the Poles, the EA was to fulfil a number of objectives. ' Primarily, it was to 
contribute to strengthening internal economic performance, crucial to long term policy 
consolidation, by providing an environment that would enable the fragile transition 
economy to resume growth.26 Indirectly, by securing the benefits o f Regional Trade 
Agreements, the Agreement was to encourage the creation of domestic winners and 
supporters of open economic policies and thus the development of political pluralism. 
Secondly, in the political dimension, the EA was to avail as a model for institution 
building, serving as a legal guideline for the design of a future market democracy, as 
well as an indispensable tool for association and eventual accession to the Union. 
Finally, the EA was to support the building of democracy itself. This required that, the 
European Union apply the notion of conditionality to pressure the Polish elites to 
continue their reforms in such a way as not to interfere with internal dialogue between 
the ‘state’ and society and avoid restricting the national reform debate to a choice 
between responding to binding international obligations and credibility constraints, on 
the one hand, and domestic pressures and democratic considerations, on the other. In 
this way, the EU was not only to strengthen the hand of the reformers by giving them
2j As defined by Art. 130u paragraph 2, Title XVII on Development Cooperation.
24 See Pridham, G. (1991). ‘The Politics of the European Community, transnational networks and 
democratic transition in Southern Europe’, in Pridham, G. (Ed.) (1991). Encouraging Democrac. ibid., p 
239.
Pridham has maintained that in the case of eastern enlargement this democratic solidarity argument was 
again clearly present.
Lewis, P.G. and Pridham, G. (Ed.) (1996). Stabilising Fragile Democracies, ibid.
25 See chapter two.
26 This was to be achieved by providing Polish producers with generous market access, investment and 
other forms of both direct and indirect financial aid.
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incentives and rewards for the continuation of reforms, but more importantly grant them 
enough leeway to adequately respond to domestic demands and emerging social 
conflicts (even if these did not always reflect optimal economic objectives in the short 
run).
Thus the liberal project of economic development espoused to and carried out by the 
initial Polish elites was dependent to an overwhelming extent on the relationship of the 
domestic reforms to the external. Moreover, it was conditioned on the fulfilment by the 
EU of the promises made of assistance with the transformation. By ensuring that the 
reforms had enough of a life time to take hold in Poland, bolstering the social and 
political situation in the country, and to avert the rise of populism and nationalism in the 
region, the EU, in turn, was to secure its own interests.
The trust of the Polish elites that integration would shorten the painful transition 
stemmed from a general belief that the European partners had the privileged knowledge 
and political will necessary to directly guide and support the process, as well as the 
expectations that the EU collectively would be accountable for its actions and would not 
exploit the confidence given to it to its advantage. However, because no real attempt 
was made on either the Polish or the EU side before or during the negotiation of the EA 
seriously to estimate its impact on the transition or to look at what terms of Agreement 
would have best served the process27, many assumptions made as to the future benefits 
of association have in fact not held. Moreover, the possible complications of 
implementing the EA were seriously underestimated, and the resistance of domestic 
interests (on both the EU and the Polish side) undervalued.
The developments in political relations during association suggest that the mechanism 
of trust, on both international and domestic levels, has been seriously weakened. 
Mayhew has attributed this deterioration in trust partly to the basic lack of 
understanding in the EU-15 of the situation in countries in transition and in the 
institutional problems faced by them. “On the side of the Union, the emphasis being put 
on verification of implementation of the acquis today suggests a lack of trust and also 
opens up many avenues for opponents of enlargement to exploit.” In fact, the politics 
o f implementing the EA have actually created an acute problem in maintaining 
confidence, trust and credibility between the associated partners.
27 Mayhew (1998). ibid., p 42.
28 Mayhew, A. (2000). ‘Enlargement of the European Union: An analysis o f the negotiations with the 
Central and Eastern European Candidate Countries’, Sussex Working Papers in Contemporary European 
Studies, No 39, Sussex: Sussex European Institute, December.
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It could be argued that on the level o f support for political and institutional reform in 
Poland, the deviation between the short-term interests of the current member states and 
considerations of democratic consolidation or specific needs of the transition proved far 
wider than initially expected. For example, while the Commissioner responsible for 
Employment and Social Policy, A. Diamantopoulu, criticised the Polish authorities for 
insufficient institutionalisation of interests representation and dysfunctional social 
dialogue, the member states represented in the Association Council as well as the 
Commissioners for Trade, Competition Policy or Internal Market continued to make 
progress in the accession and association negotiations with the Polish side conditional 
upon the fulfilment of various postulates that in effect were to be imposed upon the 
social partners without prior consultation.
i n
The low levels of financial transfers compared to the effort undertaken by the Polish 
governments, no possibilities to opt out of certain areas of the acquis, strict and 
inflexible rules on state aids, competition, environmental and social policy, as well as 
the expectation of full harmonisation and liberalisation even before accession have 
meant that the costs of adjustment have fallen disproportionally on the candidate. The 
lack of urgency as to enlargement, as exemplified by the Union’s unwillingness to 
propose any concrete dates well until ten years into association has also brought about 
political uncertainty. Thus while it was essential for the Union to project a steady and 
unambiguous commitment to enlargement to buttress political stability in transition, 
thereby encouraging investment and growth, EU policies have remained plagued by 
self- interested protectionism.
The fact that the well-being of the present member states, regions and sectors have 
tended to dominate the EU’s collective approach to cooperation with the Polish side has 
been most explicit in the growing imbalance in trade relations and in handling of the 
contentious issues themselves (see chapter 5-7). Because the European Union’s policies 
became more protectionistic than originally expected by the Poles, many of the liberal 
policies initially promoted in Poland were discredited. The opening up experience 
proved to be much more painful and the costs of adjustment much higher than would 
have been the case had the Union kept its side of the bargain. Thus as the optimism of 
the early liberalism as to the process of internationalisation proved unwarranted, 
populist parties and advocates of protectionism gained ground.
29 Byrne, Solbes, Monti, Lamy.
30 PHARE funding amounted to only .5% of EU GDP and 10% of the grants to Greece and Portugal. In 
previous enlargements, much larger funds and fiscal transfers were made available to help the new 
member states adapt.
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Technical disputes over the price of steel pipes or the quota for milk production have 
created an image in Poland of a self-interested Union and have made the EU’s declared 
support for the process of democratisation little more than rhetoric. Already in the early 
phase o f the negotiations of the EA, Pridham observed that, “there was some divergence 
between the democratic argument and the economic considerations, because the 
interests of the member states sometimes clashed with the aspirations of candidates.”31 
Thus, even though the early official response o f the Union to the changes going on in 
the east was to express solidarity with the nations in transition and to hold financial aid, 
market access and the possibility of membership as prospective rewards for the 
continuation of changes, the initial momentum for trade liberalisation, on both the EU 
side collectively led by the Commission and in Poland, was quickly undermined when 
the Union became pre-occupied with its internal affairs. This made it difficult for the 
Union to pay adequate attention to the domestic responses in Poland, preventing it from 
reacting to the social ramifications, economic developments and political repercussions 
of the integration process.
As non-competitive Polish sectors began to go under and unemployment to rise, the 
adjustment assistance policies provided for by the EU proved insufficient to serve the 
needs o f the applicant. While the losses from trade liberalisation under the EA were 
small for the EU33, the costs of adjustment were much higher for the Polish side. 
Economist W Orlowski demonstrated, for example, that even the Polish trade policy 
reversals had no significant impact on bilateral trade flows, especially if their scope is 
compared with the estimates of trade imbalances induced by the EA.34 Moreover, 
experts have provided ample evidence that the EA has had an overall positive effect for 
EU employment as a result of the significant trade surplus.35 As such, it could be argued 
that the disparity in the costs of adjustment was not sufficiently responded to from the 
Union.
31 Pridham (1991). ‘The politics’, ibid., p 239.
32 Such as EFTA enlargement, the Euro, BSE, economic recession, terrorism or illegal migration.
” See Faini and Portes (1995). ibid.
Rambow, G. (2000). ‘Excerpt from a paper on the Influence of Accession on EU policies’, ibid.
Hindley, B.V. (1993). ‘Helping transition through trade?’, ibid.
Fontenay, P.de, Gomel, G. and Hochreiter, E. (Ed.) (1995). ibid.
Friedrich Ebert Stiftung (1996).’The costs’, ibid.
Eatwell, J., Ellman, M., Karlsson, M., Nuti, D. M. and Shapiro, J. (1997). ibid.
Mayhew (2001). Enlargement and the Community Budget. Ibid.
34 Orlowski shows that the creation of FTA (up until 1996 alone) under the EA increased Polish exports 
by 2.4bn US$ and imports by 3.4 bn, resulting in a trade deficit of -1050mln US$.
Orlowski, (2000). The Costs and Gains from Poland’s Membership in the EU. ibid.
35 With only slight growth in sectoral deficits in textile, coal and steel industries that continued to 
decrease throughout the 90’s.
Hausner, J., Marody, M., Wilkin, J., Wojtyna, A. and Zirk-Sadowski, M. (Ed.) (1998). Accession or
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In addition, the carrot/stick approach applied by the EU to exert leverage on the 
applicant, exemplified a lack of flexibility in the Union’s collective interpretation of the 
conditionality criteria. The criticism by and imposition of retaliatory measures against 
the Polish side for failing to comply with the EU’s the policy prescriptions damaged 
political relations, trust and exacerbated the transition dilemmas. It also meant that 
successive governments in Poland (from Solidarity, to the Social Democrats, Freedom 
Union and even the Peasants) have had to continue to fulfil the EA obligations, to some 
extent, in spite of social protest and growing pressure for backtracking on the reforms. 
This book has shown, however, that these commitments have not been fulfilled 
consistently, and that the governments have reacted on a discretionary basis, intervening 
into the economy at random times (usually in the face o f massive strikes or corruption) 
to domestic pressures and rent-seeking activities. The uninstitutionalisation o f economic 
life in Poland has fueled the ad hoc, unpredictable and reactionary nature of Polish trade 
policy formulation and contributed to the intransparency of the trade regime.
Finally, because the enormous social costs of the transition reforms were initially 
undervalued, by both associates, and the impact of democracy on the expectations o f the 
public neglected36, the most crucial factors determining long-term policy consolidation 
were overlooked in the political strategies on which association and transformation were 
based. The perceived European indifference to or lack of support for the difficult 
internal process of reform generated a strong public reaction in Poland initially against 
the transformation reforms, and subsequently against the EU and the Polish liberal 
reformers. This development, in turn, weakened the economic reform process, 
increasing policy instability, and intensifying the various transaction costs.
Finally, even though in the early nineties West European experts like J Rollo warned 
that “these kinds of policy mistakes may be punished quickly by voters, and it is 
essential that western policy be adaptive”37, and others, such as C Preston, echoed this 
sentiment maintaining that, “international tools, like the EA, can only work and 
facilitate Poland’s internal reforms to the extent, that the method of exerting external 
leverage is itself adapted to meet the applicant’s needs” , the EU’s policies towards the 
Polish side continued to display a lack of adaptivity. Many of the rigid requirements
Integration, ibid., p 57
36 Rollo, J.M.C. with Batt, J. et al. (1990). The New Eastern Europe: western responses. London: RIIA, 
Pinter.
37 Rollo, JMC. (1990). ‘The Role of the West’, in Rollo. with Batt. et al. (1990). ibid., p 133.
38 Preston, C. (1995). ‘Obstacles to EU Enlargement: The Classical Community Method and the prospects 
for a wider Europe’, Journal o f  Common Market Studies, Vol 33, No 3, p 18.
See also Preston, C. (1998). ‘Poland and EU Membership: Current issues and future prospects’, European 
Integration, Vol 21, OPA, N.V.
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advocated by the Community in its pre-accession strategies, combined with restricted 
market access, not only contributed to slowing down economic growth in Poland, but 
also handicapped the ability of the ‘state’ to make good on its reform efforts.
In spite of suggestions to put the interests of the candidate before the short-term 
interests of the EU, as the stronger partner, the Union’s collectively incoherent and 
inconsistent approach to cooperation with the Polish partner unveiled the inability of the 
Member states to consider the long-term interests of a united ‘Europe’ ahead of the 
short term interests of individual groups, regions and sectors.39 
On the Polish domestic politics side, the governing liberal elites likewise lost society’s 
trust, initially given to them in the first free democratic elections. The effect of tying the 
elites’ hands with constraints stemming from association, coupled with the low 
economic performance of the reforms instigated, disabled the primary and subsequent 
governments from adequately responding to social demands or fulfilling the promises 
made to the public. All the successive governing coalitions, regardless of their political 
orientation, have continued to some extent to implement the elitist style of policy 
making originally introduced by the technocrats. This can be explained by the continued 
reliance of Poland on external assistance and the need to fulfil international 
commitments and conditionality parameters. The ‘anchoring’ effect o f international 
agreements has consequently perpetuated the top- down style of politics within 
mainstream parties, contributing to their growing alienation form the public. As a result, 
populist pasties, ‘the true friends of the people’ have gained political ground as the 
‘establishment’ lost the confidence of the Poles.
In sum, the type of ‘anchoring’ implemented by the Union has hampered the 
development of domestic negotiations between the social partners, increasing the 
impulse towards elitism and the isolation of the political class from society. In the realm 
of policy reform, where the unpredictability of the government’s behaviour and the 
fluency and instability of the institutions have not allowed for greater public 
participation in decision- making, interest groups have thus been unable to build the 
consensus on which the new political and economic system could be institutionalised.
,9 Mayhew, A. (2002). The Brussels European Council: historical step forward or short-sighted short­
term ism. Warsaw: UKIE.
Mayhew, A. and Wallace, H. (2001) ‘One Europe or Several, Poland: A partnership profile’, OEOS 
Policy Paper, April.
Padoan, PC. (1994). ‘The Changing European Political Economy’, in Stubbs and Underhill (Ed.) (1994). 
ibid.
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A. Rewards and sanctions
Assessing the effectiveness of the conditionality used by the EU to exert leverage on 
Polish authorities is the most crucial dimension in evaluating its impact on domestic 
reforms. However, the problems stemming from the application of conditionality as a 
relevant instrument for mobilising domestic change and exerting leverage come from an 
imprecise understanding of what exactly is meant by the term, and “whether in fact it 
can be obtained.”40
Conditionality revolves around a subtle distinction between power and influence as used 
in international relations. Commenting on this duality, R Falk has presented a case for 
“paying more attention to the instrument of influence, in the sense of indirect contact 
and motivation given for change.”41 Zukrowska similarly asserted that the reward and 
promise approach, by playing a mobilising role, is much more effective in influencing 
domestic changes than the carrot and stick method, because “as sociology tells us in the 
study o f behaviour, punishment is not considered an effective tool moving people into 
the desired direction.”42
Flexible political and economic conditionality accompanied by generous rewards for the 
changes taking place can strengthen internal democratic and market mechanisms, giving 
credibility to the reforms and the reformers. On the other hand, institutional criteria that 
relies on an overly rigid interpretation of conditionality can exacerbate unpredictability 
and uncertainty under conditions of rapid social change and paradoxically lead to policy 
destabilisation.
If it’s not flexible enough, an international regime, like the EA, can constrain the 
‘state’s capacity to readjust to changing circumstances, weaken its ability to adequately 
respond to public demands and increase policy dilemmas. Because such regimes are 
imperfect and incomplete contracts, Winters has pointed out “that in response to 
political realities of the time, when rules such as the EA are inconvenient, governments 
will simply ignore them and respond to domestic needs.”43
B. The Union’s application of conditionality
In chapter three, the author has shown that the initiation of reform in Poland was able to 
take place due to a crisis situation in the economy, which created the conditions of
40 The expectation of association was that Poland was to achieve specific implementation targets as a 
precondition for further negotiations and future membership, reinforced by the conditionality clause, 
which made financial assistance and other EU concessions dependent on meeting these targets.
Rollo, JMC. (1990). ibid.
41 Falk (1981) quoted Almond, G. (1989). ‘The international- national connection’, British Journal o f  
Political Science, April, p 254.
42 Zukrowska (1998). ‘The Scope’, in Zielinska- Glebocka and Stepniak (Ed.) (1998). ibid. p 303
43 Winters (2000). ‘The external dimension’, in Dijck, P. van and Faber, G (Ed.) (2000). ibid., p 210.
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‘extra-ordinary politics’. However, as democratisation proceeded and interest groups 
were reawakened, delays began to appear in the policy decision-making mechanisms, 
and the commitment to further reform was hampered by the internal need to search for 
compromises. Sociologists and even economists began to argue that the reforms would 
only succeed if the parliament managed to combine legitimacy with effectiveness and 
public acceptance with strategies of economic change.44 None the less, the fulfilment of 
international obligations was constraining the government’s ability to respond to social 
demands.
The author’s analysis suggests the Union’s policies advocated towards the Polish side 
and the type o f conditionality employed to exert leverage by the EU have forced the 
Polish authorities to maintain a complex balancing act. The government has had 
simultaneously to secure future election, achieve the foreign policy goal of accession to 
the EU, and as such continue with difficult economic reforms under conditions of a 
parliamentary democracy, and to systematically respond to the voice o f public opinion 
to secure a base for its reform efforts.45 Because the implementation of the EA proved 
that its framework was not flexible enough to allow the Polish authorities to deal with 
the transaction costs of the transition, or balanced between political requirements, as 
revolving around participatory democracy, and economic criteria; the ‘anchoring’ 
strategy, with its diverse targets and schedules, was weakening the Polish ‘state’s’ 
capacity respond to domestic developments. This, in turn, strained the already tense 
state-social relationship and contributed to the breakdown of social dialogue. As the 
Polish people learned that their postulates go unheard and that democratic resolution of 
conflict based on internal bargaining and consensus seeking is a mirage, the peaceful 
option of voicing protest turned into more violent forms of political resistance, 
eventually followed by Hirschman’s ‘exit’ from politics itself.46 
Public frustration with the reforms, feelings of betrayal, loss of confidence in each of 
the successive governments and growth of distrust towards all the elites have manifested 
themselves in various opinion polls. According to an OBOP study conducted in 2003, 
88% of the polish population believes in the selfishness of the politicians, 81% think
44 See Crawford, B. (Ed.) (1995). Markets, States and Democracy, ibid.
Hausner, J. and Marciniak, P. (Red.) (1994).
Ciamaga, L. (Red.) (1997). Zagraniczna Polityka Gospodarcza Polski w teorii i praktyce dostosowan 
doUnii Europejskiej. Warszawa: SGH, Elipsa.
Haggard, S. and Kaufman, R. (1995). The Political Economy o f Democratic Transition, ibid.
45 Both are conditions and criteria for future accession as proclaimed in Copenhagen European Council, 
1993. Democratic preconditions with respect to applicant states were recognized in article 237 of the 
Rome treaty requiring them to be parliamentary democracies.
46 Hirschman, A.O. (1970). ibid.
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that political parties represent only their own interests.47 A CBOS poll carried out in the 
same period shows that 75% of the Poles treat all the elites, regardless of orientation, as
A O
the same ‘self-interested power-seeking oligarchy’, ‘a pack of thieves’ . 44% judge the 
‘all the coalitions since 1989’, as ‘the most awful’ of the governments, while 15% still 
consider the initial elites as the worst. According to the Poles, all the governing 
coalitions since the beginning of the reforms have given away lucrative positions and 
contracts based on nepotistic ties and not meritocracy.49
r n
The Poles thus do not trust any of the political parties and a staggering 26% support a 
‘strong hand’ government.51 In another study, 44% maintained that power should be in 
the hands of a strong leader, while this figure corresponded to 7% in the Czech 
Republic, 12% in Slovakia and 70% in Russia.. .52
Resentment of the political elite is expressed by those who do not vote at all. 60% of the 
Poles feel they are not represented by any party.53According to the Polish Elections 
Committee only 61.25% of the Poles voted in the 2000 presidential elections, and 
46.3% of the eligible voters took part in the 2001 parliamentary elections. In the 2002 
local government elections, the corresponding figure was again a low of 44.33%, while 
the frequency in national referendums has been even lower. In the 1996, 
affranchisement referendum only 32.44% of the population went to vote, while in the 
1997 constitutional referendum the level remained well below half the public, at 
42.86%.54
C. Zig-zagging reform
The author’s analysis thus suggests that the reforms instigated in Poland by a technical 
government elite and superficially linked to external anchors have augmented the
47 OBOP, 07/03
48 LKB, ‘Frustration Has Many Faces’, Warsaw Voice, 19/03/00.
49 CBOS, 4-7/4/03.
50 GW, ‘Najdluzsza wojna na gorze’, 28-29/06/03;
Polski Generalny Sondaz Spoleczny, 2003.
Marianski, J. (20037 Kondycja Moralnapolskiego Spoleczenstwa. (2003). PAN. 
Szacki, J. ‘Tratakty niezmienia ducha’, GW, 12/06/03.
‘Zimne Piece, Cieple Piwo’, GW 1-2/06/02 
‘Sojusz przeciwko postepowi’, Wprost, 28/02/99;
‘Ludzie Wladzy’, Polityka nr 18 (2191), 1/05/99;
‘Dziesiec lat poznej’, polityka nr 1 (2174), 2/01/99;
‘W ramionach Leppera’, Polityka nr 15 (21880, 10/04/99;
‘Diagnoza spoleczna 2003’. PAN;
Kolarska- Bobinska, L. ‘Wezmy kapital wymosmy zmiany’, GW, 04/08/03.
GW, ‘Gruzy na demokracji’, 11/07/03.
51 OBOP, poll 14-16/06/03.
52 Pew Research Centre Poll, 2003.
53 Inerview with J Kucharczyk, sociologist at the Institute of Public Affairs.
54 GW. 23-24/11/2002.
GW. 15/01/03.
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erosion of public confidence in the ‘state’ and its institutions, undermining the its 
authority, capacity and the effectiveness and permanent character of the reforms 
pursued.55
Only 12- 16% of the Poles trust the basic democratic institutions in Poland and a mere 
4% think that the institutions are concerned with the interests of ordinary Poles. 7% 
consider national institutions to be effective, and 8% think that they function generally 
in an impartial/just manner. 96% assert national instituions are corrupt!56 
Accordingly, a weak Polish state, unable to rely on legitimate and stable institutions, 
faced with social resistance to its reform programme and restrained by the international 
repercussions of its actions, has not been effective in carrying out responsible policy 
reform. The attractiveness of the technocratic policy option has meant that despite the 
official attempts to consult policy decisions with social partners a large proportion of 
national decisions in Poland continued to be taken without any consultations, bringing 
on new protests.57
In addition, the dilemmas of the ‘trapped state’, have contributed to a highly 
unpredictable and unstable climate of policy making. Major reforms began to be 
postponed in order to satisfy the loudest voices o f public protest and create an image of 
social dialogue. Moreover, the deceleration of change has also been a result of political 
bickering as well as the resistance of the early ‘winners’ of the transition, whose 
concentration of market power and close ties to various political elites have contributed 
to a policy-making environment characterised by the capture of the ‘state’ by vested 
interests and increasing levels of corruption. Backtracking has been especially evident 
in institutional reform, where, for example, the privatisation of SOE’s has been severely 
delayed in several key sectors. In the legal realm, on the other hand, inappropriate 
norms and haphazardous application and enforcement of the rule of law have further 
opened the way for illicit rent- seeking activities at the expense of institutionalised 
interest mediation.
The reforms in Poland have tended to follow a stop/go pattern, and the policy pendulum 
has sometimes swung in the direction of the demands of the international and 
sometimes in the direction of the expectations of society. Paradoxically, then policies, 
such as openness, that would have been optimal under full credibility of the ‘state’, have
Polska Komisja Wyborcza, figures.
55 Przeworski (1995). ibid.
56 CBOS poll conducted for ISP. 27/02- 4/03, 2003.
57 See Marody, M. (1994). ‘State and Society in Poland’, in Rootes & Davies (Ed.), ibid. 
Hausner, J. and Marody M. (Ed.) (1999). ibid.
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turned out to be less than optimal under conditions of incomplete credibility, waning
fO
state authority and capacity.
As Przeworski has noted
i f  confidence is eroded, radical programmes can not be undertaken again under 
democratic conditions, as the government must first rebuild confidence. However, 
vacillations in policy are even more pernicious. I f  the state goes back on a particular 
reform package and then launches a new program, people, knowing that reforms have 
failed in the past are less likely to believe that they will succeed now.
Thus the most likely path o f reform is one o f radical programs, that are eventually 
slowed or partly reversed, initiated again in a more gradual form with less popular 
confidence, and again slowed or reversed, until a new government comes in and 
promises a clean break, and the cycle starts again. Consequently, the reforms neither to 
succeed nor to fail but to proceed in spurts: advancing, stumbling, retreating and
advancing again.59
Nowhere does this description of policy reform fit as well as it does in the evolution of 
the Polish trade regime. The initial radical opening up of the economy was very quickly 
followed by reversals and backsliding as the effects of liberalisation began to emerge. 
Throughout the 90’s and into the next decade, the Polish trade policy-making process 
has been marked by ad hoc decisions and inconsistent application of various measures 
of both protection and liberalisation, discussed in chapter seven. While tariffs on 
industrial goods have indeed been lowered, the government has begun to rely heavily on 
diverse NTBs, such as quality certificates or tax exemptions. In agricultural trade, 
although the double zero agreement on non-processed goods and continuing 
negotiations over processed products have represented progress, the first 10 years of 
association were characterised in the Polish trade regime by creeping state intervention 
and reliance on various tariff and NTBs. State aids and competition policy have fared 
considerably better, but even here, domestic interest pressure has become more and 
more influential on government decisions, and bureaucratically mis-managed responses 
to diverse demands have dominated over strategic, long-term policy considerations.
All of these developments suggest that the EA was not fulfilling its role as an anchor for 
Polish trade policy reform and sustainability. Partially, this was a result of the 
weakening sense of the EU’s ‘external’ legitimacy as an example of economic 
openness. The other reason for the failure of the EA to successfully consolidate the 
reform efforts in Poland stems from the very nature of economic policy making itself.
58 Przeworski ( 1 9 9 1 ) .  ibid. p  1 8 0 .
59 Przeworski (1991). ibid., p 179.
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D. Technocratic dangers to democratic consent
While ‘anchoring’ strategies have indeed compelled the Polish government to strictly 
adhere to certain regulatory frameworks and schedules, in doing so, they have made the 
process of adjustment rigid and constrained the role of negotiations between the social 
partners and the ‘state’ on the domestic level. By forcing the Polish ‘state’ to break 
agreements made within domestic consultations and not keep the promises made to 
social partners, ‘anchoring strategies’ have contributed to the polarisation of social 
demands and increasing frequency of protest coupled with political apathy. 
Radicalisation of interests has meant that the institutionalisation of interest 
representation has been replaced with intransparent rent-seeking activities and lobbying 
outside of the legal framework
The apt question thus arises whether these anchoring tools of the association process 
should in fact have been used to evoke policy changes that would otherwise be more 
difficult to achieve, but would instead have been built on internal social dialogue, 
compromise and legitimacy and therefore be more sustainable in the long run.
Hence, while policy changes, conducted in a transparent manner as a response to 
domestic pressures, are not optimal from the point of view of economic efficiency 
considerations, they could be considered desirable from the democratisation objective 
perspective. However, judging from the Union’s reactions to the Polish authorities’ 
attempts to respond to domestic pressures within the framework allowed by the EA, (see 
chapter 6) it could be argued that the evolution of democratic accountability in Poland 
has not been perceived by the EU side as a desirable process.
In fact, the Head of the British Know-How Fund and institutional adviser to the Polish 
government applauded the success of the EA, claiming that,
as was the case with previous enlargements, the specific, legally binding requirements 
o f the EA have been used to confront entrenched domestic interest groups. Whilst the 
trade disputes that have arisen between Poland and the EU suggest that these interest 
groups still retain power, particularly within some industries and ministries, without the 
EA, it is very unlikely that, for instance, steel tariff reduction schedules would have been
agreed.60
In contrast, J Rollo observed that,
it is possible that economic conditionality (applied by the EU) has undermined 
democratic structures (in the candidates) by imposing the sort o f  outside control that 
was considered reprehensible under Soviet domination, and that western policy 
interference has distorted the internal democratic discourse about transformation
60 Preston (1998). ibid., p 167.
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policies, while the policies o f rapid privatisation and restructurisation have reinforced 
many o f the negative trends in the democratisation process.61
Many of the adjustment policies required of subsequent Polish governments by the 
Union, either in fulfilment of its EA obligations or in preparation for accession, have not 
been easy to explain to the general public. Thus, because succeeding government 
coalitions have been afraid to transparently implement the difficult economic reforms, 
for fear of losing electoral support, they have often resorted to clandestine and semi­
authoritarian decision-making options, going above public opinion and presenting it 
with a fait accompli. By failing to persuade their public to follow their lead, the 
reformers discredited themselves and further strengthened social frustration and 
mistrust.
Technocratic policymaking used to achieve broad international objectives has thus 
served to reinforce earlier trends in Polish decision-making. European-related reforms 
instigated and carried out by technocratic elites were particularly reminiscent of the 
initial phases of transition, where shock therapy was implemented using the same 
methods (see chapter 3-4). By avoiding the complicated and time-consuming process of 
arriving at social compromises, the liberal government was, during this time, able to 
evade legislative delays and other obstacles to the implementation of the needed
f\")reforms. Later the same method permitted Polish authorities to carry out the most 
pressing of the EU’s demands to meet the conditionality parameters, thus avoiding 
external reprimands or the imposition of sanctions. The success of implementing these 
EU requirements has depended on proceeding as quickly as possible, in many instances 
promising the Commission things that the government knew would break social 
promises and cumulate in massive protests.63 Having to fulfil the socially costly policy 
requirements, subsequent coalitions have chosen to force them through rather then 
attempting the complicated and unpredictable process of consensus-seeking, knowing 
that the reforms could be stalled if the public failed to accept the austerity measures. 
However, as Maria Karasinska-Fedler, former Secretary of State for European 
Integration, pointed out, “the Treaties should not be negotiated by the elites and 
imposed on the citizens. 80% of the negotiations should take place domestically, 
because it is crucial primarily to negotiate with our own society on to what we can agree
61 Rollo (1990). ibid., p 130.
62 In 1991, President Walesa asked the Polish parliament to be given power to rule by decree, worried that 
the government would be unable to process 11 pieces of important economic legislation in the 7 days 
imposed by the IMF deadline.
63 For example, closing down coal mines, output and employment reductions.
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on and what not.”64 The neglect of successive governments to consult policy options 
with social partners strengthened the public conviction that the elites were not interested 
in social dialogue or internal Polish-Polish negotiations. Consequently, for many Poles, 
the conduct of the pre-accession process and the state-social relationship that developed 
in the period of association under the EA reinforced the popular stereotype that 
European integration is an elite driven process from which only a narrow, wealthy 
section of the population will benefit.
Finally, this type of “voodoo politics”, in the words of A Przeworski65, adopted without 
consultation and sometimes announced by decree, has solidified the ‘state’s’ image, in 
the eyes of Polish society, as the principal source of instability and corruption in the 
country. Strategic national policy decisions taken behind closed doors or bargains struck 
with the EU side without consultation have had a direct impact on democratic 
development, systematically educating the people that public opinion has no real role to 
play in shaping politics. This, in turn, contributed to the frequent withdrawal of the 
Poles from public life as their conviction that elections are nothing more than a formally 
staged mirages of democracy and that internal dialogue or opposition parties have no 
place in Polish politics has been strengthened. The ‘state’ was increasingly perceived by 
the population, as noted by Przeworski, as “only attempting to negotiate with social
(\f\partners to orchestrate illusory support for policies which have already been chosen.”
E. The role of conflict in policy making
Political conflict, understood as action by non-governmental actors designed to change 
either the government or its policy , is a natural bi-product of democratisation. In 
established democracies, this form of protest is usually non-violent, well-organised and 
focused exclusively on changing government policy. Although conflict is generated by 
income inequalities and is a product of social change, its positive role has evolved as a 
consequence of the growing role of civil society in national policy-making. Winners 
seek gains in the political arena, while losers use politics to ward off adverse 
consequences. D Ost has pointed out that “stable democracy requires that the grievances 
be expressed and not lie latent waiting to blow up, thus consolidating democracy in
64 Unia & Polska, No 3,4/12/98, p 12.
65 Przeworski (1991). ibid., p 186.
66 Przeworski (1995). ibid p 84.
67 Me Millan, C. (1991). ‘Foreign Direct Investment Flows to Eastern Europe and Their Implications for 
Developing Countries’, Millennium, No 2, Vol 20, Summer, p 190.
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post-communist societies does not depend on avoiding conflict, which is impossible, but 
on structuring it in the most democratically constructive way.”
In Poland, however, conflict has involved in a peculiar way. While subsequent 
governments, under the auspices of western advice69, have been tempted to minimise 
political conflict in order to enforce discipline and sustain the reform efforts, conflict 
between the elites has emerged as the most popular form of relations within the state 
apparatus. As a result, governing coalitions such as current SLD/ PSL or previous 
AWS/UW have fallen apart, and all attempts at the consolidation of a right-wing party 
have failed.70
In addition, the party system has not been able to absorb and adapt social tensions. As 
the bitterness towards the elites grew along with the broken promises, each year into the 
transformation, the political process in Poland became more and more often 
characterised by elections, executive decrees and sporadic outbursts of protest. 
Przeworski observed that, “people got a chance to vote but not to choose.”71, and 
participation in politics waned, making Hirschman’s ‘exit option’ more attractive.
With each new election, the winning governing parties were forced to chose between 
having to either seek the broadest possible social support to legitimise their reforms or 
to weaken opposition in order to make their demands ineffective. Regrettably, usually 
the second option has been chosen, and democratic consultation with partners in an 
institutionalised setting was replaced by illicit rent- seeking activities as well as large- 
scale public protests; both forms of conflict resolution functioning outside of any legal 
framework and without any coherent regulation.
As noted above, the Poles do not trust national political parties, and while these are the 
institutions of the democratic system that posses real power, their decreasing authority 
and the falling confidence of the Poles in the motives of the parties has meant that the 
resolution of political conflicts has been left to structures outside of the state’s 
institutions. The politicisation of the party apparatus and of the economy, coupled with 
the increasing tendency, throughout the transformation, of each party to staff the state 
and local administration as well as corporate boards of newly privatised SOE’s with its 
own people or appoint highly influential positions in both the public and private sector 
to persons with the right connections has clearly bred distrust with every newly exposed
68 Ost, D. (1995). ‘Labor, Class, and Democracy: Shaping Political Antagonisms in Post-Communist 
Society’, in Crawford (ed.) (1995). ibid., p 180.
69 It setting out strict economic criteria for association, for example.
70 First Solidarity split into factions. Then Unia Wolnosci internally fell part; finally AWS itself suffered 
the same fate.
71 Przeworski (1995). ibidp 84.
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case. In addition, the neglect of the initial liberals to reform the institutional and 
administrative systems has enabled each consequent government and each party to 
design institutions and formulate policies according to their own interests. Unlike the 
western political systems that have, over decades, bred certain tried and tested rules and 
standards that all parties must follow to some extent, the Polish system continues to be
77characterised by a free- for all.
As a result of these developments, the evolution of conflict resolution in Poland has 
taken place in a highly unstable environment, increasingly dominated by non- 
democratic methods of rent- seeking, as interest groups re-entered politics in a chaotic 
and unpredictable way. Partnership through consultation, as an institutional arrangement 
for interest mediation, has been replaced by wheel-dealing, insider lobbying and 
aggressive protests, as forms to influence the ‘state’s decision- making process. These 
activities have had no political transparency and, by increasing the levels of corruption 
and popular mistrust, they damaged the establishment and institutionalisation of regular 
patterns of political behaviour.
A situation, specific to Poland, labelled “tribal corporatism” by sociologist M Marody 
arose, whereby “social groups threatened by either other interests or by the policies of 
the State, felt that they had a moral right to their demands and deserved immediate 
realisation of their postulates.” (see chapter four). Marody observed that economic 
conflicts in Poland resulted from competition between these ‘tribal corporations’ for 
access to public goods73, classifying this type of social confrontation as apolitical, based 
on pure economic gain and divergent from the system of interest balancing in 
established pluralist democracies. Instead of competing for alternative economic 
programmes, as is the case in developed nations, Polish interests have been competing 
with each other for privileged rights to public goods and budgetary compensation. 
However because of international obligations, insufficient external support and internal 
austerity measures, the government’s resources have been very limited. Thus reform 
promises of any one governing coalition in Poland never materialised for the majority of 
society.
The arguments above suggest that not enough attention was paid in the initial Shock 
Therapy programme or in the Union’s policy prescriptions to Poland to institutional 
reform, in combination with regulatory issues, and that the social dialogue and 
consultations dimension of the reforms was highly undervalued.
72 Including MP behaviour and numerous scandals on the edge of business and politics.
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Neglect to pay attention to this human capital, microeconomic foundation of the 
transition74, has made it especially difficult for the population to adapt to the changing 
situation, resulting in social apathy, indifference and frustration with normal democratic 
politics, while at the same time strengthening latent opposition to the reforms that
n  c
sooner or later was bound to explode.
III. The Classical Community Method and the development of Polish Political 
Culture
Because the Polish version of capitalism has evolved as a domain restricted to the elites, 
remaining inaccessible to the majority of the public, it has strengthened the dominant 
social conviction, rooted in past legacies, that the entire political class has been using 
the reforms to advance their own interests and reap benefits available only to them. 
Consequently, politics and politicians have continued to be treated with great suspicion, 
and the political system has become the main source of tensions, conflicts and 
instability. While this development is partially to be blamed on the early Polish 
liberals for their chosen methods of policy-making and neglect to provide a transparent 
and non- discriminating institutional framework alongside macroeconomic 
liberalisation, the EU’s Association strategies have reinforced these tendencies.
By failing to provide adequate transition assistance to the reforming applicant, sending 
mixed signals and prescribing inconsistent advice, conducting the implementation of 
Association without enough flexibility, and insisting on the fulfilment by the Polish side 
of rigorous economic conditionality, the EU collectively undermined the Polish 
reformers’ authority and, in turn, the viability of liberal reforms themselves. To 
convince the Polish public to accept the pain and dislocation associated with the 
enormous costs of adjustment, the Union needed to buttress economic performance in 
transition, thus ensuring growth, and give certainty as to future membership, so as to 
increase political stability. Never the less, the EU failed to meet either of these two 
conditions, instead opting for the “club” approach of the Classical Community Method 
of enlargement. The Polish people would have been willing to accept the hardships
73 Marody, M. (1997). ‘Spolecznestwo polskie w Perspektywie Integracji z Unia Europejska’, w Belka, 
M., Hausner, J., Jasinski, L., Marody, M. and Zirk-Sadowski, M. (Red.) (1997). ibid., p 161.
74 Particularly evident in the early technocratic reforms of the liberals.
75 see Szacki, J. and Kisiel, C.A. (1995) Liberalism after Communism. Budapest: Central European 
University Press.
Amsden, A.H., Kochanowicz, J., and Taylor, L. (1994). The Market Meets Its Match, ibid.
Wilczynski, W. (1999). Wrogie Panstwo Opiekuncze. ibid.
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temporarily if at the end of the tunnel they could have seen the visible benefits emerging 
from transition and integration.
In addition, with its over-reliance on negotiations conducted by bureaucrats and 
politicians and clandestine agreements reached behind closed doors, the CCM has 
remained a realm exclusive to the elites, both in the reforming candidates and in their 
western counterparts. In fact the entire process of Eastern enlargement has been 
conducted without the active involvement of civil society, and without an effective 
information campaign, either inside the EU or in the candidate country. The 
technocratic decision making characteristic of the accession negotiations has made, 
from the point of view of the Polish public, integration seem like a game played by 
elites in Brussels, from which only a narrow group would benefit.
In fact, the decline in public support for European integration in Poland has coincided 
with the politicians’ neglect of a serious debate on the European option and reserved 
attempts at social dialogue. Only in 2002 an information campaign was launched, while 
by 2000 less than half (47%) of the Poles supported accession to the EU, 17% being
» 77directly opposed to it.
While the majority of the blame for the lack of a discussion in Poland on the issues 
related to association and accession is to be placed on the national governments, the 
former Polish Chief Negotiator J Kulakowski observed that, “some of this development 
can also be attributed to the crisis within the EU itself and the Union’s attitude and 
behaviour towards the candidate.”78 The commonly pursued policies of the Union 
towards the Polish side have not been built on trust and have not displayed policy 
credibility.
A. Political culture and democracy
The 1997 regular report of the European Commission has stated that, “Poland continues
70to fulfil the Copenhagen political criteria.” Most other specialists also maintain that
on
the formal criteria of democratic consolidation have all been achieved in Poland. 
However, while the criteria for democratic consolidation remains ambivalent, experts
76 Distrust in authorities has its origins in socialist legacies and historical experiences of foreign 
occupation. See chapter four.
77 OBOP opinion poll in PAP, 29.11.2000.
78 Unia & Polska, 22/11199 ,  p 18.
79 European Commission ( 1997) Regular Report Poland
80 Dawisha, K. and Parrot, B. (1997). The Consolidation o f Democracy in ECE. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press.
Taras, R. (1998). ‘Consolidating Democracy in Poland’, in Staar, R.F. (1998). Transition to Democracy 
in Poland. NY: St. Martin's Press.
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agree that although elections are a necessary condition, they are not sufficient, and that
Q 1
consolidation also requires accountability, civil society and the rule of law.
Thus the difference between representative/ established democracy and participatory/ 
substantive one is the ability of the individual citizen to take part in the decision-making 
process over the structures and institutions of the political system. Participatory 
democracy also depends on the existence of a political culture, based on socially 
internalised values and ideas, and conducive to the long-term consolidation of the 
reform efforts.
Political culture is the most ambivalent and difficult criterion to quantify for 
democratisation. Sociologist G Skapska has maintained that, “it is the civic culture that 
legitimises the political system and composes the contextual framework in which the
O'}
new democratic institutions operate.” Without an appropriate civic and political 
culture, legitimation and institutionalisation of democracy is not possible, and the 
danger is increased that the reforms undertaken and the institutions created will not be 
sustainable in the long run.
The question remains whether the Polish political system can in fact be classified as a 
consolidated participatory democracy according to this wider conceptualisation. 
Although elections are taking place regularly, associations are tolerated, and the law is 
formally respected, the arbitrary behaviour of the ‘state’ characterised by ad hoc 
decision making in reaction to crises or as a response to dubious inter-linkages with 
vested interests is impeding the consolidation of the rules and institutions necessary for 
the establishment of a functioning pluralist democracy. Thus while the democratic 
procedural minimum is there, the entire assembly of the legislative and institutional 
system does not form a cohesive whole which functions with regularity and is based on 
legitimised and predictable procedures capable of yielding long-term social support and 
consequently advancing sustainable economic growth.
Sociologist L Kolarska-Bobinska maintains that democracy is built on two pillars: 
institutions and an active civil society. She argues that both of these foundations have
White, S., Batt, J. and Lewis, P.G. (Ed.) (1998). Developments in Central and East European Politics 2. 
Basingstoke: Macmillan.
81 Transition to democratic rule takes place where the basic procedural requirements are laid down and the 
beginning of the routinisation of political behaviour takes place. This phase is different than consolidation 
which requires the internalisation of rules and procedures and the establishment of liberal democratic 
values. See Lewis, P.G. and Pridham, G. (1996). ‘Fragile Democracies and the Problem of Regime 
Change’, in Lewis and Pridham (Ed.) (1996). Stabilising Fragile Democracies. ibid.
Linz, J. and Stepan, A. (1996). Problems o f Democratic Transition and Consolidation: Southern Europe, 
South America, and Post-communist Europe. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press.
Lijphart, A. (1991). ‘Constitutional choices for new democracies’, Journal o f Democracy, Vol 2, No 3.
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not developed in the Polish system. The institutions of the state apparatus, the 
Parliament, government and administration, do not function as they should and the 
public’s trust in them is waning, contributing to political apathy. (See polls above). 
Kolarska accordingly asks how far democracy has really been consolidated in Poland 
and how far has it indeed been legitimised if only 12-16% of the Poles trust in the basic 
national institutions, and civil society organisations have no real power or ability to
O '!
influence policy- making?
A.2 Pluralism, corporatism or clientalism elitism?
The emerging Polish political culture dominant throughout the 90’s has been one 
characterised by a peculiar mentality based on socialist legacies and past historical 
experiences incorporated with the experiences of transition. This author thus concludes 
that substantive democracy in Poland is yet to become fully consolidated.
Linz and Stepan have argued that in addition to the existence of a functioning state, five 
other interconnected and mutually reinforcing conditions must be present for a 
democracy to be consolidated. These five are: the development of a free and lively civil 
society, a relatively autonomous political society, the subjection of all major political 
actors to the rule of law, the availability of a usable state bureaucracy by the democratic
O A
government and the institutionalisation of an economic society. In their view, “the 
legacy of ambivalence towards political society must be transcended before Poland can 
consolidate democracy.”85
In Poland, the social movement is weak, and the type of elitism that has emerged during 
transformation and association has reinforced the dysfunctional state- social 
relationship. While the civic movement has only begun to grow, it has been already 
been stifled by socially-exclusive, technocratic methods of policy-making. Ineffective 
social dialogue along with a strong backlash against the reforms have, in turn,
o n
strengthened the allure of populist forces, breeding political instability.
The anti- pluralist, anti-market, dogmatic, nationalistic and conservative pre-war 
culture, combined with the egalitarian, anti- capitalist and populist ethos of the socialist
82 Skapska, G. (1997). ‘Civic and Legal Cultures in Spain and Poland’, Polish Sociological Review, No 
1231-1413, Krakow, p 224.
83 Kolarska-Bobinska, L, Wezmy kapital, wymusmy zmiany, in GW, 4/08/03.
84 Linz, J. and Stepan, A. (1996). ‘Toward consolidated democracies’, in Journal o f Democracy, vol. 7, 
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85 Linz, J. and Stepan, A. (1996). Problems o f Democratic Transition and Consolidation. Baltimore, MD: 
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86 Skapska (1995). ‘Prisoner of Paradox’, in Perdue, W.D. (Ed.) (1995). ibid.
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‘Zimne Piece, Cieplepiwo’, GW 1-2/06/02;
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times has made the emergence of a nation wide political culture based on liberal values
oo
very troublesome . In addition, the active role of the Solidarity Trade Union in the 
collapse of socialism, high union membership rates, workers’ council experiences in the 
1950’s and the Round Table negotiations have reinforced the Polish corporatist
O Q
tradition, which, in turn, has sustained public support for labour, (see chapters 3 and 
4); While corporatism is not interpreted by the author as an ‘obstacle’ to reform, the 
dysfunctional nature of the corporate model in Poland, as an instrument of social 
partnership, has increased intransparent and illicit rent-seeking activities outside of any 
legal framework. The ‘state’ has become the main source of claims and demands made 
directly upon it by the unsatisfied social partners, frustrated by the paralysis of 
institutionalised social dialogue, as well as by oligopolistic vested interests.90 In 
addition, successive Polish governments have been either unable or have not had the 
capacity to explain to the public why certain interest groups seem to be privileged while 
others are not, contributing to the public perception of the randomness of policy 
making. Without a coherent and planned out social policy and constrained by both 
national and international pressures, the Polish ‘state’ continues to give into the most 
radical social demands, such as farmers, steel/ coal miners or the defence industry, 
while neglecting other profound postulates of groups like the public administration, 
educational and health care sectors.
The lack of respect for the rule of law and the lack of desire to take responsibility for 
one’s actions, as well as the search for easy solutions and instant gratification have 
consequently triumphed over liberalism. Because authorities have not treated the law 
seriously, the public has never been convinced of the legal possibilities of challenging 
its interests. Thus, while the rule of law has formally had constitutional status, it has not 
been fully embraced or internalised by society, making it more difficult to enforce.91 In 
addition, the frequent changes, loopholes and inconsistencies in the legal system have 
created uncertainty that has constituted one of the highest barriers to investment and
Planeta Demokracji, GW 27/06/00.
88 See ‘Liberalizm bez Liberalow’, Polityka nr 50 (2171), 12/12/98;
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economic growth. Finally, while in the higher developed countries, the incidence of 
corruption is not infrequent, the political systems there have developed rules and 
established standards to be followed and, unlike the Polish governments, western elites 
have had more experience in dealing with interest balancing and rent-seeking activities. 
For example, while lobbying activities in Poland have been evident throughout 
transition within the public apparatus, in contrast to western democracies, they have not 
become institutionalised and have had no legal standing. Instead, the ‘state’ has 
become an easy target of capture for various interests, and clientalism has emerged as 
the dominant form of achieving desired goals, strengthening the public conviction that 
nothing can be obtained without the appropriate contacts and informal networks.94 In 
turn, the belief that fair competition, justice and meritocracy are absent from public 
institutions has strengthened the role for groups that function outside of the legal 
framework and reinforced the spread of corruption. The central site of democratic 
transition, the parliament, has thus emerged in a climate of continuing suspicion about 
the elites and has become representative of various populist factions and anti-reformist 
parties.95
The Polish institutions themselves have been created in a state of disarray, combining 
elements of socialism, such as the corporatist tradition, with freshly copied models of 
western style governance, agencies and administration, and prolonging the hybrid 
structure of the economy. The frequency of changes to and manipulations within the 
institutions suggests that they have been more designed to serve each subsequent ruling 
coalitions’ interests than to fulfil some desired purpose or achieve certain reform goals. 
In the absence of effective parties, social consciousness of the past dependent on a 
protective, paternalistic ‘State’, polarised unions, a weak middle class and unstable 
political class and growing social distrust towards the ‘state’, the crystallisation of 
interests representation and the institutionalisation of interest articulation is just 
beginning. However, neither the corporate relationship that enabled the reforms to 
proceed in Spain or Ireland nor the pluralist model characteristic of the Anglo-Saxon
92 Kaminski, B. (1999). ‘The Role of Foreign Direct Investment and Trade Policies in Poland’s Accession 
to the European Union’, ibid., p 27.
93 Until 2002.
Gazeta Wyborcza, 6/3/03.
94 See chapter four
95 Holmes, S. (1995). ‘Conceptions of Democracy in the Draft Constitutions of Post-Communist 
Countries’, in Crawford (Ed.) (1995). ibid., p 77.
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tradition96 has emerged in the Polish institutional system97, reinforcing its hybrid nature 
and contributing to the increasingly problematic policy- formulation environment.98 
In contrast to its western models, the market democracy that is emerging in Poland is 
something resembling ‘political capitalism’ or in the words of C Offe, “capitalism that 
is designed, organised and set into motion by reform elites.”99 
Accordingly, this author agrees with P Schmitter’s and Linz and Stepan’s conclusions 
that democracy in Poland has only been superficially consolidated. In fact, P Schmitter 
has called the emerging political system in Poland a ‘neodemocracy’, where “most 
politicians are not trained for the act of compromise and negotiation, and the 
haphazardly functioning policy making system does not fulfil the expectations of its 
citizens. Consequently, its rules are not being socially accepted or embedded and 
legitimisation is not taking place.”100
Market reform is likewise impaired, and a peculiar syndrome, labelled by economist W 
Wilczynski as the emergence of a “hostile protective state” appears. “The population 
does not regard the state as its own, feels alienated from it and relieved of the duty to 
observe the law and elementary loyalty.”101
A.3 Endemic distrust and uninstitutionalised politics
Sociologist M Marody has classified the Polish conditions as ‘uninstitutionalised 
politics’ and has gone so far as to conclude that paradoxically, “the new democratic 
system of political representation is perceived as more remote and out of touch with the 
problems of the ordinary man, as well as less accessible for him, than the former 
communist system.”102
For most Poles, a huge gap exists between the declared virtues of the new system and 
the ability to actually secure them, leading to a sense of victimisation and Havel’s 
‘powerlessness of the individual’.103 In 2003, 68% of the Poles were unhappy with the 
transformation, claiming that the reforms have not been beneficial and have brought
96 To the dismay of the Polish liberals the creation of a pluralist market democracy could not be 
accomplished by economic decrees of deregulation.
97 Gazeta Wyborcza. 6/02/03, ‘Pakt spoleczny na ciezkie czasy’.
98 See Hausner, J. (1995). Studia nad systemem reprezentacji interesow. ibid.
ISP (1999). Rozpad Bastionu, ibid.
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102 Marody, M. (1997). ‘Spolecznestwo polskie w Perspektywie Integracji z Unia Europejska’, w Belka, 
M., Hausner, J., Jasinski, L., Marody, M. and Zirk-Sadowski, M. (Red.) (1997). ibid., p 170.
See also Marody (1994). ibid.
103 Havel, V. (1985). ‘The Power of the Powerless, Citizens against the state in Central-Eastern Europe’, 
in Keane, J. (Ed.). Armonk NY: M E Sharpe Inc.
309
them losses (!), while only 19% claimed to have benefited and 13% were undecided.104 
Another study showed that in still in 1997, 29.2% thought that the transformation had 
brought them more benefits than costs, while in 1999 the figure fell to 21.5% and by 
2002 only 13.6% supported the statement.105
The broken election promises and benefits that failed to materialise have undermined 
the elites collective authority and have strengthened social distrust, leading to strong 
feelings of betrayal and reinforcing the belief that things will only get worse. The high 
degree of social discontent and uncertainty has created Gidden’s “environment of 
risk”106, and the growing anxieties have been particularly associated with fear of 
unemployment. With falling wages, bankrupting enterprises and massive redundancies, 
these fears have unfortunately been substantiated.
In general, the various sociological opinion polls, discussed above, suggest that most 
Poles have come to believe that none of the institutions of the political system represent 
or defend their interests.107 The inability to affect the policy decision-making process, in 
turn, along with the perceived injustice of the political system, have contributed to 
fatalistic attitudes and alienation, fostering aggressive behaviour among large segments 
of the population.108
According to the Pew Global Attitudes Project, the Poles are not only one of the least 
satisfied European societies with their lives, but also one of the least trusting.109 
Throughout the 90’s, in all major opinion polls and surveys, over half of Polish society 
did not trust others and was convinced of a general dominance of egoism, corruption, 
unfair behaviour and dishonesty amongst the wider public. A strong feeling of 
victimisation and pessimism accompanied by a sense of martyrdom has also 
characterised Polish social consciousness, with only 30% of adult Poles expressing by 
2002 that they have not been in some way ‘done wrong’ or have not personally suffered 
as a result of the various political upheavals in the last decades.
The conviction that cormption exists on every level of Polish public life has been 
growing from year to in the market economy, which should be regulated by clear and
104 Diagnoza spoleczna 2003.
105 Polski Generalny Sondaz Spoleczny, 2003.
106Giddens (1990) quoted in Sztompka (1996). ibid., p 47.
107 Beyme, K. von (1996). Transition to Democracy in Eastern Europe, ibid., pp 147-160.
108 Gazeta Wyborcza, ‘Zimne piece, cieple piwo’, 1-2/06/02.
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transparent criteria.110 89% of adults in 2003 believing that corruption takes place often 
or very often, 71% doubting the possibility of fighting it, and 22% assuming that the 
situation will only get worse. According to sociologist L Kolarska- Bobinska this 
conviction about the omnipresence of corruption and lack of ability to fight it not only 
breaks down trust in the mechanisms of the democracy, but also undermines reform. 
Consequently, the symptoms of distrust have manifested themselves in Hirschman’s 
‘exit and voice options’ discussed above. The ‘exit’ option, in the form of either 
emigration or withdrawal from participation in public life, has become more and more 
pervasive. Those that chose to stay home instead of voting have traditionally been poor 
and uneducated, initially voting for populist S Tyminski, later putting their hopes in 
SLD and finally turning to the most radical Self- defense. The growth of popular 
support for Self-defence has paralleled the disappointment of large portions of the 
population with the transformation and with ‘the establishment’, as perceived to be all 
mainstream parties. While, in the 90’s, those frustrated most with the liberal reforms 
supported both SLD and AWS, who promised a more gradual course and even 
backtracking, when Self-defence appeared, contesting the entire transformation project 
and promising to reverse its direction, it quickly became a powerful political player. 
Simultaneously, the ‘voice’ option has been disfigured, when rather than using 
institutionalised forms of democracy to voice its disapproval of the government, Polish 
society has instead turned to collective protest.111 As a result, institutionalised forms of 
conflict resolution have been replaced by alternative patterns of protest from below such 
as street demonstrations, rallies, marches, road blockades and prolonged fasting.
If the amount of protest events is a good indicator of public distrust in official
119politics , then the culture of distrust in Poland is reaching epidemic proportions. 
Between 1990 and the beginning of 1998 alone, 14, 913 strikes had taken place!113 This 
staggering amount of protests that swept the Polish nation within 9 years of 
transformation has reflected the frustration of the people and their despair to make the 
‘state’ listen and respect the demands made on it. In sum, as various sociologists have 
argued, the mechanism of social trust in Poland, a foundation for the consolidation of a
uo Gazeta Wyborcza. ‘OBOP- TNS opinion poll’, 24/01/03.
Gazeta Wyborcza 27/01/03.
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participatory democracy and basis for strengthening a nation’s human capital 
endowment, has thus collapsed.114
B. State authority and capacity
While part of the reason for this growing manifestation of distrust stems from the 
legacies of the past, Polish sociologists attribute a large share of the blame on 
contemporary political conditions.115 This author, in turn, takes the argument one step 
further, asserting that this particularity of Polish political culture has been exacerbated 
by the developments in Association.
Instead of paying enough attention to national Polish specificities, in designing its 
policies towards the ‘state’ in transition, the EU’s association strategy has relied on a 
generic model applied to previous enlargements. The elitism of this Classical 
Community Method has reinforced the negative tendencies in Polish social 
consciousness, undermining many expectations behind the early Shock Therapy 
programme. Moreover, the Union’s inability to carry through its promised assistance for 
the transformation undercut the assumptions behind the ‘anchoring’ strategy initially 
pursued by the Polish liberals. When the visible benefits of external liberalisation failed 
to materialise for the majority of the Poles, and it became obvious that the member 
states continued to actively protect their domestic markets while demanding that the 
Polish side open them up, the liberal reforms lost any credibility in the eyes of the 
Polish public. Finally, the EU could be partially held responsible for the incoherence 
and unpredictability of the evolving Polish policy-making process. While requiring the 
fulfilment of economic conditionality, the Union has continued to insist on democratic 
accountability and social dialogue as conditions for association. These two 
requirements, by their very nature, have often been in conflict with each other.
The complexity of the transformation project combined with limited external aid and 
excessive intervention into domestic politics have reduced the ability of subsequent 
Polish governments to fulfil their election-promises and make good on their reform 
efforts. Policy dilemmas, exacerbated by the EU’s rigid interpretation of conditionality, 
have in addition depleted the political authority of successive Polish elites, putting in 
question the competence of the government. In sum, the policies advocated by the 
Union towards the Polish candidate have contributed to weakening state capacity and 
undermining its authority.
1.4 See J Szacki and P Sztompka in ‘Tratakty nie zmienia ducha’, in GW, 12/06/03.
1.5 Sztompka (1992). ‘Dilemmas of the Great Transition’, ibid. p 46-55.
312
The ambiguous evolution the ‘state’s’ role and its functions, driven by opposing 
objectives and inconsistent pressures from both the domestic and international levels, 
the weakness of its actions and its limited efficiency in carrying out the reforms have, in 
turn, contributed to the ad hoc nature of policy making and become real dangers 
threatening the entire process of transformation. By 1994 already, the Polish 
institutional system was highly inconsistent, plagued by unclear and intransparent 
criteria for policy making. Various legislative loopholes and contradictory pressures 
crippled the cohesion of the systemic changes and undermined state capacity to solve 
real problems.116
On the one hand, subsequent Polish governments have followed a liberal course of 
reform, stemming from the dogmatic attitude towards rational economic principles first 
adopted by the early Polish elites and later carried out, to some extent, by all subsequent 
governments, as required by the EU obligations.117 Pressures for total liberalisation of 
economic activity and withdrawal of the ‘state’ from any kind of social intervention 
bred policies, in the first years of transformation, based on the assumption that 
somehow society would adjust. The liberals’ economic programme, was limited to 
technocratic designing of free-market capitalism, founded on deregulation, privatisation 
and liberalisation, without adequate attention paid to the microeconomic foundations of 
the reforms. Society was expected to somehow generate the institutions it needed and 
adapt its mentality to the changing circumstances (see chapter three).
On the other, the second characteristic of the evolving institutionalisation of the ‘state’ 
has had at its base reactions to the habitual expectations of society, rooted in the 
legacies of socialism and reinforced under current political conditions, which have
1 1 0
manifested themselves in the form of constant social demands. Without an 
institutionalised system of interest representation and with decision-making dominated 
by technocratic secrecy, when the public resorted to political protest to make its ‘social 
voice’ heard and the strength of the resistance to the reforms intensified, various 
governments were in the end forced to ‘buy’ social peace. Accordingly, all subsequent 
Polish governments and ruling coalitions have, at various points in time, given into 
escalating demands. This has not been a part of a well thought out and socially sensitive
116 Wilczynski (1996 ). ‘Five years’, in Winiecki (Ed.) ibid., p 30.
117 Policy reversals have taken place within a general course of liberalisation, under all successive 
governments, regardless of orientation, even the notorious Pawlak PSL/ SLD coalition. Credibility 
constraints and EU accession requirements have left no alternative.
118 Hausner, J., Marody, M., Wilkin, J., Wojtyna, A. and Zirk-Sadowski, M. (Ed.) (1998). Accession or 
Integration?, ibid.
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strategy of reform, but rather reactionary, incoherent and inconsistent policy 
manipulation, designed to quell the loudest voices of protest at a given social crisis. 
While responding to public unrest is a necessary component of democratisation, the 
type of ‘buying of social peace’ prevalent in Poland is, in the author’s opinion, 
detrimental to the development system a pluralistic democracy. Each subsequent 
government in Poland, from the first Solidarity governments, to SLD/PSL, the 
AWS/UW coalition and finally the currently ruling SLD, has made sweeping election 
promises it could not meet.119 When protest intensified, each gave into the rent-seeking 
activities of the most powerful groups. However, institutionalised social dialogue 
remained dysfunctional and the more subtle and transparent forms of interest 
articulation were continuously ignored, teaching the population that the only way to 
affect policy formulation and ‘the state’ was though rallying, protest and bribery. For 
example, till this day, the educational and university system remain highly under­
financed, as the academic profession has not resorted to mass striking to get their 
postulates heard. The same is true for health care and SME’s.
Thus, the unpredictable and precarious involvement of the ‘state’ in the economy, 
intervening randomly and without any visibly coherent or rational long- term strategy, 
has not only created uncertainty over the rules of public life, but even reinforced the 
conviction that the public administration has it in its power to change any institutional 
decision which is seemingly inconvenient at the time.120
The policy making system, unsupported by a well-functioning institutional setting and 
consistent law enforcement, has functioned on the basis of tactical, hap hazardous 
concessions to particular interests, often with close ties to the government or powerful 
enough to endanger social chaos through protest. The reform imbalances left by 
inadequate attention paid to institutional reform at the beginning of the transition, when 
extra-ordinary politics would have made them possible, have meant that the authorities 
have either forced through liberal programmes with whatever means available, or have 
modified the measures to make them acceptable to the major social forces, at cost to the 
rest of society. Subsequent political elites have accordingly vacillated between the 
technocratic style of reform necessary to implement neoliberal policies and fulfil 
international obligations, on the one hand, and a corrupt version of the participatory 
style required to maintain social peace and satisfied vested interest, on the other.
119 Fiscal constraints, international obligations.
120 Gazeta Wyborcza. ‘Dlaczego Wygra SLD’, 4/4/2001. 
Gazeta Wyborcza. ‘Polska zasilkowa’, 13/12/02.
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If Przeworski is right that “in politics confidence is stock and can be depleted and
eroded in two ways: by erroneous forecasts (if politicians promise immediate
improvements but consumption in fact declines) and by vacillations”, than the Polish
authorities’ style of policy making, reinforced by the EU’s association strategies, has
undermined the stability of the reforms.
In fact, in view of the EBRD,
The states in the CEE region face extremely low levels ofpublic confidence and trust, 
thus undermining their authority to establish institutions that effectively alter the 
behaviour and practices o f  the population.
Moreover,
Weakness in democratic and economic governance is often associated with corruption, 
which, in turn inhibits both investment and further reform. Corruption weakens the 
state's ability to gain consent for, and enforce compliance with, rules and institutions, 
by undermining the public’s trust that these are designed to be fair and be enforced
without discretion or prejudice.122
In sum, the over- emphasis on macroeconomic stabilisation and liberalisation targets, 
and the under-emphasis on institutional and microeconomic reform or little attention 
paid to the sequencing of reform that could be more socially sensitive, characteristic of 
both ‘anchoring strategies’ and neoliberal reforms, have paradoxically, and regrettably, 
created political backlash and produced unpredictable social reactions and greater 
resistance to the reforms.
IV. Conclusions: The Europe Agreement and the transformation paradox
In the 1998 Regular report, the Commission applauded Poland’s fulfilment of the
democratic accession criteria, concluding that,
Poland can be regarded as a functioning market economy, and should be able to cope 
with competitive pressure and market forces within the Union in the medium term, 
provided it strengthens the pace o f economic restructuring and continues to avoid
reversals in trade policy.123
Various experts and policy makers have also claimed that,
the Europe Agreement has ensured transparency and predictability o f  CEE’s economic 
policies through the hands tying effect and binding o f domestic policies. As a result, the 
nations o f  CEE have gained more through this political impact o f the EA than through
its economic effects.124
121 Przeworski (1991). ibid., p 18.
122 EBRD. (1998). Transition Report 1998, p 3; pp24-25.
123 European Commission (1998). Regular Report Poland, Brussels, p 20.
124 Smith, A., Holmes, P, Sedelmeier, U., Wallace, H. and Young A. (1995). ‘The European Union and 
Central Eastern Europe: Pre- Accession strategies’, Sussex European Institute Working paper, No 15, 
Sussex: Sussex European Institute.
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Where then does a balanced account lie as to the evolution of Polish economic policy­
making and the impact that the EA, as an external ‘anchor’, has had on it? Were the 
prescriptions in neoliberal institutionalist theories well suited to the particular Polish 
circumstances in 1989 and later, and did the EU, as an international organisation follow 
through on these prescriptions?
In this thesis, the author has argued that the implementation of the EA combined with 
the elitism and technocratic style of Polish policy- making have discredited liberal 
reform options contributing to backtracking and policy reversals. While Polish society 
and domestic politics have had their own dynamics and most likely there would have 
been impulses towards rent-seeking and protectionism anyway , the EU’s policies 
have unexpectedly reinforced many negative tendencies. The behaviour of EU vested 
interests accordingly vindicated many of the mercantilist inclinations in Polish trade 
policy formulation, making it extremely difficult for the liberals to criticise the rising 
protectionism.
In addition, the obligatory nature of the EA and the rigid interpretation of conditionality 
by the EU have strengthened the Polish authorities’ temptation to apply technocratic 
policy-making options, contributing to social unrest and resistance to the reforms. This 
has increased the uncertainty and inconsistency of the Polish legal system and added to 
the erratic nature of economic policy.
The waning political authority and weak leadership of the Polish liberal reformers have 
been further undermined by the EU’s failure to carry through its promises of transition 
assistance, depleting social confidence in their policy programmes and ruling capacities. 
The EU’s protectionist policies have not served as a good example of economic 
liberalisation, and the current member states have been unable to commit themselves to 
maintain openness in the face of increased competition from their eastern partner. In 
turn, the Union collectively has not displayed the political will to face up to its domestic 
producer lobbies. The ambivalence of the EU’s leadership towards eastern Enlargement 
has created an image of an inward looking Union; one in which collective political 
commitments are undermined by incoherent and self-contradictory policies, pursued by 
individual member states and divided domestic groups and one in which established 
attitudes and interests at lower levels dominate the agenda.
When it came to detailed negotiations or even when the imbalance of the EA became 
clear, the Union did not react adequately to Polish domestic responses. Bigger and more
125 An issue that the Balcerowicz Team was acutely aware of, thus choosing the ‘anchoring’ methods to 
lock in as many of the reforms as possible before ordinary politics resumed.
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flexible transfers, comparable to the structural funds, as well as more elasticity in legal 
harmonisation would certainly have eased many of the financial dilemmas faced by the 
Polish government and enterprises. Faced with tight fiscal constraints and serious 
budgetary and liquidity problems, the ‘state’ in transition and individual sectors did not 
have the adequate means to finance the rising costs of adjustment.
In addition, the restrictive nature of the customs union built around the framework of 
the EA has not only excluded liberalisation of agriculture and limited the opening of 
trade in sensitive products, but simultaneously made no provisions for the free 
movement of services, capital or labour, even though access to these freedoms would 
have softened the intensity of the transition recession. While, openness to eastern 
workers would have provided an important safety valve for the reforming Polish state, 
the free movement of services is undeniably been an inseparable part of the realisation 
of the free movement of goods. Liberalisation of both freedoms would have also 
allowed the Polish associate to exploit its main competitive advantage, namely cheap 
labour.126 Moreover, the EA gave no guarantee against the future application of 
contingent protection by the EU to protect its markets, a neglect that has allowed 
various European producers to exploit the legal loopholes within the Treaty to their own 
advantage at the expense of economic efficiency or the objectives of asymmetric 
liberalisation. By 2000, the Union was still applying Anti-Dumping duties even though 
the Polish authorities were straining to not only adopt, but also implement, the Union’s 
competition policies.
Finally, within the framework of the Agreement, the Union failed to adequately address 
the problems of institutional and structural reform in the candidate, complementary 
policies or questions of social justice, such as those officially espoused to by the EU
1 7 7itself. Insufficient attention was paid within the EA to the issue of institution
126 See Zielinska- Glebocka, A. (1998). ‘Industrial Competitiveness Policy of the European Union. 
Meeting the Challenges of a Stronger and Wider Europe’, in Zielinska- Glebocka and Stepniak (Ed.)
(1998). ibid.
Orlowski, W. (1998). ‘Poland and structural funds: a short list of regional problems’, in Zielinska- 
Glebocka and Stepniak (Ed.) ibid.
Janton- Drozdowska, E. and Zielinska-Glebocka, A. (1998). ‘Competitiveness of Poland’s Economy in 
View of its integration with the European Union’, in Zielinska-Glebocka and Stepniak (Ed.) ibid. 
Ciamaga, L. (Red.) (1997). Zagraniczna Polityka Gospodarcza Polski w teorii i praktyce dostosowan 
doUnii Europejskiej.Warszawa: SGH, Elipsa.
Wyskokinska, Z. (1997). ‘Evaluation of Structural Changes in Polish Industry and in Foreign Capital 
Flow to Poland in the Period of Systemic Transformation’, in Economic Developments and Reforms in 
Cooperation Partner Countries: External Economic Relations with Particular Focus on Regional 
Cooperation, NATO- COLLOQUIUM, Brussels: NATO.
Pawlas, I. and Tendera-Wlaszczuk, T. (1999). Poland’s Economy Competitiveness with Respect to the 
Integration with the European Union, ibid.
127 See Tsoukalis, L. (1997). The New European Economy Revisited. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
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building, and the models and solutions provided did not display the kind of flexibility 
that would have allowed local Polish conditions to be incorporated into the European- 
wide designs. In Poland, “the rapid pace of liberalisation and privatisation has not been 
matched by equal progress in the development of institutions necessary to support a 
well functioning market economy.” These imbalances, in turn, have, according to the 
EBRD, “caused serious market distortions, generating substantial gains to particular 
interest groups, often with close ties to the government.”128 
Significantly, the EA also did not address the issue of strategic trade policy, which 
might have been more useful in guiding the Polish trade regime into a sustainable and 
consistent process of opening up the economy than excessive and not- well thought out 
liberalisation, which led to various reversals. While temporary protection was allotted 
for in the Agreement, within the various safeguard clauses, when the Polish partner 
attempted to apply these measures, its requests were met with unwarranted criticism 
from the Union. Quite frequently this led the Poles to apply less transparent forms of 
protection.
Finally, this book suggests that one of the main failures of the EA, as an institutional 
guide for policy reform and economic integration, has been the lack of precision in the
1OQAgreement as to the social dimension of the process. After all, the social element is a 
fundamental building bloc of the Union and underpinning component of European 
integration. An externally designed and rigid institutional framework built around 
specific implementation targets and conditionality, such as the EA, and systemically 
introduced through technocratic means, cannot provide any real social base for the 
consolidation of the policies pursued.
While overemphasising macroeconomic targets and liberalisation schedules, the 
Agreement’s directives did to place enough emphasis on structural adjustment 
programmes in Poland and undervalued the importance of the development of human 
capital and social trust for successful policy reform. Thus, by insisting on verification of 
progress and adjustment made by the candidate, the EU’s not only neglected to take into 
consideration the complexity and national specificity of the Polish transformation, but 
has also underrated the crucial political economy dimension of the process and the 
interdependent relationship between policy legitimisation and long term performance.
According to Tsoukalis the European social model combines the efficiency of market capitalism with the 
equity provided by a redistributive political system.
12 EBRD (1998). Transition Report, p 2.
129 Even though no one could have predicted what the impact of the economic reforms would have been.
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This author believes that the main obstacles to integration between the Polish state and 
the EU have not been economic, as maintained by individual member states, but rather 
social, political and ultimately psychological factors, and that the solutions offered in 
the EA towards increasing the credibility of the transformation reforms in Poland have 
been inadequate in providing for long-term policy consolidation.130 In fact the growing 
economic difficulties and intensifying political crises, exacerbated by the negative 
impact of the EA on the Polish economy, have proven that, in many ways, the 
simultaneous processes of association and transformation have been mutually blocking 
instead of mutually stimulating one another.
Finally, and significantly, while many specific characters and long-established aspects
of Polish political culture have made the development of elite/ public trust and
democratic consolidation in Poland particularly difficult131, the Union’s ‘anchoring’
effect, reliance on technocratic policy formulation and conditionality parameters have
paradoxically increased certain negative tendencies of the long-established culture of 
11*)elitism in Poland.
This author thus concludes that if the EU had collectively (or perhaps the Commission)
taken advantage of the window of opportunity for enlargement earlier on in the process,
truly committing itself, displaying signs of political will to stand up to particular 
• 1interests , conducting an active information policy to display the cost myths and 
projecting a more flexible image, it could have had, through the international anchor, a 
significantly more stabilising impact on the Polish transformation.
A. Political legacies of economic reform
Because liberal reforms can generate conflict on the level of individuals, regions and 
sectors, and as such endanger social stability, economists, in designing institutions with 
the aim of supporting the market, need to be aware of the political assumptions 
underlying their analysis. Economics as a discipline, and in particular trade theory, tend
130 Mayhew (1998), (2001), (2002). Ibid.
Padoan, PC. (1994). ‘The Changing European Political Economy’, in Stubbs and Underhill (Ed.) (1994). 
ibid.
Fontenay, P.de, Gomel, G. and Hochreiter, E. (Ed.) (1995). ibid.
Faini and Portes (Ed.) (1995). ibid.
Sedelmeier, U. (1994). ‘The EU’s Association Policy Towards Central and Eastern Europe: political and 
economic rationales in conflict’, SEI working report, No 7.
Bideleux, R. (1998). ‘The Politics of Eastern Enlargement of the European Union’, ISA Paper, Vienna, 
September.
131 See chapter four.
132 Unlike western societies, Poland has not developed a classical urban bourgeoisie’, first there was the 
Szlachta and the peasants, followed by the intelligentsia and the workers.
133 Because the ‘costs’ of opening up to these interests would have been marginal, perhaps intra-European 
transfers could have been used to compensate the sectors for their losses, without negatively affecting the 
growth potential of transition.
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not to pay enough attention to cultural factors, legacies and social considerations, basing 
their prescriptive analyses on over-simplified and generalised models.
Strategies, such as Shock Therapy, never the less, need not be discounted, as the 
neoliberals have not been economically wrong, in principle, to propose radical change. 
What the author would none the less suggest to countries attempting similar 
transformations, such as the Balkans, EE, and other EU aspirants, is a more cautious 
approach, which is not based on far reaching assumptions as to the expected behaviour 
of international partners. Transition in Croatia, Bosnia or even Iraq should not be 
fundamentally predicated on ‘international anchors’.
By over-shooting expectations as to external support, national liberalisers are setting 
themselves up to have to explain to the public the failure of the international community 
to follow through on its side of the bargain. When economic performance fails to 
materialise and the promised benefits do not appear in the amount of time projected, the 
reformers themselves become discredited, and populists reap gains from the political 
fall out.
While the eight CEE future members of the European Union have indeed followed 
somewhat varied paths of reform, with different paces and emphasis placed on various 
dimensions of marketisation and democratisation, today they face problems that are too 
similar to be coincidental. Crony capitalism, waning social trust, corruption, ineffective 
democratic and economic governance, difficulties in the enforcement of the rule of law, 
uninstitutionalised politics and poor quality of political life, various market distortions 
and imbalances, growing disparities, weak party systems and frail civil and political 
societies represent only few of their collective legacies of reform. The social unrest that 
has accompanied the rise of poverty, mariginalisation and crime have further inhibited 
reform, at a time when it is crucial to secure the benefits of accession. Public feelings of 
‘betrayal’ and ‘rejection’, exacerbated by the perceived arrogance of the elites, have 
been the most crucial factors in the emergence of the syndrome of frustration, increasing 
the allure o f alternative political options and populist leaders. The combination of a 
weak state and an extreme concentration of market power has created a policy making 
environment in CEE characterised by the capture of the state by powerful economic 
interest, discretionary intervention by state bureaucrats into the market and high levels 
of corruption.134 Thus, the social experiments built on the premises of elitism and 
anchoring have had some rather unfavourable results.
134 EBRD 1998 p 24
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However, because elitism is hard to avoid after the collapse of totalitarian regimes, no 
matter how problematic it might be for democracy, and ‘anchoring’ is an institutionally 
sound solution to reform sustainability, the key to transformation should lie in 
attempting to secure social consent for the reforms, through dialogue and 
institutionalisation of political conflict in combination with effective regulatory 
frameworks.
Looking back from the perspective of 2003, it seems that many of the assumptions 
behind the Polish liberals’ neoliberal institutionalist strategies were not fulfilled. 
Notably, the EU never fully carried out its commitments implied in the neoliberal 
institutionalist anchoring/ transition bargain. The radical policies of the early 1990’s, 
which the Poles knew to be of high political risk, were accordingly at least in part 
thwarted by protectionist behaviour of the EU, meant to be assisting and anchoring the 
transition.
In turn, weak political leadership of the liberals and of successive Polish governments 
has failed to persuade the public to follow their lead. Technocratic deliberations over the 
Shock Therapy package did not address the issue of sequencing the reforms in a 
socially- sensitive way or involving society in the debates. While initially neglecting 
informational policies and social dialogue135, by the mid-nineties, the Polish liberals 
were left arguing that Polish economic policy should be purer than anyone else’s. This 
made them appear like economic fundamentalists and not domestic representatives. 
Additionally, at the beginning of the transition, relatively little time was occupied with 
discussions about actions to be taken connected with creating the conditions for 
microeconomic institution- building and establishing a solid regulatory framework. 
While the government was rightly concerned with overcoming the economic crisis and 
instigating macroeconomic stability, institutional reform and law enforcement should 
also have been prioritised at the onset.
By 2003, the paralysis of the political spectrum, backlash against radicalism and 
internationalisation, combined with fiscal austerity and international obligations making 
it difficult for any government to respond to social demands136, have made the populist 
option more and more attractive and society’s feelings of betrayal have grown. The 
‘establishment’ has failed to make good on its promises and now the populist are up for 
election, proposing economic and political solutions far from the liberal’s ideal. (Such
135 Balcerowicz claims there was not enough time...
136 Making even the leftist Social Democrats renege on their election promises.
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as re-nationalisation of industry, import barriers, printing of currency, or taking away 
the independence of the Central Bank).
B. Policy prescriptions
It remains the author’s conviction that external anchors should be treated as secondary 
factors in determining the outcomes of domestic policy reform, and that the focus in 
reform should be the creation of an institutional framework based on a far-reaching 
‘policy-mix’. Without adequate domestic dedication to the reforms and an active 
information campaign to dispel the myths of liberalisation and integration, international 
anchors will do little to enhance policy credibility.
For policy reform to be successful, national specificities, including interest group 
balancing, foreign policy considerations, political institutions and public perceptions of 
fairness need to be considered. In addition, issues of policy legitimisation and trust 
should be addressed, the concept of human capital137 more clearly defined, and the 
pursuit of macro and microeconomic goals better co-ordinated.138 The EBRD has 
suggested that in addition to liberalisation and privatisation, reforming states should 
focus on strengthening sound economic and corporate governance, building effective 
regulatory frameworks and promoting enterprise restructuring. Enforcement of the law 
is considered crucial for success, just as is investment in the development of individual 
skills and the building of an adequate social safety net139
According to D Ost, the key to successful and long-term consolidation and stabilisation 
of economic reform under conditions of a parliamentary democracy lies in “structuring 
social anger and institutionalising political conflict.”140 A critical point of concern for 
domestic policy makers and international organisations, such as the EU, in attempting to 
support the consolidation of the transformation is to incorporate the social dimension 
into economic strategies. This requires the ‘state’ to supplement deregulation 
programmes of the economy with active policies to demonstrate its commitment to 
social dialogue in time of ordinary politics just as much as in moments of social crises.
137 Defined as the amount of knowledge, skills, health and vital energy existing in a given society/ nation. 
World Bank (1994). Poverty in Poland: an assessment in 2 volumes. Washington DC: World Bank, 14 
September, Vol one, p 161.
138 See WTO (1996). Annual Report: Trade andforeign direct investment, ibid.
WTO (1995). Regionalism and the World Trading System, Geneva: World Trade Organisation.
OECD (1998). ‘Open Markets Matter: The Benefits of Trade and Investment Liberalisation’. Thomas, V. 
and Nash, J.D. (1991). Best practices in Trade Policy Reform, ibid.
World Bank (1998). The Future Course o f Trade Liberalisation.
Kaminski, B., Wang, Z. and Winters, L.A. (1996). ‘Foreign Trade in the Transition: the international 
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Washington DC: World Bank.
139 EBRD p 23
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In practical terms, because economic growth is positively correlated with the 
advancement of institutional change141, the technical assistance and financial aid of the 
international ‘anchor’ should be geared not only towards liberalisation but also toward 
institution building and regulation. For example, an international organisations can help 
to build an adequate social safety net in transition economies to effectively target social 
benefits, such as unemployment schemes. The experience of Western democracies in 
incorporating welfare institutions into market mechanisms cannot be overvalued for 
post-socialist countries, where the welfare system from the previous regime has created 
serious path dependencies. The same can be said for a system of interest representation 
and lobbying activities, as the transition elites have no experience in dealing with legal 
rent-seeking behaviour.
Most importantly, however, the international organisation should be aware of the 
dilemmas placed upon the reforming state in responding to social pressures while trying 
to uphold international requirements, setting implementation targets and conditionality 
parameters with enough flexibility to account for changing situations and unpredictable 
public responses. This allows a government to make and keep agreements with social 
partners; crucial for the consolidation and institutionalisation of interest representation 
and indispensable for sustainable reform.
In addition, the new institutions created in regime change should be are adapted to local 
conditions (and not necessarily the EU acquis). Winters, Dixit, Hausner and Kaminski 
all conclude that mutually acceptable compromises to both the government and social 
partners should be possible if an institutional framework is established early enough, 
and if this framework is sufficiently flexible to leave the resolution of particular 
conflicts to the political process in order to prevent the escalation of social demands.142 
To minimise the appearance of corruption, law enforcement and fostering the rule of 
law among society should be prioritised. The international organisation can set the
140 Ost, D. (1995). ‘Labor, Class, and Democracy: Shaping Political Antagonisms in Post-Communist 
Society’, in Crawford (ed.) (1995). ibid, p 200.
141 See chapter two.
142 Winters, LA. (1994). ‘Who should run trade policy in Eastern Europe and how?’, CEPR Discussion 
Paper, No 1043, London: CEPR.
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the European Union’, ibid.
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standards for fighting corruption through its own practices, and strong political 
leadership is crucial to assist the governments in transition in their efforts. 
Over-emphasising the liberalisation of economic activity and neglecting the 
fundamental discussion of the role of the state can lead to weakening state capacity and 
ultimately depleting its authority. A much more active role for the state should thus be 
sought in administering and keeping watch over the ‘deregulatory’ measures. Reform of 
the administration and civil service can thus be considered as important as enterprise 
restructuring.
A Policy- mix based on a variety of market-supporting policies, that encourage growth 
and makes it sustainable, can complement the stabilisation package, laying the 
microeconomic foundations for the transition. These policies include, structural reforms 
(enterprises), creation of an effective legal framework which protects property rights 
and defines other aspects of the law, reform of labour market policies to make them 
more flexible, educational and training systems reform, changes in unemployment and 
related social benefit systems and tax/ fiscal revenue reform. Financial markets need to 
be regulated and a sound financial system established.
If the desired outcome of the transformation is the emergence of competitive market 
economies143, programmes which increase national competitiveness, supporting the 
development of a business friendly investment climate, buttressing SME’s, 
strengthening the national infrastructure, factor mobility and state financing in 
education and research and development are essential. Institutional models and anchors 
can accordingly emphasise policies aimed at bolstering the transfer and development of 
new technologies and know-how and providing incentives for entrepreneurship.
With staggering figures of unemployment directly resulting from both the opening up 
process and internal restructuring, transformation requires readjustment, redistribution 
and pro-active labour market policies that not only support the emergence of domestic 
beneficiaries, but also provide a safety valve for the losers.144 For example, by 2002, 
10% of the Poles found themselves living below poverty line and one out of five Poles 
was unable to find work, and while restructuring and privatisation processes cannot be 
delayed in order to avoid further impoverishment or growth of unemployment, the 
closing down of ineffective firms does not solve the structural nature of the 
transformation dilemmas. De-regulation of labour-market rigidities, that make labour 
costs soar, should be complemented by effective assistance and job-retraining
143 Kaminski (1999). ibid., p 29.
144 In 2002 ten years after association, unemployment levels in Poland are at 18-19%.
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programmes. Moreover, in countries like Poland, where the trade unions remain strong 
and the political culture traditionally has egalitarian inclinations, the government should 
attempt to conduct social dialogue and negotiations, and gradually (but consistently!) 
pursue economic strategies, to lessen the internal opposition to the reforms.145 
Temporary strategic trade policy coupled with the kind of corporate model of reform 
followed by Ireland thus both represent solid policy options. Powerful legacies of 
socialism as well as of the early reform days, evident in public consciousness, and social 
inclinations towards ‘third way elements’ suggest that social and microeconomic 
institution building reforms must be prioritised alongside macroeconomic liberalisation. 
Polish realities as well as the under-development and backwardness of the Polish 
enterprises in relation to EU firms suggest that more emphasis should have been put in 
the EA on an adjustment strategy that would have supported Polish producers in 
overcoming the financial, informational, organisational and technological barriers which 
have separated them from their western counterparts.146 In the absence of such 
instruments, especially industrial, export-promoting, regional, sectoral and competition 
policies, economic openness can impose bigger costs for restructuring enterprises than 
they are capable of covering, effectively leading to their liquidation, or increasing the 
pressures for protectionism.
For organisations like the European Union, and institutions like the Commission, more 
risk taking is needed, combined with an active information policy to dispel the various 
myths concerning integration. Smith et al. have suggested that “the ‘conventional 
practitioners’ approach to pre-accession, based on the creation of a FTA and unilateral 
conditionality, hasn’t allowed the candidates to meet the Copenhagen criteria, nor has 
made accession quick or smooth.” Moreover, according to their study “the conventional 
approach has not lended itself in CEE towards the creation of open markets, but instead 
has contributed to the re-emergence of dirigiste policies.”147 Increasing economic
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integration between the present and future members of the Union should, according to 
the authors, be used to reinforce the formal conditionality of association and constitute 
the actual course of pre-accession.148
H Wallace has similarly maintained that the EU focus on “flexibility”149, remaining as 
generous as possible in providing the reforming states the tools and assistance necessary 
to successfully complete the transformation.
In conclusion, external leverage can be used to encourage the development of national
attributes and strengthen human capital, two factors which constitute the most
significant elements in successful reform.
As R Sally has aptly pointed out with regards to trade,
while overall, the CEE commercial policy reforms are the most radical the world has 
ever seen, in the long run, sustainability o f trade and investment liberalisation depend 
on other factors such as support or opposition o f interests groups, the power o f  ideas, 
the institutional setting. ... Trade policy, like globalisation itself, depends critically on 
the political choice at the national level.150
C. The role of culture and of the individual
In their attempts to understand the sources of the backlash against ‘Europe’ as well as 
increasing anxieties about globalisation, experts European wide have been assigning a 
growing role to culture as a factor in integration.151 As culture becomes more 
controversial, it becomes a political issue to be dealt with. For example, the technical 
questions of land sales to foreigners (free movement of capital) or workers migration 
(free movement of labour) in the accession negotiations were based on popular fears 
and perceptions derived from specific, national, historical experiences and not 
substantiated by economic data. The meanings actors attach to specific issues, the way
148 See also Pelkmans, J., Gros, G. and Nunez Ferrer, J. (2000). ‘Long Run Economic Aspects of the 
European Union’s Eastern Enlargement’, WRR Working Documents, No 109, The Hague: WRR Scientific 
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they interpret particular events and their ‘reading’ of global processes must as such be 
confronted.
This author concludes that if a better economic and political model is to be created as a 
basis for future European integration, it must derive from profound value changes in 
society that will lead to the legitimisation of the European project. Accordingly, 
elements of political culture in CEE that are incompatible with European values have to 
somehow be challenged. Although mental and psychological barriers to integration take 
much longer to be removed than changes in institutional and economic laws regulating 
the European order, if a framework for a new Europe is eventually to be created, than 
the social obstacles must be overcome. Designing new decrees and statutes will not alter 
the behaviour of individuals and will not unravel the mysterious ‘democratic deficit’. 
While the focus thus far has been on building the capacity of the Union to deliver new 
rules, and to ensure procedural democratic accountability, it should now evolve to 
building real political support for these rules. In fact even former European Trade 
Commissioner Pascal Lamy has noticed that, “it is quite striking that the debate about 
EU reform has so far focused almost exclusively on efficiency to the detriment of 
legitimacy.”152
In setting conditions, the EU thus has to find an appropriate balance between giving 
support to the consolidation of markets and democratic considerations. For the 
candidate states to become ‘classical’ civil societies and for their mentalities, 
civilisations and value systems to be compatible with western institutions and standards, 
time and an active and creative search for solutions and ways of incorporating the 
publics into the process of integration are needed. The future prospects for the CEE 
people depend on the building of trust in the new economic sector and the disentangling 
of ties with the old one. The political culture that will evolve in the process will form 
the future basis of a stable, democratic- market order, capable of withstanding conflict, 
strife and challenges to its legitimacy, and, in turn, will increase the ability of the future 
member states of the Union to take full advantage of the opportunities offered by 
accession.
Policy makers and theorists should thus be careful to assign right and wrong answers to 
how people behave, as the unquantifiable elements of social, political and cultural
Giza-Pleszczuk, A., Marody, M. and Rychard, A. (2000). Strategie i System: Polacy w obliczu zmiany 
spolecznej. Warszawa: Instytut Filozofii i Sociologii PAN.
152 According to Pascal Lamy, European Commissioner for trade, the European Project has to score on 
three accounts: underlying values, efficiency and legitimacy. Lamy, P. ‘Between Globalisation and 
Enlargement’, Frei Universitat Berlin, Feb 8,2001.
www.europa.eu.int/rapid/start/cgi/guesten.ksh?p action.gettxt=gt&doc-SPEECH
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integration are not based on outcomes that are always rational. In fact, the 
transformation experience has been anything but rational, instead constituting a kind of 
journey; one fraught with unusual bouts of changing circumstances, uncertainty, fluid 
and unpredictable conditions.
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